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THE GROWTH AND DECLINE OF IMPORT SUBSTITUTION IN BRAZIL*
I. THE IMPORT SUBSTITUTION PROCESS VIEWED AS A MODEL OF RECENT DEVELOPMENT
IN LATIN AMERICA
A. Changes in the Latin A merican development
MODEL
1. Features of the export model
A cursory review of the salient features of the tradi­
tional externally oriented La|in American development 
model will make elear how it differs from the more 
recent development model described below.
It is usual to stress the strong influence of the external 
sector in the primary eommodity exporting eountries, 
with particular reference to the part played by the two 
basie variables: exports, as an exogenous factor respon­
sible for the generation of a substantial share of the 
national income, and for its growth; and imports, as 
the flexible source of supply of the various types of 
goods and services needed to satisfy an appreciable part 
of domestic demand. However, this synthetic descrip­
tion does not bring out the special significance of 
these two components in the under-delevoped eountries. 
Hence, if the external sector’s role in those eountries is 
to be fully grasped, it must be eompared with the role 
played by that sector in the economies of the “ centre” . 
This will reveal some of the main features of the model 
to be analysed.
Let us first examine the part played by exports in 
both cases. In the case of the industrial “ central”  eco­
nomies, although exports were an important and dynamic 
factor in generating the national income, and essential 
to its expansion, the growth of the economy did not 
depend wholly or even primarily on exports. In fact, 
that external factor was combined with a highly im­
portant internal factor, namely, autonomous investment 
coupled with technological innovations. The combina­
tion of those two internal and external factors made it 
possible at the same time both to take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by the external market and to 
diversify and integrate domestic production capacity.
In the European development process the external 
sector generally predominated, and essentially performed 
both the above-described functions. Nevertheless, even 
from a fairly abstract standpoint, it can be seen that 
there were substantial qualitative differences in the be­
haviour of the external sector in the two types of 
economy.
In the Latin American countries, on the other hand, 
not only were exports virtually the only autonomous 
source of income growth, but the export sector was the 
dynamic centre of the whole economy. Admittedly its 
effect in diversifying production capacity was neces­
sarily limited, since the external sector rested on the 
narrow basis of only one or two primary commodities; 
in addition its influence on the rest of the system de­
pended in practice on a series of factors, in particular 
the type of production process adopted, and whether or 
not the sector constituted an enclave of foreign owner­
ship. In short, the degree to which export activities in­
fluenced the general economy of each country depended 
on the nature of the production process of these primary 
commodities, and the extent to which it multiplied and 
distributed income.
• This paper represents the greater part of a study prepared 
by the Development Centre in Brazil, set up jointly by the 
Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLÀ) and the Banco 
Nacional do Desenvolvimento Econòmico (BNDE). The study is 
now undergoing final revision and will be published in mid-1964. 
Like all research of this type, it is the result of the efforts and 
observations of several workers. At the outset the work was 
directed by the economist Charles Rollins; subsequently this task 
was taken over by the economist Maria Conceigao Tavares, who is 
responsible for the text and arrangement of the present version. 
She was assisted by the senior staff of the Centre and also, as 
regards the gathering of background material, by Mr. Roberto 
Andrade and Mr. Elder Motta.
Generally speaking, the development of the export 
sector gave rise to a fairly intensive urbanization pro­
cess, during which what are known as the “ residentiary”  
industries (textiles, footwear, clothing, furniture, etc.) 
were established. These are, of course, traditional, low- 
productivity industries that are found in nearly all the 
Latin American countries, and arose out of the primary- 
export model itself.
The pertinent fact, however, is that this small-scale 
industrial activity, combined with a subsistence agri­
culture, was insufficient to impart to the domestic 
economy a vigorous growth of its own. Thus, economic 
growth remained essentially harnessed to the behaviour 
of external demand for primary commodities, and this
i
is what has given the Latin American economies their 
pre-eminently dependent and vulnerable character.
Moreover imports, as well as being different in struc­
ture, played a different part in the economy. In the 
open economies at the centre of the system, the func­
tion of imports was primarily to supply food and ma­
terials that could not, on the basis of the country’ s 
natural resources, easily be produced domestically. In 
the Latin American economies, on the other hand, im­
ports were required, in addition to meeting much the 
same needs, to supply whole ranges of finished consumer 
goods and practically all the capital goods required for 
the investment process induced by the exogenous growth 
of the national income. Thus the role of the external 
sector, as a means of filling the gap between demand and 
domestic production, is of a very different nature, which 
is largely responsible for the subsequent change in the 
development model.
Essentially, the problems of the outwardly directed 
growth that is typical of the Latin American economies 
are clearly linked to the pattern of international divi­
sion of labour that arose out of the development process 
in the advanced economies, and which for the peripheral 
countries led to a social division of labour entirely dif­
ferent from that prevailing in the centre countries.
In the more advanced countries there is not, and 
never has been, any clear dividing-line between two sorts 
of production capacity, one to meet domestic and an­
other to meet external market needs. There is no export 
sector as such; manufactured goods are both exported 
and consumed in large quantities within the country, 
and any specialization for the external market that 
exists is in terms of specific products rather than of 
different sectors of production.
In most Latin American countries, on the other hand, 
there is a clear social division of labour between the 
external and internal sectors of the economy. The ex­
port sector was, and still is, a well-defined sector of the 
economy, usually with a high level of productivity, spe­
cializing in one or two commodities of which only a 
small proportion is consumed within the country.^ The 
internal sector, on the contrary, with its low productivity 
level, was primarily a subsistence sector, and met only 
part of the food, clothing and housing needs of that 
section of the population whose consumption was within 
the monetary economy.
Moreover, the high concentration of ownership of 
natural resources, especially capital, in the more produc­
tive export sector gave rise to an extremely unequal 
distribution of income. Thus while the income of the 
bulk of the population was so low as virtually to ex­
clude them from the monetary economy, the high-income 
groups maintained levels and patterns of consumption 
similar to those prevailing in the large European centres, 
based largely on imports.
The combination of this dual pattern of division of 
labour with a marked inequality in personal income 
distribution was therefore responsible for the great dif­
ference between the structure of production and the
1 One oi the few exceptions is Argentina, where this division 
is not so clear and a substantial part of the output of its two 
chief export commodities is consumed in the country. However, 
the basic character of the export sector is the same, as regards 
specialisation, and the remarks that follow also apply.
composition of internal demand, which was made good 
by foreign trade. This, in the last analysis, is the most 
important feature of the primary-export model for an 
understanding of the post-Depression change.
2. Collapse of the traditional model and transition to 
a new one
From 1914 to 1945 the Latin American economies 
underwent successive foreign-trade crises as a result of 
twenty years of war and/or depression. The long De­
pression of the thirties, however, may be taken as the 
critical point at which the primary-export model broke 
down. The sharp decline in export receipts caused an 
immediate drop of 50 per cent in the importing capacity 
of most of the Latin American countries, and broadly 
speaking this capacity never, even after its recovery, 
regained its pre-crisis levels.^
Despite the severe impact of the Depression on the 
external sector of the Latin American economies, they 
did not remain in a prolonged state of depression like 
the more developed economies. The extent of the ex­
ternal imbalance impelled most Latin American Gov­
ernments to take measures to protect internal income, 
thus anticipating the economic policy of compensation 
that was only later advocated by the “ centre”  countries. 
These measures consisted primarily in import restric­
tions and controls, the raising of exchange rates and 
the purchase of financing of surplus output, and were 
aimed more at protecting the country against external 
disequilibrium than at stimulating internal activity. 
Nevertheless, the industrialization which then began 
was undoubtedly buttressed by the maintenance of in­
ternal income resulting from that policy.
Let us now consider briefly, and in general terms, 
how the new internally oriented development model 
came into being.
Since the existing level of demand remained at virtually 
the same level, while the capacity to import was sharply 
reduced, it was no longer possible to make an ex ante 
adjustment between the structures of production and 
of domestic demand by means of foreign trade. An ex 
post adjustment was made through a substantial in­
crease in the relative prices of imports, which provided 
a sharp stimulus to domestic import-substitution pro­
duction. By making full or even excessive use of the 
existing production capacity, it was possible to replace 
a proportion of the goods formerly imported. Later on, 
by a re-allocation of factors, especially the foreign ex­
change that was in such short supply, the available 
capacity to import was used for external purchases of 
the capital goods and raw materials needed to establish 
new production units and thus continue the import sub­
stitution process.
A lengthy description of the dynamics of this process 
is unnecessary, since it is dealt with in detail below. But 
the important fact is that it represents the emergence 
of a new development model.
The first point to be noted is the change in the 
economy’s growth factors. There was a decline in the 
external sector’s contribution to the national income
2 See the many ECLA studies on this subject, in particular the 
Economic Survey oj Latin America 1959 (E/CN.12/164/Rev.l) 
United Nations publication, Sales No.: 51.II.G.1.
and an increase in the contrihution of domestic produc­
tion, and in its growth rate.
The external growth factor, exports, yielded first 
place to the internal factor, investment, and the amount 
and composition of investment were what determined 
the continuation of the development process.
This does not mean that the external sector no longer 
played a major part in the Latin American countries, 
hut merely that its function changed: instead of being 
directly responsible for income growth, through in­
creased exports, it became the decisive factor in diversi­
fying the structure of production, through imports of 
equipment and intermediate goods.
This explains how it is possible to achieve a reason­
able rate of investment, and consequently of growth, 
despite a temporary stagnation or decline of the pur­
chasing power of exports, provided that the composi­
tion of imports can be altered by reducing non-essential 
imports in favour of capital and intermediate goods.
There are other points that need to be made clear, 
for a better understanding of Latin America’s new de­
velopment model.
In the first place, the changes in the structure of 
production were virtually confined to the industrial sec­
tor and to allied activities, and had little or no effect 
on the situation of the primary sector— including, of 
course, the traditional export lines. Hence two circum­
stances to which there will be occasion to refer later. 
One is the persistence of a precarious and undynamic 
export base, which is one of the causes of the chronic 
external bottleneck; the other is the incomplete nature 
of the transformation of the economic system, and the 
consequent emergence of a new type of dual economy.
Secondly, there is the well-known fact that the new 
dynamic sectors are established and expand within the 
narrow framework of the domestic market, which im­
poses a “ closed”  character on the new model.
If these characteristics are examined from a broad 
standpoint, it can be asserted that the change in the 
division of labour (or resources) in a country resulting 
from the industrialization process typical of the region 
was not accompanied by any corresponding change in 
the international division of labour, which remained 
basically the same, at least as regard the special func­
tions of the industrial and the under-developed economies 
in world trade. In fact, the only appreciable changes 
that took place were in the trade within the group of 
“ central”  nations.
In essence, many current aspirations and movements, 
such as those relating to the regional integration of 
Latin America or the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, are based on or imply new 
patterns for the international division of labour (or re­
sources), in line with internal changes and with the need 
to accelerate the growth rate of developing countries by 
expanding their foreign trade.
To sum up, the import substitution process may be 
interpreted as an incomplete and “ closed”  development 
process which represented an attempt, in response to 
foreign trade restrictions, to reproduce in an accelerated 
form the industrialization carried out in the past by the 
more developed countries, but in entirely different con­
ditions.
3. Nature and evolution of the external bottleneck^
Since a decline in the dynamism of the external sec­
tor is one of the, dominant features of the import sub­
stitution model, and is actually found in nearly aU the 
Latin American economies, it deserves to be examined 
in some detail.
First, a distinction, can usefully be drawn between the 
two main types of external bottleneck, namely, the 
“ absolute”  form, representing a stationary or declining 
capacity to import, and the “ relative”  form, representing 
a capacity to import that increases more slowly than the 
product. The first type of bottleneck is usually related 
to contractions of international trade in primary com­
modities, and the second to long-term trends in primary 
commodity exports.
Although there is no shortage of material on the vicis­
situdes and behaviour of the Latin American external 
sector, for the purpose of subsequent analysis it is 
useful to recapitulate briefly the main features.
Up to the end of the Second World War neither the 
volume nor the purchasing power of exports had re­
gained their pre-Depression levels. After the war the 
purchasing power of exports rose in absolute terms, 
because of the increased volume exported and a tem­
porary improvement in the terms of trade between 1949 
and 1954. Since 1954 the purchasing power of exports 
from all the Latin American countries (except Vene­
zuela) has remained at a standstill, and in recent years 
has even tended to decline because of the deterioration 
of the terms of trade.
A comparison of the evolution of per capita income 
and the per capita purchasing power of exports, sheds 
some light on the external sector’s failure to recover 
in relative terms. From 1928-29 to 1960, while the 
region’s average per capita income rose by over 60 per 
cent, the per capita purchasing power of exports feU by 
over 50 per cent. Even in 1950-51, the most favourable 
post-war years for Latin American exports, their per 
capita purchasing power remained 23 per cent below 
the pre-Depression level.
This external bottleneck and the consequent fairly 
intensive import substitution process were reflected in a 
reduction in the coefficient of the Latin American 
economies.
The proportion of Latin America’s total income ab­
sorbed by imports, which before the Depression was 
28 per cent, has in recent years fallen to the relatively 
low level of 12 per cent, and as early as 1945-49 it was 
only in the region of 15 per cent.
In establishing the relation between these changes in 
the external sector and the various forms of import 
substitution, it is helpful to consider three separate 
periods that represent changes in the nature of this 
relation.
In the first period, extending from the Depression 
to the end of the Second World War, there were sharp 
reductions in the capacity to import, either over-aU or
3 The data used in this section were obtained from the follow­
ing sources: ECLA’s Economic Survey of Latin America 1949; 
“ Inflation and growth: a summary of experience in Latin
America” , in the Economic Bulletin for Latin America, voL VII 
(1962), pp. 23, et seq., and Towards a dynamic development 
policy for Latin America (E/CN.12/680).
specific, according to the individual situation. Conse­
quently this was a period when restrictions in the ex­
ternal sector were “ absolute” , and called for vigorous 
import substitution in nearly all the Latin American 
countries, which was reflected in a substantial decline 
in the general import coefiScient. This first phase was 
characterized above all by substitution in respect of 
non-durable final consumer goods. In some of the 
larger countries— including Brazil, as we shall see later—  
the process was extended to intermediate and capital 
goods as well.
In the second period, or the first decade after the 
war, the capacity to import was less restricted. The 
increased purchasing power of exports, though insuffi­
cient to restore the external sector to its former relative 
level, nevertheless permitted a considerable acceleration 
of the growth rate of the economy, through the expan­
sion of domestic production combined with improved 
conditions in the export sector.
Ehiring this period, most of the Latin American coun­
tries reverted in practice to an externally rather than 
an internally oriented growth, based on a higher pur­
chasing power of exports rather than on import substitu­
tion. In a few countries, however, such as Brazil, full 
advantage was taken of this relatively favourable situa­
tion in the external sector to expand the industrializa­
tion process. Thus import substitution made considerable 
progress, and some categories of durable consumer 
goods, were embarked upon, while production of other 
lines, including capital goods, continued.
Of the three decades under consideration this was the 
period of greatest growth for Latin America as a whole.'* 
Broadly speaking, it was made possible solely by a 
rapid increase in the purchasing power of exports, 
although this increase was slower than that of the 
product. (This means that the limitations deriving from 
the external sector were only of a relative nature.)
From 1954 on, external conditions were once more 
wholly restrictive (except in the petroleum producing 
countries) and the region’s capacity to import again 
approached stagnation. Most of the countries were un­
able to maintain their rate of development by means 
of import substitution. Mexico and Brazil were practi­
cally the only countries able to proceed with industrial 
expansion at a rapid pace. Brazil even succeeded in 
increasing its growth rate through a number of cir­
cumstances dealt with in the section on Brazil below, 
but only at the cost of considerably increasing its bal- 
ance-of-payments deficit.
B. T h e  various meanings given to the term 
“ import substitution”
The term “ import substitution”  is often used in a 
simple and literal way to denote the reduetion or elimina­
tion of certain imports and their replacement by do­
mestic products. This interpretation obscures the real 
nature of the import substitution process described 
above, and even gives rise to a false notion of its 
dynamics.
In actual fact, the term “ import substitution” , which 
has been adopted to denote the new process of develop­
See The economic development of Latin America in the post  ^
tvar period (E/CN.12/659).
ment taking place in the under-developed countries, is 
unsatisfactory because it gives the impression that this 
process consists simply and solely in the removal or 
diminution of components of the import structure and 
their replacement by national products. It might be 
assumed by extension that the natural goal would be 
to eliminate imports altogether, in other words, to 
achieve self-sufficiency.®
Nothing, however, could be further from the truth. 
In the first place, the substitution process is not intended 
to reduce the over-all import quantum. Such a reduc­
tion, when it occurs, is the outcome of restrictions in 
the external sector rather than an aim in itself. It is these 
restrictions, whether absolute or relative, that make it 
necessary to produce in the country goods formerly 
imported. But the place of the ousted goods is taken 
by others, and as the process gathers momentum it gen­
erates an increase in derived demand for imports of 
intermediate and capital goods which may lead to 
greater dependence on the external sector than during 
the earlier stages of the substitution process.
Now that attention has been drawn to this possible 
misapprehension, the next step is a more detailed ex­
amination of the analytical problems that may arise 
when import substitution is understood in its restricted 
sense, that is, as an absolute or relative decrease in 
certain groups of products in the import structure. For 
this purpose, some examples are given below in which 
no such decrease occurs, or, if it does, its real nature 
is masked by the “ apparent”  substitution taking place.
The first example that might be considered is the 
extreme case where no change takes place in the com­
position of imports in absolute or relative terms, that 
is, neither the quantum nor the respective proportions 
of the principal commodity groups in the import struc­
ture undergo any modification. In such an event there 
would be no “ apparent”  or “ visible”  substitution, even 
though a vigorous and effective process of substitution 
might actually be taking place through an increase in 
domestic industry’s contribution to an expanding do­
mestic supply, which would be reflected in a reduction 
of the eeonomy’s import coefficient.
Another kind of problem is posed by the emergence 
of new products on the world market, which makes it 
difficult to undertake a comparative analysis of the pat­
tern of imports in different periods. For instance, after 
the Second World War, new durable consumer goods 
made their appearance which bore no resemblance to 
the type of product imported previously. Consequently 
the development of a domestic industry producing such 
goods cannot be deseribed, strictly speaking, as “ substi­
tution”  in terms of pre-war imports. It is obviously a 
continuation of the general process described above; 
that is, it involves a realignment of the faetors of pro- 
duetion eorresponding to a change in the pattern for 
the division of labour in the economy.
Another common occurrence in Latin America, par­
ticularly during the last decade, is a decline in imports 
of non-essential goods (certain kinds of durables and
® Incidentally, this point of view has Leen advanced by some 
theoretists, such as Professor Rottenberg of Chicago, to emphasize 
the “ dangers” inherent in a policy of import substitution. See 
Simon Rottenberg, Reflexiones sobre la industrialización y el 
desarrollo económico. Catholic University, Santiago, 1957.
non-durables) as the result of discriminatory exchange 
policies aimed at reconciling the over-all level of im­
ports with the real capacity to import.
The effect of these restrictions has been to stimulate 
domestic production. Obviously, in these circumstances 
the “ real”  substitution takes place after the “ apparent”  
substitution discernible in the pattern of imports. But 
it may well be that some products are not actually 
replaced (because the market is not large enough, 
and/or the resources for producing them locally are 
lacking), and that their reduced share in the import 
structure is entirely attributable to import controls. Once 
these have eased, imports of such goods will automati­
cally begin to climb again, possibly in company with 
those of other goods that cannot be produced locally 
on a competitive basis without the protection afforded 
by very high tariffs or other discriminatory measures.
Lastly, there is a point which, while obvious enough, 
is not always clearly grasped; “ real”  substitution is 
usually much less than the “ apparent”  substitution 
manifested in the reduction of certain imports. For 
instance, when import substitution takes place in end 
goods, there is a rise in demand for basic inputs and 
materials (not all necessarily produced locally), pay­
ments have to be made in respect of technical services 
and capital, and so forth. In reality, the production 
of a particular article replaces only part of the value 
added which used to be generated outside the economy. 
As previously indicated, the result may be an increase 
in the derived demand for imports that exceeds the 
saving in foreign exchange achieved by domestic pro­
duction.
These brief remarks are not intended solely to indi­
cate the risks inherent in a narrow interpretation of the 
term “ import substitution”  but to draw attention to 
some features of the process itself that are masked by 
that designation and sometimes even appear to be in 
conflict with it.
An analysis follows of the dynamics of what will 
continue to be called “ the import substitution process” , 
since this is the accepted term in the literature of eco­
nomic development in Latin America, and in ECLA 
studies in particular. Nevertheless it should be under­
stood that in the rest of this study this term will be 
used in a broad sense, to designate an internal develop­
ment process that arises out of and takes its direction 
from external restrictions, and is evidenced mainly in 
the expansion and diversification of industrial produc­
tion capacity.
C. The dynamics of the import substitution process
The object of this section is to make a highly theoreti­
cal analysis of the main features of the dynamics of 
what is meant by “ import substitution” , in the broad 
sense, and of the external and internal problems that 
arise as this process develops.
The dynamics of the process of development through 
import substitution may be regarded, to put it shortly, 
as a series of responses to the successive challenges 
presented by the restrictions in the external sector, as 
a result of which the economy gradually becomes less 
quantitatively dependent on external sources, and also 
effects a transformation in the nature of this depend­
ence. Throughout this process, which gives rise to a 
number of structural modifications in the economy, the 
basic contradiction between development requirements 
and the barrier represented by the capacity to import 
manifests itself in a series of different forms. The aim 
here is to show how some of the difficulties can be sur­
mounted, but the conclusion reached is that external 
and internal problems tend to accumulate to the point 
where they act as a brake on the dynamism of the 
process.
1. Responses to the challenge of external disequilibrium
The beginning of the import substitution process is 
historically linked with the world Depression of the 
thirties, but for analytical purposes the starting-point 
chosen may be any lasting external disequilibrium that 
disrupts the balance between demand and production, 
as described above in dealing with the traditional ex­
port model.
Thus, during its first phase the aim is to satisfy cur­
rent domestic demand which is not affected by the crisis 
in the export sector, and may or may not be maintained 
by government action.
There are three possible ways of expanding domestic 
supply, namely: better utilization of existing installed 
production capacity; the production of goods and serv­
ices relatively independent of the external sector (e.g., 
government services); and the establishment of produc­
tion units to replace former imports.
The first alternative comes to an end when the utiliza­
tion of idle capacity existing in the economy reaches 
saturation point. Part of the second alternative is closely 
bound up with the third, and together they form the 
backbone of the inward-oriented development process 
known as import substitution.
Substitution usually begins in the easiest area, the 
production of finished consumer goods, partly because 
the technology is generally less complicated and less 
capital-intensive, but mainly because there is a larger 
untapped market for goods of this kind, either already 
existing, or brought into being as a result of the foreign 
trade policy adopted as a defensive measure.
There now follows an explanation of how the very 
expansion of internal production that characterizes the 
first phase imposes the need to press on with the de­
velopment process.
In the first place, the establishment of industrial 
plants to produce internally final consumer goods for­
merly imported tends to enlarge the home market for 
such goods, not only because of the higher income that 
results from the investment process,® but also because 
of the absence of internal restrictions of the kind im­
posed on equivalent imports. Secondly, domestic pro­
duction, as we have seen, replaces only a part of the 
value added that was previously generated outside the 
economy. Consequently, derived demand for imports of 
raw materials and other inputs climbs rapidly and tends 
to outstrip the supply of foreign exchange.
This, then, is the first manifestation of one phase 
of the above-mentioned internal contradiction between
® How far consumption expands in relation to the growth of 
income is essentially a question of the income-elasticity of the 
products in question.
the aim of the process, which is to expand the product 
(and, consequently, imports, at least to some extent), 
and the limitations of the capacity to import.
The response to this challenge is a fresh wave of 
substitutions, which means that some of the less essen­
tial imports have to be cut to release the foreign ex­
change required for the establishment and operation 
of new production units. Once more there is an increase 
in the product and in income, and the phenomenon 
described above then repeats itself, to a greater or lesser 
extent.
The mainspring of the import substitution process is 
the constant struggle to resolve these contradictions. 
Theoretically, the process could continue, though a 
rigorously selective use of foreign exchange, to that 
point in the international division of labour where utili­
zation of existing domestic resources reaches its maxi­
mum.^
But in practice, as the substitution process solves the 
problems successively posed by the “ external barrier” , 
its progress becomes increasingly difficult and costly, 
not simply for internal reasons, such as market size, 
technology, etc., but also because, as a result of the 
limitations of the capacity to import, the import struc­
ture tends to become extremely rigid before the devel­
opment process has acquired sufficient independence in 
terms of diversification of production.
The internal factors are analysed in the next section, 
which deals in more detail with the ways in which the 
dynamics of substitution affect the structure of imports, 
and what the implications are for the continuity of the 
process.
2. Changes in the structure of imports and the 
substitution mechanism
In the first phase of the substitution process the choice 
of new fines of production is based on the existing 
domestic demand for those items in the import struc­
ture that were easiest to manufacture, to wit, as already 
indicated, finished consumer goods.
This change in the orientation of domestic activity 
is reflected in the import structure by a reduction in the 
proportion of finished consumer goods and an increase 
in the proportion of intermediate products.
However, once the initial stage of industrialization 
is completed, the persistence of a structure of imports 
largely unchanged as regards the relative position of 
the three main groups (consumer goods, intermediate 
products and capital goods) may mean that substitu­
tion is being effected in several categories at the same 
time, although the emphasis on particular groups of 
products will vary according to the individual circum­
stances of each country and the stage of development 
it has attained.
Clearly, this does not mean that there is no altera­
tion in the structure of imports; on the contrary, it will 
undergo changes within each group, at a speed deter­
mined by the pace of the substitution process. However, 
if the process is to continue, substitution activities must 
be so co-ordinated as to prevent any coincidence of
The lack of some of the natural resources required rules out 
even the academic possibility of progressing towards self- 
sufficiency.
peaks of demand for imports that might give rise to a 
persistent internal bottleneck. The behaviour of the 
various historical series for imports could therefore 
be expected to appear in a graph as a series of dephased 
parabolas that represent the alternate appearance and 
disappearance of new products in the import structure.
The possibility of maintaining some degree of flexi­
bility in the structure of imports, when the capacity of 
import is limited, depends on forging as soon as pos­
sible certain finks in the chain of production which are 
of strategic importance for furthering the process. In 
other words, the possibility of proceeding with substitu­
tion depends upon the types of substitution already 
effected.
If, for example, substitution were confined to final 
consumer goods, the import schedule might be virtually 
limited to the imports needed to maintain current pro­
duction, with no margin left for the entry of new 
products and, in particular, of the capital goods essen­
tial for the expansion of production capacity. To pre­
vent this happening, it is imperative to embark promptly 
on substitution in respect of additional categories, espe­
cially of intermediate products and capital goods, before 
an excessively rigid import structure jeopardizes the 
very continuation of the process.
A  notable advantage of substitution in respect of 
semi-processed materials and other intermediate prod­
ucts, from the standpoint of internal restrictions, is that 
imports needed to maintain existing output are rela­
tively modest. There are two main reasons for this. The 
first is that some of the raw materials needed for the 
manufacture of such goods can be found within the 
country itself, and the proportion imported consists of 
raw or simply processed materials of a low unit value. 
The second is that their domestic market, unlike the 
internal market for consumer goods, does not tend to 
expand sharply merely because production within the 
country is undertaken. In all probability the main out­
lay of foreign exchange made once and for all will be 
on the purchase of the equipment needed for the instal­
lation of production units.
In this intermediate production sector, however, there 
is a considerable time lag between the decision to in­
vest in a given branch of activity and entry into opera­
tion. Consequently, if import substitution is not en­
visaged until these products have already become 
important items in the import structure, almost certainly 
the rise in derived demand, combined with the time 
lag in the domestic supply, will result in a substantial 
increase in such imports which may exceed the coun­
try’s foreign exchange resources.
What has been said above, especially in the preced­
ing paragraph, about the production of intermediate 
goods also applies to some extent to certain types of 
capital goods. In addition the earliest possible start on 
their production has the strategic advantage of giving 
the domestic development process some degree of inde­
pendence in relation to external restrictions.
To sum up, it can be asserted that, given the condi­
tions of the import substitution model, it is practically 
impossible for the industrialization process to proceed 
from the base to the apex of the production pyramid, 
that is, to start with the more simply processed con­
sumer goods and progress gradually until it includes
capital goods. The substitution process might be re­
garded as a building of which every storey must be 
erected simultaneously, although the degree of con­
centration on each varies from one period to another.
It is plain that this undertaking gives rise to a series 
of problems of all kinds whose solution requires a con­
junction of favourable conditions. Two such problems, 
one internal and the other external, merit special at­
tention.
The first relates to the choice of product categories 
for substitution purposes. Clearly, in view of what has 
been said above, such a choice cannot be made in the 
light of a static conception either of the domestic 
market, or of the import structure at a given moment, 
or of both. In the first place, this means that not all 
investment can be induced only by existing demand, 
and secondly, it calls for a degree of foresight and ability 
to make autonomous decisions that can be looked for 
only from the State, or occasionally from the very few 
entrepreneurs of the “ innovating”  type.®
It will be difBcult for what are termed the basic 
investments, for example, to be effected soon enough 
except through government decisions, either to under­
take direct promotion of private entreprise or to stimu­
late and protect it by financial and other measures.
Of the market-induced investments themselves, many 
are in no way “ spontaneous” ,® since they are due 
largely to economic policy decisions, especially on for­
eign trade (exchange and tariff policy), which by caus­
ing changes (sometimes very abrupt) in relative prices, 
deliberately or otherwise determine changes in produc­
tion capacity.
The second type of problem that arises with import 
substitution relates to the nature of the limitations of 
the external sector. Naturally, if there is an “absolute”  
stagnation of the capacity to import, it is hardly pos­
sible for industry to expand suflSciently to maintain a 
rapid growth rate. If the high rates of capital formation 
and the composition of investment needed for the rapid 
diversification and integration of the production me­
chanism are to be achieved, the limitations of the ex­
ternal sector must at worst be relative, i.e., there must 
be some import expansion, even if it takes place at a 
lower rate than the growth of the product. This can 
be achieved by an increase in the purchasing power of 
exports, with or without an autonomous or compensa­
tory inflow of foreign capital.
As explained below in the section on Brazil, in recent 
times fairly satisfactory solutions have been found for 
the two problems referred to.
3. Internal conditions affecting the process
So far the development model of the Latin American 
economies has been examined from the angle of the 
growth of import substitution as regards the various
8 The term is used in the Schumpeterian sense. Thus, although 
it is recognized that in some of the Latin American economies 
there is a considerable body of able entrepreneurs capable of 
responding adequately to market stimuli or decisions of govern­
ment economic policy, or both, the “ innovating”  and far-sighted 
type of entrepreneur, capable of seeking out the opportunities 
implicit in the opening-up of new lines of productive activity, 
may fairly be considered a rarity.
8 In the sense of resulting from the free play of market forces.
types of problems and responses arising from external 
limitations.
We now turn to those determining factors of the 
process that stem from certain internal limitations. 
There are three types of factors which eventually become 
serious problems, as economic development through 
import substitution proceeds, and which, moreover, are 
among the causes of the distortions to which the process 
has been subject in the Latin American countries in the 
past. These are the size and structure of the domestic 
markets, the nature of technological development and 
the constellation of productive resources. The three fac­
tors are, of course, closely interrelated in many respects, 
and only a thorough and systematic analysis of their 
interaction would make possible an over-all yet detailed 
view of the complex of economic development problems 
in the Latin American countries.
(a) The first step is to analyse the problems arising 
from the size and structure of the domestic market.
As already noted, the industrialization process in 
Latin America was on a strictly national scale, because 
of the situation with respect to the international division 
of labour which prevailed when the process began, and 
which has changed little since. To overcome this ob­
stacle, the larger countries could rely on their domestic 
markets and superimpose on their old structure of 
primary production a modern secondary sector, by 
readapting and modernizing the services sector formerly 
directed towards export activities. However, the size 
and diversification of the new sectors was determined 
by the scale and composition of domestic demand and 
by its subsequent development. These, in turn, neces­
sarily depend on the existing and future level and 
distribution of income.
As a result of the income distribution existing when 
import substitution began, the productive system had 
to be directed primarily to meeting the unsatisfied im­
port demand of the high-income sectors. Although this 
encouraged industrial diversification, because of the 
varied demand of those sectors, it entailed obvious 
disadvantages in terms of cost structure and concentra­
tion of production.
Since the absolute size of the domestic market was 
relatively small to begin with,^® it is easy to imagine 
what it meant, from the standpoint of economic scales of 
production, to have to satisfy a whole range of require­
ments of goods and services, each one of which repre­
sented only a minute fraction of the total market.
This fact explains the inevitable trend towards con­
centration of economic activités, since it was incon­
ceivable that a large number of enterprises could be 
established, on a competitive yet profitable basis, to 
fight for single-product markets that were so very small 
(with the exception of the markets for certain consumer 
goods).
Moreover, these problems tend to become more serious 
as the industrialization process extends to new and more
10 According to the ECLA study. The Latin American Common 
Market (E/CN.12/531, United Nations publication. Sales No.: 
59.11.G.4), in 1959 the largest domestic market in Latin America 
had an annual purchasing power of some $13 200 million, while 
the United States’ motor vehicle market alone represented a 
purchasing power of approximately $7 200 million. The absolute 
size in the thirties was obviously smaller, but the relative dis­
proportion must have been the same.
complex categories of production, since to embark on 
a certain type of metal-transforming industry or inter­
mediate-goods industry, for example, requires a very 
large scale of production in relation to the size of the 
market.
Let us now see how the development of the indus­
trialization process through import substitution gives 
rise to expansion of the domestic market itself, and 
what is the nature of this expansion.
Since import substitution was effected in categories 
of non-durable consumer goods, or in certain inter­
mediate and capital goods for which the technology 
adopted required a low capital density, the pattern of 
investment, besides raising income, tended to increase 
employment sharply. Thus the market expanded in two 
ways: through the increase in the income of the higher 
brackets, and through incorporation of the workers em­
ployed in the new dynamic sectors, who naturally re­
ceived higher wages, in the market for industrial and 
allied goods and services. However, as import substitu­
tion progresses, and especially when it embraces cate­
gories of durable consumer goods, the relative market 
growth becomes mainly vertical, that is, it is based on 
the purchasing power of the high-income sectors. This 
is due to two main factors: (1) the high capital density 
per unit of output precludes the large-scale absorption 
of labour; (2) the high unit value of the goods pro­
duced permits the entry into the consumer markets of 
only small sectors of the population.
Thus, although the establishment of new sectors of 
production makes the economy very dynamic in terms 
of income growth, and accelerates the import substitu­
tion process, it also introduces a serious disproportion 
between the production capacity of enterprises or sec­
tors established on a scale in line with the requirements 
of the mass markets in the developed countries, on the 
one hand, and, on the other, the actual size of the 
market in an under-developed country.
(6) The next step is to consider the problems posed 
by the nature of modern technology in relation to the 
import substitution process.
One point often stressed is that the developing coun­
tries adopt techniques originally conceived for the 
“ centre”  economies, in line with their own constella­
tions of resources, which are totally different from those 
of the developing countries. The need to import such 
techniques is due to the substitutive nature of the indus­
trialization process in the latter countries and to the 
difficulty of working out new techniques better suited 
to their own individual circumstances.
The general drawbacks are also fairly well known, 
and may be summarized as follows: the amount of capi­
tal required in order to substitute domestic production 
for a given volume of output is very large, while the 
volume of employment generated is relatively small. 
This means in terms of growth that economic expansion 
entails a high level of capital accumulation coupled with 
insufficient absorption of the growing numbers who 
annually join the labour force. Attempts to improve 
the absorption rate must involve increasing the rate of 
investment, as long as the basic features of the tech­
nology adopted remain unchanged.
In addition to the foregoing general consideration 
of the problem of employment and of the growth rate
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of the Latin American economies in very broad terms, 
it is useful to give some thought also to the obstacles 
that impede the continuation of the process when it 
becomes necessary to embark on substitution in tyj>es 
of production where the problems of scale and tech­
nological complexity become increasingly acute. Thus, 
the actual diversification and integration of the indus­
trial production machinery tend to slow down in so 
far as the amount of capital needed combines with the 
size of the domestic market and with questions of tech­
nical know-how in impeding access to a series of sectors 
where even a small-scale production unit is too large 
for the real capacity of the economy.
The question arises whether, with the exception of 
those sectors with relatively specific technical patterns 
of production, it would not be jmssible to adopt a tech­
nology entailing lower capital density which would be 
more in line with the plentiful labour and land resources 
typical of the Latin American economies. This is a 
strictly academic question, however, at least as regards 
the adoption of such methods by private entrepreneurs 
within the dynamics of the import substitution model, 
particularly in the second period of development which 
took place after the war.
There now follows an explanation of why such a 
solution was not really feasible in the actual conditions 
under which industrialization took place in the Latin 
American countries.
In the first place, the tendency to use more capital 
and less manpower, in proportions differing widely 
from those dictated by the relative availability of the 
two factors, is due to the fact that there is no relation 
between the real (opportunity) costs of those factors 
and their monetary costs. Thus the minimum wage, for 
example, is virtually the same in all parts of a country, 
though the opportunity cost may be zero in areas where 
there is unemployment of unskilled manpower. On the 
other hand the price of capital goods, which are mostly 
imported, was generally reduced artificially by means 
of preferential exchange rates, in order to promote 
industrial development.
Furthermore, most import substitution activities were 
based on direct foreign investment (sometimes in asso­
ciation with national entrepreneurs) which involved 
the use of foreign techniques as well as foreign capital.
These factors, allied to the fact that some of the 
new ventures were in sectors where traditional enter­
prises were already established, were conducive to a 
rapid depreciation of the latter’s equipment on grounds 
of obsolescence, and the total effect was to waste exist­
ing capital, impose a higher level of capitalization on 
the economy and deprive unskilled labour of employment.
(c) As regards the constellation of productive re­
sources, its most notable feature is recognized to be the 
disproportion between the supply of the various factors: 
that is, natural resources and unskilled manpower are 
relatively abundant, while skilled manpower and capital 
are scarce. Consequently, the ideal macro-economic pat­
terns of production which would be more in keeping 
with such supplies of resources are completely different 
from those resulting from the sum of the micro-economic 
patterns actually adopted by entrepreneurs in the im­
port substitution process, on the basis of the existing 
system of relative prices.
This disproportion tends to widen as the process 
advances, in that increasing quantities of scarce factors 
are used (often wastefully) in the secondary sector, and 
the structure of the primary sector remains unaltered. 
This situation is largely responsible for the serious 
structural unemployment of unskilled manpower and 
for the fact that potentially productive reserves are left 
idle.
Other problems arising in the Latin American econo­
mies relate to the fact that relative abundance of natural 
resources does not always mean that their composition 
is what is needed for the growth of the industrialization 
process. In early stages of this process the two basic 
requirements from the standpoint of natural resources 
are: (1) the existence of an agricultural sector that can 
expand, either through increasing the area under cultiva­
tion or through more intensive land use with increased 
productivity, thus making possible a fairly elastic food 
supply; and (2) the existence of raw materials to 
supply the traditional consumer goods industries.
In the ensuing phases, however, there must be, in 
addition to those resources, a series of sources of energy 
(petroleum, coal, water resources) and other mineral 
resources, and possibilities of exploiting them. But these 
resources are not evenly distributed throughout Latin 
America, and in nearly every country some of them, 
often essential items, are lacking, and this constitutes 
a serious obstacle in view of the restricted capacity to 
import.
D. Criticism of Latin America’s industrialization 
PROCESS
In analysing the difficulties deriving from the external 
sector that have conditioned the development process 
in the Latin American countries it is commonly recog­
nized that they represent external factors on which the 
individual action of the country concerned can have 
very little effect. On the other hand, there is much sup­
port for the view that the reason why industrialization 
has generally led to insufficient absorption of labour, 
largely uncompetitive market structures and high pro­
duction costs, in conjunction with the maintenance of 
an extremely uneven distribution of income, is the 
failure to adopt suitable economic policy measures.^^
In this connexion, it is helpful to present some com­
ments that bring into clearer perspective the analysis 
in the preceding section of the structural factors that 
govern the dynamics of the process. However, a prior 
general proviso is needed, pointing out that these gov­
erning factors can operate differently in different coun­
tries, and have a favourable or restrictive effect accord­
ing to the actual conditions in each country, and the 
period at which the various stages of its development 
take place. The degree of freedom of action resulting 
from the possible permutations of external and internal
ir This does not mean that any change in the structure of 
the primary sector would automatically modify that trend. If, 
for example, such a change entailed adopting a high-capital- 
density technology, the trend would very likely be accentuated, 
at least in the short run.
12 By some these are termed simply “ errors of government” , 
and by others, in more technical or up-to-date terminology, 
“ inadequate programming” .
structural factors allows economic policy more or less 
room for manœuvre, but once this policy has been 
adopted it, too, becomes a basic factor determining 
how far good use can be made of the economy’s poten­
tial resources, or at least how far the obstacles to devel­
opment can be overcome.
This should make it clear that the present analysis 
does not start with any arbitrarily deterministic inter­
pretations; however, it must be recognized that within 
the basic parameters of the import substitution model 
the industrialization process could hardly have led to 
radically different results from those actually produced. 
There does not seem to be any point, moreover, in at­
tempting to rewrite history by discussing the theoretical 
viability of some other development model based on 
such completely different parameters as a less imequal 
structure of ownership or distribution of the product, 
which would in the last analysis lead to entirely different 
general functions of production.
1. The problem of high costs and lack of competition
A commonly criticized fault of the industrialization 
process in Latin America is the high costs of the goods 
produced, a fact usually ascribed to lack of competition.
The problem of costs has in general been wrongly 
defined in terms of a comparison between domestic and 
foreign prices, whereas in practice, its main significance, 
from the domestic standpoint, relates to such macro- 
economic questions as the wastage of scarce resources 
and the inadequate utilization of the plentiful resources 
of the Latin American economies.^® If the problem of 
costs is looked at from this angle, it becomes necessary 
to make calculations on economicity, and to consider 
as such what is really a macro-economic relationship 
which takes accoimt of social profit and expenditure.
However, when the problem is dealt with from the 
standpoint of foreign trade the micro-economic aspect 
must necessarily prevail, since in the final analysis the 
aim is to compare domestic prices with the prevailing 
world prices. Nevertheless, it would not be correct to 
assert that high domestic costs and the consequent dif­
ficulty in gaining a footing in the manufactured goods 
market are due to a lack of competition. Paradoxical 
as it may seem, it can reasonably be argued that, in 
view of the economies of scale that could be affected 
in certain sectors, a greater degree of concentration is 
needed, or even monopoly.^*
In any case, even this theoretical possibility would 
not necessarily solve the problem of high relative costs. 
In this connexion it must not be forgotten that the 
substitution industries in the Latin American countries 
were established to replace imports that represented only 
an insignificant fraction of the production capacity of 
any exporting country. As an illustration of this point, 
even if the whole of the motor vehicle industry in
18 For an analysis of the problem of relative costs see the 
ECLA study Theoretical and practical problems of economic 
growth (E/CN.12/221).
11 Moreover it should be noted that the mere existence of a 
number of enterprises does not ensure competition. In the motor 
vehicle industry in Brazil, for example, seventeen enterprises 
have been established, but their joint action on the market is 
aetually para-monopolistic in terms of prices, without any of the 
advantages of a monopoly in terms of costs.
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Brazil were concentrated in a single enterprise in order 
to increase its economies of scale, the volume of its 
output would represent only a very small fraction of 
the output of a large-scale European enterprise such as 
Volkswagen.
The problem naturally is of a different character in 
many traditional industries, and also in some of the 
heavier and more complex industries where economies 
of scale are not the decisive cost factor. In these cases, 
where competitive prices can be achieved, the oppor­
tunities are likely to depend primarily on whether access 
to the markets of the “ centre”  countries is difficult or 
easy, on regional integration agreements, and on a 
variety of internal factors.
2. The employment question
As already noted, one of the distinguishing features 
of the Latin American economies is the chronic, and 
often increasing, structural unemployment of imskilled 
manpower. Moreover, it has also been shown that in the 
sector of vigorous growth par excellence, the secondary 
sector, the growth rate of employment has lagged behind 
that of the population in the last few years,^® owing 
not only to the population explosion but also to the 
high capital-intensity technology adopted in the modern 
branches of industry.
The only possibilities of counteracting this trend 
(within an import substitution model and in default of 
any radical changes in the primary sector) would con­
sist essentially in the absorption of the population sur­
plus either by tbe services sector or by public works 
programmes. This has been done to some extent, espe­
cially in the services sector where the spoils system and 
disguised unemployment are unmistakable signs of the 
lack of openings elsewhere. In the public works sector, 
however, the technology adopted has also, with a few 
rare exceptions, entailed a low level of manpower ab­
sorption. This is, of course, the result both of a tech­
nological dependence, and of the Government’s inability, 
in tbe absence of adequate financing machinery, to 
allow itself to be guided by opportunity costs regardless 
of tbe monetary outlay involved.
There is no sign that this trend will imdergo any 
spontaneous change in the future, and the problem might 
well be aggravated by the introduction of new and even 
more capital-intensive techniques, not only in the indus­
trial sector, but more particularly in the services sector.^®
The two possible ways of significantly improving the 
situation are to be found within the framework, not of 
the import substitution model, but of an over-all devel­
opment model. Government investment in public works 
would have to be aimed in particular at providing em-
15 In 193848 the annual growth rate of Latin America’s 
industrial product was 5.8 per cent, and that of industrial employ­
ment 3.6 per cent. In 1953-58, on the other hand, whereas the 
annual growth rate of the product was 6.2 per cent, that of 
employment dropped to 1.6 per cent. See An (tgricultural policy 
to expedite the economic development of Latin America (E / 
CN.12/592).
18 The introduction of modem electronic computers on a wide 
scale in large public and private companies is by no means a 
remote possibility and, although from the isolated viewpoint of 
the enterprise concerned it represents a considerable increase in 
efiSciency, it is clearly not the ideal solution from the standpoint 
of opportunity costs.
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ployment, and in the primary sector, which employs the 
bulk of Latin American population, steps would have 
to be taken to carry out an agrarian reform that makes 
full use of the land and labour factors, thus increasing 
labour productivity through better land use instead of 
through the use of capital-intensive techniques.
3. The problem of inadequate programming
As stated in the introductory part of this section, 
many of the criticisms levelled at the industrialization 
process have ascribed its defects to a lack of rationality 
in economic policy decisions, or in other words, to a 
lack of programming. Some of those objections have 
now been brought within what appears to be their true 
frame of reference, namely, the development model ap­
plied in the past in the Latin American countries.
This does not mean, however, that careful planning 
could not or should not have been adopted, even within 
the basic framework of the import substitution model, 
while making full use, on a co-ordinated basis, of aU 
the economic policy instruments at the Government’s 
disposal. Such a procedure might at least have prevented 
any worsening of the strains of all kinds to which the 
Latin American economies were subjected, from severe 
inflationary pressures to rising sectoral and regional 
imbalances.
In fact, even viewed strictly from the angle of import 
substitution, programming is becoming more and more 
necessary as the process develops. The choice between 
investment alternatives becomes increasingly difficult 
and yet more decisive for further progress. Criteria 
such as that of giving priority to investments that are 
likely to save most foreign exchange (even though this 
may be only an empirical rule adopted during the first 
stage of the process) are becoming increasingly inap­
propriate and even dangerous. This is largely because 
the calculation is usually made in static terms, that is, 
without taking account of the subsequent growth of 
domestic demand for the product once substitution is 
begun, or the consequent increase in the demand for 
imports. The frequent result is an increase over a fairly 
long period (determined by the rapidity of the vertical 
integration of the substitution sector) in the expenditure 
of foreign exchange, the same scarce resource which 
the original aim was to save.
On the other hand, even were the calculation cor­
rectly made in terms of growth, from the standpoint 
of the continuity of the industrialization process there 
are several other factors to be considered, whose sig­
nificance varies with the stage of the process. These 
factors include the existence of other equally scarce 
resources, and the essential links between the different 
parts of the productive process.
Thus it can safely be asserted that programming of 
public and private investment is essential, in particular 
in order to avoid discontinuity in the system’s produc­
tive machinery and considerable waste of resources. In 
that respect the criticism of lack of co-ordination be­
tween the various economic policy measures adopted by 
tbe Latin American countries is valid, as regards both 
the instruments used, and the compatibility of over-all 
and sectoral aims. Nevertheless, it is again stressed that 
although such defects could have been avoided by means
of programming, the basic problems referred to pre­
viously would have remained largely unaffected as long 
as the essential parameters of the substitution model 
were maintained.
To sum up, the dynamic growth characterizing that 
type of development could not be expected to bring 
about unaided a change in the macro-economic func­
tions of production that would be conducive to national 
integration, with absorption of the manpower surplus 
and a better income distribution at the personal, sec­
toral and regional levels.
Seemingly, therefore, unless those aims are deli­
berately pursued, the process may well accentuate still 
futher the basic structural duality of the Latin American 
economies, or in other words, it may widen the exist­
ing gap between the relatively developed “ capitalist 
sector”  and the extremely under-developed “ subsistence 
sector” . This would not only prevent the former from 
becoming the motor force of the system as a whole, 
but in aU probability would eventually put a brake on 
its ability to accelerate its own growth.
n . THE CASE OF BRAZIL
A. Introduction
In the last century the Brazilian economy was of the 
traditional primary commodity exporting type, like that 
of most Latin American countries, and Brazil, in com­
mon with those countries, formed part of the periphery 
dependent on the dominant industrialized countries at 
the centre of the system, and thus the pace of its devel­
opment, externally oriented at is was, was determined 
by the growth of demand for its exports in the major 
economies.
In addition, as its exports consisted mainly of one or 
two products, Brazil’s economy was a “ reflex”  economy, 
in the full sense of the term, in that it was not only 
affected by any crisis in the economies on which it 
depended, but was also extremely vulnerable to fluc­
tuations in world prices of its few export products.
Every country with this traditional exporting kind of 
economy entered a state of economic crisis after the 
Depression of the thirties.
The long period that then ensued before there was 
a world recovery, followed by the Second World War, 
forced the Brazilian economy to turn in upon itself and 
develop new productive activities based on sectors of 
internal demand formerly supplied by imports. The 
pressure of a violent contraction in the capacity to im­
port thus set off an import substitution process that has 
continued to the present time and has led to a level of 
industrial diversification, and to growth rates, that are 
substantially higher than those in most other Latin 
American countries.
In fact Brazil’s position compares favourably with 
that of most other countries in the region, especially as 
regards the domestic factors obtaining at the beginning 
of the process, and the external factors in the post-war 
period.
At the time of the Depression the country already had 
a substantial domestic market, and an industrial struc­
ture that, although still at an early stage of develop­
ment, was already fairly diversified. This was due to the 
nature of the export sector, which had a powerful dif­
fusive effect in the economy of the region in which it 
was situated .T hus, within the framework of the pri­
mary commodity exporting model, a vigorous process
For an economic analysis of the conditions attendant on the 
establishment of the new development model, see Celso Furtado, 
Formaqdo Econòmica Brasileira.
of urbanization took place in conjunction with the 
building up of an infrastructure of basic services and 
the development of a series of “ traditional”  industries, 
such as food, beverages, furniture, clothing, etc. Even 
the metallurgical industry was originally established a 
fairly long time ago, though on an artisan basis.
Accordingly it is clear that the defensive measures 
against external imbalance that were adopted by the 
Brazilian Government, and led, in practice, to the main­
tenance of the level of internal demand, were able to 
evoke a favourable initial response from existing under­
utilized capacity. The persistence of the external bottle­
neck for a long period, in conjunction with the defence 
of the income level of the groups connected with the 
export sector, provided a constant incentive to diversify 
domestic import substitution lines that reflected the 
structure of demand in those groups.
Expansion and structural changes in production were 
accompanied by a markedly entrepreneurial response on 
the part of most of the coffee growers, who also 
embarked on industrial activities. This changeover is 
only one of the two aspects of another favourable ele­
ment in the development of Brazilian industry, which 
up to a point is peculiar to Brazil, as far as the Latin 
American countries are concerned. This is the geographi­
cal overlapping of the most dynamic productive sectors in 
both development models. This overlapping, initially due 
to the relative abundance of external economies in the 
area lying between Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, 
transformed the Centro-Sul region into an area with 
a high concentration of economic activity, through a 
cumulative process which greatly facilitated the growth 
of import substitution, although it led to a sharp in­
crease in regional imbalances.
When the war ended Brazil again found itself in a 
relatively favourable position, this time as regards 
limitations on the external sector. Whereas Latin Ameri­
can countries that had adopted similar development 
models (for example Chile and Argentina), found them­
selves with a capacity to import that had not returned 
to pre-Depression levels, Brazil was able to attain and 
even surpass its former levels because exports expanded 
vigorously, especially in terms of purchasing power, as 
a result of the rise in world coffee prices that lasted 
until 1953-54.
After that date, external conditions became unfavour­
able both for Brazil and for the region as a whole.
H
However, the development process had already been 
given sufficient impetus to continue, and import substi­
tution permitted industrial development not only to con­
tinue, but even to increase its pace. This was due partly 
to the entrepreneurial ability of the private sector and 
partly to the Government’s economic policy, which was 
strongly slanted towards the dynamic component of 
the model.
Private entrepreneurs showed their industrial grasp 
by taking advantage of the years that were most favour­
able to the external sector (1951-52) to import ma­
chinery on a large scale and invest in a wide range 
of domestic activities. These investments, some with long 
maturity periods, were of considerable importance for 
the development of the following period, not only as 
sources of additional income and employment, but more 
especially, from the standpoint of the expansion and 
diversification of productive capacity, as a series of 
beach-heads to form the jumping-off point for future 
stages of industrialization.
The Government’s economic policy followed two main 
lines of action, both directed almost entirely towards 
maintaining the past pattern of the industrialization 
process, from the standpoint both of its industrial struc­
ture and of its geographical concentration. The first 
was foreign trade policy, especially exchange control, 
which although applied through a number of different 
instruments (from quantitative controls to multiple rates 
of exchange), maintained until recently an effective dis­
crimination between imports and gave preferential treat­
ment to capital goods and certain strategic inputs, in 
addition to using the so-called “ exchange profits”  (the 
difference between the Government’s agio and the prefer­
ential rate of exchange paid to exporters when they 
sell their foreign currency) as a parafiscal instrument 
for obtaining funds to finance certain operations in the 
public sector.
The second main line of action was investment policy, 
which, after the phase of pioneer enterprises such as 
Volta Redonda and Petrobras, went on to the systematic 
elimination of the main bottlenecks in the infrastructure 
sectors, and the financing and orienting of other basic 
investments through a government financing agency, 
the Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Econòmico 
(BNDE). This policy was translated into a programme 
of targets which represented the first attempt at plan­
ning on a national scale, and met with a certain amount 
of success even though it was carried out in sectoral 
terms and had all the defects inherent in the lack of an 
over-all and integrated view of the economy.
Thus although recent development has undoubtedly 
been accompanied by serious inflationary pressure, an 
increase in external disequilibrium and regional im­
balances, it is equally true that Brazil is one of the few 
Latin American countries that has been able to maintain 
a high growth rate in recent years, and in which import 
substitution has progressed to an advanced level of na­
tional integration.
Broadly speaking, the development of import substitu­
tion in Brazil was determined by the behaviour of the 
group of factors described in the theoretical section of 
this paper. Moreover, in most cases Brazil was used as 
the point of reference in painting the general picture,
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although care was taken to leave out of account any 
element peculiar to Brazil.
In the second part of this paper, the aim is to descend 
from the theoretical level and study in greater detail 
some aspects of the process that appear quantifiable. 
The statistical data available permit a more objective 
analysis only of the external factors involved and of the 
broad internal aggregates, and a somewhat more tenta­
tive analysis of their correlations with changes in the 
industrial structure. Unfortunately it was not possible 
to obtain data permitting any more specific analysis than 
that already made above of the other internal factors 
indicated as influencing the substitution process, and 
their implications as regards employment, costs and 
income distribution.^®
B. Reaction to the external bottleneck
The aim of this section is not only to show that 
Brazil’s recent economic development was essentially 
induced by restrictions on the external sector, but also 
to sketch in broad outline the main stages of this de­
velopment, with particular emphasis on the post-war 
period.
The first point dealt with is the main trends of the 
external restrictions from the standpoint both of the 
evolution of Brazil’s capacity to import and of the 
balance-of-payments deficit.
There is not always a close correlation between these 
two aspects of the problem, since although stagnation 
of the capacity to import in a developing country will 
in fact produce a structural trend towards a balance- 
of-payments deficit, such a deficit may also be caused 
by other internal or external factors, whose effect may 
be intensified or mitigated by the economic policy 
adopted, especially with regard to questions of ex­
change.
In the second part of the section some indices are 
given with a view to drawing a picture of the Brazilian 
economy’s reaction to the external bottleneck, and a 
brief analysis is subsequently made of the principal 
stages of the import substitution process in relation to 
the main economic policy measures adopted, especially 
as regards foreign trade,
1. Features of Brazils external bottleneck
From the standpoint of the capacity to import, the 
restrictions that affected Brazil during the Depression 
and the Second World War were similar to those ap­
plied in other Latin American countries, and represented 
a reduction of about 50 per cent in the quantum of 
imports.
In the post-war period, however, limitations on the 
external sector were considerably less in Brazil than in 
the other countries of the region, such as Chile and 
Argentina. In fact, an examination of the data on the 
purchasing power of the three countries’ exports shows 
that from 1945 on the situation in Brazil was more 
satisfactory, in both total and per capita terms.
18 The basic statistics available are those on foreign trade, 
national income and industrial production. National accounts were 
published only from 1948 up to 1961, and this period was 
accordingly chosen for analysis.
Argentina, Brazil and Chile : Purchasing power of
(1955 =  100)
EXPORTS, 1928-29 to 1959
Total Per capita
Years Brazil Argentina Chile Brazil Argentina Chile
1928-29 ................................... 78 242 123 140 405 195
1932 ......................................... 44 148 23 73 228 35
1940 ......................................... 42 112 64 60 151 85
1945 ......................................... 70 118 75 88 147 92
1950-51 ..................................... 117 139 81 130 102 89
1955 ......................................... 100 100 100 100 100 100
1959 ......................................... 104 136 103 94 126 94
Sources: Data from the Economic Survey of Latin America 1949 (United Nations Publication, 
Sales No.: 51.11.G.l, E/CN.12/164/Rev.l) and from the Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 
vol. V, No. 2, dealt with in greater detail in the (unpublished) study Inflation and growth: a 
summary of experience in Latin America (E/CN.12/563).
Brazil was one of the few Latin American countries 
that succeeded in regaining its capacity to import in 
absolute terms in the immediate post-war period, and 
during the subsequent period of improvements in its 
terms of trade, which lasted until 1954, was conse­
quently able to raise its capacity to import to a much 
higher level than that of the other Latin American 
countries.^®
The increase in the purchasing power of Brazilian 
exports was so marked that in the most favourable years 
it even made possible an appreciable recovery in per 
capita terms, to a level very close to that prevailing 
in the pre-war period.
From 1954 on, however, conditions in the external 
sector in Brazil, as in other Latin American countries, 
took a turn for the worse. With the fall in coffee prices 
and the lack of any compensatory increase in the volume 
of coffee exports, the capacity to import tended to de­
cline and the over-all quantum of imports was main­
tained only at the cost of considerable external financing.
If the external situation described above is compared 
with the annual balance-of-payments figures (see table 
1 ), there is no obvious correlation, for the reasons al­
ready explained. Thus, although it was the deficit on 
current account that became a more regular feature
Save for a few exceptions like Venezuela which, for obvious 
reasons, did not find their capacity to import severely restricted.
and tended to increase in the final years of the period, 
the balance of payments throughout the period showed 
a generally negative trend, and, strangely enough, the 
disequilibrium registered in 1951-52, when there was 
a marked increase in the purchasing power of exports, 
was relatively greater.
The latter phenomenon was clearly due to the sharp 
increase in imports (especially of capital goods) pur­
chased as a precautionary measure in view of the ex­
pectations arising from the outbreak of war in Korea, 
an increase which far exceeded the expansion in the 
capacity to import resulting from the improvement in 
the terms of trade. The trend towards a deficit had, in 
fact, already manifested itself, although less markedly, 
as early as 1947.
The euphoric atmosphere of the post-war period led 
to the rapid exhaustion of the foreign currency accumu­
lated during the Second World War, and from 1948 
onwards the pressure on imports made it necessary to 
resort to exchange controls.
Despite this general trend towards a deficit in nearly 
all the post-war years, the nature of the deficit was 
essentially at the beginning and end of the period. At 
the beginning the imbalance was principally due to 
circumstantial factors of the type already indicated, 
since the situation of the external sector was relatively 
favourable. During the second stage, however, the im­
































Liabilities (increase — ) Various TotalMerchandise Services Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (II) (12) (13) (14) (15)
1947 ............. .............  1,30 —276 —146 —24 — 170 50 —43 —182 82 61 —136 166 10 182
1948 ............ .............  278 —135 —37 —7 —44 —9 29 —24 34 - 2 0 30 —21 37 —56 24
1949 ............ .............  153 —271 —118 —3 —121, —35 82 —74 28 38 —32 41 —1 — 74
1950 ............ .............  425 —319 106 —2 104 —29 —23 52 —103 — 31 24 — 1 —3 —52
1951 ............ .............  67 —535 ^168 —2 —470 56 123 —291 30 28 82 156 —1 —4 291
1952 ............ .............  —286 —421 —707 —2 —709 120 —26 —615 541 —28 28 75 — 1 — 615
1953 ............ .............  423 —392 31 —14 17 97 —98 16 —563 486 41 21 —1 — — 16
1954 ............ .............  150 — 380 —230 —5 —235 22 10 —203 —46 200 —10 60 — 1 — 203
1955 ............ .............  320 —344 —24 —10 —34 39 12 17 —8 61 —11 —58 —1 — — 17
1956 ............ .............  437 —419 18 —11 7 201 —14 194 — —28 — 182 17 —1 — — 194
1957 ............. .............  107 —394 —286 —13 —299 290 —171 —180 — 37 161 —18 — — 180
1958 ............ .............  64 —326 —262 —4 —266 202 —189 —253 — 105 31 28 —1 253
1959 ............. .............  72 —373 —301 —10 —311 182 —25 — 154 — —21 26 150 —1 — 154
1960b ........... .............  —24 —470 —494 —15 —509 53 26 —430 — 58 —26 358 49 — 430
1961b .......... .............  I l l —359 —248 7 —241 270 27 56 —68 309 —180 —119 2 — —56
SoD RC E: SUMQC, Economic Department (Balance-of-Payments Division).
“ Includes loans from the International Monetary Fund, the Export-Import Bank, the Federal Reserve Bank, private banks, etc. 
Preliminary data.
For example, a study of the average data for the first 
and second five-year periods shows that there was a 
sharp change in the structure of the balance of pay­
ments, which to some extent reflected the above- 
mentioned deterioration in Brazil’ s external sector. The 
change in question was the substantial reduction in the 
contribution of exports to foreign exchange earnings 
and the considerable increase in capital flows (see table 
2 ). This means that during the first period development 
was based on the growth of the export sector, whereas 
in the second period the lack of growth in that sector 
had to be offset by a substantial inflow of autonomous 
compensatory foreign capital.
It is clear from the foregoing that Brazil’s external 
bottleneck became very much worse from every stand­
point.
As a result of the decline in exports from 1954 on, 
and the accompanying increase in the external debt, the 
margin for the purchase of imports was progressively 
reduced. If imports of absolutely essential intermediate 
goods are added to the financial payments made in the 
last years of the period, it can be seen that the balance 
available for imports of other goods and services had
already been reduced in 1959 to less than 30 per cent 
of total export earnings (see table 3 ). It was therefore 
only possible to maintain the over-all quantum of im­
ports at the expense of the net inflow of capital.
Table 2
Brazil: Balance of payments, receipts and expenditures
J948-S2 1956-60






Total receipts ........ . . .  1477 100.0 2 001 100.0
Exports (f.o.b.) .. . . .  1366 92.5 1334 66.7
Services ................ 61 4.1 170 8.5
Donations ............. 3 0.2 14 0.7
Capital .................. 47 3.2 483 24.1
Total expenditure . . .  1704 100.0 2 091 100.0
Imports (f.o.b.) . . , . . .  1238 72.6 1203 57.5
Services ................. 380 22.3 546 26.1
Donations .............. 6 0.4 24 1.1
Capital ................... 80 4.7 318 15.3
Source: A s for table 1.
Table 3
Brazil: Export receipts and their utilization, 1948-59 























*'Fixed imports’ * loans for Balance-
~ specific of-payments
Year Exports Fuels IFheat Newsprint Total plans loans Interest
ff ) (2) (^T  (4) (5) (6) (7)
1948 ........................ 1172.7 138.9 62.0 11.1 212.0 41 20 28
1949 ........................ 1089.3 129.9 104.9 8.2 242.9 28 79 24
1950 ........................ 1346.6 148.5 109.6 10.1 268.0 85 — 29
1951 ........................ 1757.4 234.6 130.8 25.1 390.5 27 — 22
1952 ........................ 1408.8 265.8 131.2 30.9 427.9 35 28 26
1953   1539.1 244.5 80.2 22.1 346.8 48 — 47
1954 ........................ 1561.8 266.4 125.8 28.5 420.7 71 65 65
1955 ........................ 1423.2 273.4 142.1 30.0 445.5 87 59 48
1956   1482.0 294.1 108.6 35.3 438.0 119 97 69
1957 ........................ 1391.6 281.5 104.2 45.2 430.9 166 77 73
1958 ........................ 1243.0 307.3 111.8 35.6 454.7 259 58 57
1959   1282.0 281.2 131.5 32.4 445.1 297 80 89
Sources: For imports and exports, ECLA; for financial transactions, SUMOC.














Brazil: Over-all import coeffioents, 1948-61 
(Thousand million cruzeiros at 1955 prices)
Supply of
Imports of Gross domestic
goods and domestic goods and Over-all import coefficient
Year services product services {percentage) Year services
1948 ___ 47.3 473.1 440.4 10.0 10.7 1955 ___ 56.3
1949 ___ 48.4 500.1 477.0 9.7 10.1 1956 ___ 54.2
1950 ___ 56.8 525.0 519.5 10.8 10.9 1957 ___ 63.3
1951 ........ 88.0 552.0 573.4 15.9 15.3 1958 ___ 62.2
1952 ........ 84.7 582.4 612.1 14.5 13.8 1959 . . . . 68.2
1953 ___ 54.4 601.1 594.4 9.1 9.2 1960 ........ 68.3




































Source: Basic data supplied by the Fundajao Getulio Vargas (FGV) and ECLA.
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2. Import substitution as a reaction to the external 
bottleneck
The slowing down of the growth of the export sector, 
especially after the Depression, led to an efifort to re­
orient economic activity. This effort consisted mainly 
in replacing imports by domestic production that was 
safeguarded by the reserved market ensured through ex­
change and tariff protection.
Import substitution was concentrated principally in 
industrial activities and opened the way to broader 
investment opportunities and thus to a stable or even 
swifter rate of economic growth for long periods.
A  comparison of the evolution of the gross domestic 
product and of industrial production, and of the evolu­
tion of the quantum of imports in general and of im­
ports of industrial products, shows how effectively the
effort in question was directed towards the manufactur­
ing industries.
On the other hand, a study of the total import coefS- 
cients for the main macro-economic aggregates (see 
tables 5 and 6) shows how low the share of the external 
sector in the Brazilian economy became in quantita­
tive terms. The import coefihcient declined appreciably 
throughout the period, in relation both to the gross 
domestic product and to the gross domestic supply of 
goods and services (at 1955 prices), and by 1961 was 
about 7 per cent.
The share of imported goods in total consumption 
is negligible, and is relatively modest even in capital 
formation itself if the years 1951-52 (which for reasons 
already explained were exceptional) are excluded. In 
1960 imported machinery accounted for less than 20 per 
cent of the over-all gross fixed investment for the 
economy.
Table 5
Brazil: Imports, total consumption, total gross fixed investment and aggregate import coefficients, 1948-61
































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) ( 1 0 )
1948 ....................... 23.3 11.4 23.1 21.0 345.2 97.1 6.8 3.3 23.8 21.6
1949 ....................... 24.0 10.4 23.7 20.1 395.5 92.0 6.1 2.6 25.7 21.8
1950 ....................... 28.3 10.1 27.5 23.7 451.8 78.1 6.3 2.2 35.3 30.3
1951 ....................... 41.4 18.8 46.3 40.5 460.6 96.9 9.0 4.1 46.7 41.8
19.52 ....................... 36.1 14.7 47.7 43.8 479.9 103.4 7.5 3.1 46.1 42.4
1953 ....................... 28.6 7.2 24.8 19.7 497.4 93.0 5.7 1.4 26.7 21.2
1954 ....................... 37.1 8.3 33.8 24.7 528.1 112.0 7.0 1.6 30.1 22.1
1955 ....................... 33.3 6.7 21.6 17.3 574.2 99.2 5.8 1.2 21.8 17.4
1956 ....................... 33.0 6.7 19.7 16.2 582.3 97.2 5.7 12 20.3 16.7
1957 ....................... 31.4 6.6 30.3 26.4 622.4 108.8 5.0 1.1 27.9 24.3
1958 ....................... 31.7 5.1 29.2 26.8 681.6 107.9 4.7 0.7 27.1 24.8
1959 ....................... 32.9 5.8 34.2 32.1 707.9 118.8 4.7 0.8 28.8 27.0
1960 ....................... 37.4 6.6 29.5 25.8 751.8 135.7 5.0 0.9 21.7 19.0
1961 ....................... 37.4 29.0
Source: Basic data supplied by the Fundajao Getulio Vargas (FGV) and ECLA.
Table 6
Brazil: Breakdown OF IMPORTS BY MAJOR CATEGORIES
(Absolute values in millions oj cruzeiros at 1948 prices: base for quantum indices: 1929 =  1 0 0 )
1929 1931 1937-33 1948
Quantum Percentage Quantum Percentage Quantum Percentage Quantum Percentage
Major category Values indices of total Values indices of total Values indices of total Values indices of total
Consumer goods . . . . . .  3 204 100 18.7 966 30 12.3 1835 57 13.3 3 877 121 21.3
Durable .............. . . . .  1 277 100 7.5 147 12 1.9 861 67 6.2 1 964 154 10.8
Non-durable . . . . . . . .  1 927 100 11.2 819 43 10.4 974 51 7.1 1.913 99 10.5
F uels and lubricants. . .  1 443 100 8.4 940 65 11.9 1355 94 9.8 2 616 181 14.4
Raw materials and inter-
mediate products . . .  7 909 100 46.2 5 076 64 64.4 7 366 93 53.2 6 402 81 35.2
Metal .................. . . . .  1814 100 10.6 516 28 6.5 1303 72 9.4 1 087 60 6.0
Non-metal .......... . . . .  6 095 100 35.6 4 560 75 57.9 6 063 100 43.8 5 315 87 29.2
Capital goods ........ . . . .  4 564 100 26.7 894 20 11.4 3 281 72 23.7 5 277 166 29.1
Sample total .......... . . . .  17121 100 100.0 7 876 46 1 0 0 .0 13 837 81 1 0 0 .0 18 172 106 1 0 0 .0
Sources: Brazilian foreign trade yearbooks. Values calculated on the basis of the ECLA sample.
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Although the external sector’s contribution to the 
economy is small in quantitative terms, its qualitative 
importance should not be underestimated. The main­
tenance of high investment rates, and, what is even 
more important, an investment structiure that permitted 
a considerable degree of expansion and diversification 
of Brazil’s industrial inventory, were possible only be­
cause imports of capital goods kept at much the same 
level without any marked decline throughout the period. 
This import coefficient was a key factor in the expansion 
of productive capacity, which would otherwise have been 
limited to the expansion permitted by the existing margin 
of the relatively small domestic capital goods industry.
Let us now consider the main stages of the Brazilian 
process of import substitution, but only in terms of their 
more salient features, since the analysis of structural 
changes will be undertaken in greater detail in sub­
sequent sections.
In the period following the Depression there was a 
rapid recovery in domestic activity, as a result of the 
Government’s economic policy of protection against the 
external bottleneck. In the years preceding the Second 
World War the expansion of domestic industry was 
largely due to the more intensive use of installed ca­
pacity, which paved the way for substitution of a range 
of light consumer goods that had previously been im­
ported. A similar expansion must have taken place in 
the food industry, in the production of some building 
materials, and in certain types of agricultural machinery, 
of which imports had fallen off sharply, as the follow­
ing section shows.
During the Second World War the Government de­
cided, in view of external supply problems, and despite 
the difficulties created by those problems, to enter the 
steel sector by starting a pioneer plant at Volta Re- 
donda, whose entry into operation in 1946 represented 
the first large-scale operation of heavy industry in Latin 
America.
Generally speaking the post-war period was charac­
terized by continuing expansion and structural changes 
in Brazil’s industry, which are reviewed in section D 
of this study. For the moment it will suffice to consider 
the three main stages of the development process in this 
period.
The first stage corresponded to the immediate post­
war period, from 1945 to 1947, and represented an 
improvement in the situation of the external sector 
accompanied by a return to pre-Depression levels on 
the part of the capacity to import. Consequently the 
growth of the economy during those years was directed 
less towards import substitution than to expansion of 
the export sector. The contribution of exports to the 
dompst r product rose considerably, in 1946 reaching a 
level close to that of the pre-war period.^®
During the second stage (1948 to 1954), despite a 
continued increase in the capacity to import (after 
1949 due mainly to higher international prices for 
coffee), the improvement was not sufficient, even in the 
most favourable years, to restore the per capita levels 
prevailing in 1929. Since there was a considerable in­
crease in national income during this period, it is clear 
why the import liberalization policy followed in the
20 See BNDE/ECLA Joint Group, Análises e Projegdes do 
Desenvolvimento Económico no Brasil.
post-war period (at a fixed rate of exchange) laid con­
stant pressure on the balance of payments. Consequently, 
once the exchange reserves accumulated abroad during 
the war were exhausted, the first deficits began to 
appear, in 1948, and the country started to enforce a 
system of exchange control.
This control was based, however, on the main­
tenance of the existing rate of exchange and on quanti­
tative import controls that discriminated sharply against 
non-essential consumer goods while keeping the cost 
of imports of intermediate and capital goods relatively 
low. The natural result was a considerable impetus to the 
establishment of domestic import substitution industries 
for the manufacture of these consumer goods, especially 
dirrable goods, which up to then had not been produced 
in Brazil, and which came to enjoy a twofold exchange 
protection, in terms both of a reserved market and 
of operating costs. This was essentially the stage when 
the industries producing electrical household appliances 
and other durable consumer goods were established.
The increase in derived demand for imports due to 
this unintegrated expansion, in conjunction with the 
Korean war, resulted in a sharp increase in the balance- 
of-payments deficit, which took the form of an accumu­
lation of deferred import payments. In 1953 an ex­
change reform was undertaken, in order to remedy this 
situation, whereby direct control of imports was re­
placed by a system of auctioning foreign currency, 
under which imports were divided into five categories 
according to how essential they were and how far they 
could be produced domestically. This system, by rais­
ing the average “ real”  rate of exchange, not only made 
it possible to keep down the volume of imports to the 
level of the capacity to import for that year, but also 
made domestic production relatively more attractive 
with respect to a range of basic industrial products and 
raw materials whose import prices in local currency 
rose considerably because they became subject to pay­
ment of increasingly large exchange agios.
Thus 1954 may be regarded as the end of the second 
stage of internal development, when relatively rapid 
(although disorganized) industrial development coin­
cided with an increase in the purchasing power of ex­
ports. It should be noted that in 1954 the Government 
made large investments in the petroleum sector, which 
bad a considerable influence on development in the suc­
ceeding period.
The years 1955 and 1956 may be regarded as a period 
of transition from both the political and economic stand­
points, and 1956 was, in fact, the only year when there 
was a decline in the per capita product.
The period from 1956 to 1961 represents the third 
stage of post-war development. It has two outstanding 
features: an increase in the direct and indirect par­
ticipation of the Government in basic investment, and 
an inflow of foreign private and public capital to finance 
a substantial proportion of investment in certain sectors.
The Government’s action was combined with a pro­
gramme of sectoral targets which endowed industrial 
expansion with some degree of rationality. Part of the 
inflow of public capital was autonomous, for the pur­
pose of financing specific projects, but a larger part 
was compensatory, for the purpose of covering balance- 
of-payments deficits. The inflow of foreign private ca­
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pital was directed essentially towards the metal-trans­
forming industry, in the form of direct investment 
stimulated by the preferential treatment granted under 
SUMOC Order No. 113.
This period saw the installation of some dynamic 
industries, such as motor-vehicle production, shipbuild­
ing, the manufacture of heavy electrical equipment, and 
other machinery-producing industries, and the expan­
sion of such basic industries as the steel, petroleum, 
metallurgical (ferrous metals), pulp and paper, and 
heavy chemical industries.
This considerable expansion and diversification of 
industry was stimulated by means of various incentives 
and subsidies, in particular the exchange and tariff 
privileges introduced by Act No. 3,244 of 1957.
In this way there was a considerable extension of the 
import substitution process in Brazil, leading to higher 
development rates for this than for preceding periods. 
However, it is important not to overlook the fact that 
this process was accompanied by a marked increase in 
inflationary pressure and regional imbalances.
The increase in the share of the public sector in na­
tional expenditure,^^ without a satisfactory system of 
financing, combined with the aggravation in the external 
bottleneck, stimulated inflationary pressures, with seri­
ous repercussions on the economy as a whole.
The vast concentration of industry in the region of 
the country that was already the most developed, al­
though explicable and even defensible as a “ normal”  
process of polarization, nevertheless increased the re­
gional imbalance, with all that that implies in the way 
of economic, political and social problems.
Thus, although Brazil admittedly succeeded in devel­
oping at a period when most of the Latin American 
countries were stagnating, the social cost of this process 
was relatively high (although obviously not as high as 
the cost of stagnation).
Moreover, the period of dynamic growth in import 
substitution appears to be coming to an end, and a 
fourth period of development in terms of the same model 
seems unlikely. The stage through which Brazil is going 
at present indicates the need for a transition to a new 
model of economic and social development. However, 
no more than a few brief observations will be made on 
this aspect in the final section of the present study.
C. Changes in the structure of imports
The purpose of the present section is to show how 
far the import substitution process which has been 
taking place in Brazil during the last two or three decades 
has been reflected in perceptible changes in the struc­
ture of the import schedule, and to analyse the be­
haviour and composition of the different categories of 
imports.
The main emphasis will be laid on the period 1948-61, 
the thirties being taken into consideration only for 
reference purposes.
The analysis will be carried out at several levels of 
aggregation, ranging from the whole of the sample 
elected by ECLA in 1955— which in that year repre-
21 See data in Plano Trienal de Desenvolvimento Económico 
e Social do Brasil 1963-65, table V.
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sented over 90 per cent of the schedule— to various 
types of groupings of representative products, and 
thence, in some instances, to a detailed break-down.
In this study of import structure attention will be 
focused chiefly on quantitative fluctuations in the dif­
ferent categories of goods and changes in their relative 
participation in the sample.
Although the import substitution process may be 
taken, in a more general sense, as one of expansion 
and diversification of domestic production— especially 
manufacturing— in face of the limitations of the ca­
pacity to import, the present chapter will be confined 
to indicating the categories of goods and the periods 
of time in which substitution in the strict sense of the 
term has taken place. It has already been shown that 
substitution proper may be defined as a reduction in 
absolute and/or relative terms, in certain products or 
groups of products in the import schedule.
If the substitution process is to be successful and is 
to permit internal economic expansion, given a capacity 
to import which increases slowly, or sometimes remains 
stationary or even declines, it is essential that some 
import categories be reduced, eliminated or prevented 
from increasing at the same rate as the over-all quantum, 
in order that others may be maintained or expanded 
and new products, indispensable for continued develop­
ment, may be incorporated.
It is with this absolute or relative reduction of par­
ticipation in the sample, termed here “ visible”  substitu­
tion, that the ensuing analysis is concerned.
It has also been shown that the substitution effort of 
an economy or of an industrial sector cannot be meas­
ured only in terms of the decrease in imports. In the 
case of aggregates, in particular, but even where single 
products are concerned, substitution— i.e., replacement 
of imports by domestic production— may be taking place 
without any apparent contraction of purchases abroad, 
This necessarily implies that the expansion of consump 
tion is being more than proportionally covered by do 
mestic production, or, in other words, that the per 
centage of total supply represented by imports is dwin 
dling.
An analysis of this type, permitting a more thorough 
evaluation of the economy’s import substitution effort, 
will be presented in section D, on the basis of a com­
parative study of imports and domestic production. It 
must be repeated that the present section is concerned 
only with showing how far the structure of imports 
alters as substitution proceeds, and identifying some of 
the branches of activity in which “ visible”  substitution 
has taken place.
1. Period of reference
Although the period selected for detailed analysis of 
the changes in the composition and behaviour of im­
ports is that extending from 1948 to 1961, certain years 
in the period 1929-38 have been singled out for refer­
ence purposes, with a view to establishing a relation 
between the state of affairs in the thirties, before and 
after the world Depression, and the post-war situation.
The study of this period of reference will be based 
on the data presented in table 6. The years selected 
were as follows: 1929 (prior to the Depression); 1931 
(when the Depression sank to its lowest e b b ); 1937-38
(years of recovery) ; and 1948 (opening year of the 
later period).
The indices and percentages are calculated on the 
basis of data in terms of cruzeiros at 1948 prices, to 
facilitate the comparison between one period and an­
other. This comparability, however, is very rough indeed, 
since the data for the period under analysis are given 
in dollars at constant 1 ^ 5  prices, and the sample itself, 
selected in that year, is much less representative in rela­
tion to the thirties.
(a) Quantitative variations
Consideration of the sample data reveals that the 
over-all level of imports attained in 1929 was not re­
gained during the next ten years, and that only in 1948 
was it slightly exceeded. Since the sample represented 
only 78 per cent of total imports in 1929, 81 per cent 
in 1937-38 and 87 per cent in 1948, the trend during 
the decade was probably less clearly in the direction 
of a recovery of the 1929 import level than table 6 
indicates. In the year 1931, imports contracted by more 
than 50 per cent in relation to their 1929 level, although, 
as was to be expected, purchases of fuels and of raw 
materials and intermediate products were the least af­
fected, falling only by 35 and 36 per cent, respectively, 
whereas the respective reductions of consumer goods 
and equipment amounted to 70 and 80 per cent.
Despite the fact that 1937 and 1938 were years of 
recovery, and as far as imports were concerned, the 
most propitious of the decade, the sample quantum 
was still 19 per cent less than in 1929, and only after 
the Second World War did the capacity to import revert 
to its pre-Depression levels.
The behaviour of the major categories during the 
period will now be reviewed.
Imports of consumer goods contracted very sharply 
at the time of the Depression, especially durable con­
sumer goods, whose behaviour pattern shows a high 
degree of elasticity in relation to fluctuations in the 
over-all quantum, since consumption of these commodi­
ties can be restricted more easily than that of other 
items in the import schedule. This group of products, 
while recovering more rapidly than non-durable con­
sumer goods, failed to regain their 1929 levels in the 
course of the thirties. By the end of the next decade, 
however, imports of durable consumer goods had reached 
very high figures, surpassed only by fuels, and exceed­
ing the average for the sample by 50 per cent.
Imports of non-durable consumer goods not only re­
mained throughout the whole of the thirties at an aver­
age level 50 per cent lower than that registered in 1929, 
but even in 1948 had difficulty in climbing back to pre- 
Depression levels. A  process of substitution of domestic 
production for imports therefore took place, which was 
particularly intensive in the case of foods of animal 
origin, beverages and some of the simpler manufactured 
goods.^^
The phenomenon of import substitution is not ap­
parent in the durable consumer goods sector as a whole.
22 According to the sample data, imports of such products 
(in terms of cruzeiros at constant 1948 prices) fell by some 70 
per cent between 1929 and 1938, and even in 1948 still stood 
about 50 per cent below their pre-Depression level.
On the contrary, the relative importance of such products 
in the schedule increased.
This, however, was attributable not so much to the 
non-existence of substitution in respect of the categories 
of goods included in the 1929 schedule, as to the api- 
pearance of new products on the world market. Thus, 
in the sample selected, which pertains to the year 1955, 
a large proportion of the durable consumer goods group 
consists of electrical appliances for household use, which 
did not exist in the thirties.^
In addition, the years immediately following the war 
were characterized in Brazil by a certain buoyancy of 
the exchange rate, deriving from the enforced accumula­
tion of foreign exchange reserves during the war. Thus, 
imports of durable consumer goods reached very high 
levels (these were so-called years of “ squandering of 
foreign exchange” ) , in response to a demand that had 
been held in check during the war years. Even in 1951 
and 1952, when imports of these and other types of 
goods rose to their peak, the relative participation of 
durable consumer goods in the schedule was lower 
than in 1948.
The fuels and lubricants group was the one that 
showed most rigidly in relation to fluctuations in the 
over-all level of purchases abroad. Not only was the 
decrease in the quantum of imports relatively smaller 
in this category than in any of the others during the 
years of the Depression, but also, once the period of 
recession was over, the level of imports in this group 
showed a virtual recovery, keeping pace with the growth 
of economic activity. In 1948 the volume registered was 
double the 1938 figure, a development which simul­
taneously reflected the economic expansion of the post­
war period and the impossibility of effecting import 
substitution owing to the non-existence of a petroleum 
industry.
The group of imports ranking second as regards the 
difficulty of restricting them and the degree of recovery 
attained is that of raw materials and intermediate 
products, whose level was only slightly lower in 1937 
than in 1959, for reasons similar to those adduced in 
the case of the preceding group. As far as the import 
substitution process is concerned, however, the situa­
tion is very different. In this group substitution was 
effected in respect of several items of importance— it 
might even be said, of key importance— for subsequent 
economic development, and was so intensive that by 
1948, whereas the other groups and the over-all level 
of imports had already reached higher figures than in 
1929, imports of raw materials and intermediate goods 
had contracted by 20 per cent. The process is particularly 
“ visible”  in the case of metal products, imports of which 
declined by 40 per cent between 1929 and 1948. In 
addition, it dates farther back than in respect of other 
items in the group; in the case of non-metallic raw 
materials, substitution is observable only from 1938 
onwards, imports of such goods having reacted in the
23 A phenomenon of much the same kind, although less intensive 
in degree, must have occurred in the case of equipment. But where 
this was concerned it was more a matter of changes in type and 
quality than of the actual disappearance of some lines of pro­
duction and appearance of new items. Furthermore, this problem 
is one of major importance, and accounts for the great difEculty 
of constructing series in terms of constant prices and strictly 
comparable on a year-by-year basis, over so long a period.
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post-Depression period even more sharply than external 
purchases of fuels. This behaviour is natural enough, 
since the group of products in question comprises the 
basic inputs for the industries producing non-durable 
final consumer goods, in which the substitution effort 
must have been accentuated during the period when the 
bottleneck in the external sector was most serious. On 
the other hand, even in the years of economic recovery, 
imports of semi-manufactured metal products registered 
a decline, thanks to the expansion of the domestic steel­
making industry, which had been growing up ever 
since the beginning of the century, although large-scale 
production was initiated only when the Volta Redonda 
plant entered operation during the Second World War. 
An analysis of import schedules shows that in terms 
of cruzeiros at constant prices imports of steel products 
dropped by 50 per cent between 1929 and 1948.
The same period witnessed a decrease in external 
purchases of non-metallic raw materials in relation to 
the following items: skins and hides, textile fibres and 
yams, paper products (other than newsprint), rubber 
manufactures, sheet glass and cement.
Capital goods displayed a fair degree of elasticity in 
relation to fluctuations in the over-all level of imports. 
Next to durable consumer goods, this was the group 
that underwent the most severe restrictions as a result 
of the Depression. Its recovery during the rest of the 
decade also followed the same course as that of the for­
mer category. In 1948, however, notwithstanding the 
fact that the level of imports of capital goods was above 
the over-all average, their expansion by no means 
equalled that of external purchases of durable con­
sumer goods. Although the group as a whole shows no 
sign of a substitution process like that registered for 
intermediate products, a beginning may be said to have 
been made in respect of some ranges of goods. Thus, 
between 1929 and 1948 there was a considerable de­
crease in imports of agricultural equipment (especially 
tools) and of railway material, corresponding to do­
mestic production in those branches of industry.
(b) Variations in the composition of the sample
The structure of imports altered perceptibly between 
1929 and 1948, as industrialization progressed.
It should be noted to begin with that the relatively 
modest participation of consumer goods in the 1929 
structure^^ suggests that the process had already been 
initiated prior to that date, even within the traditional 
export model. Industrialization had in fact been taking 
place in Brazil, although only in its incipient phases, 
since the beginning of the century, and gained stronger 
momentum during the period of the First World War. 
By the time of the world Depression, the traditional 
industries had already attained a certain level of devel­
opment, so that the introduction of the import substitu­
tion process via non-durable consumer goods was facili­
tated not only by the smaller markets and less capital- 
intensive technology which these required, but also, 
above all, by the possibility of more efficient utilization 
of the existing production capacity.
2^  The participation in question is underestimated in relation 
to total imports, since the sample was selected in 1955. But this 
does not seem enough to invalidate the argument developed below.
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Nevertheless, the progress achieved in replacing this 
range of imported goods by domestic production did 
not suffice to bring external purchases down to a level 
compatible with a capacity to import as limited as 
Brazil’s.
With the over-all reduction of imports, raw materials 
and intermediate products had come to represent in the 
thirties more than 50 per cent of current purchases 
abroad. It durs became a matter of urgency to embark 
upon the substitution process, especially in respect of 
building materials.
The corresponding effort started after the Depression 
was intensified at the time of the Second World War, 
and by 1948, three years after the cessation of hostilities, 
and with exports still at their 1929 level, the structure 
of the schedule showed substantial changes.
The share of intermediate products had decreased 
from 46 to 35 per cent, while at the same time, as was 
seen above, these imports had also declined in absolute 
terms. The reduction of their relative importance made 
it possible not only to offset the absolute and relative 
expansion of fuel imports deriving from economic de­
velopment, but also to increase the participation of 
consumer goods and of the capital goods which were 
indispensable for the continuation of the development 
process.
Attention must once more be drawn to the fact that 
the proportional increment of consumer goods was at­
tributable entirely to durable consumer goods, for the 
reasons already noted. Non-durable consumer goods 
constituted the other group in which “ visible”  substitu­
tion took place, and their share in the schedule was 
therefore smaller in 1948 than it had been in 1929.
Briefly, then, it may be concluded that during the 
post-Depression period and up to the end of the Second 
World War, the substitution process in respect of non­
durable consumer goods was carried practically as far 
as possible, and some efforts of key importance were 
made in connexion with the group comprising raw ma­
terials and more particularly, building materials. The 
increase in the proportion of the schedule represented 
by non-durable consumer goods, resulting from the ap­
pearance of new products, from the demand held in 
check during the war, and the post-war buoyancy of the 
exchange rate, opened up new paths for substitution in 
the subsequent period, which Brazilian industry was to 
pursue for about ten years.
The substitution process itself, however, was bound 
to entail new imports of raw materials and equipment. 
These additional requirements quickly exhausted the 
country’ s limited resources to import— which from 1954 
onwards actually declined— a^nd compelled the substitu­
tion process to make a fresh and more vigorous start 
in the branches of production comprising intermediate 
goods. How this process developed, and what changes 
ensued in the quantum and composition of commodity 
imports, are the questions to be analysed in the follow­
ing sections.
2. Behaviour pattern of import schedule aggregates
1948-61
To begin with, the same classification as for the 
period of reference wiU be adopted: consumer goods 
(durable and non-durable) ; fuels and lubricants, raw
in
materials and intermediate products (metal and non- 
metallic); and capital goods.
The data relating to this classification are assembled 
in tables 7-A, 8-A and 9-A. The consumer goods column 
includes, in addition to machinery, appliances and in­
struments for consumer use, and all the corresponding 
parts of accessories. The capital goods column com­
prises, apart from finished machinery and equipment, 
the requisite imported parts for domestic assembly 
industries.
Since the parts, accessories and spare parts covered 
by these two columns afford very important indications 
of the substitution processes deriving from the progres­
sive integration of Brazil’s metal-transforming industries,
it was decided to group them separately in a second 
classification under the general heading of spare parts.
In this new classification, which can be seen in 
tables 7-B, 8-B and 9-B, the group thus formed is pre­
sented in conjunction with raw materials and semi­
manufactured goods under the broad designation of 
intermediate products. In this last major category are 
included all ffie basic inputs used in the economy, with 
the exception of fuels and lubricants, which were grouped 
separately, and include crude petroleum, coal, and petro­
leum and coal products.
The durable consumer goods and equipment shown 
in the new classification are finished goods, or, rather, 
are intended for final use.
The tables referred to above will now be analysed.
Table 7-A
Brazil: Quantum of imports, by m.ajor categories, 1948-61 
(Thousands of dollars at 1955 prices)
Consumer goods
Raw materials and 
intermediate products
Capital SampU
Year Durable Non-durable Sub-total lubricants Metal Non-metal Sub-total goods total
............... 74 589 172 579 129 729 68 716 234 036 302 752 392 085 997 245
1949 ............... 76 052 160 166 136 903 96168 254462 350 690 375 377 1 023 076
1950 ............... ............. 76214 83 999 160 213 164463 107 800 322 390 430 190 443 299 1198 165
1951 ............... ............. 172 878 122 874 295 752 212 299 152 076 439 418 591494 757 160 1 856 705
1952 ............... ............. 107 248 120 943 228 191 234 738 129 696 374 330 504 026 820 252 1 787 207
1953 ............... ............. 24274 84 504 108 778 231 335 112 268 328 170 440 438 368 672 1149223
1954 ............... ............. 38 761 97 975 136 736 278 408 219 481 425 531 645 012 462 570 1 522 726
1955 ............... ............. 19 952 90131 110 083 271107 111246 371 575 482 821 323 959 1 187 970
1956 ............... ............. 19 503 90 231 109 734 281633 99236 349 251 448 487 302 747 1 335 683
1957 ............... ............. 25 372 84 964 110 336 254 433 124561 351 450 476 on 494 903 1 309 566
1958 ............... 61248 88 628 284573 94 372 340 365 434 737 501 628 1440 314
1959 ............... ............. 29120 61236 90 356 279 089 98 364 372 664 471 028 599 841 1441 759
1960 ............... ............. 20 594 80 052 100 646 319 590 119 055 420 432 599 487 482 036 1 420 757
1961 ............... ............. 16 707 87 944 104 651 322 834 134 651 409114 543 765 449 507
Source: ECLA sample data.
Table 7-B
Brazil: Quantum of imports, by major categories, 1948-61 
(Thousands of dollars at 1955 prices)
Final consumer goods Intermediate products
Year Durable Non durable Sub-total lubricants Metal Non-metal Spare parts Sub-total Equipment Sample total
1948 ..................... .................... 91522 74589 166111 129 829 68 716 234 036 93 455 396 207 305 098 997 245
1949 ..................... .................... 74 700 76 052 150 752 136 903 36 168 254462 61 739 412 369 323 052 1 023 076
1950 .................... .................... 62 693 83 999 146 692 164 463 107 800 322 390 76 202 506 392 380 618 1 198 165
1951 ..................... .................... 150 476 122 874 273 350 212 299 152 076 439 418 147 929 739 423 631 633 1 856 705
1952 .................... .................... 92 415 120 943 213 358 234 738 129 696 374 330 118 972 617 998 721113 1 787 207
1953 ..................... .................... 19 813 84 504 104 317 231 335 112 268 328 170 16 510 456 948 356 623 1149 223
1954 .................... .................... 21785 97 975 119760 278 408 219 481 425 531 68 626 713 638 410 920 1 522 726
1955 .................... ....................  7 078 90131 97 209 271107 111246 371 575 44 827 527 648 292 006 1 187 970
1956 .................... .................... 7105 90 231 97 336 281 633 99 236 349 251 58175 506 662 256 969 1 142 601
1957 .................... ....................  11469 84 964 96 433 254 433 124 561 351 450 106 967 582 978 401 839 1 335 683
1958 .................... .................... 12 873 61248 74121 284573 94 372 340 365 161 692 596 429 354 443 1309566
1959 .................... .................... 23 063 61236 84299 279 089 98 364 372 664 193 416 664 444 412 482 1440 314
1960 .................... .................... 15 029 80 028 95 081 319590 119 055 420 432 98 769 638 254 388 832 1 441 759
1961 .................... .................... 8 388 87 944 96 332 322 834 134 651 409114 27 404 571169 430 422 1420 757
Source: ECLA sample data.
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Table 8-A
Brazil: Import quantum indices, by major categories, 1948-61 
(1948 =  100)
Consumer goods





totalYear Durable Non-durable'■ Sub-total lubricants Metal Non-metal Sub-total
1948 ......... ......................  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1949 .......... ......................  85.8 102.0 92.8 105.4 140.0 108.7 115.8 95.7 102.6
1950 ......... ...................... 77.8 112.6 92.8 126.7 156.9 137.8 142.1 113.1 120.1
1951 ......... ...................... 176.4 164.7 171.4 163.5 221.3 187.8 195.5 193.1 186.2;
1952 ......... ...................... 109.5 162.1 132.2 180.8 188.7 159.9 166.5 209.2 179.2.
1953 ......... ...................... 24.8 113.3 63.0 178.2 163.4 140.2 145.5 94.0 115.2
1954 ......... ...................... 39.6 131.4 79.2 214.4 319.4 181.8 213.1 118.0 152.7
1955 .......... ...................... 20.4 120.8 63.8 208.8 161.9 158.8 159.5 82.6 119.1
1956 ......... ...................... 19.9 121.0 63.6 216.9 144.4 149.2 148.1 77.2 114.6.
1957 ........... ...................... 25.9 115.3 51.3 196.0 181.3 150.2 157.2 126.2 134.0
1958 ......... ...................... 27.9 82.0 51.4 219.2 137.3 145.4 143.6 127.9 131.3
1959 ......... ...................... 29.7 82.1 52.4 215.0 143.1 159.2 155.6 153.0 144.4
1960 ......... ...................... 21.0 107.3 58.3 246.2 173.3 179.6 178.2 122.9 144.6
1961 ................................. 17.0 117.9 60.6 248.7 196.0 174.8 179.6 114.6 142.5
Source: ECLA sample (data in dollars at constant prices).
Table 8-B
Brazil: Import quantum[ indices, by major categories, 1948-61
(1948 =  100)
Final consumer goods Intermediate products
Year Durable Non-durable Sub-total lubricants Metal Non-metal Spare parts Sub-total Equipment Sample total
1948 ...........................  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1949 ...........................  81.ff 102.0 90.8 105.4 140.0 108.7 66.1 104.1 105.9 102.6
1950 ...........................  68.5 112.6 88.3 126.7 156.9 137.8 81.5 127.8 124.7 120.1
1951 ...........................  164.4 164.7 164.6 163.5 221.3 187.8 158.3 186.6 207.0 186.2
1952 ...........................  101.0 162.1 128.4 180.8 188.7 159.9 122.0 156.0 236.4 179.2
1953 ........... . ............... 21.7 113.3 62.8 178.2 163.4 140.2 17.7 115.3 116.9 115.2:
1954 ........... . ............... 23.8 131.4 72.1 214.4 319.4 181.8 73.4 180.1 134.7 152.7
1955 ...........................  7.7 120.8 58.5 208.8 161.9 158.8 48.0 133.2 95.7 119.1
1956 ........... ................ 7.8 121.0 58.6 216.9 144.4 149.2 62.3 127.9 84.2 114.6
1957 ........... ................ 12.5 115.3 58.6 196.0 181.3 150.2 114.5 147.1 131.7 134.0
1958 ........... . ............... 14.5 82.0 44.6 219.2 137.3 145.4 173.0 150.5 116.2 131.3
1959 ........... ............... 25.2 82.1 50.7 215.0 143.1 159.2 207.0 167.7 135.2 144.4
1960 ........................... 16.4 107.3 57.2 246.2 173.3 179.6 105.7 161.1 127.4 144.6
1961 ...........................  9.2 117.9 58.0 248.7 196.0 174.8 29.3 144.2 141.1 742.5
Source: ECLA sample (data in dollars at constant prices).
Table 9-A









totalYear Durable Non-durable Sub-tota Metal Non-metal Sub-total
1948 ........... ....................  9.8 7.5 17.3 13.0 6.9 23.5 30.4 39.3 100.0
1949 ........... ....................  8.2 7.4 15.6 13.4 9.4 24.9 34.3 36.7 100.0
1950 ........... ....................  6.4 7.0 13.4 13.7 9.0 26.9 35.9 37.0 100.0
1951 ........... ....................  9.3 6.6 15.9 11.4 8.2 23.7 31.9 40.8 100.0
1952 ........... ....................  6.0 6.8 12.8 13.1 7.3 20.9 28.2 45.9 100.0
1953 ........... ....................  2.1 7.4 9.5 20.1 9.8 28.6 38.4 32.0 100.0
1954 ........... ....................  2.6 6.4 9.0 18.3 14.4 27.9 42.3 30.4 100.0
1955 ........... ....................  1.7 lA 9.3 22.8 9.4 31.3 40.7 27.2 100.0
1956 ........... ...................... 1.7 7.9 9.6 24.6 8.7 30.6 39.3 26.5 100.0
1957 ........... ...................... 1.9 6.4 8.3 19.0 9.3 26.3 35.6 37.1 100.0
1958 ........... ....................  2.1 4.7 6.8 21.7 7.2 26.0 33.2 38.3 100.0
1959 ........... 4.3 6.3 19.3 6.8 25.9 32.7 41.7 100.0
1960 ........... ....................  1.4 5.6 7.0 22.2 8.3 29.1 37.4 33.4 100.0
1961 ........... ...................... 1.2 6.2 7.4 22.7 9.5 28.8 38.3 31.6 100.0
Source: ECLA sample (data in dollars at constant prices).
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Table 9-B








totalDurable Non-durable Sub-total Metal Non-metal Spare parts Sub-total
1948 .................. ............ 9.2 7.5 16.7 13.0 6.9 23.5 9.4 39.8 30.5 100.0
1949 .................. ............ 7.3 7.4 14.7 13.4 9.4 24.9 6.0 40.3 31.6 100.0
1950 .................. ............ 5.2 7.0 12.2 13.7 9.0 26.9 6.4 42.3 31.8 100.0
1951 .................. ............ 8.1 6.6 14.7 11.4 8.2 23.7 8.0 39.9 34.0 100.0
1952 .................. ............ 5.2 6.8 12.0 13.1 7.3 20.9 6.4 34.6 40.3 100.0
1953 .................. ............ 1.7 7A 9.1 20.1 9.8 28.6 lA 39.8 31.0 100.0
1954 .................. ............ 1.4 6.4 7.8 18.3 14.4 27.9 4.6 46.9 27.0 100.0
1955 .................. ............ 0.6 7.6 8.2 22.8 9.4 31.3 3.7 44.4 24.6 100.0
1956 .................. ............ 0.6 7.9 8.5 24.6 8.7 30.6 5.2 44.4 22.5 100.0
1957 .................. ............ 0.9 6.4 7.3 19.0 9.3 26.3 8.0 43.6 30.1 100.0
1958 .................. ............ 1.0 4.7 5.7 21.7 7.2 26.0 12.3 45.5 27.1 100.0
1959 .................. ............ 1.6 4.3 5.9 19.3 6.8 25.9 13.4 46.1 28.7 100.0
1960 .................. ............ 1.0 5.6 6.6 22.2 8.3 29.1 6.8 44.2 27.0 100.0
1961 .................. ............ 0.6 6.2 6.8 22.7 95 28.8 1.9 40.2 30.3 100.0
Source; ECLA sample (data in dollars at constant prices).
(a) Quantitative variations
The variations registered in the import quantum can 
he studied in table 8, and reveal that, in the period as 
a whole, the only major category in which “ visible”  
substitution took place was the consumer goods group.
The substitution effort was strongest in the case of 
durable consumer goods, whose quantum dropped 
abruptly in the course of the period.
Non-durable consumer goods, however, also show 
signs of a substitution process, although on a much 
smaller scale, inasmuch as the quantum of such im­
ports did not keep pace with the rise in the over-all 
import quantum, but remained at its 1948 level in the 
later years of the period under review.
In all the other groups increases in the quantum of 
imports were registered throughout the period. The 
most striking expansion was that of fuels and lubri­
cants, whose quantum increased in the course of the 
period by 150 per cent.
The quantum indices for finished capital goods and 
intermediate products as a whole show exactly the same 
trend between the beginning and end of the period as 
the over-aU import quantum, although with fluctuations 
of differing degrees of intensity.
Naturally enough, as was previously pointed out, ca­
pital goods displayed more elasticity than the other 
categories in reacting to the movements of the over-all 
quantum of imports. Thus, in 1951 and 1952, the years 
in which the latter reached its peak levels, the increase 
in external purchases of equipment was dispropor­
tionately great, and the quantum of such imports rose 
to more than double the 1948 figure. It was lower in 
1955 and 1956, which were years when the over-all level 
declined, than it had been in 1948.
Significantly as this circumstance was reflected in the 
economy’s rate of investment, it is explicable enough 
in view of the fact that new equipment was the easiest 
of all the schedule items to restrict, since imports of 
finished consumer goods had already been reduced to 
very low levels.
Raw materials and intermediate products showed a 
more rigid behaviour pattern in relation to changes in
the over-all level of imports, inasmuch as external pur­
chases of these goods were indispensable for the main­
tenance of the existing level of economic activity, espe­
cially in industry. Thus, quantum fluctuations were less 
sharp in their case than in respect of aggregate imports, 
except in 1954, when mass purchases of metal products 
were effected.
It should also be noted that in 1954-60, which was a 
period of intensive industrialization, the quantum index 
of imports in the foregoing category remained at a 
higher level than that of total imports, whereas in the 
case of the equipment the reverse took place.
-Among the intermediate products, the only items in 
respect of which “ visible”  substitution can be noted are 
the so-called “ spare parts” , which include parts and 
accessories required for the assembly of electrical appli­
ances for household use, and motor vehicle parts. It 
was only from 1959 onwards, however, that the vertical 
integration of production in these two sectors made 
sufficient progress for any considerable decrease in im­
ports to he registered.
(b) Variations in the composition of the sample
Variations in the percentage participation of the dif­
ferent groups of items in the sample can be evaluated 
in the light of table 9. At the beginning of the period, 
the structure of the schedule was roughly as follows;
Consumer goods ....................................................  17 per cent
Fuels and lubricants..............................................  13 per cent
Intermediate products ........................................... 40 per cent
Capital goods ........................................................  30 per cent
The only substantial change to be noted by the end of 
the period is the decrease in the share of consumer goods 
and the corresponding increase in that of fuels and 
lubricants. The relative positions of intermediate prod­
ucts and capital goods remained the same.
The respective upward and downward trends of the 
first two groups are constant. This implies a serious 
piroblem where fuels are concerned. If the substitution 
effort in respect of these latter is not sufficient to reverse 
or at least to check the trend in question, it will not be 
long before the increment in their share in the import
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schedule is achieved at the expense of intermediate 
products and equipment since the proportion correspond­
ing to consumer goods, which is already extremely small, 
could hardly he reduced still further. To judge from the 
data for the last two years of the period, during which 
the share of consumer goods slightly increased, even the 
maintenance of so low a level is becoming a difficult 
matter.
The relation between the percentages represented by 
intermediate products and equipment fluctuated as al­
ready shown in the analysis of the quantum data.
It should be stressed, however, that throughout the 
whole period, and particularly in the last few years 
when the volume of imports was stationary, there was 
no increase in the proportion of the import schedule 
absorbed by intermediate products, despite the rapid 
expansion of industrial activity.
Obviously, this was only possible because the purpose 
of part of that industrial activity itself was to substitute 
domestic production for imports in the sectors cor­
responding to raw materials, intermediate products and 
spare parts. Although the substitution is “ visible”  only 
in the case of the last-named group, through a contrac­
tion of imports in absolute and relative terras, it will 
be seen later, in an analysis at a lower level of aggrega­
tion, that progress was in fact achieved in several other 
lines of intermediate goods. Indeed, it was by virtue 
of the substitution effort made in this field that a margin 
of about 30 per cent of the schedule could be earmarked 
for imports of equipment. This largely accounts for 
the country’s having been able to maintain its rate of 
investment and, consequently, keep up its economic de­
velopment process in recent years.
3. Analysis of the structure o f imports by economic 
use and destination^’^
In this section an attempt is made to classify the 
total imports shown in the sample on two different 
bases firstly, as end or intermediate products and sec­
ondly, according to whether they are intended for con­
sumption or investment (see table 10).
These two classifications are then combined in such 
a way as to obtain four sub-groups showing at one and 
the same time the type of use and the final purpose for 
which the goods are intended (see table 11).
In the classification by end and intermediate products, 
the former comprise finished consumer goods, equip­
ment and processed fuels— in short, all the goods re­
garded as for final use. Intermediate products cover 
raw and other materials (metal and non-metallic), spare 
parts and unprocessed fuels.
In the breakdown by goods for consumption and for 
investment, the products grouped in the latter category 
were finished equipment, spare parts for assembly of 
transport equipment, metal intermediate products and.
26 The purpose of the present analysis is to make this part 
of the study comparable with two similar studies carried out 
by ECLA in relation to the Latin American region, one of which 
was published in the Economic Survey of Latin America 1956 
and the other in Algunas características del desarrollo industrial 
en el periodo 1950-60 (E/CN.12/602), March 1961. The methods 
of classification adopted in the present section and in these two 
studies are similar, although not exactly the same.
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among non-metallic materials, only those for the build­
ing industry (cement, glass, etc.).
Consumer goods include all other non-metallic inter­
mediate products and raw materials, finished consumer 
goods and spare parts for electric household appliances, 
and all fuels and lubricants.
This division is somewhat artificial, since in the case 
of intermediate products and fuels, it is impossible to 
distinguish a priori the proportions intended for con­
sumption and for investment. The classification was 
established on precisely the same lines as that adopted 
in the two studies referred to above, allocating to the 
consumer goods category those items which are predo­
minantly, even though indirectly, used in the produc­
tion of final consumer goods, besides, of course, goods 
for direct consumption. The same criterion was adopted 
in relation to investment.
The first classification, by end and intermediate prod­
ucts, is also artificial, and betrays the same defects, 
perhaps in greater measure. The most serious classifica­
tion problems arise in connexion with spare parts— some 
of which may be directly used for final consumption—  
and fuels, which it is difficult to break down by type 
of use.
Despite these shortcomings, the classification adopted 
seems useful for the purposes of the present section, the 
aim of which is to analyse over-all import schedule 
trends in the direction of greater or lesser rigidity, and 
the effects on the development process deriving there­
from, in so far as a loss of flexibility is reflected in 
a contraction of imports of capital goods.
To begin with, then, the first part of table 10, which 
relates to the breakdown of the sample by intermediate 
and end products, must be analysed.
As will be seen, the relative importance of end and 
intermediate products altered substantially during the 
first decade of the period under review; whereas in 
1948 their respective shares were 60 and 40 per cent, 
in 1958 the position was reversed, the proportion of 
end products being 45 per cent as against 55 per cent 
of intermediate goods. This inerease in the participa­
tion of intermediate products is consistent with the 
normal modification of the import schedule that ac­
companies an industrialization process in an under­
developed country whose capacity to import does not 
increase rapidly.
The long-term prolongation of such a trend, how­
ever, would have adverse effects on the development 
process, which might lapse into stagnation.^® Given the 
limitations of the capacity to import, the relative con­
traction in imports of end products would ultimately 
become a decrease in absolute terms, the rigidity of 
the import schedule would be steadily aggravated, and 
imports of capital goods, which are at once the most 
important and the most flexible group under the head 
of end products, would be restricted. This would not 
only retard the development process but would also 
increase the vulnerability of the economy in relation to 
the external sector, since the maintenance of existing 
industrial activity itself would remain strategically de­
pendent upon mass imports of raw materials.
26 See Part I of the present study, section 3, “The dynamics 
of the import substitution process” .
Table 10
Brazil: Breakdown of imports by economic use and destination, 1948-61 
(Quantum in thousands of dollars at 1955 prices)
By type o f ute By destination
Intermediate product* End product* For con*umpdon For investment
Year Total Kiuantum
Percentage 
o f total Quantum
Percentage 
o f total Quantum
Percentage 
o f total Quantum
Percentage 
of total
1948 ........ 997 245 396 207 39.7 601038 60.3 520 673 52.2 476 482 47.8
1949 ........ 1023 076 412 369 40.3 610 707 59.7 535 753 52.4 487 323 47.6
1950 ____ 1198165 506 633 42.3 691 532 57.7 631246 52.7 566 919 47.3
1951 ........ 1 856 705 739 933 39.9 1116 772 60.1 924 218 49.8 932 487 50.2
1952 ........ 1787207 618 387 34.6 1 168 820 65.4 806 103 45.1 981104 54.9
1953 ........ 1149223 457 615 39.8 691 608 60.2 637 809 55.5 511414 44.5
1954 ........ 1522 726 716 772 47.1 805 954 52.9 827 814 54.4 694912 45.6
1955 ........ 1187 970 604724 50.9 583 246 49.1 743 307 62.6 444 663 37.4
1956 ........ 1142 601 613 930 53.7 528 671 46.3 737 214 64.5 405 387 35.5
1957 ........ 1 335 683 689 302 51.6 646 381 48.4 711 857 53.3 623 826 46.7
1958 ........ 1309566 720 444 55.0 589 122 45.0 708 098 54.1 601 468 45.9
1959 ........ 1440 314 790 427 54.9 649 887 45.1 735 634 51.1 704 680 48.9
1960 ........ 1441 759 762 961 52.9 678 798 47.1 835 129 57.9 606 630 42.1
1961 ........ 1432046 736 796 51.5 695 250 48.5 834584 58.3 597 462 41.7
Source:: ECLA sample (data in dollars at constant prices).
Table 11
Brazil: Gross-classification of imports by ECONOMIC USE AND DF.STINATION, 1948-61
(Quantum in thousands of dollars at 1955 prices)
intermediate proditcu Erui products













Quantum o f total
f Over-all 
total
1948 ........ 396 207 39.7 224 823 22.5 171 384 17.2 601038 60.3 295 940 29.7 305 098 30.6 997 245
1949 ........ 412 369 40.3 248 098 24.3 164271 16.0 610 707 59.7 287 655 28.1 323 052 31.6 1023 076
1950 ........ 506 633 42.3 320 332 26.7 186 301 15.6 691532 57.7 310 914 25.9 380 618 31.8 1198 165
1951 ........ 739 933 39.9 439 079 23.6 300 854 16.3 1116 772 60.1 485 139 26.1 631 633 34.0 1 856 705
1952 ........ 618 387 34.6 358 396 20.1 259 991 14.5 1168 820 65.4 447 707 25.1 721113 40.3 1787 207
1953 ........ 457 615 39.8 302 824 26.4 154 791 13.4 691 608 60.2 334 985 29.1 356 623 31.1 1149 223
1954 ........ 716 772 47.1 432 780 28.4 283 992 18.7 805 954 52.9 395 034 25.9 410 920 27.0 1 522 726
1955 ........ 604724 50.9 452 067 38.1 152 657 12.8 583 246 49.1 291 240 24.5 292 006 24.6 1187 970
1956 ........ 613 930 53.7 465 512 40.7 148418 13.0 528 671 46.3 271 702 23.8 256 969 22.5 1142 601
1957 ........ 689 302 51.6 467 315 35.0 221 987 16.6 646 381 48.4 244 542 18.3 401839 30.1 1 335 683
1958 ........ 720 444 55.0 473 419 36.2 247 025 18.8 589122 45.0 234 679 17.9 354 443 27.1 1309566
1959 ........ 790 427 54.9 498 229 34.6 292 198 20.3 649 887 45.1 237 405 16.5 412 482 28.6 1440 314
1960 ........ 762 961 52.9 545 163 37.8 217 798 15.1 678 798 47.1 289 966 20.1 388 832 27.0 1 441 759
1961 ........ 736 796 51.5 569 756 39.8 167 040 11.7 695 250 48.5 264 828 18.5 430422 30.0 1432 046
Source: ECLA sample data.
It should be stressed that the situation in Brazil does 
not seem to have reached so serious a pitch. In the 
first place, the expansion of those imports of raw ma­
terials and intermediate products that cannot be re­
stricted was not effected, in absolute terms, at the ex­
pense of end products. Broadly speaking, the import 
quantum of these latter remained constant throughout 
the period,^’^  so that, given a 44-per-cent increment in 
the quantum of aggregate imports, that of intermediate 
goods was able to increase by more than 80 per cent. 
Thus, although on the basis of severe restrictions on 
external purchases of certain consumer goods, it was 
possible to maintain the share of imports of equipment.
27 Excluding the steep upswings registered in 1951 and 1952, 
which were, as already shown, two exceptional years.
On the other hand, the rising trend in the relative 
importance of intermediate products seems to have been 
reversed from 1958 onwards. During the last three years 
of the period under discussion, the proportion cor­
responding to these goods declined, and by 1961 re­
presented little more than 50 per cent of over-all im­
ports. This reversal of the trend suggests that the 
substitution effort that had been taking place for a 
number of years in respect of some branches of inter­
mediate products had been crowned with success, so 
that the substitution in question ultimately became ap­
parent for the category as a whole. This result is all the 
more satisfactory if it is taken into account that the 
group includes certain commodities, such as crude oil, 
wheat and newsprint, in relation to which the substitu­
tion effort did not suffice to produce visible effects.
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Hence it may be concluded that despite these and other 
difiEculties, which will be discussed in fuUer detail at a 
later stage, the composition of the schedule is less un­
favourable in this respect than might be expected.
The second part of the table, showing the breakdown 
by economic destination, will now be analysed.
In the first three years of the series, the relative 
shares of imports for consumption and for investment 
remained constant, at a little over and a little under 
50 per cent, respectively. During the fifties, variations 
in the relative weight of these two groups were espe­
cially noteworthy in the years when the level of total 
imports rose (1951-52) and fell (1955-56). As was 
to be expected, in the former case the change was favour­
able and in the latter prejudicial to imports for invest­
ment purposes. This greater elasticity characterizing the 
reaction of imports for investment to fluctuations in the 
over-all level is perfectly explicable, and has been ob­
served in all the Latin American countries.
No major changes in the composition of the schedule 
took place in the other years of the decade.
As from 1959, in which year the structure of the 
schedule was relatively favourable to investment, the 
proportion of imports of consumer goods increased. 
The explanation may be found in phenomena of three 
different kinds: the stagnation of aggregate imports; 
the impossibility of controlling the expansion of imports 
of fuels (especially petroleum) ; and the replacement of 
some lines of imported capital goods by domestic pro­
duction.
While the first of these factors is clearly evidenced 
by the data presented in table 10, the other two will 
be analysed only in the following sections.
In table 11 the classification by end and intermediate 
products is sub-divided by economic destination, ac­
cording to whether goods are imported for consumption 
or for investment purposes.
Products for final consumption comprise durable and 
non-durable consumer goods (essentially manufactures 
ready for use) and processed fuels. The group as a 
whole shows visible substitution; its quantum followed 
a downward trend (although recovering slightly in the 
last two years under consideration) and its relative 
share declined from 30 per cent at the beginning to 
18.5 per cent at the end of the period. In the sub-group 
formed by equipment (end products for investment 
purposes), although the quantum registers a gently ris­
ing trend and the proportion of the sample represented 
hovers around 30 per cent, considerable fluctuations 
are apparent. The sharpest are observable in the same 
periods as were noted above in connexion with the 
major category “ Imports for investment purposes” , and 
derive from the same causes.
Intermediate products for consumption show a marked 
increase both in their quantum and in their relative 
importance in the sample. They constitute, in fact, the 
only sub-group which, although with a few slight inter­
ruptions, kept up steady and increasing resistance to 
the import substitution process. This is not surprising 
if it is recalled that they include raw materials and 
materials at various stages of processing for the chemical 
industry, besides petroleum, wheat, and a number of 
other commodities which Brazil has found it impossible 
to produce on a satisfactory scale because of difficulties
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relating to technology or to availability of natural re­
sources.
Intermediate goods for investment comprise metal 
products, non-metaUic building materials and spare parts 
for equipment. As can be seen both from the quantum 
data and from the distribution percentages, substitu­
tion efforts yielded some visible results.
Developments in this group will be analysed later, 
but it may be remarked in anticipation that the ap­
parent slowing-up of the substitution process in this 
field, manifested in an expansion both of the quantum 
and of the proportion of imports of such goods between 
1956 and 1959, is nothing but a phase in the economic 
expansion and diversification process itself. Indeed, the 
expansion in question is almost entirely attributable to 
purchases of spare parts for the motor vehicle industry 
that was installed in Brazil in 1955-56. Since 1959, the 
growth and progressive development of the domestic 
manufacture of motor-vehicle parts has once again re­
duced the quantum and percentage of imports in this 
category, the latter falling to the lowest level registered 
in the period.
With respect to the group as a whole, although its 
share in the schedule is already relatively small— under 
12 per cent— some opportunities for continued substitu­
tion will be afforded by the prospective entry into opera­
tion of new steel-making units in the next few years, 
apart from the possibilities of expansion of the non- 
ferrous metal industries.
In short, from the analysis presented in this section 
— ^within the general lines on which it has been carried 
out— t^he following conclusions may be drawn.
The evolution of the structure of imports was definitely 
unfavourable only in the case of intermediate products 
for direct consumption, the proportion of which in­
creased until by 1961 they absorbed about 40 per cent 
of the schedule. In compensation the problem of a stand­
still in total imports for investment purposes, which 
would be seriously detrimental to the development 
process, was successfully by-passed by means of substitu­
tion in the intermediate products group and the main­
tenance of imports of finished equipment.
It was the sub-group comprising final consumer goods 
that showed the most clearly-marked trend towards sub­
stitution. Even so, it still accounted for about 19 per 
cent of total imports in 1961, since it included processed 
fuels, in respect of which, despite an intensive domestic 
production effort, self-sufficiency was as yet a long 
way off.
Thus, given the basic difficulty of keeping up the de­
velopment process in face of a slow-growing capacity 
to import, which actually remained stationary in the 
final years of the period, the problems arising in the 
past in connexion with the degree of rigidity of the 
import structure did not prove insuperable. On the con­
trary, the structure in question retained sufficient flex- 
ibihty to leave a margin of about 30 per cent of total 
imports available for capital goods.
It is true that in the last two or three years of the 
period the very maintenance of the real capacity to 
import was achieved at the cost of more and more 
external borrowing, and the aforesaid margin of imports 
for investment purposes could be secured only by virtue
of a discriminatory exchange policy and a considerable 
inflow of foreign capitaL
The prospeets for eontinuing the substitution process 
in such unfavourable external conditions are not, there- 
iore, very encouraging, and the maintenance of the 
existing over-all import eoefficient would imply a sub­
stantial increase in the rigidity of the schedule, since 
the margin of imports susceptible of restriction, even 
if drastic controls are applied, is becoming steadily 
narrower.
The possibilities for intensive import substitution in 
respect of equipment, which would give the schedule 
more flexibility and the investment process greater inde­
pendence, will be discussed in the last part of the 
study.
4. More detailed analysis of the composition of the 
major aggregates
In the two preeeding sections, the trends followed by 
the most important aggregates in the import schedule 
were analysed in broad outline, in order to evaluate the 
principal changes in their structure deriving from the 
intensification of the import substitution process in 
1948-61.
The aim of this section is to present an analysis 
designed to give a closer insight into this same struc­
ture and at the same time to serve as a means of identify­
ing specific lines of production in which “ visible”  sub­
stitution may perhaps have been taking place. Ob­
viously, substitution may fail to be apparent in the 
major groups as a whole, owing to the level of aggrega­
tion, and yet may have taken place on a considerable 
scale in relation to a number of minor sub-groups.
The classification adopted in sub-section 1 of section C 
is taken as a basis for a further breakdown, under the 
major heads shown in the tables appended to the present 
section.
(a) Non-durable consumer goods
As already shown, the volume of imports in this 
group as a whole did not keep pace with the rising 
trend of the over-all quantum, although obviously fol­
lowing its fluctuations, but with little elasticity. The 
average level of imports was exactly the same in the 
last four as in the first two years of the period. The 
share of this group in the sample hovered around 7 per 
cent until 1956, after which it dropped sharply, albeit 
showing a trend towards recovery in the last two years.
Table 12 will now be studied with a view to a more 
detailed breakdown of the structure of the group.
At the beginning of the period, the most important 
sub-division in this category was constituted by food- 
stuS's, which represented 55 per cent of the group. They 
comprised mainly temperate-zone commodities, the prin­
cipal items being fruit from Argentina, olive oil, cod 
and some by-products of animal origin. Next in order 
of importance came beverages, medicaments and tex­
tile manufactures, with similar shares of about 11 per 
cent each, and, lastly, printed matter and miscellaneous 
manufactures, accounting for 5 and 7 per cent, respec­
tively.
By the end of the period, foodstuffs were stiU in a 
privileged position, and had even gained in relative 
importance within the group. As regards the other items, 
speeial mention must be made of the increased sig­
nificance of imports of medicaments and printed matter, 
which, although reaching their peak (in relative terms) 
in 1958, StiU represented about 20 and 8 per cent, 
respectively, o f total imports of non-durable consumer 
goods in 1961.
In respect of textiles and miscellaneous manufactured 
goods, the substitution process has practically reached 
its limit, external purchases having been reduced to 
negligible levels. Imports of beverages, despite the ad­
vanced stage reached by the substitution process, showed 
a slightly rising trend in the last five years of the period. 
This coincided, as wiU be seen later, with the stagna­
tion of the rate of production in the beverages industry 
during the last two or three years under review.^®
To sum up, among the groups of imports o f non­
durable consumer goods that are still of some signifi­
cance, two have shown themselves to be virtually irre­
ducible— temperate-zone foodstuffs and printed matter—  
despite the restrictive exchange measures applied in 
relation to the former, and the considerable expansion 
of Brazil’s own publishing industry.
The only branch of imports in this group for which 
it seems possible that “ real”  substitution might still 
take place is that of medicaments, although even so a 
substantial reorganization and development effort on 
the part of the domestic pharmaceutical industry would 
be an indispensable prerequisite.
(b ) Durable consumer goods
It has already been shown that in respect of this 
group as a whole an intensive substitution process took 
place, since its position in the schedule deteriorated 
abruptly not only in relative but also in absolute terms.
28 Although domestically-produced beverages are not “ perfect” 
substitutes for their imported counterparts, they are nevertheless 




Brazil: Imports of non-durable consumer goods, 1948-61 










































1948 .......... ........  74 589 7.5 40 930 54.9 8572 11.5 7 752 10.4 7 765 10.4 4 006 5.4 5 564 7.4
1949 .......... ........  76 052 7.4 44 779 58.9 3 027 4.0 12 681 16.7 8 547 11.2 4 323 5.7 1695 3.5
1950 .......... ........  83 999 7.0 57 204 68.1 3 699 4.4 10 070 12.0 6 690 8.0 3 697 4.4 2 639 3.1
1951 .......... ........  122 874 6.6 78113 63.6 7 750 6.3 23 458 19.1 4566 3.7 5 706 4.6 3 281 2.7
1952 .......... ........  120 843 6.8 81081 67.0 4 455 3.7 24 205 20.0 2 525 2.1 5 860 4.8 2 817 2.4
1953 .......... ........  84 504 7.4 59 006 69.8 2473 2.9 12 891 15.3 1865 2.2 7 333 8.7 937 1.1
1954 .......... ........  97 975 6.4 61 231 62.5 2 714 2.8 23 082 23.6 119 0.8 9150 9.3 1019 1.0
1955 ......... .......... 90131 7.6 64009 71.0 1188 1.3 14218 15.8 246 0.3 9 640 10.7 830 0.9
1956 .......... ........  90 231 7.9 59 797 66.3 1805 2.0 17 571 19.5 271 0.3 10 093 11.2 705 0.7
1957 .......... ........  84 964 6.4 60237 70.9 1834 2.2 12 840 15.1 391 0.5 8 995 10.6 667 0.7
1958 ................... ........  61248 4.7 35138 57.4 1706 2.8 15 512 25.3 165 0.3 7 876 12.9 851 1.3
1959 .......... ........  61236 4.3 41101 67.1 1 769 2.9 9842 16.1 476 0.8 7 226 11.8 823 1.3
1960 ................... ........  80 052 5.6 55 208 69.0 2103 2.6 13 773 17.2 251 0.3 7 728 9.1 990 1.2
1961 .......... ........  87 944 6.1 59 206 67.3 1667 1.9 18 222 20.7 273 0.3 7 403 8.4 1173 1.4
Source: ECLA sample data.
From an analysis of table 13, it can be seen that the 
substitution in question is “ visible”  in respect of the 
three sub-groups considered— vehicles and accessories.
electric household appliances, and miscellaneous manu­
factured goods— imports of all o f which declined in ab­
solute terms.
Table 13
Brazil: Imports of durable consumer goods, 1948-61 






















1948 ........................... 9.8 56 240 57.4 26 362 26.9 15 388 15.7
1949 ........................... ...................... 84114 8.2 44 974 53.5 24177 28.7 14 963 17.8
1950 ........................... ...................... 76 214 6.4 35 335 46.4 23 832 31.3 17 047 22.3
1951 ........................... ...................... 172 878 9.3 94 486 54.7 47 936 27.7 30 456 17.6
1952 ........................... ...................... 107 248 6.0 63 796 59.5 22 692 21.2 20 760 19.3
1953 ........................... ...................... 24 274 2.1 17 523 72.2 5 216 21.5 1535 6.3
1954 ........................... ...................... 38 761 2.6 15 199 39.2 20 417 52.7 3145 8.1
1955 ........................... ...................... 19 952 1.7 6 881 34.5 11727 58.8 1344 6.7
1956 ........................... ....................... 19 503 1.7 6 586 33.8 10 975 56.3 1941 9.9
1957 ........................... ...................... 25 372 1.9 9 221 36.3 12 616 49.7 3 535 14.0
1958 ........................... ...................... 27 380 2.1 11781 43.0 14 042 51.3 1557 5.7
1959 ........................... ...................... 29120 2.0 21 075 72.4 6 691 23.0 1254 4.6
1960 ........................... ...................... 20 594 1.4 11470 55.7 5 678 27.6 3 446 16.7
1961 ........................... ...................... 16 707 1.2 5 213 31.2 7 721 46.2 3 773 22.6
Source : ECXA sample data.
The sub-division in which the substitution effort was 
strongest was that of vehicles and accessories, which 
comprises passenger cars, motor-cycles and bicycles, as 
well as the corresponding accessories. The proportion 
of the group for which they accounted, after exceeding 
50 per cent at the beginning of the period, by the end 
of it had fallen to about 30 per cent, while in absolute 
terms such imports were reduced by 90 per cent, as 
the result of the installation of the motor vehicle industry 
and its rapid integration process (the evolution of the 
data from 1959 onwards should be noted).
Although the amounts represented by the other two 
sub-divisions were insignificant in absolute terms, their 
percentage shares in imports of durable consumer goods 
increased, simply because in the later years of the period 
substitution advanced less rapidly in their case than in 
respect of the first group.
Where miscellaneous manufactured goods were con­
cerned, the substitution process seems to have remained 
stationary from 1953 onwards. This illustrates the fact 
referred to in sub-section 2, in the discussion of the 
meaning of the term “ import substitution” . What hap­
pened here was obviously that the “ apparent”  substitu­
tion reflected since 1953 in a substantial contraction of 
imports of goods in this category (and of finished con­
sumer goods in general) resulted from the discrimi­
natory exchange measures adopted at that stage. It was, 
in fact, under the stimulus of the ensuing restriction of 
imports that “ real”  substitution afterwards took place, 
and even so only in so far as the goods produced were 
approximate substitutes for those formerly imported. 
When this was not the case, the relaxation of restric­
tions, or the trend towards unification of exchange rates 
registered as from 1960, caused imports of the items 
in question to resume their upward trend.
(c) Fuels and lubricants
Although imports of products in this group as a 
whole greatly increased in both absolute and relative 
terms, a more detailed analysis reveals substitution in 
some lines of production.
To begin with, attention should be drawn to the evolu­
tion of imports of liquid fuels. Up to 1954, virtually 
only petroleum products were imported, and no crude
oil. From that year onwards, with the entry into opera­
tion of PETROBRAS’ first big refining unit, an intensive 
substitution process began to take place in respect of 
processed fuels, and imports of crude oil swung sharply 
upwards. In this latter field, domestic production was 
also embarked upon at practically the same time, but 
it did not suffice to prevent an increase in the amount 
of foreign exchange spent on petroleum and petroleum 
products.
If the data in table 14 are now analysed, it will be 
seen that fuels constituted the bulk of imports in this 
category of which they represented about 80 per cent 
almost constantly throughout the period. Lubricants 
and other petroleum products, together with coal, ac­
counted for a little under 20 per cent, but their relative 
positions slightly altered in the course of the period, 
the share of lubricants decreasing, while that of other 
derivatives increased.
Among fuels, there is clear evidence of substitution 
in respect of coal, both its quantum and its relative im­
portance in the sub-group having declined. External 
purchases of coal accounted for 21 per cent of fuel 
imports in 1948 and only 7 per cent in 1961.
This situation was reversed in the case of liquid fuels. 
The quantum of imports showed a tremendous increase 
(over 300 per cent between 1948 and 1961), and con­
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sequently the proportion of the sub-group they repre­
sented rose from 79 per cent in 1948 to 93 per cent 
in 1961.
A  more detailed analysis of what happened in the 
case of liquid fuels (see table 15), reveals that from 
1954 onwards, as has already been mentioned, substitu­
tion was effected on a substantial scale in respect of 
processed liquid fuels. It was of course accompanied by 
a sharp upswing in imports of crude oil, which soared 
from $3 million to $166 million (at constant prices) 
between 1954 and 1961. The share of crude oil in total 
imports of liquid fuels, which had been only 1 per cent 
in 1954, by 1961 had risen to over 60 per cent.
Among processed fuels, petrol registered a more in­
tensive but less steady substitution process than fuel
oil. Petrol imports dropped by 75 per cent between 
1954 and 1957. Thenceforward, however, no major con­
traction was registered, and in the last two years of 
the period an actual increase took place in relative 
terms. The reason for this, apart from the difficulties 
of expanding refining capacity, was the rapid growth of 
consumption, attributable largely to the development 
of the domestic motor vehicle industry, and also, in 
some measure, to the maintenance of the exchange sub­
sidy granted to fuels. Fuel oils succeeded in achieving 
a steadier reduction of their share in imports, which 
attained its minimum level in 1961. Accounting for only 
17 per cent of total imports of liquid fuels, it was, even 
so, slightly higher than the proportion corresponding 
to petrol, whereas up to 1954 it had been definitely 
lower.
Table 14
Brazil: Imports of fuels, lubricants and other petroleum derivatives, 1948-61 
































1948 .......... ..........  123 829 13.0 105 618 81.4 22 578 21.4 83 040 78.6 14 623 11.3 9 588 7.3
1949 .......... ..........  136 903 13.4 113 288 82.8 16 906 14.9 96 382 85.1 12 306 9.0 11309 8.2
1950 .......... ..........  164 463 13.7 133 168 81.0 23 972 18.0 109 196 82.0 17 391 10.6 13 904 8.4
1951 .......... ..........  212 299 11.4 166 382 78.4 22 215 13.4 144 167 86.6 27 638 13.0 18 279 8.6
1952 .......... ..........  234738 13.1 192 211 81.9 19 783 10.3 172 428 89.7 21 933 3.3 20 594 8.8
1953 .......... ..........  231395 20.1 186 570 80.7 14 898 8.0 171 671 92.0 21946 9.5 22 819 9.8
1954 .......... ..........  278 408 18.3 215 265 77.3 16 042 7.5 199 222 92.5 30 318 10.9 32 825 11.8
1955 .......... ..........  271 108 22.8 215 683 79.6 22120 10.3 193 563 89.7 22 362 10.4 27 062 10.0
1956 .......... ..........  281633 24.6 222111 78.9 17 381 7.8 204729 92.2 27676 9.0 31847 11.3
1957 .......... ..........  254433 19.0 206 347 81.1 18269 8.9 188 078 91.1 26 927 10.6 21159 8.3
1958 .......... ..........  284 573 21.7 238 533 83.8 12 454 5.0 226 508 95.0 22113 7.8 23 927 8.4
1959 .......... ..........  279 089 19.3 228 578 81.9 13 454 5.9 215 125 94.1 26118 9.4 24 394 8.7
1960 .......... ..........  319 590 22.2 259 719 81.3 20 618 7.9 239 100 92.1 29 864 9.3 30 007 9.4
1961 .......... .......... 322 834 22.5 264 296 81.9 17 494 6.6 246 802 93.4 25 909 8.0 32 629 10.1
Source: ECLA sample data.
Table 15
Brazil; Imports of liquid fuels, 1948-61
(Quantum in thousands of dollars at 1955 prices)
P r 0 c e s s e d  1'■i q u i d f u e I s
Crude petroleum Total Petrol Fuel oil
Over-all Percentage Percentage Percentage Percentage
total o f group o f group of group o f group
Year Quantum Quantum total Quantum total Quantum total Quantum total
1948 .......... .....................  83 040 _ _ 83 400 100.0 46168 55.6 36 872 44.4
1949 .......... .....................  96 382 96 382 100.0 57 954 60.1 38 428 39.9
1950 .......... .....................  109196 241 0.2 108 955 99.8 59 900 54.9 49 055 44.9
1951 ........... .....................  144167 430 0.3 143 737 99.7 85 021 59.0 58 716 40.7
1952 ........... .....................  172 428 389 0.2 172 039 99.8 102 882 59.7 69 157 40.1
1953 .......... .....................  171671 667 0.4 171 004 99.6 94 005 54.8 76 999 44.8
1954 ........... .....................  199 222 3124 1.6 196 098 98.4 102 484 51.4 93 614 47.0
1955 ........... .....................  193 563 77 076 39.8 116 487 60.2 43 094 22.3 73 393 37.9
1956 ........... .....................  204 729 107 267 52.4 97462 47.6 26 083 12.7 71379 34.9
1957 .......... .....................  188 078 106 324 56.5 81 754 43.5 24 788 13.2 56 966 30.3
1958 ........... .....................  226 508 124 015 54.8 102 493 45.2 36 230 16.0 66 263 29.3
1959 .......... .....................  215125 125 983 58.6 89 142 41.4 25 623 11.9 63 519 29.5
1960 ........... .....................  239100 124 705 52.2 114 395 47.8 42 828 17.9 71 567 29.9
1961 .......... .....................  246 802 165 627 67.1 81175 32.9 38 856 15.7 42 319 17.1
Source; ECLA sample data.
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In the field of lubricants and other petroleum prod­
ucts, fruitful substitution activities were undertaken in 
respect of certain derivatives such as grease, kerosene 
and turpentine, imports of which decreased substan­
tially. But these endeavours did not suffice to reduce 
the quantum of imports itself in these two sub-groups, 
or, in view of their relative incidence, in the group as 
a whole.
Briefly, it may be concluded that despite the expan­
sion of domestic output which took place in almost 
all lines of production, although most intensively in 
respect of processed fuels, the effort made failed to 
reverse the upward trend of imports in the group as a 
whole. This also constitutes the most rigid division of 
the schedule at present.
In the following section, a more precise evaluation 
of the effort put forth in this sector will be attempted 
on the basis of a comparison between domestic produc­
tion and import series, and the import coefficients of 
apparent consumption will be analysed.
(d) Metal raw materials and intermediate products
This group was initially broken down by processed 
and semi-processed products.^ Such classification is 
difficult to make, because there is no clear dividing line 
between the two levels of processing. Metal products in 
fact pass through several stages of processing, depend­
ing upon the production process and the purpose for 
which they are intended. The only purpose of the some­
what arbitrary breakdown referred to was to try to 
evaluate how far domestic production to replace im­
ports in the two major categories of metal intermediate 
products— ferrous and non-ferrous— developed on more 
or less integrated lines.
29 Raw materials were not taken into account, because the only 
metal ore imported is cassiterite, the figures for which are 
relatively insignificant.
Processed metals are taken to include sheet, shapes, 
structures, wire and filaments, and, in general, all high- 
grade rolled and wire-drawn products. Semi-processed 
metals comprise ingots, bars and rods and thick plate.
Analysis of the data presented in tables 16 and 17, 
reveals an increase in the proportion of imports repre­
sented by semi-processed materials, which means that 
the substitution effort was greater in the case of the 
processed intermediate products. Among the latter, it 
was the ferrous group whose relative importance was 
the greater. Non-ferrous products, besides accounting 
for only a small percentage, were the object of an in­
tensive substitution process, so that by the end of the 
period imports of such goods were reduced to less than 
$1 million.
In the case o f processed iron and steel products, sub­
stitution is “ visible”  in the following cases: tinplate, 
filaments and wire, tubing and pipes, shapes, cylinders, 
tanks and other manufactured goods. On the other hand, 
the substitution effort is not reflected in the schedule 
where plate, structures and barbed wire are concerned. 
As the incidence of these latter items is very great, sub­
stitution in this sub-group is not apparent in absolute 
terms. But the decrease registered in relative terms 
testifies to the efficacy of the effort made.
Among semi-processed materials, it is the non-ferrous 
metal products whose share in imports is the greater. 
Substitution is “ visible”  in the sample only in the case 
of lead and tin products. In fact, the progress achieved 
in the metallurgical industry is still very unsatisfactory 
in the case of non-ferrous metals, especially copper, 
which currently accounts for 27 per cent of total im­
ports of metal intermediate products and 50 per cent 
of imports of semi-processed metals. Even the branch 
of metallurgy that made the greatest strides— the alu­
minium sector— was unable to halt the expansion of 
imports in the last two years of the period.
Table 16
Bbazu : Imports of intermediate metal products (processed), 1948-61 
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1948 . . . . . . .  68 716 6.9 46 053 67.0 40 128 58.4 1038 1.5 15 253 22.2 3 179 4.6 5 925 8.6
1949 . . . . . . .  96 168 9.4 57 691 60.0 49 921 51.9 1167 1.2 10 297 10.7 8 256 8.6 7 770 8.1
1950 . . . . . . .  107 800 9.0 61 352 56.9 53 846 50.0 1941 1.8 10 889 10.1 11 310 10.5 7 506 6.9
1951 . . . . . . .  152 076 8.2 89 728 59.0 76 247 50.1 2 287 1.5 21147 13.9 12 084 7.9 13 481 8.9
1952 . . . . . . .  129 696 7.6 81629 62.9 70 105 54.1 2 569 2.0 16 453 12.7 9 238 7.1 11524 8.8
1953 . . . . . . .  112 268 9.8 68 146 60.7 59 725 53.2 9 414 8.4 14 443 12.9 6 793 6.1 8 421 7.5
1954 . . . . . . .  219 481 14.4 117118 53.4 109 830 50.0 19 185 8.7 25 688 11.7 16 075 7.3 7 288 3.4
1955 . . . . . . .  111246 9.4 68 444 61.5 65 856 59.2 7 405 6.6 16 215 14.6 6 203 5.6 2 588 2.3
1956 . . . . . . .  99 236 8.7 54 994 55.4 53 113 53.5 5 632 5.7 21308 21.5 11792 11.9 1881 1.9
1957 . . . . . . .  124 561 9.3 65 307 52.4 63 667 51.1 8 258 6.6 24 595 19.7 12 068 9.7 1640 1.3
1958 . . . . . . .  94 371 7.2 33 830 35.8 32 531 34.5 8 322 8.8 7 441 7.9 3 076 3.3 1299 1.3
1959 . . . . . . .  98 364 6.8 54 417 55.3 52 886 53.8 15 371 15.6 13 083 13.3 4 001 4.1 1531 1.5
1960 . . . . . . .  119 055 8.3 61404 51.6 60 491 50.8 16 784 14.1 19 199 16.1 9 360 7.9 913 0.8
1961 . . . . . . .  134 651 9.4 62 189 46.2 61 339 45.6 20 893 15.5 9 065 6.7 8 856 6.6 850 0.6
Source: ECLA sample data.
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Table 17
Brazil: Imports of intermediate metal products (semi-processed), 1948-61 




































1948 .. . . . . .  68 716 6.9 22 663 33.0 18 937 27.6 12 839 18.7 2 974 4.3 24 _ 3 726 5.4
1949 .. . . . . .  96 168 9.4 38 477 40.0 33 485 34.8 26 949 28.0 3 395 3.9 216 0.2 4 992 5.2
1950 . . . . . . .  107 800 8.0 46 448 43.1 40 236 37.3 19 967 18.5 4 401 4.1 3 647 3.4 6 212 5.8
1951 .. . . . . .  152 076 8.2 62 348 40.1 55137 35.4 26 542 17.5 6 919 4.5 4391 2.9 7 211 4.7
1952 .. . . . . .  129 696 7.3 48 067 37.1 40165 31.0 25 360 19.6 3 908 3.0 3 477 2.7 7 902 6.1
1953 ... . . . .  112 268 9.8 44122 39.3 40 617 26.2 20 827 18.6 5122 4.6 4 589 4.1 3 505 3.1
1954 . . . . . . .  219 481 14.4 102 364 46.6 73 194 33.3 43 058 19.6 9 602 4.4 7 730 3.5 29 170 13.3
1955 ... . . . .  111246 9.4 42 802 38.5 30498 27.4 15 199 13.7 4 092 3.7 5 047 4.5 12 304 11.1
1956 ... . . . .  99 236 8.7 44 242 44.6 41 512 41.8 20 623 20.8 8 214 8.3 6 867 6.9 2 730 2,8
1957 ... . . . .  124561 9.3 59 254 47.6 54 452 43.7 29 411 23.6 8188 6.6 5 482 4.4 4802 3,9
1958 ... . . . .  94 371 7.2 60 542 64.2 58 357 61.9 2d 322 29.0 8 961 9.5 8174 8.7 2185 2,3
1959 ... . . . .  98 364 6.8 43 948 44.7 40 743 41.4 20 353 20.7 5 623 5.7 7 809 7.9 3 205 3,3
1960 ... . . . .  119 055 8.3 57 651 48.4 54494 45.7 29 685 24.9 9 344 7.8 10 833 9.1 3157 2.7
1961 ... . . . .  134 651 9.4 72 462 53.8 67109 49.8 36 317 27.0 11575 8.6 11561 8.6 5 353 4.0
Source: ECLA sample data.
To sum up, the steel-making industry made a good 
deal of headway in the substitution of domestic pro­
duction for imports of semi-processed intermediate prod­
ucts, and has still several stages to traverse where 
processed materials are concerned, especially plate, 
structures and harhed wire. The non-ferrous metal indus­
tries are in exactly the opposite position.
Factors of two different types account for this, in 
the writer’s view: the existence or non-existence of 
proven reserves, and world market conditions for the 
sale of metal products. As Brazil has no iron ore and 
manganese problem, it was possible for the steel-making 
industry to be vertically integrated, and substitution 
was slower in respect of fully-processed materials for 
reasons of technology and scale of production. In the 
case of the non-ferrous metals, the only plentiful proven 
reserves are those of aluminium ore, while the difficulties 
of obtaining copper ore are particularly serious.
As non-ferrous ores are generally sold on the world 
market in a semi-processed state only, integration of 
the non-ferrous metal industries was not feasible, alu­
minium constituting almost the sole exception to this 
rule. On the other hand, high-grade rolled and wire­
drawn products could be manufactured, with the result 
that substitution in respect of the more fully-processed 
items gained the lead.
However, efforts are being channelled towards the 
development of some sectors of the non-ferrous metal 
industries, both in relation to prospecting for mineral 
deposits and from the standpoint of the expansion of 
existing production capiacity.
(e) Non-metallic raw materials and intermediate
products
The growth of imports in this group as a whole out­
stripped that of the over-all import quantum in the 
course of the period, with the resulting increase in the 
percentage of the sample they represented. In 1961 the
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relative importance of the group was exactly the same 
as that of equipment.
Nevertheless, a slightly more detailed breakdovra 
shows that visible substitution took place in some lines 
of production. To this end, the first step is to divide 
the group into three sub-groups, as follows: raw ma­
terials, semi-processed and fully-processed products. 
This classification presents the same difficulties as were 
noted above, and its general aims are likewise the same. 
The following was the criterion adopted: the first sub­
group includes all commodities that have undergone 
virtually no processing at all (wheat, raw rubber, ores, 
natural textile fibres, natural fertilizers); the second 
sub-group comprises goods that have been subjected to 
simple processing, and/or those which, despite more 
complex processing, are susceptible of subsequent trans­
formation while remaining within the category of in­
puts or intermediate products (cases in point being 
pulp, tanned skins and hides, textile yarns, cement, 
organic and inorganic chemical products, plastic ma­
terials and synthetic resins, e tc .); and the third sub­
group embraces processed intermediate products which, 
as inputs, are not susceptible of any further transforma­
tion (chemical fertilizers and pesticides, paper, asbestos 
and rubber manufactures, refractory products, sheet 
glass, etc.).
From a study of table 18 it can be seen that there 
was a substantial increase in imports of raw materials, 
whose quantum was more than quadrupled in the course 
of the period, while their share in the group rose from 
22 to 57 per cent.
Fully-processed intermediate products also failed to 
show “ visible”  substitution although the increment in 
their quantum, and particularly in their contribution 
to the group, was moderate. Especially in the last five 
years under consideration, their relative position re­
mained comparatively stable, fluctuating around 20 per 
cent of the group.
Table 18
Brazil; Imports of non-metallic raw materials and intermediate products, 1948-61 
{Quantum in thousands of dollars at 1955 prices)
Year
Group total














































1948 .............. .......... 234 23.5 52 22.3 26 11.3 144 61.6 12 5.2 32 13.5 38 16.1 7 3.0 14 5.9
1949 .............. .......... 254 24.9 91 35.8 68 26.6 127 50.1 22 8.8 42 16.6 36 14.1 8 3.0 11 4.4
1950 .............. .......... 322 26.9 135 42.0 104 32.1 130 40.2 34 10.5 46 14.4 57 17.8 19 6.0 15 4.7
1951 .............. .......... 439 23.7 161 36.5 110 25.1 186 42.4 33 7.5 66 15.1 92 21.1 29 6.6 19 4.3
1952 .............. .......... 374 20.9 139 37.3 96 25.6 146 39.1 24 6.4 45 12.1 89 23.6 17 4.5 29 7.6
1953 .............. .......... 328 28.6 165 50.4 136 41.5 117 35.6 24 7.4 31 9.6 46 14.0 8 2.3 23 7.0
1954 .............. .......... 426 27.9 164 38.6 119 27.9 194 45.7 41 9.7 73 17.1 67 15.7 14 3.3 30 7.1
1955 .............. .......... 372 31.3 183 49.4 142 38.3 128 34.3 28 7.5 46 12.3 61 16.3 11 2.9 31 8.4
1956 .............. .......... 349 30.6 151 43.1 120 34.3 130 37.1 30 8.7 60 17.3 69 19.8 13 3.8 37 11.0
1957 .............. .......... 351 26.3 154 43.9 121 34.6 116 32.9 31 8.8 52 14.7 81 23.2 14 4.0 47 13.0
1958 .............. .......... 340 26.0 171 50.1 127 37.3 94 27.5 24 7.0 42 12.2 76 22.4 20 5.9 40 12.0
1959 .............. .......... 373 25.9 211 56.5 153 41.2 88 23.6 24 6.5 44 11.7 74 19.9 21 5.6 39 10.0
1960 .............. .......... 420 29.1 242 57.4 171 40.8 84 19.9 22 5.2 44 10.4 95 22.7 39 9.4 42 10.0
1961 .............. .......... 409 28.6 231 56.5 159 38.8 90 22.0 20 4.8 49 12.0 88 21.4 29 7.1 36 9.0
Source: ECLA sample data.
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In the case of semi-processed goods, “ visible”  sub­
stitution definitely took place, both their quantum and 
their relative importance in the group declining, the 
latter proportionally to the increase in the share of raw 
materials.
This situation is understandable enough, and to some 
extent confirms the theory that in respect of non-metallic 
intermediate products the substitution process usually 
develops vertically, from the most to the least highly 
processed items. This does not mean that substitution 
did not occur in greater or lesser degree in all lines 
of production. In fact, if this were not so, the substitu­
tion process would be brought to a halt through a 
formidable upswing in imports of goods at the lowest 
levels of processing. The long-term outcome of the sub­
stitution process as a whole seems therefore to be as 
noted.
Within the period analysed, substitution in the more 
highly processed sub-group is not “ visible” , because a 
sector whose relative incidence is very considerable in 
under-developed countries— that of textile manufac­
tures— w^as the one in which substitution was first 
effected, and in Brazil’s case this happened prior to the 
period covered by the analysis. For the same reason, 
the share of processed goods in this group of imports 
was the smallest throughout the period. In the case of 
processed goods other than textiles, substitution is more 
difficult. Nevertheless, continuing efforts are under way, 
as will be seen later, and are particularly satisfactory 
in relation to rubber and asbestos manufactures, al­
though less successful where paper and fertilizers are 
concerned. They have not sufficed, however, to reduce 
the share of products in this category in the import 
group under discussion, much less in the schedule.
To judge from the sample data, substitution in the 
sub-group comprising semi-processed materials was par­
ticularly marked in the case of wheat flour, textile yarns, 
cement (where self-sufficiency was achieved) and skins 
and hides.
With regard to pulp and other wood products a con­
siderable effort was made, whose results were mani­
fested during the last five years of the period in a con­
traction of imports of such commodities, in both absolute 
and relative terms. The same is true, although in a 
lesser degree, of chemical and pharmaceutical products 
in general.
Lastly, among raw materials, there was a substantial 
increase in imports of wheat and rubber. Wheat alone 
at the present time accounts for 40 per cent of imports 
in the whole group and 70 per cent of external pur­
chases of raw materials. Rubber represents a much 
less serious problem, and its situation will be discussed 
in the next section.
There was also an increase, although on a smaller 
scale, in imports of sulphur, textile fibres and cereals 
other than wheat. Imports of natural fertilizers, asbestos, 
skins and hides remained practically stationary. The 
only imports in this sub-group that declined were those 
of a few products of mineral origin, such as marble, 
clay, chalk and asphalt, whose relative significance is 
negligible.
To sum up, it may be concluded that as regards non- 
metallic raw materials and basic inputs, the substitution
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process has already reached a fairly advanced and there­
fore more difficult stage as far as fully processed goods 
are concerned, and is developing at a generally satis­
factory rate in the case of semi-processed products. 
Raw materials, however, present considerable substitu­
tion problems. One of the few exceptions is rubber, in 
whose case conditions are favourable for the expansion 
of production, and for which it is even possible, tech­
nologically speaking, to substitute synthetic rubber. 
Apart from this, only a few products of mineral origin 
may perhaps come to be replaced by their domestically- 
produced counterparts.
The case of wheat is obviously the most serious, since 
it is difficult to control the expansion of consumption 
through import substitution based on similar commodi­
ties. Moreover, domestic production conditions are far 
from satisfactory from the standpoint of achieving even 
a reduction in the import coefficient of consumption, as 
can be seen from the following data:





Imports as a 
percentage of 
consumption
1948 ............ ............ 728 405 313 44.4
1949 ............ ............ 1241 438 803 64.7
1950 ............ ............ 1760 532 1228 69.8
1951 ............ ............  1730 424 1306 75.5
1952 ............ ............ 1824 690 1134 62.2
1953 ............ ............ 2 387 111 1615 67.7
1954 ............ ............ 2 280 871 1409 61.8
1955 ............ ............ 2 787 1101 1686 60.5
1956 ............ ............ 2 307 885 1422 61.6
1957 ............ ............ 2 222 781 1441 64.9
1958 ............ ............ 2139 589 1506 72.5
1959 ............ ............ 2 475 611 1820 75.3
1960 ............ ............ 2 935 902 2 033 69.3
Sources: Servigo de Estatistica Economica e Finaneeira (SEEF) 
and Servigo de Estatistica de Produgao (SEP).
(f) Capital goods
As has already been pointed out, Brazil allocates a 
considerable amount of foreign exchange to imports 
of capital goods— between $300 million and $5(X) mil­
lion, without counting such exceptional years as 1951 
and 1952, in which imports soared to exceedingly high 
levels. Their share in the schedule has thus been kept 
within reasonable limits, fluctuating between 30 and 40 
per cent, and this fact largely accounts for Brazil 
having been able to maintain its rate of economic 
growth.
It should be stressed, however, that so constant a 
proportion of imports does not imply the absence of 
substitution in this field. Substitution did in fact take 
place in various lines of production, during the later 
years of the period, as a result of the installation and 
expansion of several metal transforming industries in 
Brazil.
From an analysis of table 19 it can be seen that the 
substitution process in question was “ visible”  at an
early stage iii the case of agricultural equipment (it 
began with agricultural tools and implements, long 
before 1948®®).
In respect of transport equipment, it was “ visible”  
only in the last two years of the period under review, 
but actually started with the installation of the motor 
vehicle industry, whose large-scale operation dates from 
1957.
See reference period.
Machinery and equipment for specific industries show 
some signs of substitution, especially if a comparison 
is made between the earliest and latest years of the 
period. In practice, however, as can be seen in table 20, 
definitely “ visible”  substitution took place only in the 
case of machinery for the textile industry. It was offset 
by a substantial increase in imports of equipment for 
foundries and the metallurgical industry in general, 
although by the last two years of the period some 
degree of contraction, especially in absolute terms, was 
observable.
Table 19
Brazil: Imports of capital goods, 1948-61 
(Quantum in thousands of dollars at 1955 prices)
Total Agricultural equipment
Machinery and equip­
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o f group 
total Quantum
Percentage 
o f group 
total
1948 .............. 392 085 39.3 26 709 6.8 54 453 13.9 43 551 11.1 153 257 39.1 114115 29.1
1949 36.7 40 314 10.7 57 233 15.2 40 991 10.9 91619 24.4 145 220 38.8
1950 .............. 443 299 37.0 86 346 19.5 57 682 13.0 41020 9.3 111 868 25.2 146 383 33.0
1951 .............. 757160 40.8 49168 6.5 87 585 11.6 81773 10.8 264464 34.9 274170 36.2
1952 .............. 820 252 45.9 52228 6.4 100 895 12.3 95 231 11.6 264 925 32.3 306 974 37.4
1953 .............. 368 672 32.0 13 204 3.6 73 438 19.9 59 345 16.1 80 894 21.9 141792 38.5
1954 .............. 462 570 30.4 28 382 6.1 53 262 11.5 63 663 13.8 106 501 23.0 210 761 45.6
1955 27.2 13 630 4.2 50 177 15.5 49127 15.2 89 335 2U.6 121 691 37.5
1956 .............. 302 747 26.5 13 868 4.6 37 634 12.4 45 275 15.0 93 957 31.0 112 014 37.0
1957 .............. 494 903 37.1 13 730 2.8 52 722 10.7 47 824 9.7 195 287 39.5 185 340 37.3
1958 .............. 501628 38.3 8147 1.6 44318 8.8 47 052 9.4 234888 46.8 167 223 33.4
1959 .............. 599 841 41.7 5 096 0.8 63 720 10.6 51 077 8.5 317519 52.9 162 429 Z12
1960 33.4 7 084 1.5 47178 9.8 49422 10.3 172 700 35.8 205 653 42.6
1961 .............. 449 507 31.4 8190 1.8 44 071 9.8 78 207 17A 90 004 20.0 229035 51.0
Source; ECLA sample data.
Table 20
Brazil: Imports of agricultural, AND INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT, 1948-61
(Quantum in thousands of dollars at 1955 prices)
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sub-groupYear Quantum Quantum Quantum Quantum Quantum sub-group Quantum i Quantum
1948 ............ 26 709 10 620 39.8 54 453 1269 2.3 1915 3.5 35 021 64.3 4 402 8.1
1949 ............ .40 314 20 778 51.5 57 233 %5 1.7 2 887 5.0 37 312 65.2 5 634 9.8
1950 28 240 32.7 57 682 5 642 9.8 3 883 6.7 27 456 47.8 8 644 15.0
1951 ............ 49168 16 538 33.6 87 585 9 802 11.2 3 788 4.3 43 763 50.0 11992 13.7
1952 ............  52228 12 425 23.8 100 895 7 271 7.2 7 284 7.2 56 367 55.9 13 738 13.6
1953 ............  13 204 3 200 24.2 73438 15 940 21.7 6 779 9.2 26 972 36.7 7153 9.7
1954 ............ 28 382 20 610 72.6 53 262 15 232 28.6 5 025 9.4 18 467 34.7 7 480 14.0
1955 ............ 13 630 6138 45.0 50 177 12 460 24.8 6149 12.3 16 375 32.6 6171 12.3
1956 ............ 13 868 6 259 45.1 37 634 9 743 25.9 1124 3.0 13 399 35.6 4116 10.9
1957 ............ 13 730 9 257 67.4 52 722 15 969 30.3 6 609 12.5 9 344 Yl.l 4232 8.0
1958 ............  8147 5 407 66.4 44 318 21005 47.4 1803 4.1 10 054 •22.1 4 705 10.6
1959 ............  5 096 2 926 57.4 63 720 34 865 54.7 1541 2.4 8 454 13.3 4 835 7.6
1%0 ............  7 084 4 934 69.6 47178 26502 56.2 3866 8.2 7% 9 16.9 4 594 9.7
1961 ............  8190 2 951 36.0 44 071 16 921 38.4 3152 7.2 16 380 37.2 4 383 9.9
Source: ECLA sample data.
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From 1956 onwards, the group constituted by elec­
trical machinery and equipment registered a fairly con­
stant volume of imports, revealing the considerable 
substitution effort made in that sector. In 1961, how­
ever, imports reached their peak for the whole period. 
This was attributable to a substantial increase in pur­
chases of heavy equipment, which is the branch of pro­
duction in which the stubstitution effort has only very 
recently been initiated (see table 21).
Lastly, it was in the proportion of the schedule repre­
sented by the remaining types of machinery and equip­
ment, grouped imder the head of miscellaneous items, 
that the biggest increment was registered during the 
period, in the course of which this sub-division came to 
account for 50 per cent of imported equipment. It covers, 
as will be seen later, all the heavy metal-transforming 
industries.
(i) Electrical machinery and equipment (table 21) : 
The two branches in which rnarked substitution took 
place were communications and medical and hospital
equipment. Substitution is also “ visible”  from 1953 on­
wards, although on a less significant scale, in respect 
of motors, generators and transformers, which had 
originally represented more than one half of total im­
ports of electrical equipment. The reason is that this 
sub-group comprises both light and heavy equipment. 
Where substitution actually took place was in the lighter 
lines of production, and, as already stated, it is only 
just beginning in the heavier branches. Even so, this 
is still the group whose relative importance within the 
table is greatest.
The only sub-group which represented a steadily ex­
panding proportion of imports and in which considerable 
figures were reached was that of miscellaneous items and 
accessories, the explanation obviously lying in the do­
mestic production process itself, which began with the 
assembly of imported parts and only gradually advanced 
towards integration. Moreover, the accessories in question 
include electrical parts for the motor vehicle industry, 
whose incidence is decisive as regards the increase in 
the relative importance of this sub-group.
Table 21
Brazil; Imports of electrical machinery and appliances, 1948-61 




































Year Quantum Quantum sub-group Quantum sub-group Quantum sub-group Quantum sub-group Quantum sub-group Quantum sub-group
1948 . . . . 43 551 24 213 55.6 9 690 22.3 2 788 6.4 3 008 6.9 1422 3.3 2 429 5.5
1949 . . . . 40 991 22147 54.0 4650 11.3 2 967 7.2 4271 10.4 3444 8.4 3512 8.7
1950 . . . . 41 020 21 914 53.4 4 218 10.3 4116 10.0 3 705 9.0 4 076 9.9 2 991 7.4
1951 . . . . 81 773 36 647 44.8 7 595 9.3 4 273 5.2 9 073 11.1 4 596 5.6 19 589 24.0
1952 . . . . 95 231 48 948 51.4 11823 12.4 4164 4.4 7 572 8.0 5 681 6.0 17 043 17.8
1953 . . . . 59 345 36 163 60.9 5 876 9.9 3148 5.3 1390 2.3 4169 7.0 8 599 14.6
1954 . . . . 63 663 37 660 59.2 4 836 1.6 3 041 4.8 3 721 5.8 4439 7.0 9 968 15.6
1955 . . . . 49127 24 513 49.9 8 894 18.1 1861 3.8 2157 4.4 2 895 5.9 8 807 17.9
1956 . . . . 45 275 20 974 46.3 10 571 23.3 1823 4.0 2 003 4.4 3 251 7.2 6 652 14.8
1957 . . . . 47 824 18 577 38.8 10 794 22.6 3 029 6.3 3131 6.5 5 402 11.3 6 892 14.5
1958 . . . . 47 052 20 321 43.2 6 340 13.5 1416 3.0 2 737 5.8 6 000 12.8 10 238 21.7
1959 . . . . 51 077 22 062 43.2 4 343 8.5 823 1.6 2 702 5.3 10234 20.0 10 913 21.4
1960 . . . . 49 422 14 978 30.3 3197 6.5 1189 2.4 3 899 7.9 7 299 14.8 18 860 38.1
1961 . . . . 78 207 36 808 47.1 6156 7.9 1234 1.6 4 760 6.1 7 408 9.5 21840 27.8
Source: ECLA sample data.
(ii) Transport equipment (table 2 2 ): As is natural 
intensive substitution is observable in respect of road 
transport equipment. Its share in this group of imports 
had dropped abruptly by the end of the period. Al­
though existing production capacity in the railway ma­
terial industry was largely under-utilized, no reduction 
of imports was achieved, except in the last two years 
of the period. This was mainly due to lack of com­
plementarity and to somewhat imsatisfactory manage­
ment and import policies. It must be noted, moreover, 
that as from 1957 imports of track (which are included
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in the group) became considerable— except in the last 
year of the period— as a result of the steel-making indus­
try’s own internal production policy. Since the different 
lines of end products are up to a point alternative, and 
the manufacture of track is relatively less lucrative, it is 
understandable that existing production capacity is 
used to obtain other goods of higher market value.
Maritime and air transport equipment shows no signs 
of a substitution process, and currently accounts for 
66 per cent of total imports in this group.
Table 22
Brazil: Imports of transport equipment, 1948-61 




























Tear Quanfum Quantum sub-group Quantum sub-group Quantum sub-group Quantum sub-group Quantum sub-group Quantum sub-group
1948 . . . . 153 257 21 553 14.1 13 698 8.9 4350 2.8 118 047 77.0 83 979 54.8 13 657 8.9
1949 . . . . 91 619 12 835 14.0 7534 8.2 918 1.0 69 652 76.0 48 054 52.5 9132 10.0
1950 . . . . 111868 7 533 6.7 3 520 3.1 888 0.8 95 760 85.6 58 976 52.7 8 575 7.7
1951 . . . . 264 464 9 601 3.6 6 203 2.3 945 0.4 188 468 71.3 116 454 44.0 66 395 25.1
1952 . . . . 264 925 43 423 16.4 39 811 15.0 1473 0.6 160 485 60.6 91567 34.6 61017 23.0
1953 . . . . 80 894 19 714 24.4 11225 13.9 1219 1.5 32 409 40.1 10 659 13.2 28 771 35.6
1954 . . . . 106 501 8 495 8.0 3 735 35 1431 1.3 88 850 83.4 47 929 45.0 9157 8.6
1955 . . . . 89 335 23 969 26.8 2 457 2.8 3 965 4.4 41 235 46.2 29 796 33.4 24131 27.0
1956 . . . . 93 957 8 086 8.6 4 866 5.2 1281 1.4 58860 62.7 43 774 46.6 27 o n 28.8
1957 . . . . 195 287 40 504 20.7 7 534 3.9 13 300 6.8 124 654 63.8 89 933 46.1 30130 15.4
1958 . . . . 234 888 26 597 11.3 5 970 2.5 11883 5.1 191 334 81.5 144 448 61.5 16 957 7.2
1959 . . . . 317 519 52 676 16.6 5 791 1.8 38 163 12.0 231 888 73.0 184 658 58.2 32 956 10.4
1960 . . . . 172 700 30 593 17.7 4 921 2.8 22 575 13.1 94442 54.7 89 305 51.7 47 665 27.6
1961 . . . . 90 004 14 959 16.6 6 306 7.0 6 776 7.5 15 753 17.5 14 325 15.9 59 292 65.9
Source: ECLA sample data.
(iii) MisceU/meous machinery and equipment (table 
2 3 ): In this group no “ visible”  substitution can be 
noted. On the contrary, aggregate imports doubled be­
tween the beginning and the end of the period, their 
quantum in 1961 exceeding $200 million.
The sub-group whose relative importance is highest 
is that of equipment for the heavy metal-transforming
industry, whose share fluctuates between 50 and 65 per 
cent of total imports in this group. Its composition can 
be seen in table 24, which bears witness to the increase 
in the proportion represented by machine-tools during 
the last part of the period— when the principal metal 
transforming industries were installed— and the conco­
mitant decrease (in relative terms) in imports of prime 
movers.
Table 23
Brazil: Imports of miscellaneous machinery and equipment, 1948-61 


































1948 . .................. 114 115 56 851 49.8 24 800 21.7 10 803 9.5 9 467 8.3 12 194 10.7
1949 ... ................ 146 220 81159 55.9 27 349 18.8 11325 7.8 11136 7.7 14 251 9.8
1950 ...................  146 383 83 547 57.1 27 905 19.1 8 442 5.8 12 640 8.6 13 849 9.4
1951 ...................  274 170 147 597 53.8 60 952 22.2 11467 4.2 18 588 6.8 35 566 13.0
1952 ...................  306 974 172 445 56.2 56 203 18.3 12 586 4.1 15 061 4.9 50 679 16.5
1953 ...................  141792 94139 66.4 21 049 14.8 6663 4.7 3 662 2.6 16 279 11.5
1954 ...................  210 761 137 001 65.0 33 866 16.1 12 999 6.2 8 718 4.1 18 178 8.6
1955 ...................  121691 64 926 53.4 28 159 23.1 8 975 7.4 4 573 3.8 15 058 12.3
1956 .. ................ 112 014 60 078 53.6 26 755 23.9 9 662 8.6 4 979 4.4 10 540 9.5
1957 ...................  185 340 114514 61.8 29 444 15.9 13 838 7.5 8 652 4.7 18 893 10.1
1958 ...................  167 223 106 283 63.6 23 020 13.8 13 079 7.8 11494 6.9 13 348 7.9
1959 ...................  162 429 85 030 52.3 40 488 24.9 9 936 6.1 9 392 5.8 17 583 10.9
1960 ...................  205 653 131494 63.9 38 243 18.6 10 818 5.3 12 064 5.9 13 033 6.3
1961 .. 124 146 54.2 42 228 18.4 14 240 6.2 18 547 8.1 29 874 13.1
Source: ECLA sample data.
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Table 24
BRAaL: Principal items in sub-croups of imports of heavy metal-transforminc machinery 





























1948 . . . . ........  56 851 5 314 9.3 18.391 32.3 12 611 22.2 12 545 22.1 6 238 11.0
1949 . . . . ........  81159 7 813 9.6 20 471 25.2 12 236 15.1 25 788 31.8 12 567 15.5
1950 . . . . ........  83 547 9 060 10.8 21123 25.3 8504 10.2 30 889 37.0 31403 37.6
1951 . . . . ........  147 597 23 955 16.2 32 646 22.1 9 716 6.6 27163 18.4 41581 28.2
1952 . . . . ........  172 445 30 464 17.7 36 890 21.4 13 238 7.7 38 333 22.2 33 968 19.7
1953 . . . . ........  94139 7139 7.6 20 573 21.9 8 385 8.9 18 145 19.3 24 302 25.8
1954 . . . . ........  137 001 9 087 6.6 24 787 18.1 7 569 5.5 24539 17.9 63 241 46.2
1955 . . . . ........  64926 8 071 13.4 15 670 24.1 5 798 8.9 7 997 12.3 22149 34.1
1956 . . . . ........  60 078 8104 13.5 13 876 23.1 5 039 8.4 8 310 13.8 18 712 31.1
1957 . . . . ........  114514 11758 10.3 22 433 19.6 5 725 5.0 30 170 26.3 39 571 34.6
1958 . . . . ........  106 283 13 947 13.1 16 260 15.3 7115 6.7 25 654 24.1 40 405 38.1
1959 . . . . ........  85 030 26 215 30.8 14 384 16.9 6 258 7.4 11177 13.1 24184 28.4
1960 . . . . ........  131494 13 347 10.2 17 592 13.4 8 885 6.8 24 947 19.0 60 791 46.2
1961 . . . . ........  124146 27 374 22.1 20 483 16.5 18 702 15.1 15 927 12.8 35 740 28.8
Source: ECLA sample data.
Other imports of heavy machinery also show more 
or less marked fluctuations, the most representative case 
being that of machinery for road building and repairs, 
in which a considerable decline was registered during 
the critical years 1955-56.
Broadly speaking, in respect of heavy equipment as 
of medium and light equipment, of scientific apparatus 
as of machines for office use, there was a eonsiderable 
increase in imports in absolute terms (irrespectively of 
their relative trends) between the beginning and end of 
the period covered by the analysis.
To sum up, in the light of the study of the main 
sample items, it may be coneluded that no real substitu­
tion process took place in respeet of eapital goods as 
a whole. Although in recent years a number of lines of 
domestic production of equipment were installed, in 
praetiee the results were insuffieient to meet any eon­
siderable proportion of the existing internal demand, 
with the sole exeeption of transport equipment. The 
causes of this phenomenon, whieh eoineides with the 
existenee of under-utilized eapacity in several branehes 
of the equipment industry, will be diseussed in the fol­
lowing seetions.
D. Relationship between the structure and evolu­
tion OF industrial production and of imports
This section will show, in broad terms, how the struc­
ture of Brazil’s industrial sectors was modified as a 
result of the import substitution process. For this pur­
pose a comparative analysis is made of some production 
and imports series, by sector and by product, in order to 
throw more light on substitution as actually carried out 
in certain branches of industry, since a simple analysis 
of the import structure is insufficient for its evaluation.
The analysis deals only with those manufacturing in­
dustries on which the best statistical series are avail­
able and which, moreover, are most directly linked to 
the substitution process.
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The first part of this section comprises a brief evalua­
tion of the changes that have taken place in the produc­
tion structure of the leading manufacturing sectors, and 
of the parallel changes in the import structure of indus­
trial products. The aim of this evaluation is to measure, 
by means of the import coefficient in terms of the total 
sectoral supply, the substitution that actually took place 
in each branch of activity.
In the second part a comparison is made between the 
evolution of the relevant series on industrial produc­
tion and on imports, and between their respiective growth 
rates, in an attempt to assess how far the rate of the 
former in the last few years was rapid enough to reduce 
or at least to curb the growth rate of the latter. In 
addition, a few salient products are picked out in each 
sector to show the evolution of the share of imports in 
the total apparent consumption of such products.
The above-mentioned analysis, although brief, will 
convey some idea of the results of the substitution 
process for the main sectors of Brazil’s manufacturing 
industry.
1. Sectoral changes in the structure of Brazilian industry 
from 1949 to 1961
The sectoral changes in the structure of industry can 
be evaluated in the light of the data in table 25,®^  which
31 The production figures contained in this table are based on 
the 1949 Census data and on data on Brazil’s industrial output 
in 1958. The provisional data for 1961 were taken from the 
August 1963 issue of Desenvolvimento e Conjuntura. For the 
selection of data on industrial imports, by groups of manufactur­
ing industries, a correlation was established between the SEEF 
1953 nomenclature for Brazilian goods and Brazil’s industrial 
classification.
One shortcoming of the table comparing 1949, 1958 and 1961 
is that the data are expressed in terms of current cruzeiros. 
Distortions may have crept in as a result of variations in the 
relative prices, but since price indexes by manufacturing sector 
were not available, there was no other course to follow. It should 
also be pointed out that the production figures for 1961 are 
tentative in the extreme.
indicate that substantial changes took place between 
1949 and 1961.
In 1949 two industries alone— food and textiles—  
accounted for over 50 per cent of the total value of 
manufacturing production. The share of each of the 
remaining industries was less than 10 per cent, although 
metallurgy and chemicals had already begun to emerge 
as the next in order of importance, even if at a far 
lower level than the first two.
By 1958 the combined share of the food and textile 
industries had declined to 36 per cent, and in 1961 ac­
counted for only 34 per cent of aggregate production 
value. Generally speaking, a considerable increase took 
place in the relative importance of the metal-transform­
ing, metallurgical, electrical equipment, transport equip­
ment and chemical industries, which for this reason, are 
henceforward termed the dynamic industries. The group 
as a whole expanded its participation from 22 per cent 
in 1949 to 38 per cent in 1958 and 41 per cent in 1961.
The converse is true of the traditional industries, 
namely, food products, beverages, tobacco manufactures, 
hides and skins, textiles, clothing, wood products, furni­
ture and printing and publishing, whose total share fell 
from 70 per cent in 1949 to 52 per cent in 1958 and 
49 per cent in 1961. This does not mean that these 
industries have not stepped up their production, but 
simply, shown later, that they did so at a far slower 
pace than the first group mentioned, and are therefore 
referred to hereafter as the slow-growth industries.
The industries for processing non-metalliferous ores, 
paper, paperboard and rubber, which are here termed 
the intermediate industries,^^ also increased their share 
of production (from 8 per cent in 1949 to 10 per cent 
in 1958-61), but to a less marked extent than the dynamic 
industries.
Some data are given below to indicate how changes 
in the structure of production affect the import sub­
stitution process. To that end an examination is made 
of the changes in the structure of industrial imports 
(grouped under the heads of the different manufactur­
ing industries), in conjunction with the variations in 
the coefficients expressing imports as a proportion of 
the total sectoral supply.
Industrial imports that may be regarded as belonging 
to the slow-growth industries were in general at an 
exceeding low level in 1949. This indicates that the 
majority of these industries had by then virtually com­
pleted the substitution process. It also explains why 
the figures for imports of furniture, clothing and tobacco 
manufactures are of no significance, the relevant import 
coefficients having dropped practically to nothing.
32 The term “ intermediate industries” does not refer merely to 
the fact that their output is destined for intermediate use in the 
production process in general, since that is equally true of some 
products of the traditional and dynamic industries. As, however, 
the latter are classified in sectoral aggregates, which make it 
impossible to separate production according to use (intermediate 
or final), and the output of the three sectors considered (non- 
metalliferous ores, paper and rubber) is mostly destined for 
intermediate use, their grouping in a third category would appear 
to be justified. Even more important, however, is the fact that 
their average growth rate comes somewhere between that of the 
other two groups (the slow-growth and the dynamic industries). 
Hence it was decided to adopt the term “ intermediate” , subject 
to the necessary reservations.
Imports of wood products, hides and skins, bever­
ages and printed matter are equally insignificant. The 
share of the first group remained the same throughout 
the period and the import coefficient (1 per cent) was 
virtually unchanged. Imports of hides and skins declined, 
and their import coefficient with respect to total supplies 
dropped to negligible proportions. Beverages and printed 
matter increased their share of imports, and as a result 
of the unsatisfactory growth of domestic production, 
their import coefficients registered a moderate rise be­
tween 1949 and 1958. However in 1961 the publishing 
industry seems to have succeeded in reducing both its 
import coefficient and its share in total imports.
The only slow-growth industries of importance for an 
analysis of the substitution process are food products 
and textiles. In both, production must have expanded 
more rapidly than consumption, since there was a simul­
taneous drop in their import coefficients with respect to 
total supplies and in their relative share of imports. 
Nevertheless, substitution was more drastic in the textile 
industry. In fact, textile imports dropped sharply and 
the import coefficient fell in 1958 to less than 1 per cent 
of the over-all supply, and remained at that level up 
to 1961.
The situation will now be examined from the angle 
of the dynamic industries. In all cases, the import coef­
ficient in 1949 was fairly high in relation to total 
supply, and so was these industries’ contribution to 
industrial imports. This corresponded to the particular 
import substitution phase reached by the economy at 
the time.
Generally speaking the expansion of production caused 
a sharp reduction in the import coefficients; however the 
1961 data appear to indicate that, in some industries, 
substitution after 1958 was not sufficient to keep the 
coefficients down to the level reached that year.
The highest import coefficients for 1949 were regis­
tered by the metal-transforming, transport equipment 
and electrical equipment industries.
In 1958 there was an appreciable drop in the import 
coefficient of the metal-transforming industry, and also 
in its share of imports. However, both these indicators 
rose considerably in 1961, and there was a slight de­
cline in the industry’s contribution to total production. 
This is undoubtedly the branch of industry where the 
greatest substitution effort has yet to be made; its im­
port coefficient is by far the highest of all the manu­
facturing industries, since it is nearly 50 per cent of the 
total supply in this sector.
The most satisfactory results in the years under review 
were achieved by the transport equipment industry, al­
though the main effort was made only after 1957, when 
Brazil’s motor-vehicle industry was established. Hence 
the increase in this industry’s share of imports in 1958 
(consisting mainly of spare parts, as noted above), 
despite the sharp decline in the import coefficient. In 
1961, on the other hand, both the import coefficient and 
the share of imports fell sharply.
In the electrical equipment industry there was a reduc­
tion of 70 per cent in the import coefficient between 1949 
and 1958, which was the sharpest drop in any industrial 
sector during the period. This intensive substitution re­
presented the establishment of industries manufacturing 
household electrical appliances and light equipment and
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Table 25
Brazil; Production, imports and import coefficients for the manufacturing industries
(Millions of current cruzeiros)
Branch o f manufacturing industry
1949 195S 1961




Imports Percentage Production Percentage Imports Percentage Productior\ Percentage Imports Percentage Production Percentage 1949 1958 1961
Metallurgy .................... 2 334 13.5 8137 7.7 10 237 12.6 76 977 11.0 35 221 16.3 266 030 13.4 22.3 11.7 11.7
Metal-tranfonning .............. 3 032 17.5 1719 1.6 12 480 15.4 17 577 2.5 41754 19.4 48 468 2.4 63.8 41.5 46.3
Electrical and communica-
tions equipment .............. 1218 7.0 1502 1.4 4 773 5.9 31163 4.4 17 088 7.9 84171 4.2 448 13.3 16.9
Transport equipment ........ 3 232 18.6 7. M l 2.3 20 590 25.3 46 850 6.7 37 189 172 163185 8.1 56.6 30.5 18.6
Chemicals and pharmaceu-
tical products .................. 3 809 22.0 9196 8.7 23 424 28.8 93 934 13.4 54 566 25.3 259 459 12.9 29.3 20.0 17.4
Processing of non-metallifer-
ous ores ........................... 542 3.1 4835 4.6 1826 2.2 33 701 4.8 4078 1.9 88 751 4.4 10.1 5.1 44
paper and paperboard........ 226 1.3 2132 2.0 1134 1.4 20 427 2.9 4821 2.2 62135 3.1 9.6 5.3 72
Rubber ................................. 22 0.1 1722 1.6 972 1.2 13890 2.0 6 796 32 39 573 2.0 1.3 6.5 147
Wood products ................... 37 0.2 3 634 3.4 180 02 17 934 2.6 352 0.2 51106 2.5 1.0 1.0 0.7
Textiles ............................... 1319 7.6 20 026 19.0 578 0.7 98 941 14.1 1702 0.8 269 738 13.4 6.2 0.6 0.6
Clothing, footwear, etc....... — — 4649 4.4 3 — 26177 3.7 11 _ 68114 3.4 0.2 _ _
Food products ..................... 1362 7.8 34 302 32.5 4002 4.9 159 058 22.6 9 301 4.3 411669 20.5 3.8 2.5 22
Beverages ............................. 82 0.5 3 348 3.2 485 0.6 18 083 2.6 1366 0.6 51345 2.6 2.4 2.6 2.6
Tobacco ............................... 6 — 1475 1.4 18 — 9 270 1.3 6 -  I f 0.4 —  1
Printing and publishing.... 69 0.4 3 031 2.9 501 0.6 16 363 2.3 1377 0.6 1 22 3.0 1.0
Furniture ............................. 6 — 1781 1.7 2 — 13 553 1.9 5 148 404 7.3 ^ 0.3 -  (Hides and skins................. 50 0.3 1630 1.5 69 0.1 8 876 1.3 57 -  J 1 3.0 0.7 J
Total ................................. 17 353 100.0 105596 100.0 81274 100.0 702 784 100.0 215690 100.0 2012148 100.0 15.6 11.3 9.7
Source; Yearbooks on industrial production and foreign trade, and the periodical Desenvolvimento e Conjuntura.
fixtures, and the result was an increase In the sector’s 
contribution to the total value of industrial production, 
and a relative reduction in imports. Once substitution 
was virtually completed in the lighter industries, the 
growth of industry as a whole slowed down considerably, 
as shown by the data for 1961. In fact, that year wit­
nessed a complete reversal of the previous pattern of be­
haviour, as regards not only production and imports, but 
also the import coefiGicient, which rose again to nearly 17 
per cent of the total supply of electrical equipment.
The two dynamic industries in which import substi­
tution had already reached a more advanced stage by 
1949 were the chemical and pharmaceutical industry 
and the metallurgical industry. The latter considerably 
increased its contribution to production, particularly at 
the end of the period, when it outstripped all the other 
manufacturing industries except the food industry. It 
was impossible to reduce the import coefficient after 
1958, however, because of the rapid growth of consump­
tion. The reverse is true of the chemical and pharmaceu­
tical industry; despite the contraction of its contribution 
to production during that period, it expanded sufficiently 
in absolute terms to reduce the import coefficient in 1961, 
as well as its share in imports, even though the latter still 
accounted for over 25 per cent of total industrial imports 
for that year.
Lastly, in the intermediate industries, for the process­
ing of non-metalliferous ores the results of substitution 
were entirely satisfactory, for the paper and paperboard 
industry much less so, and for the rubber industry com­
pletely unsatisfactory.
In the first sector not only did the already small share 
of imports diminish still further, but the import coeffi­
cient declined by over 30 per cent between 1949 and 
1961. The expansion of production in the paper and 
paperboard industry between 1949 and 1958 permitted 
a reduction in the import coefficient; however, in spite of 
a persistent rise in its share of industrial production, the 
industry was unable to prevent a rise in the import co­
efficient in 1961. This shows that there was a marked 
expansion of consumption in the last few years, which 
can be ascribed to the parallel substitution process which 
took place in the printing and publishing industry.
At the beginning of the period in question the rubber 
industry had one of the lowest import coefficients, while 
its share of imports was negligible. However, the ex­
pansion of its production capacity lagged far behind the 
increased growth rate of consumption, especially at the 
end of the period, and the result was a sharp increase in 
the import coefficient, which in 1961 was about 15 per 
cent of the total value of supply in the sector.
To sum up, generally speaking nearly all the manu­
facturing industries can be said to have achieved a con­
siderable import substitution during the period under 
review. The extent of this achievement can be measured 
by the fact that the average import coefficient ( in terms of 
the total supply of industrial products) fell from nearly 
16 per cent in 1949 to less than 10 per cent in 1961.
The only industries in which no effective type of sub­
stitution could be distinguished were the rubber and 
beverage industries. In all the rest, it is evident from a 
comparison of the figures for the beginning and the end 
of tbe period that production expanded faster than con­
sumption. Most of them even attained rates capable of
reducing the corresponding imports in relative terms. 
This does not mean that a reduction took place in abso­
lute terms; as shown below, this occurred in one or two 
sectors only, and even then rarely for the whole period.
These import substitution activities in the manufactur­
ing sector brought about marked changes in the structure 
of production and consequently in the structure of im­
ports. In the first place, there was an appreciable decline 
in the relative importance of food products and textiles, 
in both production and imports. In fact, from 1958 on 
the substitution process may be regarded as having come 
to an end in the traditional industries as a whole.
From the standpoint of the structure of imports, the 
only sectors that increased their share in the sample 
were the metallurgical, metal-transforming, and chemical 
and pharmaceutical industries, which in 1961 accounted 
for over 50 per cent of the total volume of industrial 
imports.
As might be expected, the most dynamic behaviour 
during the period concerned was that of the basic indus­
tries, whose high import coefficients in terms of total 
supply left room for considerable substitution. However, 
certain of these industries appear to have lost something 
of their dynamism between 1958 and 1961.®® In the two 
most obvious cases, the metal-transforming and electrical 
equipment industries, this slower rate of growth is easily 
explained by two main factors: the transition from the 
categories of light industries to the capital-intensive in­
dustries, and the reduction of the margin of domestic 
market that remains for substitution.
Examination of the size of import coefficients in terms 
of sectoral supply shows that they were still relatively 
high in 1961 for the metal-transforming, chemical, rub­
ber and transport equipment industries.
These are nevertheless the only branches of industry 
in which effective substitution is possible on a fairly 
large scale in the next few years, and even so it would 
be significant in absolute terms only in the first three 
industries. Since, moreover, those three sectors would re­
quire a high capital investment for expansion of their 
production capacity, it is clear that to proceed with 
industrialization purely by means of import substitution, 
even if this were possible, would lead to an expansion 
of the economy entailing a reduction in the product- 
capital ratio, that is, at least in the short term, decreasing 
yields in macro-economic terms.®^
The feasibility and implications of such a course are 
considered in the last sections of this study.
2. The evolution of domestic production in the main 
manufacturing industries, and of the corresponding 
imports^^
The total output of the manufacturing industries in­
creased by about 82 per cent in the period 1955-61, com-
33 It must be home in mind that the data for 1961 are very 
tentative; however, they can be regarded as acceptable for 
purposes of comparison in relative terms, on the assumption that 
the errors are distributed evenly throughout the sample.
34 Of course, the expansion of industrial production in those 
sectors where there is installed capacity that is not being fully 
used would, on the contrary, permit increased returns, in macro- 
economic terms, from the scarce factor, capital, through the full 
utilization of that capacity.
*3 For the analysis in this section, the data used for imports 
are those of the ECLA sample, expressed in dollars at 1955
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pared with an increase of only 66 per cent in the previous 
six years.
Imports of the corresponding industrial products in­
creased relatively little, if the exceptional years 1951-52 
are excluded. Between 1948 and 1961 the over-all growth 
of the quantum of such products was 14 per cent, as 
against over 40 per cent for the total import quantum. 
Thus it is clear that the substitution that took place was 
closely linked to expansion of the manufacturing industry, 
and that the ties became even stronger towards the end of 
the period.
The sectors in which the substitution process goes back 
furthest and has now reached a very advanced stage, are 
the traditional, or slow-growth industries. For nearly 
all these branehes imports of the eorresponding produets 
are negligible in absolute terms, with the one exeeption 
of food products, which account for over half of the 
imports in this group as a whole and averaged over $30 
million a year for the period 1955-61.
Analysis of the quantum indexes in table 26-A shows 
that, as might be expeeted, the rate at which the slow- 
growth industries develop was lower than that of in­
dustry as a whole, although for most of them the tempo
prices and reclassified in accordance with the Brazilian industrial 
classification. For output the indices used were those for industrial 
production calculated by the Fundagao Getulio Vargas, published 
in Conjuntura Económica, February 1963. In the antdysis the 
following industrial sectors were not included; wood products, 
furniture, clothing and footwear. This was not only because in 
some of these sectors output data are by no means reliable, 
but even more because the import data are not particularly 
revealing, since they refer to sectors in which substitution took 
place a long time ago. In the comparative analysis of the pro­
duction and import indices the emphasis, generally speaking, is 
on 1955 and subsequent years, since it is only for that period 
that there are production data for the more dynamic industries 
and consequently comparison between the various sectors is 
possible.
towards the end of the period was satisfactory and even 
permitted import substitution to continue.
In the food industry production increased 49 per cent 
between the base year (1955) and 1961, while towards 
the end of the period imports were in the region of half 
the volume for 1955. The same is true of the hides and 
skins industry.
For the textile and tobacco industries the growth rate 
was similar, and in the last years of the period there was 
a sharp contraction in imports of the corresponding 
items, which fell to very low levels. This did not, how­
ever, reflect a special effort on the part of the domestic 
industries, since there is a large amount of idle eapacity 
in the textile industry, and Brazil has always been a 
large producer (and even exporter) of tobaeeo produets.
For the beverage industry, too, the main substitution 
effort was made some time ago. However, this industry 
stood out from the other traditional branches by being 
the only one in which output remained virtually stationary 
throughout the period, except for the last year. At the 
same time imports, which in 1955 had been redueed to 
a very low level, took an upturn.
The printing and publishing industry had a satisfae- 
tory tempo of development similar to that of the other 
slow-growth industries, and a reduction of over 20 per 
cent in imports was effected compared with the base 
year. However, this industry is the only one of the group 
for which the corresponding import quantum was higher 
in 1961 than in 1948. This is probably due not only 
to a marked inerease in eonsumption, related to the 
increase in higher education, but also to a less forceful 
policy of import restriction. Even so, difSculties in the 
way of importing foreign books and publieations, es- 
peeially because of the high cost of foreign exchange, 
were sufScient to lead to the appearanee in the last few
Table 26-A
Brazil: Import and production indices for the manufacturinc industries
(1955 =  100)
SloW’grototh (traditional) industries
Hides and skins
All manufacturing similar  ^ r. , , Printing
industries products Textiles Food products Beverages Tobacco and publishing
YgQf Imports Production Imports Production Imports Production Imports Production Imports Production Imports Production Imports Production
1948 ................ 99.9 54.5 92.1 89.9 306.5 66.1 147.1 60.7 721.6 63.8 474.5 44.4 41.6 49.6
1949 ................ 98.2 60.3 126.5 91.9 320.8 71.0 72.0 68.4 254.8 71.4 322.1 51.6 44.8 48.7
1950 ’ .............. 109.8 67.8 174.8 93.9 315.4 75.0 53.8 76.9 311.4 84.8 457.0 58.7 38.4 58.3
1951 ................ 181.9 71.9 247.8 100.0 509.3 72.6 86.7 79.5 652.4 101.1 630.3 69.0 60.0 71.3
1952 ................ 174.3 76.0 189.8 94.9 242.2 76.6 114.7 80.3 375.0 91.4 534.9 76.2 60.8 85.2
1953 ................ 103.5 82.6 82.5 101.0 161.9 80.6 62.7 85.5 208.2 95.2 308.7 79.4 76.1 87.0
1954 ................ 148.2 90.1 136.6 102.0 277.9 95.2 112.8 83.8 228.4 94.3 217.4 91.3 94.9 95.7
1955 ................  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1956 ................ 94.7 106.6 103.6 111.1 125.1 100.0 84.4 88.9 151.9 87.6 308.7 105.6 104.7 104.3
1957 ................ 117.0 112.4 80.9 115.2 129.5 87.9 70.4 107.7 154.4 94.3 60.8 111.9 93.3 132.2
1958 ............ 111.5 131.4 63.5 126.3 61.2 117.7 46.7 118.8 143.6 102.9 143.5 120.6 60.9 121.7
1959 ................ 123.3 142.1 48.0 125.3 31.2 122.6 36.2 130.8 148.9 107.6 1565 127.0 75.0 125.2
1960 ................ 119.7 163.6 52.7 139.4 18.2 133.9 50.7 138.5 177.1 104.8 78.3 131.0 80.0 1365
1961 ................ 113.9 181.8 62.4 149.5 27.3 142.2 59.8 145.3 140.3 121.9 17.4 150.8 76.8 144.3
Source; Production indices of the Fundagao Getulio Vargas (FGV) and import indices given by the ECLA sample.
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years of a number of publishing concerns devoted to the 
translation and publication of foreign technical books.
In brief, it can be concluded that the substitution pro­
cess in the traditional industries has continued at a 
fairly active level during recent years, especially in view 
of the advanced stage it had already reached. In fact the 
growth rates of nearly all the industries in this group 
are higher than the growth rate of per capita income, 
which, generally speaking, is what may be expected of 
the slow-growth industries.*®
This is largely attributable to the markedly restrictive 
exchange policy adopted in relation to imports of non- 
essential products, which gave a strong impetus to con-
36 In view of the fact that their average income elasticity 
would not be higher than unity.
tinned import substitution in these sectors. Already in 
1960 and 1961, when the exchange policy became less 
sharply selective, there was an increase in imports of 
products of nearly all the industrial groups considered, 
despite the standstill in the total import quantum.
Let us now examine the trends followed by the dynamic 
industries. In the case of the metallurgical industry, and 
the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, in which im­
port substitution began some time ago, the growth rates 
of production in recent years are lower than for other 
industries in this group. The industries producing elec­
trical equipment and transport equipment, and the metal­
transforming industry, are of more recent establishment, 
and the available production indices, which date from 
1955, show a rapid growth rate, particularly for metal­
transforming (see table 26-B).
Table 26-B
Brazil: Import and production indices for the manufacturing industries
(1955 =  100)
Dynamic industries Intermediate industries
Transport
Chemicals and Electrical and equipment Non-metallic
pharmaceutical Metal- communications (construction mineral Paper and
Metallurgy products transforming equipment and assembly) manufacture- paperboard Rubber
Im- Produc- Im- Produc- Im- Produc- Im- Produc- Im- Produc- Im- Produc- Im- Produc- Im- Produc- 
Year ports tion ports tion ports tion ports tion ports tion ports don ports tion ports tion
1948 .............. 72.4 45.9 63.7 21.4 97.5 122.3 222.3 155.2 47.3 41.2 56.1 11.6 49.6
1949 .............. 91.8 55.0 76.8 23.3 124.2 115.8 143.8 152.8 51.2 54.0 64.9 7.2 56.4
1950 .............. 94.5 69.7 92.7 26.3 149.8 118.0 158.6 157.0 55.8 73.2 74.6 6.7 65.8
1951   139.9 77.1 131.8 35.1 219.3 233.6 388.1 258.7 58.1 84.7 78.9 83.2 71.8
1952   133.5 80.7 124.8 32.1 239.9 201.2 330.1 292.8 64.3 87.1 78.9 116.0 76.9
1953   96.2 91.7 110.4 38.2 130.3 107.4 105.4 246.6 77.5 76.6 87.7 3.8 85.5
1954 .............. 182.0 99.1 151.1 42.7 163.3 134.0 130.4 136.0 93.0 118.2 94.7 86.1 97.4
1955 .............. 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1956 .............. 88.1 115.6 103.0 133.6 85.1 115.0 93.4 159.0 107.6 112.0 62.5 110.0 109.1 114.9 37.3 94.0
1957   118.3 107.3 87.8 136.3 139.5 110.0 101.4 156.0 207.3 249.0 66.1 109.3 134.2 108.8 72.3 98.3
1958   86.0 127.5 91.9 159.2 122A 119.0 100.4 261.0 2545 366.0 54.1 111.6 109.2 125.4 92.6 111.1
1959 .............. 126.3 143.1 86.7 163.7 122.1 —  95.2 313.0 325.7 530.0 59.2 123.3 108.6 132.5 161.0 131.6
1960 .............. 128.1 1505 108.9 186.6 142.3 —  92.8 385.0 1755 721.0 54.1 131.8 106.9 143.0 197.8 148.7
1961   132.1 167.0 96.3 205.3 150.0 —  1395 477.0 95.9 800.0 96.8 141.1 93.9 155.3 205.0 146.2
Source: Production indices of the Fundajao Getulio Vargas (FGV) and import indices given by the ECLA sample.
The metallurgical industry, although expanding at a 
relatively satisfactory rate between 1955 and 1961, was 
unable to meet the growing demand for metal products 
entailed by the rapid expansion of other industrial sec­
tors, and this led to a substantial increase in imports of 
these products in recent years.
The situation should be remedied to some extent once 
the recent additions to production capacity in the na­
tional steel industry begin to operate. Nevertheless, a 
more radical process of import substitution is called for, 
and will have to continue for a number of years, in the
metallurgy of both ferrous and non-ferrous metals. On 
the pace of import substitution in this sector largely de­
pend the possibilities of pressing on with this process 
in a number of other sectors, in particular the metal­
transforming industries, in order to avoid a considerable 
net increase in imports.
To evaluate the effective substitution that has taken 
place in the national steel industry, see the evolution of 
the import coefficients with respect to apparent consump­
tion, given in table 27.
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Table 27
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Production 279 635 35 903 60 026 42 050 117 689 37 186 572 849
Imports 24 909 112 324 5 611 27 346 48 369 45 747 264306
Total 304544 148 227 65 637 42 050 145 035 85 555 45 747 836 795
— Exports 4 201 4201
304544 148 227 65 637 42 050 140 834 85 555 45 747 832 594 31.7
1951
Production 345 594 44901 42 243 50 880 154 652 43 545 681815
Imports 48474 144506 5 972 34 782 93 924 46 996 374 654
Total 394068 189 407 42 215 50 880 189 434 137469 46 996 1056 469
— Exports 18 542 560
394050 189 407 48 215 50 880 188 892 137 469 46 996 1055 909 35.5
1952
Production 315 651 40 533 77 890 57 390 169477 42 162 703103
Imports 46 873 112 885 9 309 79 747 73 107 50493 372414
Total 362 524 153 418 87 199 57 390 249 224 115 269 50 493 1 075 517
— Exports 2 724 2 724
362 524 153 418 87199 57 390 246 500 115 269 50 493 1072 793 34.7
1953
Production 401696 48 945 53 945 63 575 185 872 40 414 794 460
Imports 23 259 51637 7 650 36 686 64148 65 25 510 208 955
Total 424 955 100 595 61595 63 575 222 558 104 562 65 25 510 1003 415
■—-Exports


























419 794 48 004 52 360 62 666 209 987 41226 834 037
192 725 164 510 8 596 11528 104 029 114 094 60 56 754 652 296
612 519 212 514 60 956 74194 314 016 155 320 60 56 754 1 486 333
612 519 212 514 60 956 74194 314 016 155 320 60 56 754 1486 333 43.9
376 761 61587 80 598 79707 295 800 37 830 932 283
83 733 90 396 23 523 2 405 47 970 72 018 80 19 239 332 364
460 494 151 983 104121 82112 343 770 109 848 80 19 239 1271647
11851 11851
448 643 151 983 104121 82112 343 770 109 848 80 19239 1259 796 26.4
439 567 67 723 122 532 64328 302 612 76 899 1 073 661
21538 82 368 5 764 102 31 880 94 637 94 10 970 247 353
461105 150 091 128 296 64 430 334 492 171 536 94 10 970 1321 014
2 724 2 724
458 381 150 091 128 296 64 430 334 492 171 536 94 10 970 1318290 18.8
507 000 70 000 90 243 87 567 311433 63 946 1130189
25 858 94112 82 326 328 46 604 109 237 1795 6182 21038 387 480
532 858 164112 172 569 87 895 358 037 173183 1795 6182 21038 1517 669
3110 3110
529 748 164 112 172 569 87 895 358 037 173 183 1795 6181 21038 1514 559 25.6
631 000 75 000 57 248 102 072 358 928 79 385 1 303 633
25 547 29 381 75 029 196 39 583 33 051 45 2 890 7123 212 845
656 547 104 381 132 277 102 268 398 511 112436 45 2 890 7123 1516 478























Production 735 000 89 000 53114 104483 420 474 89 938 1492 009
Imports 52465 39 372 240 998 25 015 80494 58108 697 1048 6573 594770
Total 787 465 128 372 294112 129 498 500 968 148 046 697 1048 6 573 1 996 779 25.3
— Exports
787 465 128 372 294112 129498 500 968 148 046 697 1048 6 573 1 996 779
1960
Production 869700 115 788 13 864 102997 503 202 94 078 826 6 910 1 707 365
Imports 36 655 64299 141660 7 925 85 009 85 274 127 662 12 871 434 482
Total 906 355 180 087 155 524 110 922 588211 179 352 953 7 572 12 871 2 141847
— Exports 16 827 1349
889528 180 087 155 524 110922 586 862 179352 953 7 572 12 871 2123 671 20.5
1961
Production 939 711 139163 31677 124 059 551896 132 727 2 469 6 891 1928 593
Imports 59916 62 019 42 819 11143 100 759 40262 8 488 13 304 330 718
Total 999 627 201182 74496 135 202 652 655 172 989 I M l 7 379 13 304 2 259311
—Exports 7 745 275 8 020
991882 201182 74 496 135202 652 655 172 989 2 477 7 104 13 304 2 251 291 14.7
Sources: ECLA, Banco Nacional do Desenvolviraento Economico (BNDE) and SEEF.
Note: In order to make the Latin American countries’ import figures uniform wire manufactures (7.74.11, 7.74.22, 7.74.29) 
are included under wire, and tinplate manufactures (7439) under tinplate.
Data on the metallurgy of non-ferrous metals are less 
satisfactory, and could be obtained only for the five-year 
period 1955-60. Nevertheless they suflBce to show the 
high degree of dependence on imports for the supply of 
these materials. The expansion of domestic production 
was insufficient to reduce the volume of imports, even 
for aluminium, which is the most developed sector of this 
industry, and was particularly unsatisfactory for copper 
and tin, even though tin had the lowest import coefficient 
in relation to apparent consumption.
Br.4xil: Import coefficients for non-ferrous metals, 1955-60
Total Production Imports Import
coefficient
(percentage)(Tons)
1955 .......... ............ 82 687 7 271 75 416 91.2
1956 .......... ............ 92 545 13 796 78 749 85.1
1957 .......... ............ 115178 19 384 95 794 83.2
1958 .......... ............ 104 958 16 037 88 921 84.7
1959 .......... ............ 100 635 24 473 76162 75.7
1960 .......... ............ 120 061 26 395 93 666 78.0
Source: BNDE (Economic Department).
The industry manufacturing chemicals and pharca- 
ceutical products, taken as a whole, expanded more 
rapidly than the metallurgical industry; for the six-year 
period 1955-61 the growth rate was in the region of 205 
per cent, which is considerably higher than the rate for 
the manufacturing industries as a whole.
However, this higher growth rate is really due almost 
entirely to the inclusion in the group of the petroleum 
products industry. If the data for 1954 are compared 
with those for 1955, it is clear that output, which had 
been increasing at a moderate pace, rose suddenly by 
over 100 per cent, while imports fell by 50 per cent.
This coincided with the large-scale entry into operation 
of Petrobras.
The existing production series are not sufficient to per­
mit a separate evaluation of the growth of the three main 
aggregates concerned, namely, the petroleum industry, 
the pharmaceutical industry and the remainder of the 
chemical industry.®'  ^ Consequently the following para­
graphs analyse the behaviour of some of the most sig­
nificant products, though they belong only to the first and 
third of the above three sectors.
A study of the data available for the group as a whole, 
however, shows that the industry’s over-all expansion was 
sufficient to stabilize imports for the period in question.
Tables 28 to 30 give some production and import data 
for caustic soda, chemical fertilizers and the petroleum 
industry. The import coefficients represent a very high 
proportion of total supply for the first two, despite the 
considerable efforts being made to raise domestic pro­
duction both of caustic soda and other basic chemicals, 
and of fertilizers, particularly the nitrogenous kind. For 
the latter the import coefficient continues to be over 
50 per cent of apparent consumption, despite Petrobras’ 
recent entry into this branch of the petrochemical in­
dustry.
In the petroleum industry proper there has been a 
rapid expansion of petroleum-refining capacity and a 
considerable decline in the import coefficient in relation 
to total apparent consumption of liquid fuels, although 
substitution was much more intense in the case of motor 
spirit, and imports of fuel oil in 1960 stiU represent about 
50 per cent of the total supply.
sr For data on the production of chemicals in 1959-60 see the 
ECLA study La industria química en América Latina (E/CN.12/ 
628/Rev.l).
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As regards crude petroleum, however, despite the 
enormous efforts made the results merely sufiBced to 
prevent a rise in imports in the last three years of the 
period under analysis. Although the import coefiBcient 
decreased in relation to total apparent consumption, it 
still remained very high (over 60 per cent).
Table 28








Caustic soda (thousands of tons)
1956 . . . . ............ 175 47 128 73.1
1957 . . . , .............  148 57 91 61.5
1958 . . . . ............ 148 60 88 59.5
1959 . . . . ............  166 64 102 61.4
1960 . . . . ............ 170 69 101 59.4
Fertilizers (tons)
1956 . . . . ............ 645 016 188 970 456 046 70.7
1957 . . . . ............ 716 596 230.177 486 419 67.9
1958 . . . . ............  893 773 303 372 590 401 66.1
1959 . . . . ............ 894 230 509 295 384 935 43.0
1960 . . . . ............ 1067 264 614 632 452 632 42.4
Sources: BNDE, Conselho do Desenvolvimento (CD), CNA 
and SEEF.
Table 29









1950 ........ 55 082 44 078 11004 19.98
1951 ........,. 109 667 90 063 19 604 17.88
1952 ........,. 115 567 97 817 17 750 15.36
1953 ........ . 149 783 119400 30 383 20.28
1954 ........ . 271789 129 390 142 399 52.39
1955 ........ . 3 776 671 263 615 3 513 056 93.02
1956 ........ . 5 418 282 529173 4 889109 90.23
1957 ........ . 6163 772 1 317 655 4 846117 78.62
1958 ........ . 5 831768 2 467 146 5 652 473 2 287 851 96.93
1959 ........ . 7 350 374 3 075 648 5 742162 1467 436 78.12
1960 ........ . 8 957 816 3 861 255 5 683 919 587 358 63.45
S o u r c e s : Petrobras and SEEF.
Table 30








1948 ........ . . . .  1 789 190 66 1 789 124 100.0
1949 ........ . . . .  4129 467 74 4129 393 100.0
1950 ........ . . . .  4 757 984 72 4 757 912 100.0








1952 ........ . . . .  6 881 479 187 6 881 292 100.0
1953 ......... . . . .  7 300 678 277 7 300 401 100.0
1954 ........ . . . .  8 899 487 360 359 8 539 128 96.0
1955 ........ . . . .  9 265 613 3786 346 5 479 267 59.1
1956 ........ . . . .  10 527 498 5 867 576 4 659 922 44.3
1957 ........ . . . .  10 325 644 6 561 588 3 764 956 36.5
1958 ........ 7 105 192 4 349 262 38.0
1959 ......... . . . .  11455 032 7 837 880 3 617 152 31.6
1960 ......... . . . .  13 571256 9 357 431 4 213 825 31.0
Sources : Petrobras and SEEF.
The metal-transforming industry is that for which 
the existing data are the least well prepared, and there 
are no satisfactory production indices available. Both 
the FGV and the BNDE have calculated production 
indices for 1955-58 only. Although the basic data used 
must have been the same (industrial surveys whose find­
ings were published in Produgao Industrial Brasileira), 
the series represent entirely different orders of magni­
tude, both for the metal-transforming industry and for 
the other groups. The BNDE indices are in general much 
higher. While the FGV puts forward a growth rate of 
only 19 per cent for the metal-transforming industry, 
BNDE gives a rate of 84 per cent for the period, over 
50 per cent of the increase having taken place between 
1955 and 1956.
Whatever the growth rate of the industry may have 
been, the results of import substitution, although satis­
factory between 1949 and 1958 (see previous section), 
were plainly unsatisfactory for the final years of the 
period, since imports of the items concerned rose by 
50 per cent during 1955-61.
This was due not so much to a shortage of production 
capacity in the industry (since there is idle capacity in 
a number of branches) as to the fact that the bulk of 
recent investment has been in imported capital goods. 
There are a number of reasons for this emphasis, of 
which the most significant seem to be, in increasing order 
of importance: (1) the specialized nature of some cap­
ital goods, which are not produced in Brazil; (2) the 
favourable exchange policy applied until recently; (3) 
the lack of internal financing for domestic equipment, 
which places it at a competitive disadvantage, despite 
high tariff protection; and (4) the fact that many of 
the relatively recent investments made consisted largely 
of foreign private capital associated with the firms that 
supplied the equipment.
Furthermore, the main problem in this sector, from 
the structural standpoint, seems to be a certain lack of 
complementarity, both technological and economic. Thus 
idle capacity in certain branches of the industry exists 
side by side with serious difficulties in other branches in 
meeting substantial orders for equipment within a rea­
sonable time-limit.^® This feature, in conjunction with
38 One example of these difficulties was the installation of the 
Duque de Caxias refinery, for which only a part of the machinery 
and equipment needed could be supplied by Brazilian firms, and 
even then only after the formation of a veritable consortium.
the rather weak and ill-organized policy adopted towards 
the industry, makes it clear why the expansion problems 
of this sector are somewhat complex.®*
The possibility of continuing the import substitution 
process in Brazil through greater domestic production of 
capital goods will be discussed in broad outline in the 
final section of this study.
The industry manufacturing electrical and communi­
cations equipment had a fairly rapid growth rate during 
the period 1955-61. The increase in production was su­
fficient to meet the expansion in consumption without any 
increase in imports during those five years. In 1961, 
however, imports rose by over 40 per cent. This rise 
represented two separate factors; the first was an in­
crease in imports of heavy machinery (generators, 
motors and transformers), this being the category in 
which there has been the least substitution thus far, and 
the second an increase in imports of electrical equipment 
for motor vehicle assembly.
The establishment of the motor vehicle industry was 
accompanied by intensive domestic manufacture of the 
supplementary machine parts, but a considerable part 
of the noble-metal electrical equipment still remains for 
substitution. Consequently the rapid expansion in the 
production of motor vehicles from 1959 on resulted in 
a sharp rise in imports of electrical components.
The two factors together accounted for an increase of 
$30 million out of the total of $85.5 million imported by 
this sector in 1961. In brief, it can be concluded that 
in the electrical equipment sector import substitution of 
some items, such as electrical appliances (especially 
household appliances) and light and medium equipment, 
is fairly advanced.
Import substitutions of heavy equipment is still at 
the initial stage, and prior to 1956 Brazil produced 
virtually no heavy electrical equipment.'*® On the other 
hand, there is already widespread substitution of elec­
trical equipment for motor vehicle assembly, the only 
items that have not yet been replaced being a few very 
complex types of equipment, in this and other branches, 
that would have to be produced by a high-precision elec­
tronics industry of a type that does not yet exist in 
Brazil.
The construction and assembly of transport equip­
ment has the highest growth rate in 1955-61 for the 
whole group of the dynamic industries— 700 per cent in 
six years. This expansion was due mainly to the estab­
lishment of the motor vehicle industry, which under­
went a fairly rapid vertical integration. As a result, the 
substantial increase in imports for 1952-59, representing 
imported parts for vehicle assembly, was sharply reversed 
from 1959 on, because of the vigorous expansion of the 
industry producing motor vehicle spare parts. The motor 
vehicle sector is now practically self-sufficient, since the 
import coefficient has been reduced to 1 per cent.
39 A more exact idea of the problems facing the metal­
transporting industry and its expansion prospects can be obtained 
from the ECLA studies on The manufacture of industrud ma­
chinery and equipment in Latin America. I. Basic equipment 
in Brazil (E/CN.12/619/Rev.l, United Nations publication, 
Sales No.: 1963.II.G.2), and The machine-tools industry in Brazil 
(ST/ECLA/CONF.11/L.32, United Nations publication, Sales 
No.: 1963.II.G.4).
iOFor information on present production, capacity and pos­
sibilities of expansion see Basic equipment in Brazil, op. cit.
Apparent
consumption Production Imports Import
— — - coefficient
{Units) {percentage)
1949 .......................  30 640 30 640 100.0
1950 .......................  33 066 33 066 100.0
1951 .......................  81 447 81 447 100.0
1952 .......................  65 734 65 734 100.0
1953 .......................  18 511 18 511 100.0
1954 .......................  28 164 28 164 100.0
1955 .......................  7 400 7 400 100.0
1956 .......................  9 371 9 371 100.0
1957 .......................  52 554 30 700 21854 41.6
1958 .......................  94853 61 129 33 724 35.6
1959 .......................  135 434 96 243 39 191 28.9
1960 .......................  141771 133 078 8 693 6.1
1961 .......................  147 393 145 674 1 719 1.1
Sources: Anudrio Estatistico and Anudrio do Comercio
Exterior.
In the other transport equipment sectors the situa­
tion was less favourable. As regards railway equip­
ment there are serious problems to solve, especially 
with respect to complementarity. In the shipbuilding sec­
tor, although there has recently been substantial progress 
in installing new and modern shipyards, problems exist 
that are similar to those in the equipment industry.
The behaviour of the intermediate industries is shown 
by the data in the third part of table 26-B. As regards 
the growth rate, this group lies between the slow-growth 
and the dynamic industries. Since 1955 the intermediate 
industries expanded at a slower rate than the manu­
facturing industries as a whole, whose average was 
raised considerably by the high growth rate of the 
dynamic industries.
The non-metallic mineral manufactures sector, al­
though its growth rate was below that of the other two 
industries in this group, was the only sector where sub­
stitution increased throughout the period. Although ex­
pansion over the five-year period was only 32 per cent, 
imports fell by nearly 50 per cent. This was because the 
substitution process has now reached a very advanced 
stage in this sector, and even includes cement produc­
tion, in which Brazil has been practically self-sufficient 
since 1957 (see table 31).
Table 31





Year consumption Production Imports Exports (percentage)
1949 .......... 1709 1 281 428 H  2s!o
1950 .......... 1780 1 386 394 — 22.1
1951 ..........  2 079 1 441 638 —  30.7
1952 ..........  2 426 1 614 812 — 33 5
1953 ..........  3 023 2 041 982 — 32.5
1954 .......... 2 750 2 418 332 — 12.1
1955 ..........  2 976 2 734 242 — 8.1
1956 ..........  3 308 3 278 31 1 1.0
1957 ..........  3 382 3 376 9 3 0.1
1958 ..........  3 767 3 769 —  2 —
1959 .......... 3 824 3 798 29 3 0.1
1960 ..........  4 418 4 418 0 0 —
4 678
Source: Cement Producers’ Association.
Brazil: Import coEFnaENTS for motor vehicles, 1949-61
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In 1961 there was a substantial increase in the im­
port quantum for the group, due entirely to large im­
ports of refractory materials for furnace construction. 
As the level of imports was already very low (only 
$7 million in I960), imports of $5 million worth of 
these materials were sufficient to raise the index sharply. 
In fact, this is one of the industrial sectors in which 
the substitution process has gone furthest; as indicated 
in the preceding section, the import coefficient in terms 
of total supply was one of the two lowest for the whole 
of that manufacturing sector.
The paper and paperboard industry as a whole suc­
ceeded in meeting the increase in consumption, without 
any increase in imports being required, except for 1957, 
when production fell. However, the substitution process 
in the industry covered two separate items, newsprint 
and paper other than newsprint. As table 33 shows, sub­
stitution of the second item began early; even in 1949 
the import coefficient was only 2.8 per cent, and in 
recent years it has been in the neighbourhood of 1 per
cent, whereas for newsprint the coefficient increased 
from 37 per cent in 1949 to 65 per cent in 1957. Only 
after that year production, which had remained more 
or less constant since 1951 at the level of about 100 000 
tons, began to increase, and in 1960 amounted to about 
150 000 tons. Even so, in 1960, when apparent consump­
tion of both types of paper was practically the same 
— about 330 000 tons— output of newsprint was less 
than half that of other paper, whereas imports were 
thirty times as much (o f 190 000 tons of paper im­
ported in 1960, about 185 000 were newsprint).
In sum, the paper industry still has far to go in sub­
stitution of newsprint, as the expansion in production 
has not been sufficient to meet the increase in con­
sumption. Although the import coefficient has fallen in 
recent years it is still high (50 per cent). The present 
difficulties, particularly as regards printing paper, seem 
to be mainly technological. However, it should be noted 
that the substitution already effected has been of an 
integrated nature, since there has also been considerable 
substitution in the production of pulp, as shown below.
Table 32
Brazil: Production and imports of newsprint and other paper, 1937-38 and 1948-60
(Tons)
A l l  p a p e r  N e w s p r i n t  Paper other than newsprint
Impart Import Import
Apparent coefficient Apparent coefficient Apparent coefficient
Year consumption Production Imports (percentage) consumption Production Imports (percentage) consumption Production Imports (percentage)
1937   170 245 102 831 67 414 39.6
1938 ..............  156 830 106 702 60 128 32.0
1948 .............. 248 772 186 957 61 815 24.9 67 350 119 607
1949   267 919 216 544 51 375 19.2 126 815 79 441 47 374 37.4 141 104 137103 4 001 2.8
1950   316 802 247 894 68 908 21.8 151 754 87 142 64 612 42.6 165 048 160 752 4 296 2.6
1951   352 330 261 045 91 285 26.0 176 551 91 220 85 331 48.3 175 779 169 825 5 954 3.4
1952 .............. 378 342 261 883 116 459 30.8 196 925 86 866 110 059 55.9 181 417 175 017 6 400 3.5
1953   403 641 291 414 112 227 27.8 205 164 94 679 110 485 53.9 198 477 196 735 1 742 0.9
1954 ..............  457 988 314 286 143 702 31.4 231 243 91592 139 651 60.4 227 187 222 694 4 493 2.0
1955 .............. 479 660 333 149 146 511 30.5 242 601 99 392 143 209 59.0 237 059 233 757 3 302 1.4
1956 .............. 545 841 380 537 165 304 30.3 265 975 104 745 161 230 60.6 279 866 275 792 4 074 1.5
1957 .............. 572 977 362 646 210 331 36.7 316 331 110 701 205 630 65.0 256 646 251 945 4 701 1.8
1958 .............. 591 178 416 471 174 707 29.6 308 248 136 895 171 353 55.6 282 930 279 576 3 354 1.2
1959 .............. 609 592 439 900 169 692 7.8 308 642 140 038 168 604 54.6 300 950 299 861 1088 0.4
1960   664 757 474 383 190 374 28.6 335 237 150 744 184 493 45.0 329 520 323 639 5 881 1.8
Sources: ANFP and SEEP.
Table 33












Motor vehicle tires (units) Processed rubber (tons]
1955 ........ ........  2 188 120 2 185 295 2 825 0.13 1956 ........ 14 627 7 266 7 361 50.3
1956 ........ ........  1 921 472 1 918 779 2 693 0.14 1957 .......... 23 939 7 781 15 158 63.3
1957 ........ ........  1 988 195 1 985 195 3 000 0.15 1958 ........ 29 037 9 602 19 435 66.9
1958 ........ ........  2 147 135 2 140 582 6 553 0.31 1959 ........ » . • 34 943 • • •
1959 ........ 2 742 794 4 090 0.15 1960 .......... • . . 43 325 • • •
1960 ........ ........  3 255111 3 252 515 2 596 0.08 1961 ........ 42 529 ...
S o u r c e s : Anudrio Estatistico do Brasil a n d  SEEF.
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Brazil: I mport coE F F iaE N T S  for chemicar pulp for the
PAPER AND PAPERBOARD INDUSTRY, 1956-60
Apparent
consumption Production Imports Import
coefficient
(percentage){Thousands of tons)
1956 ............ .......... 190 74 116 61
1957 ............ .......... 204 100 104 51
1958 ............ .......... 215 120 95 44
1959 ............ .......... 250 162 88 35
1960 ............ .......... 291 210 81 28
Source: SEEF of the Ministry of Finance.
In the rubber industry output remained unchanged 
for a number of years up to 1958. From then on there 
was a fairly satisfactory increase in output in response 
to the rise of the motor vehicle industry, sufficient to 
meet the expansion in the consumption of rubber manu­
factures, especially tires. As table 38 shows, for tires 
the substitution process has practically been completed.
As regards production of processed rubber, however, 
the expansion was quite inadequate to meet the grow­
ing demand of the rubber manufacturing sector itself; 
this is clear from the considerable increase in imports 
of these products, which account for practically all the 
imports in this group.
Brazil: Imports of rubber products, 1953-61 
{Thousands of 1955 dollars)
Years Total Processed rubber
1953 ....................................................  757 193
1954 ....................................................  16 951 15 789
1955 ....................................................  19 685 18 650
1956 .........................................................  7 347 6 532
1957 ....................................................  14 240 13 451
1958 ....................................................  18 231 17 246
1959 ....................................................  31696 31008
1960 ....................................................  38 947 38 447
1961 ....................................................  40 358 37 562
Source: ECLA sample.
Although the production data available for rubber 
processing are very scanty and relate to only three years, 
they show that not only is the import coefficient in 
terms of apparent consumption very high, but there is 
a rising trend (see again table 33). This trend was 
strengthened, after 1958, by a sharp increase in imports.
The unsatisfactory situation of the rubber industry 
as regards processing originated in the stagnation of 
production of natural rubber, which since 1943 has 
been in the region of 130 000 tons. This stagnation fol­
lowed a period in the early years of the century when 
Brazil was one of the main world producers and ex­
porters of rubber. Only when the motor vehicle industry 
was founded was there a new effort to expand produc­
tion of this item in Brazil. Even so, the firms producing 
tires took over the bulk of the new plantation, espe­
cially in Sao Paulo and Bahia. The Amazon basin, the 
original source of natural rubber, did not succeed in 
taking advantage of this new development to achieve
a more dynamic economy, this time on a permanent 
basis.
In recent times there has been additional substitution 
activity in the form of installation of a synthetic rubber 
plant by Petrobras, but although the continuing expan­
sion of consumpion opens up new opportunities for im­
port substitution, it does not seem likely that they will 
be on a scale to permit an appreciable reduction of 
rubber imports in the next few years.^^
In short, while the data on industrial production have 
been fairly unsatisfactory since 1958, trends in the 
manufacturing industry, including the traditional indus­
tries, may be said to have been relatively favourable 
up to 1961.
However, the structural difficulties besetting some 
sectors, such as the metal-transforming industry in gen­
eral and the heavy equipment industry in particular, 
together with the progressive saturation of the markets 
for these industrial sectors which have until now been 
the most dynamic (durable consumer goods), point to 
a loss of momentum in the manufactures industry, and 
this seems in fact to have been taking place since 1962.^^
Thus, while the past model of development through 
import substitution may have played a reasonably use­
ful part in the diversification and expansion of Brazil’s 
industrial activity in its various stages, the dynamic 
impulse to proceed with industrialization by this method 
seems to have been virtually exhausted. The chief argu­
ments in this connexion will be summed up in the fol­
lowing chapter on conclusions and prospects.
E. Conclusions
The purpose of the final observations is to summarize 
and systematize as far as possible the economic argu­
ments which provide an explanation of why the import 
substitution process not only made such rapid headway 
in Brazil, but was also accompanied by growth rates 
exceeding those for Latin America as a whole; this 
recapitulation will be followed by comments on the main 
problems characteristic of the kind of economic struc­
ture imposed on the country by its past development 
model.
1. Growth factors of the import substitution process
It has already been noted briefly, in the introduction 
to the section of Brazil, some of the internal and ex­
ternal conditions which placed the country in a more 
favourable position than many others in the region to 
take advantage of the import substitution process as a 
development model.
It would seem at first sight that other Latin American 
countries which had, and still have, a higher import 
coefficient were better placed to achieve a rapid growth 
rate by means of substitution. However, the conditions 
favouring such growth in fact depend essentially on 
two basic prerequisites. Firstly, the volume and struc­
ture of imports should represent a sufficiently ample 
potential market to warrant the establishment of a num­
ber of substitution industries. Secondly, the existing
See the projections in Plano Trienal de Desenvolvimento 
Econòmico e Social do Brasil 1963-1965.
“*2 See the provisional data published in Conjuntura Econòmica, 
February 1963.
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degree of diversification of production capacity in the 
economic system should already be sufiScient to permit 
a satisfactory reaction to the impetus provided by the 
external bottleneck.
In other words, the impetus to the industrial sector 
resulting from a contraction of the import coefficient 
depends far less on the relative importance of the ex­
ternal sector than on the absolute size of the domestic 
market and on its structure, and on the possibilities of 
taking advantage of it.
In Brazil these two conditions were comparatively 
favourable, which disposes of any hypothesis that in 
this respect Brazil was at a disadvantage compared with 
the other Latin American countries.
To express the problem in more systematic terms, 
there appear to be two groups of factors, internal and 
external, that suflfice to explain the phenomenon.
Some of the internal factors have already been re­
ferred to, and include the relative size and structure 
of the market, and the degree of diversification of the 
structure of production achieved within the traditional 
export model. The other factors include the concentra­
tion of the dynamic sectors of both development models 
in the same area, the relative availability of factors of 
production (especially an abundance of land and labour) 
and the economic policy pursued.
The above-mentioned factors are clearly heterogeneous 
and some of them represent various facets of a single 
phenomenon; nevertheless, they all help to explain the 
success of Brazil’s import substitution model.
From the standpoint of launching the industrializa­
tion process, the first two of the above-listed factors 
were clearly decisive, and their importance is attributable 
to the past evolution of Brazil’s coffee economy. This 
evolution led to an extraordinary concentration of the 
most profitable economic activities in the Centro-Sur 
region; the result was a cumulative process of expan­
sion and diversification which, at the time of the crisis 
in the export sector,^® made it easier to progress to 
another type of development than in several other Latin 
American countries.
Although Brazil’s per capita income and consump­
tion of primary industrial products were and still are, 
lower than those of other large Latin American coun­
tries, its absolute levels are usually bigber (see table 
34). Consequently, the size of its domestic market was 
and still is relatively more favourable for industrializa­
tion, particularly in view of its concentration.
The market structure was largely similar to that of 
the other Latin American countries as regards the 
diversification of demand of the high-income sectors, 
but in the industrial consumer goods sector domestic 
production capacity could meet requirements to a much 
greater extent than in most of the other countries in 
the region.'*^
See Celso Furtado, FormagSo Económica do Brasil, especially 
the chapter comparing the coffee and sugar economies from the 
standpoint of the generation and distribution of monetary income. 
See table 6, which contains data on import structure.
Table 34
Some significant indices of the size of the market in selected Latin American countries, 1960
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Argentina .. . . .  11327 539 1148 55 22 449 1069 1680 80 2646 126 168 8 63 3 14 826 706
Bra2dl ........ . . .  17 466 250 1715 24 26 040 372 3 010 43 4 760 68 210 3 210 3 13 720 196
Chile .......... . . .  2 503 313 449 56 7 064 883 408 51 880 110 80 10 16 2 1944 243
Mexico . . . . 262 1044 30 35 420 1012 1575 45 3185 91 350 10 105 3 16 625 475
Source; ECLA, The economic development of Latin America in the post-war period (E/CN.12/659 and Add.l), and OAS, Eco­
nomic and social survey of Latin America, 1961 (documents 5-A, 5-B and 5-C).
Moreover, the existence of a more diversified produc­
tion structure, especially in the secondary sector, served 
as a basis for tbe subsequent import substitution process, 
providing the first links in the chain of progressive 
diversification which were to make possible the vertical 
integration of the production machinery.
However, these two factors, which largely account 
for the industrialization that followed the onset of the 
crisis in the export sector, are not essentially different 
from those which determined the emergence of the same 
phenomenon in the other leading Latin American coun­
tries. The feature peculiar to Brazil, which was highly 
favourable to the internal dynamics of the process, was 
that in both development models the dynamic sectors
50
(the export sector in the traditional model and the sec­
ondary sector in the import substitution model) were 
concentrated in tbe same geographical area.
Such concentration can be explained by a concatena­
tion of past factors which caused the decisive elements 
of an industrialization process— t^he market, external 
economies provided by an already developed tertiary 
sector, and entrepreneurial capacity— t^o be located in 
the same geographical area. It should also be noted that 
this geographical concentration played an important 
part in the development that took place following the 
Depression of the thirties.
At the time of the coffee crisis, despite vigorous 
defensive measures of government policy, investment in
the export sector obviously lost its attraction. This had 
the result of freeing resources, especially financial re­
sources, whose easy transfer to the industrial sector 
was naturally facilitated by the existence in the same 
economic area of the three factors referred to in the 
previous paragraph. During the post-war period of indus­
trial development, certain social and political develop­
ments resulting from the geographical grouping also 
contributed to the transfer to the industrial sector of 
the increased income of the coffee sector due to the rise 
in world prices, through an exchange policy clearly 
favouring industries in the area. Furthermore, the proxi­
mity of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil’s largest consumer centre 
and the then seat of the Federal Government, led to the 
formation of an economic axis that progressively trans­
formed the Centro-Sur region into a concentrated centre 
of economic activity.
From a strictly economic viewpoint, the causes of the 
high rates of return obtained by industrial entrepreneurs, 
which were a powerful stimulus to capitalization in the 
sector, can be summarized as the large (and geographi­
cally concentrated) potential market for import sub­
stitution, the elastic supply of little-organized labour, 
and the extensive privileges accorded by government 
economic policy.
With respect to the availability of factors of produc­
tion, the relative abundance of manpower and land made 
it possible to increase the area under cultivation, which 
explains how industrialization could take place without 
a parallel effort to increase productivity in the food pro­
duction sector.
As regards the Federal Government’s economic policy, 
it must not be forgotten that, as noted in the introduc­
tion, the capitalization process, concentrated in the in­
dustrial sector and in the most developed area, was 
greatly helped, especially in the post-war period, by the 
substantial incentives to import substitution provided 
by exchange and financial measures and by the Federal 
Government’s own investment policy.
Accordingly, this combination of internal factors can 
be regarded as having strongly favoured the develop­
ment of Brazil’s economy within the new model, and 
in itself is sufficient explanation of the fact that develop­
ment was more rapid than in most of the other coun­
tries in Latin America and in the other under-developed 
areas of the world.
Examination of the behaviour of the external vari­
ables referred to in section II. B of the present study 
showed that to a certain extent they, too, favoured the 
growth of industrialization until comparatively recently.
In fact, although restrictions in the external sector 
may be responsible for generating strains and dis- 
equilibria in some sectors of the economy, they con­
stitute the spur to achieving the structural changes re­
quired by an import substitution process. The whole 
problem, as we have seen in the theoretical part of this 
study, lies in the fact that the restrictions in absolute 
terms should not last too long, so that the economy can 
advance through successive stages of diversification. 
Thus the theory can be advanced that each period of 
increasing restrictions in the external sector should be 
followed by a period of relaxation to facilitate the 
transition to the next stage.
In Brazil, the behaviour of external conditions was 
of a cyclical nature that, generally speaking, followed 
such a pattern, although the trend was naturally towards 
a sharp reduction in the import coefficient. In the im­
mediate post-war period the purchasing power of ex­
ports, as we have seen, recovered considerably, and this 
was followed by a phase of marked improvement in the 
terms of trade up to 1954. Even in 1955-60, when the 
relative situation of the external sector again deterio­
rated, it was possible to maintain the absolute level of 
imports and even to raise it slightly, although at the 
cost of considerably increasing the external debt. In 
addition, there was an appreciable increase in direct 
foreign investment,^® whose significance was mainly 
qualitative. The outstanding aspect of the inflow of for­
eign capital for the expansion and diversification of 
industry was not so much its volume as its orientation; 
that is, it was channelled, in the case of public capital, 
into strategic sectors of the economy, and in the case 
of private capital, into the sectors where the import 
substitution prospects were most promising.
In short, it can be asserted that in the recent period 
of development both the internal and external variables 
operated in favour of the import substitution process, 
thereby leading to an acceleration of industrial activities 
capable of increasing the growth rate of the economy 
as a whole.
2. Characteristics of the social and economic structure 
resulting from the import substitution model
Notwithstanding the relatively high growth rate at­
tained by Brazil’s economy in the last few years and 
the degree of diversification achieved by its industrial 
sector, the economic development process presents an 
essential imbalance at three converging levels, the sec­
toral, regional and social.
From the sectoral point of view, attention was focused 
on the secondary sector, in particular the manufactur­
ing industries; the tertiary sector, although benefiting 
from a series of infrastructural investments in transport 
and power, had only a moderate growth rate in the 
post-war period, especially in some sectors covering 
services and public administration, which in many ways 
are out of date.
The structure of the agricultural sector, on the other 
hand, has remained unchanged, at least in over-all terms, 
although agricultural production has expanded at a rea­
sonable rate, especially in recent years.
Agricultural growth between 1950 and 1960 is actually 
due less to an average increase in crop yields than to 
an increase in the area under cultivation.^® Such ex­
tension of the land under cultivation, prompted by the 
expansion of the urban market, was based essentially 
on the existing production functions, that is, without 
the absorption of technological progress that took place 
in the secondary sector.
4® See External financing in the economic development of 
Latin America (E/CN.12/649), table III-21. In 1955-60 there 
was an increase of $400 million in direct foreign investment 
compared with the previous five-year period.
46 The reverse is true of Mexico, for example, where there was 
a considerable increase in yields over the past decade (see 
table 35).
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Year Moite Beans Wheat Rice Cotton
1940 ........ . . . .  1249
Brazil
784 506 1514 648
1950 ........ . . . .  1287 690 816 1638 443
1951 ........ . . . .  1309 692 584 1618 400
1952 ........ . . . .  1214 626 852 1565 496
1953 ........ . . . .  1169 695 848 1483 429
1954 ........ . . . .  1228 702 806 1388 469
1955 ........ . . . .  1 190 662 921 1488 490
1956 ........ . . . .  1167 611 967 1366 448
1957 ........ . . . .  1274 681 677 1635 425
1958 ........ . . . .  1273 684 407 1523 423
1940 ........ 491
Mexico
152 772 1751 258
1950 ........ . . . .  721 258 911 1759 342
1951 ........ 773 248 877 1728 326
1952 ........ 756 253 863 1832 337
1953 ........ 766 305 1020 1616 363
1954 ........ . . . .  854 361 1098 1888 424
1955 ........ 836 377 1063 2192 480
1956 ........ 803 322 1326 2 038 487
1957 ........ 835 356 1437 2 044 522
1958 ........ 812 364 1592 2 079 504
Source: For Brazil, Anudrio Estadstico do Brazil; for Mexico, 
the Agricultural Economics Department.
That is why real productivity per person employed 
in agriculture has remained at a consistently low level. 
By contrast, as may he seen in the following table, in­
dustrial productivity doubled during the same period.
Brazil: Real productivity of labour employed in agriculture 
AND INDUSTRY
















1950 ................ .............. 51.3 10 996 834 4.7
1960 ................ .............. 77.9 15 521 701 5.0
Industry
1950 ................ .............. 44.3 1 177 644 37.6
1960 ................ .............. 105.9 1519 711 69.7
Source: Cuentas Naciorudes of the Getulio Vargas Foundation, 
and population censuses.
Consequently, the population shift from rural to urban 
areas that can be inferred from the population census 
data, does not have the same meaning in Brazil as in 
certain past growth models of the now developed coun­
tries, or as in Lewis’ theoretical two-sector model.
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What seems to have occurred is simply a migration 
of the unemployed from the country to the town in 
search of better opportunities, resulting in an enormous 
expansion of the large urban centres, together with a 
parallel increase in the marginal population groups in 
which disguised unemployment is rife.
However, in the industrial sector itself, where there 
has been a notable increase in productivity and diversifi­
cation, the stage of development reached is by no means 
well-balanced.
As the expansion of the industrial sector has been 
disorganized, the process has been marked throughout 
by a series of defects in synchronization that were and 
still are the cause of certain serious bottlenecks, espe­
cially in the infrastructure sectors; and even the manu­
facturing industry is lacking to some degree in tech­
nological and economic complementarity. Thus, for ex­
ample, while most of the industries producing end goods 
have excess production capacity— especially the textile 
industry, the industry producing electric household ap­
pliances, the transport material industry, and even the 
light equipment industry— other industries suffer from 
a shortage of installed capacity, especially the industries 
producing intermediate goods, such as the basic metal­
lurgical and chemical industries, and the rubber and 
paper industries.
Furthermore, although the diversification of the in­
dustrial sector in Brazil is much greater than in any 
other Latin American country, the per capita output 
of most of the intermediate product industries was 
lower in 1959/60 than in a number of other indus­
trialized countries in Latin America, and in the cement, 
sulphuric acid and petroleum products industries it was 
lower than the average for the region as a whole (see 
table 36).
It is true that the absolute output figures are gen­
erally higher than for any other South American country 
(see table 37). Consequently the per capita figures serve 
to show, not so much the degree of development attained 
by the basic industries, since the average is reduced 
when related to the total population of the country, as 
the fact that large sectors of the population live in very 
under-developed areas and are more or less excluded 
from the transformation that has taken place in the 
Centro-Sur region. In other words, these indices are 
particularly suitable as indicators of another type of 
disequilibrium from which the Brazilian economy suffers, 
that is, its regional disequilibrium.
The increase in regional disequilibrium reflects a 
natural tendency for economic activity to concentrate 
round the region that represents the nucleus of the 
system, and this tendency is increased by an economic 
policy of industrial incentives that in practice amounts 
to a transfer of income from the less developed to the 
more developed areas.
In recent times this economic policy trend has been 
modified (especially as regards exchange policy), and 
the deliberate aim is now, on the contrary, to correct 
the inequalities that exist, especially in the Nordeste 
region; however, the two main industrial States in 
Brazil (Guanabara and Sao Paulo) still generate about 
50 per cent of the national income, although their 
population represents only 25 per cent of the total.














Argentina ........................................... 20 135 17 8 2 618
Brazil ................................................... 38 69 9 3 1 178
Chile .................................................. 56 112 14 10 1 205
Colombia ............................................. 108 4 2 2 255
Meixco ................................................ 88 12 7 2 482
Peru .................................................... 58 5 2 0 216
Uruguay ............................................... 3 154 14 — 0 531
Venezuela ............................................ 8 205 8 1 0 6 811
Latin AmencdP ............................. 26 86 9 4 1 286=
Sources: OAS, Economic and social survey of Latin America, 1961 (doeuments 5-A, 5-B
and 5-C).
® 1960 data.
*> Average for all the Latin America countries.
® Excluding Venezuela.
Table 37
Output of six intermediate products in selected Latin American countries
(Thousands of tons)
Country
Crude steel Cement Paper and paperboard Sulphuric acid Caustic soda Petroleum products
1951 1961 1957 1961 1951 1961 1955 1960 1955 1960 1950 1961
Argentina ...................... 132 442 1543 2 880 231 370 100 160 28 44 6 389 13 218
Brazil ............................. 843 2493 1456 4688 326 639 121 200 28 80 71 11 998
Chile ............................... 184 391 673 873 46 131 40 75 4 6 — 1601
Colombia ...................... 6 192 648 1565 10 58 10 26 12 25 1253 3 689
Mexieo ........................... 473 1682 1535 3160 190 422 126 249 24 66 8 056 17130
Peru ............................... — 75 368 621 22 55 15 25 1 3 1628 2 320
Uruguay ....................... 13 9 293 460 25 40 — — — — 780 1480
Venezuela ...................... — 71 621 1543 9 60 3 7 0 3 13 377 51250
Latin America (total) 1651 5 369 7 895 17 332 897 1874 451 782 98 228 32120 107 286
Source: OAS, Economic and social survey of Latin America, 1961 (documents 5-A, 5-B and 5-C).
Since 1955 there seems to have been a reversal of 
the trend towards an accentuation of regional inequali­
ties, since the data on the income of the Centro-Sur 
region indicate that that region’s predominance has 
weakened slightly in favour of the Norte and Nordeste 
regions.^’^
In fact this is due less to a reduction in industrial 
concentration in the most developed region than to an 
increase in the contribution to the national income of 
Brazil of the agriculture of the less developed states.'** 
In the light of the relative importance of the industrial 
sector in the former group of States, this development 
may be attributable to the improvement in the terms 
of trade of agricultural as against industrial products 
that has taken place in recent years.
Consideration will now be given to the problem of 
social disequilibrium, which in the final analysis is 
merely a new aspect of the severe economic disequili­
brium that has already been discussed from a number 
of different angles.
See Plano Trienal de Desenvolvimento Económico e Social 
do Brasil 1963-65, table XXVI.
See Contas Nacionais, published by the Getulio Vargas 
Foundation.
The social imbalances appear to have worsened dur­
ing the recent process of development, to judge by vari­
ous indicators, including the increase in the marginal 
populations in the cities and the gap between the income 
of those employed in the most backward sector— the 
primary— and those employed in the most developed 
sector— the secondary. This increase in social dis­
equilibrium derives largely from the inability of the 
dynamic sectors to create employment opportunities at 
a pace sufiScient to absorb the growing masses of popula­
tion in the economically active age groups.
As the growth rate of the industrial sector was con­
siderably higher than that of the agricultural sector, 
the difference in productivity between the two could 
have been reduced if the absorption of manpower in 
industry had been considerably higher than in agricul­
ture. But this was not the case, at least in recent times. 
According to the 1950 and 1960 census data the popula­
tion employed in agriculture increased more rapidly be­
tween those dates than that employed in industry 
(sharply reversing the trend of the previous decade), 
and this factor alone would suffice to magnify the dif­
ferences in labour productivity (see table 38).
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Brazil: Number employed in acricultore and in industry, 













1940 .. . .  960 663 • . . — 10 159 545 —
1950 .. . .  1522 844 1 177 644 -f58 10 996 834 + 8
1960 .. 1 519 711« -f29 15 521 701 -f41
Source: 1940, 1950 and 1960 censuses.
A As the data were not available for the whole of 1960, the 
monthly data published were used.
Furthermore, to judge by the data on employment 
in the most dynamic sector, which was the manufac­
turing industry, the situation continued to deteriorate. 
In 1954-58, when there was an increase in the growth 
of manufacturing which permitted an annual average 
rate of 9.7 per cent, employment increased at an annual 
rate of only 0.2 per cent.'*® In fact the only industry 
in which employment increased at a rate higher than 
that of demographic growth was the metallurgical in­
dustry.®® In the textile, food, wood products and chem­
ical industries employment declined in absolute figures 
during the period, although production continued to ex­
pand vigorously.
Another indication that demonstrates the inability of 
the high-productivity sector to absorb manpower at an 
increasing rate is the decrease in the ratio of wages 
to value added in the manufacturing industry between 
1953 and 1958, as shown in the table below, despite 
the increase in real wages during the same period.






1939 . . . . .................................  6 420 1848 29
1949 . . . . .................................  47 575 13 485 28
1953 . . . . .................................  89 898 28 679 32
1958 . . . . .................................  319592 95 224 30
Source : The growth of world industry. op. cit.
Any of the above facts is easily explained by the 
observations made in the first part of this study, in 
the section on the dynamics of the import substitution 
process; in particular they reflect the fact that indus­
trialization was progressively including types of produc­
tion that by their very nature are capital intensive, and 
the effect was sometimes magnified by the introduction 
of labour-saving techniques in replacing equipment in 
the traditional industries with the aim of increasing 
returns.
Another fact that can be regarded as an indicator of 
social imbalance within the same highly developed re-
49 See The growth of world industry 1938-1961 (ST/STAT/ 
SER.P/2, United Nations publication. Sales No.: 63.XVII.5).
®® And probably the metal transforming industry, for which no 
data are available.
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gion is the economic concentration in the industrial 
sector, which is also the result of the internal dynamics 
of the process. To give an idea of the degree of monopoly 
attained in the market structure of the most dynamic 
sectors, it will suffice to note that in most of the branches 
of the metal-transforming and metallurgical industries 
in Sao Paulo, the bulk of the output in each branch is 
produced by only three enterprises, as shown by the 
folowing table:
Branch o f activity
Number of 
enterprises
Proportion of output 
produced by the three 
largest enterprises 
{percentage)
Metal structures ...................... ........  8 78
Agricultural implements ........ ........  9 97
Ploughs ..................................... ........  17 76
Electric motors ....................... ........  9 86
Refrigerators ........................... ........  8 91
Washing machines .................. .......  6 82
Scales ....................................... ........  19 74
Lifts ........................................... ........  6 99
Source: Dirigente Industrial, July 1963.
In conclusion, it should not be forgotten that the 
regular programmes of social welfare carried out by the 
public sector in the fields of health and education have 
also helped to confirm this tendency to disequilibrium 
inherent in the import substitution model of economic 
development. To mention only the most obvious example, 
most of what are termed social investments have bad 
practically no impact on the mass of the rural population.
All the foregoing observations point to the conclusion 
that the effect of the recent development model has been 
to transform the Brazilian economy into one of the most 
perfect examples of dual economy to be found in all 
Latin America.
This duality can be described, from the structural 
standpoint, as involving the existence of a dynamic 
capitalist sector, that expands rapidly, absorbs relatively 
little manpower, and has a comparatively high level of 
productivity, side by side with an under-developed 
sector in which is found the bulk of the population and 
which is to all intents and purposes excluded from the 
development process. The seriousness of this problem lies 
in the fact that not only do absolute differences in prod­
uctivity between the two sectors exist, but that these 
differences have tended to increase as development pro­
ceeds.
From the standpoint of the personal distribution of 
income this system has given rise to a pyramid in which, 
on the assumption that the structure of distribution is 
similar to the average for Latin America, 5 or 6 per cent 
of the population receive about 35 per cent of the na­
tional income, nearly 50 per cent of the population re­
ceive only 17 per cent of the total, and the remaining 
45 per cent receive an income close to the general 
average.®*
®* As no data are available on the distribution of income in 
Brazil, the foUowing distribution has been assumed, which does 
not appear wholly unreasonable, since the indices reflect a social 
and economic structure not very different from the Latin American 
average.
B r a z i l : H y p o t h e t i c a l  i n c o m e  d is t r ib u t io n  in  1960
Category
Percentage 












I ................ 50 35.0 100 3.5
II ................ 45 31.5 325 10.5
Ill ................ 3 2.1 1430 3.0
IV ................ 2 1.4 2 850 4.0
Total . . . . . . . .  100 70.0 300 21.0
A The figures in this column are calculated on the assumption 
that the income for each category is the same as that calculated 
for Latin America as a whole (see table 114 in document 
E/CN.12/659/Add.l) and on the basis of the per capita income 
of Brazil shown in the Plano Trienal de Desenvolvimento Eco­
nòmico e Social do Brasil 1963-65.
The apex of the pyramid represents the large con­
sumer market for the “ capitalist sector”  of the struc­
ture of production, whose purehasing power was suffi­
cient even to ensure a market for durable consumer 
goods. The intermediate layers represent that portion of 
the population whieh is on the fringe of the group that 
centres round the dynamie pole, and whose average in­
come approximates the average for Brazil. Since this 
average is very low, it does not represent any consider­
able purchasing power except for industrial products for 
mass consumption. Lastly, the base of the pyramid repre­
sents half the population, which is more or less ex­
cluded from the capitalist market.
To use the pyramid metaphor, which seems a clear 
means of conveying the requisite impression, the aggra­
vation of the structural duality of the Brazilian economy 
could be visualized in terms of the development of a 
series of pyramids whose upper strata represent the 
“ eapitalist sector”  and whose base corresponds to the 
“ under-developed seetor” . During the initial phase of a 
given import substitution proeess, the apex is gradually 
enlarged as a result of the expansion and diversification 
engendered by an industrialization process “ in breadth” , 
and even if the structure of production in the less de­
veloped sector remains very much the same, the popula­
tion groups at the base of the triangle have some measure 
of aecess to the dynamic sector, whose production func­
tions absorb manpower.®^ But as industrialization be­
comes more coneentrated with the advance towards 
inereasingly capital-intensive levels, while the structure 
of the primary seetor continues unchanged, the shift from 
one sector to another no longer takes place, and the 
apex of the pyramid tends to beeome cut off from the 
base. This is what seems, in the light of the data pre­
sented above, to have happened in the Brazilian economy 
during the past decade.
The recent acceleration of growth must have enabled 
the whole of the population at the apex to secure a 
greater or a lesser share in the benefits deriving from 
productivity; the seetors at the base, in contrast, have 
been untouched by the process.
Sinee the level of aggregation of the national aeeounts 
data on the functional distribution of income is ex-
tremely high, nothing is known of the way in which the 
productivity increments are distributed within the “ cap­
italist sector” . Probably, the share falling to those sectors 
in which the elasticity of the manpower supply is con­
siderable and demand not particularly buoyant has been 
very small, and vice versa. There are specific indications 
that this assumption is a sound one. For example, the 
metallurgical industries, whieh, as has already been 
shown, were those absorbing most manpower in recent 
years, were also those in whieh the wage index registered 
the biggest increase— logically enough, inasmuch as a 
dynamic demand was aeeompanied by a good deal of 
inelasticity in supply conditions, not only because skilled 
labour was required but also because a high level of 
trade-union organization existed in the sector.®®
In any event, an assuranee which can safely be given 
is that whatever the relative distribution of the benefits 
aeeruing from produetivity, the abrupt decline in the 
rate of employment in the dynamie seetor meant that in 
relative terms the growth of the market became vertical 
rather than horizontal.
The process of market expansion in this dual economy 
presents a striking contrast with its counterpart in the 
past in the developed countries, especially the United 
States. Given the originally agricultural structure of 
this latter country, the improvement in productivity in 
the primary sector, by raising the level of income of 
wage-earners, increased the purchasing power of the 
base of the pyramid and at the same time allowed the 
agricultural manpower that was released by the intro­
duction of technical advances to be absorbed in the 
secondary and tertiary sectors, whose dynamism was 
thus essentially based on the expansion of the domestic 
market in all sectors. It is therefore understandable that 
although in personal terms the distribution of income 
may not have been very satisfactory, the continuous 
shift from the base of the pyramid to the middle strata, 
and the concomitant rise in the per capita income of the 
population concerned, enabled the “ capitalist sectors’ ” 
market to expand so vigorously that it quickly became a 
mass consumption market.
In contrast, the process described in relation to the 
Brazilian economy, besides resulting in an increasing 
degree of social inequality which places the population 
groups not incorporated in it at a grave disadvantage, 
jeopardizes the dynamism of the “ capitalist sector”  it­
self; in absolute terms, the internal market expansion 
that is taking place within that sector is not sufficient 
to ensure the maintenance of the recent acceleration of 
the rate of industrial growth, which has been achieved 
largely by virtue of a reserved market for import sub­
stitution industries.
The impossibility of drawing increasingly large popu­
lation groups into the consumer market in the near 
future is basically imputable to the fact that the struc­
ture of production in the primary sector corresponding 
to the base of the pyramid has remained unaltered.
An agrarian reform which would not displace too 
much manpower and would raise per capita productivity 
by increasing yields per hectare would thus be justified 
from the strictly economic standpoint, in that it would 
pave the way for future mass consumption, which is one
See the data on the growth of the population employed in 
agriculture and in industry during the forties, presented in 
table 36.
S3 Where certain public utilities are concerned, wage increases 
obviously bear no relation to improvements in productivity.
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of the basic characteristics of a developed capitalist 
society.
In default of this type of consumption, industries pro­
ducing durable consumer goods are compelled to attempt 
increasingly vertical utilization of the existing market 
strata. In the case of Brazil, a symptomatic instance of 
this struggle to expand by making the utmost possible 
use of the purchasing power of the higher income 
brackets is the recent appearance on the market of 
luxury cars and other conspicuous consumer goods.
It seems unlikely that such a solution could be anything 
but a short-term palliative of the industrial growth 
problem. Moreover, it has two drawbacks: it establishes 
an allocation of resources which is highly unsatisfactory 
from the standpoint of real (social) costs; and it gives 
the structure of industry a bias towards stratification, if 
not aggravation, of the defective income distribution 
existing within the capitalist sector itself. The most 
dynamic sectors are driven to depend increasingly upon 
the demand of the upper income strata.
In the analysis of the three divergent types of dis- 
equilibria characteristic of the Brazilian economy’s 
recent development process, a fourth was deliberately 
omitted; namely, financial disequilibrium,®^ which also 
characterized the period under discussion, and was per­
haps more marked because it was so closely related to 
the acceleration of the inflationary process.
It is true that import substitution brings in its train 
a series of inflationary pressures, deriving either from 
the external bottleneck itself or from maladjustments in 
the internal structure of production; nevertheless, the 
transformation of these pressures into a definite in­
flationary process comes about through development 
financing mechanisms, and cannot be studied without 
prior analysis of what takes place in the nerve centre 
of the “ capitalist sector”— its financial and monetary 
system. This is entirely outside the scope of the present 
study.
S'* Generally speaking, any reference made here to financial 
disequilibrium alludes to the fact that changes in the structure 
of production—i.e., the emergence of new dynamic sectors, both 
public and private—have not been accompanied by a correspond­
ing adjustment of the financial machinery
In the case of the private sector, it is obvious that the increase 
in the relative importance of industries manufacturing durable 
consumer and capital goods, whose production processes are 
more “capitalistic” , from the standpoint of both fixed and working 
capital, has not been combined with the financial changes typical 
of the advanced countries, where the sectors in question are 
predominant. For the sake of simplicity, suffice it to mention 
the present situation as regards the capital market and the 
banking system, which are not prepared for large-scale financing 
of the type involved.
The situation of the public sector is little different, either 
at the strictly governmental level or in the semi-public sector, 
where, by virtue of the recent development process, substantial 
investments have had to be effected (especially in the basic 
sectors), with the result that its share in national investment 
has considerably increased. And, as in the private sector, this 
quantitative and qualitative change has not been linked to the 
establishment of a financing mechanism capable of regularly 
meeting the financing requirements of public expenditure.
Inflation may justifiably be said to have aggravated the problem, 
but on the same grounds, and without embarking on an analysis 
of the subject, it might also be asserted that inflation itself is 
in some measure due to the gap between objective financing 
requirements and the capacity of the existing financial structure 
to satisfy them.
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Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn here with regard 
to the evolution of the import substitution process, in 
hroad outline, as one of Brazil’s economic development 
models would probably still have been reached if con­
ditions of stability had prevailed. Even in the absence of 
financial disequilibrium, higher rates of growth than 
those registered in 1956-61, or a greater acceleration 
and diversification of industrial development, would 
hardly have been attainable, nor would the structural 
disequilibria referred to above have been prevented 
(except in the case of basic services under the control of 
the public sector), unless the development model followed 
in the past had been different altogether.
F. Prospects
The Brazilian economy is now faced with a problem 
of strategy, coupled with other short-term problems, 
deriving from the fact that import substitution as a 
development model has already reached its final stage 
and it has now become imperative to move on towards 
a new and truly autonomous phase, receiving its vital 
force from the system itself, in which the structural 
questions that have been pointed out in the course of 
this document will have to be dealt with.
The inability of import substitution to carry the de­
velopment of most of the Latin American countries very 
much further is a premise that is widely accepted by 
the economists of the region. The question should, how­
ever, be related specifically to the case of Brazil and 
cleared up in that context, particularly concerning those 
aspects in which it would be purely academic to regard 
Latin America as constituting a whole.
In several Latin American countries the development 
process has been checked primarily by “ physical”  difiS- 
culties, deriving mainly from the lack of a sufiSciently 
diversified industrial structure to enable new stages of 
substitution, prompted by the external bottleneck, to be 
embarked upon. For instance, it is particularly difiS- 
cult for these countries to become producers of capital 
goods, partly because of their relatively limited market 
but more especially because of the lack of raw materials 
and manpower that would enable fairly sizable invest­
ments to be made in activities that are highly capital- 
intensive and technologically very complex.
Brazil presents a different problem, as import substi­
tution has progressed far more there than in the other 
Latin American countries, and its industrial develop­
ment is already sufficiently advanced to be able “ physi­
cally”  to replace a number of items forming part of its 
range of imports. Accordingly, the question is not to 
discover whether it is “ possible”  to replace a particular 
product, but to determine the economic results of such 
substitution and the “ motive force”  underlying it.
As far as the results of continued import substitution 
are concerned, it may be said, in broad terms, that it 
would tend to slow down economic growth. Apart from 
the actual magnitude of the present import coefficient—  
already one of the lowest in the western world— the 
main argument in support of this statement is the com­
position of the imports that would serve as a guide to 
the investment process. Given the kind of goods that 
currently constitute the range of imports, substitution 
would lead to investment with a high product-capital 
ratio; in other words, it would bring about, over the;
short term at least, a process of growth with decreasing 
macro-economic returns. Consequently, if the economy 
keeps to its present pattern, the previous rate of expan­
sion will obviously he dif&cult to maintain unless a 
more intensive rate of investment is achieved than has 
hitherto been the case.
On the other hand, there are considerations related 
to demand which make it necessary to inquire into the 
origin of the motive force so as to undertake substitu­
tion where it has not yet been resorted to. In this con­
nexion some of the model’s dynamic elements, already 
described in the first part of this study and closely re­
lated to the chain reaction set off by the restrictions on 
the capacity to import, should be recalled.
In actual fact, the external bottleneck stimulated the 
development process only to the extent that there was 
pent-up internal demand for imports of consumer goods. 
Substitution of these imports expanded the domestic 
market and generated a consequential demand for capital 
and intermediate goods which, in its turn, produced a 
fresh external bottleneck, another wave of substitution 
and so on in succession.
When, however, the process reaches such an advanced 
stage that, on the one hand, the imports not yet replaeed 
by the substitution proeess eonsist ehiefly of capital 
goods, or raw materials and intermediate products for 
industry, and, on the other, the eonsumer goods indus­
tries have reached maturity and exhausted the market 
whieh was theirs by reason of the external bottleneck, the 
latter ceases to aet as an incentive to investment and 
hence to growth, and becomes merely an obstacle, re­
moval of which can no longer be the motive underlying 
the dynamics of the economy.
In the ease of Brazil, the diversification brought about 
by the substitution process was substantial and enabled 
a wide range of capital goods to be produeed. Conse­
quently, the erux of the problem is not the impossibility 
of eontinuing with substitution, but the fact that the 
series of incentives created have lost virtually all their 
power.
The items that currently make up the major part of 
Brazil’s imports and include categories suitable for sub­
stitution are capital goods. These are, however, the 
products of consequential demand which does not in 
itself justify substitution. Where will the demand eome 
from to warrant such substitution? As was pointed out, 
the expansion of the more dynamie eonsumer goods in­
dustries has lost its initial momentum (with the satura­
tion of the reserved market), and has eome to the point 
at which its future development will tend to depend on 
the rate of income growth.®® They are, moreover, new 
industries, which will not need to replace their equip­
ment for some time to come.
From this it may be inferred that, when an external 
bottleneck exists, the eontinuity of the growth process 
depends fundamentally on autonomous demand for 
eapital goods which is capable of making better use 
of installed capacity in the domestie eapital goods in­
dustry or of forcing complementarity, thereby freeing 
foreign exchange and thus permitting increased imports
The decline in the rate of industrial expansion seems, in 
fact, to have been sufficient to reduce the growth rate of the 
whole economy in 1962.
of eertain raw materials and intermediate goods for 
whieh domestie production facilities are inadequate.
Autonomous demand of this kind has, moreover, an 
important short-term function to perform, which is to 
prevent the loss of momentum in the previously most 
dynamie sectors from causing a slowdown the effect 
of which may well be to plunge the eapitalist sector into 
a depression (in whieh ease the external bottleneck will 
naturally tend to disappear, at least as far as the pressure 
of imports is concerned).
All that has been said so far bears out the argument 
that the strategie problem eonfronting the Brazilian 
eeonomy is how to make the transition from an import 
substitution model to a self-sustaining growth model.
In aceomplishing the task of bridging the gap between 
the two models, the deeisive variable will be the volume 
and composition of government investment. Only the 
publie sector, with its relative significance within the 
economy, is capable of providing autonomous demand 
on a sufficient seale to eounterbalance the negative effeets 
of the exhaustion of the external stimulus.
The fact that autonomous government investment is 
in practice translated into import substitution does not 
imply a repetition of the old model. In aetual fact, the 
development proeess that would take place during this 
transition period would not be determined essentially 
by the external bottleneck but by the impulse it receives 
through government investment itself, on whose volume 
and composition will depend the short-term rate of 
growth and, above all, the orientation of the system 
over the long term.
As the Brazilian economy already has a fairly ex­
tensive capital goods sector which includes some ae- 
tivities with very flexible produetion lines (such as basic 
equipment or machine-tool manufacture) and a certain 
amount of idle capacity, there is enough scope for 
manoeuvring from the standpoint of real resources to 
allow for orientation of the structural changes in different 
directions. Hence, the complementarity in the industrial 
sector will largely depend on the strategie planning of 
the government investment programme.
It is manifestly impossible to discount the importance 
of the economic policy measures that will have to be 
adopted at every level in order to get through the transi­
tion period suecessfully. However, given the nature of 
the present study, whieh is aimed primarily at clarify­
ing the kind of structural modifications that will be 
involved in a change of model, the analysis herein is 
made on a highly theoretical plane, thus ruling out eon- 
sideration of economie poliey matters, however important 
they may be.
The purpose of these final remarks is to indieate the 
different strategic possibilities that may arise in the case 
of Brazil. For methodological reasons, four of them 
have been ehosen to illustrate the broad outlines of the 
prineipal topies dealt with so far, but it has been borne 
in mind that the evolution of the economy may make 
for the combination of some of them, or at least of some 
of their aspects.
As regards the first possibility, it is assumed that the 
external bottleneck will persist and that the sectoral 
and regional market struetures will remain the same. 
In sueh eireumstances there would be no incentive 
to large-scale private investment whether domestie or 
foreign, apart from the investment induced by income
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growth. Consequently, development itself would mainly 
be determined by the amount and composition of public 
investment.
In view of the premises on which this assumption is 
based, public investment would be directed towards main­
taining the growth rate of the “ capitalist”  sector. As 
a result, the basic lines of action of public investment 
would be twofold; (a) to remedy the internal confusion 
in the sector, particularly by means of investment in 
such infrastructural sectors as energy and basic services; 
and (b) to proceed with import substitution in the vari­
ous branches of intermediate industry. The first course 
would tend to raise the yield from the economic sys­
tem as a whole, while the second, whose cost would be 
relatively very high, would tend to reduce it. Moreover, 
considering that in both cases the share of investment 
with a high product-capital ratio is large, the growth 
process is liable to slow down unless the Government 
succeeds in bringing about an appreciable improvement 
in the economy’s over-all rate of savings investment as 
well as increasing its relative share.
There would continue to be a gap in income distribu­
tion between the apex of the pyramid (the “ capitalist”  
sector) and the base (the “ less developed”  sector), with 
a probable worsening of the functional and personal 
distribution of income within the “ capitalist”  sector 
itself. This would be due to the low rate of labour ab­
sorption in the sectors with the highest productivity and 
a decline in the growth rate of the hitherto most dynamic 
industries. These, in an attempt to keep up their rate 
of return, would be compelled to make increasing inroads 
on the share of wages in value added, while continuing 
to exploit to the utmost the consumer capacity of the 
high-income brackets.
The second assumption is that the external bottleneck 
will remain but the sectoral and regional distribution 
of the market might be changed in order to reduce the 
basic duality of the system. As in the first hypothesis, 
the growth process would depend primarily on autono­
mous government investment, but in this particular case 
the composition of such investment would be the deter­
mining factor in reducing the disequilibrium.
To do this, the Government would have to invest 
heavily in the primary sector and must make every 
effort to finance and encourage investment in the under­
developed areas in order to increase both employment 
and productivity in the less advanced sector and broaden 
the future market for the “ capitalist”  sector.
During the transition period, some branches of in­
dustry in the “ capitalist”  sector itself would be given 
a considerable fillip, especially those manufacturing pro­
duction goods. Among these mention should be made of 
the basic equipment industry which, having a relatively 
flexible production capacity, could adapt itself more 
easily to the new type of demand created in an autono­
mous way by the Government. The impact of this kind 
of demand would mainly be felt by the industries pro­
ducing tools and light equipment for farming and for 
small and medium-scale industry in the under-developed 
areas.
The traditional industries as well would fairly soon 
be reaping the benefit of the over-all increase in the 
income of the under-developed sector. These benefits 
would accrue not only from the rapid increase in the 
productivity of certain sectors as a result of the invest­
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ment made in them, but also from the immediate increase 
in expenditure and employment in the under-developed 
sector.
The durable consumer goods industries alone would 
fail to derive short-term benefits. They might even he 
harmed to a certain extent since the resources needed 
for financing an investment programme of the kind en­
visaged could not be obtained without an indirect 
redistribution of income through the public sector and 
the consequent reduction of the market exploited by the 
industries in question.
If investment is channelled in this direction, imports 
of capital goods could be reduced, both because an 
attempt would be made to make fuller use of domestic 
capacity for producing such goods and because the 
change in the structure of public and private investment 
would sharply reduce import requirements in respect 
of the capital goods which cannot be manufactured in 
Brazil.
Since a programme along these lines would bring 
about a rise in average income and, at the same time, 
increase employment in the less developed sector, con­
ditions would be ripe for a population shift from the 
primary to the secondary sector. Meanwhile, the ex­
pansion of the market would stimulate the new indus­
tries, including those producing durable consumer goods; 
in fact, Brazil would find itself with an autonomous 
development model, in which both sectors would develop 
at the same pace.
On the assumption that external conditions will change 
while the internal structure is left intact, a third pos­
sibility arises, that of an improvement in the position 
of the external sector as the result of an expansion in 
traditional exports.
The effect of this would be to increase the capacity 
to import, thereby giving the industrial sector greater 
flexibility, and in addition to make use of the ample 
resources available in the primary sector. In other words, 
reactivation of the external sector would raise income 
both directly and through the higher yields produced 
by the economy as a whole. Then, too, the effects of 
the improvement in traditional exports on market com­
position would depend primarily on how the additional 
income is distributed throughout the system and par­
ticularly in the export sector itself. As regards the public 
sector, the Government would be in a better position 
to finance investment in the infrastructure.
Under these conditions, however, there would be no 
basic changes in the structure of the existing system, 
with all its possibilities and limitations. Moreover, 
judging from past experience and the long-term pros­
pects for primary commodities, the period of relief would 
probably be short-lived.
The fourth possibility envisages the resurgence of 
the external sector through diversification of exports, 
particularly of industrial products.
It is clear that the chief result of an expansion of 
industrial exports, either to the Latin American market 
or to the rest of the world, would be a reactivation of 
what had hitherto been the most dynamic industrial 
activities in the “ capitalist”  sector. This would, in fact, 
mean the addition of a number of elements of dynamic 
external demand to that part of the domestic market 
now forming the apex of the income pyramid.
Consequently, if the process follows this course only, 
the basic dichotomy between the developed and the 
under-developed sector would be accentuated, since the 
effects of an expansion in the dynamic sectors would 
simply act indirectly on the primary sector (in that 
they would absorb more of the labour force) but would 
not necessarily alter the production functions of the 
more backward sectors.
Needless to say, the four hypotheses are not mutually 
exclusive, particularly as regards the possibility of com­
bining some internal changes with modifications in the 
external variables.
The most dynamic hypothesis would be the combina­
tion of domestic changes on the lines of those described 
in the second alternative with an improvement in the 
position of traditional exports and the gaining of new 
markets for the industrial goods produced by the more 
dynamic sectors. Thus, while external demand stimulated 
the “ capitalist”  sector, the Government could intensify 
its autonomous investment to complete the existing in­
dustrial structure, with particular attention to the infra­
structure of basic services, and to increase in large
measure the proportion of investment in the primary 
sector and under-developed areas. By means of this 
investment policy, reinforced on the social plane by meas­
ures to achieve better income distribution (especially 
in the primary sector), the gap between the two sectors 
of the economy would gradually be closed.
Economic policy obviously comes up against more 
obstacles when it attempts to influence external variables 
than when it deals with domestic factors, although the 
sphere of action of domestic policy is affected by a 
number of problems deriving from existing institutional 
and politico-social structures. It is important, however, 
to have a clear grasp of the possibilities of pursuing 
a line of policy that would make for a combination of 
the most promising and feasible aims and methods.
This is undoubtedly a difficult task, the chief obstacles 
arising not from its intrinsic complexities but from the 
fact that the country is currently beset by a number 
of acute and immediate problems that offer little hope 
for the future. This is probably the greatest challenge 
facing those who are now responsible for determining 
the course of Brazilian policy.
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PROTECTIONISM AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA
by Santiago Macario*
A. Import substitution and protectionist policy in
Latin A merica: evolution and principal charac­
teristics
1. With very few exceptions, the Latin American 
countries cannot be said to apply a protectionist policy, 
if by this is to be understood a systematic body of 
measures deliberately designed to permit and encourage 
the development of certain industries rationally selected 
within an over-all framework of objectives established 
under a given economic development policy. ^'Tiat did 
and still does exist is protectionism, but as the largely 
indirect result of ad hoc measures, often adopted, at 
least initially or during a first stage, as emergency pro­
cedures, either in order to solve balance-of-payments 
problems, or under the pressure of other exogenous 
factors. Such measures, temporary to begin with, became 
permanent in most cases and more general in their scope, 
giving rise to a form of protectionism which has been 
characterized by extemporaneousness, lack of autonomy 
(since it is primarily motivated by external causes), 
extremely high levels and indiscriminate application, 
and whose basic objective is import substitution at any 
cost, regardless of which industries it is most expedient 
to develop and how far the process should be carried.
2. Up to the beginning of the thirties, the Latin 
American countries pursued a pre-eminently free-trade 
policy. It is true that during the twenties a number of 
them had already begun to make use of customs duties 
as a means of encouraging the expansion of their indus­
trial production (which had been given a considerable 
impetus during the First World W ar), not only by in­
tensifying the application of moderately protectionist 
duties in favour of incipient industries, but also through 
the reduction of duties on imports of industrial ma­
chinery and equipment. Nevertheless customs tariffs re­
mained preponderantly fiscal in character, and the main 
object of the relatively frequent increases in duties reg­
istered in Latin America during the decade in question 
was to augment revenue.^ The stimulus to the economic
* The author, who is a staff member of the Economic Com­
mission for Latin America, has been temporarily seconded to 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The 
opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own views 
and will not necessarily coincide with those of either of the 
two organizations.
1 According to estimates prepared hy the League of Nations, 
the average level of tariffs in Argentina (the country that had 
attained the highest degree of industrialization in Latin America) 
was the same in 1925 as in 1913, i.e., 26 per cent, determined 
as the simple arithmetic mean of the rates—in ad valoTem 
terms— of duties on 278 products selected as the most repre­
sentative of the foreign trade of the fourteen countries covered 
by the study (the ad valorem rate for each product was calculated 
on the basis of its average export price). In the case of 
Argentina, the average level of duties and charges on manufactured 
goods barely exceeded the over-all tariff level—28 per cent in 
1913 and 29 per cent in 1925— a fact indicative of the non-
development of the countries of the region was tradi­
tionally provided by the growth of exports; and although 
in some countries a few fairly significant industries 
other than export activities developed (in most cases 
“ spontaneously” , at least in their initial phase, and 
afterwards under the aegis of some degree of protection), 
demand for manufactured goods was mainly satisfied by 
means of imports. Moreover, these were relatively easily 
kept in line with the capacity to import through the 
repercussions of the expansions and contractions in pri­
mary exports on economic activity and income levels.
3. With the world depression of the thirties, however, 
exports of primary commodities underwent so abrupt, 
marked and persistent a contraction® that the purchasing 
power of total Latin American exports dropped by almost 
60 per cent between 1928 and 1933.® This setback was 
combined with heavy losses of foreign exchange as a 
result of the flight of capital and the propensity of Latin 
American exporters to retain a considerable proportion 
of their foreign exchange export earnings abroad. The 
impact of these and other circumstances (for instance, 
the United Kingdom’s abandonment of the gold stan­
dard) placed many Latin American countries under 
the necessity, first of declaring their currencies non- 
convertible, in 1929 and 1930, and countenancing appre­
ciable devaluations, and later, from 1931 onwards, 
applying exchange controls in order to forestall further 
devaluations, defend their currency and reserves (by 
holding capital outflows in check and controlling foreign 
exchange export earnings), and, in general, cope with 
their serious balance-of-payments disequilibria by ra­
tioning the foreign exchange available. The principal
protectionist character of the duties. The foregoing levels were 
a good deal lower than those computed for Spain and the United 
States, and comparable, as regards the year 1925, to the estimates 
for Australia, Hungary and Poland and, in the case of manu­
factured goods, to those for Canada and Czechoslovakia, besides 
being little higher than the figures for France, Germany and 
Italy. See League of Nations, Tariff Level Indices, Publications 
of the League of Nations, II. Economic and Financial, 1927.11.34, 
Geneva, 1927,
2 To the falling-off in demand for primary commodities caused 
by the contraction of economic activity in the industrialized 
countries were added the effects of the stringent policy of 
agricultural protectionism adopted by most of these countries 
as a reaction to the depression.
3 At current prices and in terms of “ new dollars” , that is, 
of the value of the dollar after its devaluation in 1934, the total 
value of exports from Latin America declined from about $5 000 
million in 1928 and 1929 to $2 400 million in 1931 and SI 500 
million in 1933. Up to the year 1941 (inclusive) their level 
remained below ?2 000 million (except in 1937), and only in 
194.7 did it once again exceed |5 000 million. This downward 
movement was mainly due to the fall in prices (in 1933 the 
unit value of Latin America exports was only a little over one- 
third of the 1928 figure). Even in 1960 the purchasing power 
of the region’s exports was lower than in 1928; and if Venezuela 
is excluded, it was barely two-thirds as high in the former as 
in the latter year (see table 1 below).
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aim of such rationing was to safeguard the supply of 
foreign exchange at a preferential rate for the servicing 
of the external public debt (which at the same time 
was prevented hy the suspension of devaluation from 
becoming too heavy a burden), as well as for imports 
of goods regarded as essential (staple consumer goods, 
raw materials and capital goods).'*
At that time the exchange controls in question were 
adopted as emergency measures, purely to serve the 
ends of exchange policy, not those of protectionism, and 
were not, at least to begin with, used to restrict specific 
imports. Thus it was that they were not at first accom­
panied or supplemented, save in exceptional cases, by 
quantitative restrictions. It was impossible, however, 
to prevent them from indirectly producing protectionist 
effects; for the mere rationing of foreign exchange and 
establishment of an order of import priorities means 
that non-essential or luxury goods or products with 
domestically-manufactured counterparts tend to be rele­
gated to the background, and are assigned a limited 
amount of foreign exchange, or none at all, at the pref­
erential ofiicial market rate, so that payment for them 
has to be made through the free market, at a less favour­
able rate of exchange, with the consequent addition 
to their cost. Inevitably, too, the authorities discovered 
that such exchange restrictions (which were soon com­
bined with others of a quantitative nature) enabled them 
to apply policies whose implementation by other means 
(through changes in the tariff, for instance) would be 
impossible, or much less effective and rapid in its results. 
Hence, when the original need to safeguard the balance 
of payments became of secondary importance, the Gov­
ernments of the region did not display much willingness 
to forego such convenient and flexible instruments 
altogether.
5. Thus, although exchange controls were relaxed 
throughout the Latin American countries from 1934 
onwards (in consequence of the increase in the value 
and volume of exports, and the resultant alleviation of 
the foreign exchange shortage), most of the countries 
of the region began to apply quantitative import restric­
tions (permits, quotas, embargoes, etc.), or, where such 
restrictions already existed, they assumed far more im­
portance than before. Increasing recourse was also had 
to multiple exchange rates,® these again, however, were 
not yet applied to any significant extent for protectionist 
purposes, but in response to the need for appropriate 
instruments of bilateral negotiation and, in many in­
stances, discrimination. In such direct restrictions the 
Latin American countries found a particularly eflBcacious 
instrument of negotiation, whose use, moreover, was 
virtually forced upon them, in view of the marked trend 
towards bilateralism in world trade and payments, since 
it constituted the only effective way of protecting na­
tional interests and acquiring some measure of bargain­
■* Seven Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Nicaragua and Uruguay) adopted exchange 
control systems in 1931; three more (Costa Rica, Ecuador and 
Paraguay) did so in 1932. Mexico followed their example in 
1933 and Honduras and Venezuela in 1934. Cuba and El Salvador 
put exchange controls in operation, but only for brief periods 
of one and a half and three naonths, while the Dominican Republic 
and Peru introduced them only in 1942 and 1945, respectively.
5 It was only after the Second World War, however, that the 
application of multiple exchange rates by the Latin Anaerican 
countries became widespread and intensive (see below, para­
graphs 14 and 18, and footnote 13).
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ing power vis-à-vis countries which, like many of the 
industrialized economies, applied very severe foreign 
trade controls and conducted their trade on strictly 
bilateral bases.
6. Direct restrictions have certain alluring advantages 
over the traditional customs tariff instrument. They pro­
duce results with greater speed, efiBcacy and precision; 
they can be applied with more freedom and flexibility, 
and lend themselves better to the exercise of adminis­
trative judgement; they are more easily adaptable to 
changing circumstances; and so forth. These paramount 
considerations, in conjunction with the situation outlined 
in the preceding paragraph and with the persistence or 
resurgence, in some instances, of serious balance-of- 
payments disequilibria, account for the fact that the 
exchange controls and quantitative restrictions which had 
originally been introduced as emergency measures took 
on a permanent character, and became for many years 
the normal or predominant instruments of trade policy 
employed by the majority of the Latin American 
countries.
7. As far as customs tariffs were concerned, during 
the thirties— or at least after the slackening of exchange 
restrictions in 1934— they stiU played a fairly important 
role in many Latin American countries, especially in 
those where customs duties can be altered by the execu­
tive without prior authorization by the legislature. But 
they lost a great deal of their effectiveness, and became 
increasingly inflexible, as a result of the many trade 
treaties concluded by the Latin American countries with 
third parties (and in a good many cases with other 
countries of the region), under the terms of which they 
granted reductions and consolidations of customs duties 
in relation to a large number of manufactured goods.® 
This also played a decisive part in inducing most of 
the Latin American countries to relegate the customs 
tariff to a very secondary place as an instrument of 
trade policy, and to make increasing use of direct con­
trols for the regulation of their foreign trade— a state 
of affairs which became much more marked during and 
after the Second World War, as will be seen forthwith.'^
6 Cases in point are the agreements signed by Argentina with 
the United Kingdom in 1933 and with the United States in 
1941. The tariff concessions accorded under them by Argentina 
related to products which constituted approximately 60 per cent 
of the total value of its imports. From 1934 onwards, many other 
Latin American countries signed what were known as “ trade 
reciprocity” agreements with the United States, and likewise 
granted a number of tariff concessions in respect of manufactured 
goods.
It should also be pointed out that as from 1931 several Latin 
American countries (Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti and Uruguay) adopted multi-column tariffs— 
which for years had been a common procedure among the
European countries—with the aim of applying discriminatory 
treatment according to the markets of origin or imports, in
particular for balance-of-payments reasons or as a countermeasure 
against discriminations by which they in their turn were sub­
jected. Thus, imports from countries with which they had a 
heavy trade deficit. were subject to the maximum tariff, with
duties that might be, for example, 100 per cent higher than
the basic rates.
T This was particularly true of the South American countries, 
since they all, without exception, resorted (especially in the years 
immediately following the Second World War) to the simultaneous 
application of exchange controls, quantitative restrictions and 
multiple exchange rates, as well as other types of restrictions 
such as prior deposits, tie-in or mixing requirements, etc. On 
the other hand, of the remaining ten Latin American countries
8. The indirectly protectionist repercussions of the 
exchange controls and quantitative restrictions adopted 
by the Latin American countries during the thirties were 
reinforced by the effects of the suspension or contraction 
of normal supplies of manufactured goods from the in­
dustrialized countries during the Second World War. 
The Latin American industries, especially those already 
established, were thus afforded an opportunity of ex­
panding production up to the limit of their capacity, 
to satisfy domestic demand and, in the case of countries 
at a more advanced stage of industrialization, such as 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, to supply markets 
elsewhere in the region and even outside Latin America.®
9. Full advantage could not be taken of this first 
opportunity for large-scale import substitution, on ac­
count of the shortage of equipment for the installation 
of new industries or the expansion of those already 
existing (most of which produced non-durable consumer 
goods, for example, textiles), and also because of the 
prevailing tendency to improvisation and the lack of a 
clear-cut industrial development programme. Neverthe­
less, it definitively spurred on the industrialization 
process in several Latin American countries; and— per­
haps more important still— it was also a decisive factor 
in awakening both Government circles and the private 
sector to the necesity and potentialities of industrializa­
tion. Originally dictated by external factors, industriali­
zation became, especially under the pressure of vested 
interests, a fundamental objective of the economic pohcy 
of the Governments concerned.
10. It was thus that, the war once over, the authorities 
in question adopted an openly protectionist policy in 
respect of the industries established during the war 
years and now facing the threat of a recrudescence of 
external competition. To this end, they used mainly the 
instruments they had come to consider customary and 
most efficacious as means of influencing the volume and 
composition of imports— i.e., direct controls. These, 
moreover, made it possible to maintain the wartime 
status quo, or, in other words, to reserve the domestic 
market exclusively for the home industry, and at the 
same time guaranteed this latter a supply of foreign 
exchange at preferential rates for imports of capital 
goods and other inputs not obtainable in the country.
11. But the factor that did most to promote the 
maintenance of direct restrictions was the concern 
aroused by the shortage of foreign exchange, in face 
of the persistence and even the aggravation of the 
balance-of-payments deficits of most of the Latin Ameri­
can countries, which resulted not only from the eco­
only Costa Rica and Nicaragua took steps of this kind. Mexico, 
for its part, adopted the licensing system for a considerable and 
increasing number of products in 1948, to serve preponderantly 
protectionist ends. In the other seven countries, the customs tariff 
continued to be virtually the only instrument of import control, 
and was applied almost exclusively for fiscal purposes.
8 For instance, in 1943 Argentina exported 19 000 tons of 
textile goods, 70 000 dozen pairs of shoes for women and children, 
510 tons of other leather manufactures, etc.; Brazil, also in 
1943, exported 26 400 tons of cotton textiles (to a value of about 
$80 million), as well as substantial quantities of wooOen textiles 
and yarn, pencils, pharmaceutical products, ceramic products and 
glassware, etc. All these exports contracted sharply in the post­
war years, especially after 1948, and by the beginning of the 
fifties were practically non-existent.
nomic distortions caused by the war® but also from the 
pressure exerted by demand that had been imsatisfied 
or held in check for several years— demand both for 
durable and other consumer goods, and for industrial 
equipment. At the same time, the urbanization process 
and the rise in the income levels of the population as 
a whole had also caused an expansion of normal or 
current demand for imported consumer goods, and this 
development was intensified in most cases by inflationary 
pressures and by the maintenance of exchange rates 
based on over-valuation of the currency.
12. These factors were combined, especially in the 
more developed economies of Latin America, with an­
other whose importance was very great, above all over 
the long term, and which derived from the industriali­
zation process itself: the increasing demand for pro­
duction goods (raw materials, fuels, intermediate prod­
ucts and capital goods).
13. Although Latin America’s exports, in their turn, 
expanded rapidly in the years immediately following the 
war, their total value (as well as the value of the ex­
ternal sales of each of the leading exporter coun­
tries— Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and 
Venezuela) having doubled between 1945 and 1948, 
were far from reaching a level sufficiently high 
to cover total demand for imports; and after imder- 
going an abrupt contraction in 1949, they climbed only 
by slow degrees during the fifties, and almost entirely 
by virtue of the increase in Venezuela’s exports. The 
purchasing power of exports from Argentina and Chile 
stood— and still stands— far below the levels attained 
by both countries in 1928 and 1929;'® in other coun­
tries, such as Brazil, Mexico and Peru, the 1928 and 
1929 figures were exceeded only in the fifties, and then 
by relatively narrow margins. Table 1 reflects this situa­
tion in relation to Latin America as a whole, with the 
inclusion and with the exclusion of Venezuela."
14. In face of this growing disparity between their 
import requirements and their capacity to import, and 
reluctant as they were to countenance the indiscriminate 
devaluation of their currencies, most of the Latin Ameri­
can countries continued to limit their imports on a 
selective basis during the post-war years through the 
application of exchange controls, quantitative restric­
tions and, above all, multiple exchange rates. In this 
respect, there was a marked trend in the direction of 
composite systems, i.e., the combined application of 
controls to regulate foreign exchange movements by 
limiting or rationing the use of the foreign exchange 
available, quantitative restrictions on the quantum or 
value of the goods to be imported or exported, as the 
case might be, and restrictions of the kind that operate 
by raising the cost of imports, typical examples being
8 In many cases, the balance-of-payments deficits registered in 
the post-war period were not so much global as partial, with 
certain currency areas, especially the dollar area, as a result 
of the non-convertibility of other currencies and the European 
countries’ inability, for several years, to export the necessary 
quantities of manufactured goods.
10 From 1951 onwards, the purchasing power of Argentina’s 
exports fluctuated around 50 per cent of the 1928 and 1929 
figures.
11 For data on the evolution of exports as well as on that of 
imports, by countries or for the years not included in table 1, 
see ECLA, Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vols. V and VT, 
Santiago, Chile.
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customs duties and other charges, surcharges and mul­
tiple exchange rates. These systems became distinctly 
complex, the specific restrictive measures applied by the 
different countries varying considerably; and within the 
over-all trend towards composite and complex systems, 
there was a noteworthy increase in the use of multiple
exchange rates. These, in fact, came to constitute the 
main instrument of import control or selective regula­
tion used by the Latin American countries in the post­
war years, playing a more important role than quantita­
tive restrictions, which in their turn had ousted exchange 
controls proper as the principal means of regulating 
imports.
Table 1
Latin America: Total AND PER CAPITA EXPORTS AT CURRENT AND CONSTANT PRICES, Í928-60
Year
Total exports 


























1928 .. ............ 5 077 7192 99.3 51.13 72.43 90 122 220
1930 .. ............  3 380 6 313 102.6 32.94 61.53 79 86 150
1945 . . ............  3 262 6 639 137.9 23.65 48.14 83 65 84
1950 .. ............ 6 604 7 069 156.1 42.31 45.29 88 98 112
1955 .. ............ 8 017 8 017 178.9 44.81 44.81 100 100 100
1957 .. ............ 8 684 8 852 189.3 45.87 46.76 110 106 100
1958 . . ............ 8 214 8 999 194.7 42.19 46.22 112 102 94
1959 .. ............  8 345 9 870 200.3 41.66 49.28 123 108 96
1960 .. ............ 8 706 10 037 205.9 42.28 48.75 125 111 96
1961« . ............ 8 708 10 238 211.8 41.11 48.34 128 111 94
1962a . ............ 9160 11054 217.8 42.06 50.75 138 109 90
Excluding Venezuela
1928 .. ............ 4880 6 886 96.3 50.67 71.51 113 154 276
1930 .. ............ 3 073 5 931 99.7 30.82 59.49 97 104 180
1945 .. ............  2 908 5 817 133.6 21.77 43.54 95 76 98
1950 .. ............ 5 443 5 758 151.2 36.00 38.08 94 105 120
1955 .. ............  6105 6105 172.8 35.33 35.33 100 100 100
1957 .. ............  6 317 6 385 182.7 34.58 34.95 104 105 99
1958 .. ............ 5 893 6 637 187.9 31.36 35.32 109 99 91
1959 .. ............ 5 976 7 339 193.2 30.93 37.99 120 103 92
1960 .. ............  6169 7 342 198.6 31.06 36.97 120 106 92
1961a . ............ 6 295 7 619 204.2 30.83 37.31 125 109 92
1962a . ............  6 566 8 211 210.0 31.27 39.10 134 106 87
Sources: Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol. V (1960), VI (1961) and VII (1962). 
For 1928 and 1930, ECLA estimates, on the basis of national statistics.
“ Provisional figures.
15. Thus, at the end of the forties twelve of the Latin 
American countries (all those of South America, and, 
in addition, Costa Rica and Nicaragua) were maintain­
ing the exchange controls introduced in 1931 and 1932 
by all but Venezuela and Peru, which began to apply 
them in 1934 and 1945 respectively, although in Vene­
zuela’s case they were of negligible significance, and in 
practice very liberal treatment was accorded to external 
payments. The same twelve countries also resorted to 
quantitative import restrictions in the shape of licences 
or permits (generally granted on the basis of individual 
quotas for each product, and in a few cases— for in­
stance, in Argentina— on the basis of aggregate quotas), 
and/or embargoes on imports of certain goods (whether 
specified on a schedule or simply not included among 
authorized imports). In addition all made use of multiple 
exchange rates for import purposes, with the exception 
of Peru, which, however, effected its imports through 
an exchange certificate market, at a rate rather more 
favourable than that prevailing on the free market. The 
degrees of complexity of these multiple exchange rate
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systems varied a good deal with regard to the number, 
combination and determination of rates, etc., although 
systems based on fixed multiple rates predominated. Sub­
sequently there was a movement towards fluctuating 
multiple rates, and, in more recent years, fluctuating 
single rates. In addition, Costa Rica and Nicaragua had 
already introduced the system of prior deposits on im­
ports, and this procedure soon spread to a number of 
South American countries, in some of which— Chile in 
particular— it ultimately acquired major importance as 
a restrictive measure.
16. The other eight Latin American countries, on 
the contrary, had given up (or had never adopted) ex­
change controls and quantitative restrictions, save for 
a very few exceptional cases. The most important of these 
was Mexico’s adoption of the import licensing system 
in 1948, alongside the devaluation of the currency. This 
system was gradually extended until it became the main 
instrument for the restriction of imports; furthermore, 
on several occasions Mexico resorted to a general de­
valuation of its currency as a means of relieving balance-
of-payments pressures. The Dominican Republic and 
Honduras applied exchange controls, but not restrictively 
(for example, in Honduras permits were required for 
external payments, but could be obtained without difiB- 
culty). In the other five countries (Cuba, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti and Panama) there were no exchange 
controls (although Cuba taxed all remittances of foreign 
exchange abroad at a rate of 2 per cent), nor were 
quantitative restrictions applied as in the Dominican 
Republic and Honduras, except occasionally in respect 
of certain products. All these countries, including Mexico, 
had a single fixed exchange rate. In all of them but 
Mexico, therefore, the customs tariff continued to con­
stitute the only instrument of import control, and, more­
over, was pre-eminently fiscal in character.
17. Although recourse to them was still mainly 
prompted by the need to ease balance-of-payments 
pressures (except in isolated cases where the foreign 
exchange situation was fairly comfortable, as in Argen­
tina up to 1951), the exchange controls and quantitative 
restrictions applied by the Latin American countries in 
the post-war years were by that time used much more 
deliberately than before as an instrument to stimulate 
the import substitution process and promote industrial 
development, at least in countries like Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and Mexico, where industrialization had reached 
a more advanced stage and was more firmly established, 
and, furthermore, had the backing of vested interests 
and of favourable attitudes and expectations on the 
part of private enterprise, as well as of a markedly 
nationalistic outlook among government officials. The 
authorities made industrialization their watchword, con­
siderably intensifying the import substitution process, 
which seemed to represent on the one hand the sole 
(or at least the most viable and immediate) solution 
for the recurrent problem of the foreign exchange 
shortage, and, on the other, the only way of absorbing 
the population increment so as to achieve a more effi­
cient utilization of resources and, in generaL attain a 
more satisfactory rate of economic development. These 
last considerations, however, began to carry weight only 
o posteriori, as a rationalization of the advantages of 
industrialization.^^ Greater influence was exerted, in the 
years immediately following the war, by the need for 
import substitution to alleviate balance-of-payments pres­
sures, by the intensification of nationalism and of defi­
nitely autarkical trends, and by the persistence of the 
buoyancy resulting from the industrialization process 
that had taken place during the war.
Concurrently, from 1948 onwards, and chiefly in the ECLA 
secretariat, a body of theories was gradually built up, in support 
of industrialization and import substitution in the relatively less 
developed countries, on the basis of protection, as the only 
practicable method whereby such countries could secure an 
adequate share in the benefits deriving from technical progress, 
solve their recurrent balance-of-payments difficulties, satisfactorily 
absorb the increase in the labour force, promote the expansion 
of the total product of the economy, etc. See in particular the 
following ECLA documents: The economic development of Latin 
America and its principal problems. United Nations Publication, 
Sales No.: 1950.11.G.2; Economic Survey of Latin America 1949, 
Part I, United Nations Publication, Sales No.: 1951.II.G.1; 
Problemas Teóricos y Prácticos del Crecimiento Económico, 
United Nations Publication, Sales No.: 1952.II.G.1 (English 
version issued in mimeographed form only, under the title 
Theoretical and practical problems of economic growth) ; and 
International Co-operation in a Latin American Development 
Policy, United Nations Publication, Sales No.: 1954.II.G.2, 
chapter IV.
18. The pre-eminence accorded by the Latin Ameri­
can countries to the use of multiple or differential 
exchange rates during this period was substantially 
attributable precisely to the more decidedly protectionist 
orientation of import restriction policy; for this type 
of measure, as has been pointed out, enables a differen­
tial and selective devaluation to be put into effect, such 
as will ensure that foreign exchange is available at 
favourable or preferential exchange rates for imports 
of capital goods and other inputs required for indus­
trialization purposes as well as of essential consumer 
goods, while items replaceable by domestically-produced 
counterparts, or luxury goods, or lines that compete 
with domestic production, have to be imported (if quan­
titative restrictions so permit) at a more burdensome 
rate of exchange. And although differential exchange 
rates are equivalent in their effects to customs duties, 
they have an advantage over these inasmuch as their 
influence on the level and composition of imports is 
more direct and efficacious, and particularly as they 
can be established and amended by administrative de­
cisions, whereas duties, as has been shown, were largely 
consolidated by various trade agreements; moreover, in 
many instances changes in these have to be approved 
by the legislature.^®
19. This, however, by no means implies that import 
substitution was a planned process, and that the in­
dustries to be protected were determined by rational and 
systematic selection with a view to promoting the op­
timum allocation of resources and/or the maximum real 
saving of foreign exchange. Apart from the continuance 
of protection for industries already established (before, 
and above all during, the Seeond World W ar), import 
substitution was effeeted mainly on the basis of restric­
tions, and even direct embargoes, imposed on imports 
of products classified as non-essential or luxury goods, 
and also, to an increasing extent, in response to requests 
for proteetion presented by the private seetor in favour 
of new lines of produetion that had been launehed or 
that were felt to be worth developing. In most cases, 
such petitions met, and still meet, with a favourable 
reception.
20. In this connexion, attention must be drawn to 
the relatively passive role played in most instanees, 
both now and in the past, by the Latin Ameriean au­
thorities in the adoption of deliberately proteetionist
i®For a discussion of the applicabilitv of multiple exchange 
rates in the under-developed countries, given their situation and 
particularly their economic development requirements, as well as 
of the advantages and disadvantages of the use of such rales 
in relation to that of the tariff instrument (with which they have 
important points of contact, since they operate in the same way 
as customs duties), see E. R. Schlesinger, Multiple Exchange 
Rates and Economic Development, Princeton Studies in Inter­
national Finance, No. 2, Princeton University Press, 1952. 
Schlesinger emphasizes the advantages of using, in the countries 
in question, selective measures of this kind, whose operation 
is direct and immediate, and which can be modified by the 
authorities to bring them into line with changing circumstances, 
rather than resorting to instruments which operate automatically 
and impersonally; and he draws the conclusion that although 
the application of direct controls is attended by certain dangers 
and drawbacks, their introduction in one form or another 
constitutes a calculated risk that is worth running.
With respect to various forms or type of quantitative restric­
tions, differences between these and customs duties as regards 
mode of operation and effects, etc., see Quantitative Trade 
Controls: their causes and nature. League of Nations Publica­
tion No. 1943.II.A.5, Geneva 1943.
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measures, since they have seldom assumed the initiative 
in the determination of the industries that should be 
protected and developed. Only towards the end of the 
fifties did some Governments (particularly those of 
Brazil and Mexico) begin to take a more energetic line 
and impose some degree of planning on the import 
substitution process, chiefly with the aim of attaining 
a higher level of industrial integration; concurrently, 
certain requisites relating to prices, quality, and, more 
commonly, volume of output, use of domestically- 
produced raw materials and other inputs, etc., which 
an industrialist must fulfil for protection to be granted 
or maintained, were established or for the first time 
effectively enforced.
21. The contraction undergone between 1951 and 
1953 by the purchasing power of exports from several 
Latin American countries, in particular Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico and Uruguay, in conjunction with the sub­
stantial expansion of imports that had taken place in 
the immediately preceding years (owing to the renewal 
of supplies of exportable goods in the industrialized 
countries, as well as to the greater inflow of foreign 
exchange and the uncertainty of future supply prospects 
resulting from the hostilities in Korea), caused new and 
increasing balance-of-payments pressures in most of the 
countries in question. This gave rise to a considerable 
intensification of their import restrictions, alongside a 
trend towards the application of more complex and 
diversified measures of control. In Argentina, for ex­
ample, the sharp decline in the export quantum regis­
tered in 1951, which became even steeper in 1952, 
compelled the authorities to limit imports in the latter 
year to essential supplies of raw materials, fuels and 
capital goods, and to suspend the granting of foreign 
exchange for imports of any products of a type pro­
duced within the country. In the same year, Brazil tightly 
controlled imports against convertible currencies, con­
fining them to strictly indispensable materials and equip­
ment, the schedule of which, moreover, was reduced 
from 500 to some 170 products. In 1953 it adopted the 
system of auctioning foreign exchange, with the aim 
of still further curtailing imports of non-essential goods 
or products similar to those manufactured by domestic 
industry, and affording the latter a higher degree of 
protection that it had obtained through the multiple 
exchange rates in force up to that time, besides making 
up for the inefficacy of the customs tariff.^* Chile and 
Uruguay, for their part, reinstituted the import licence 
in mid-1952 for all products, and the former also made 
additions to its list of banned imports. Mexico, in its 
turn, endeavoured to offset the increasing pressure on
Up to that time the multiple exchange rates had derived 
from the application of an exchange tax on most external pay­
ments. Under the new auction system five categories of products 
were established (plus another special category), and in 1954 
the surcharge on the cost of foreign exchange for imports in 
the fifth category was approximately 265 per cent of the official 
exchange rate. As for the customs tariff, it had almost entirely 
lost its efficacy as a result of the application of specific duties 
and of the tariff concessions accorded under bilateral treaties 
and, to a lesser extent, under GATT. Thus, the average incidence 
of the import duties and charges actually collected (with the 
exclusion of petroleum products) declined from 25.3 per cent 
in 1935 to 9 per cent in 1947 and 8.1 per cent in 1951; on 70 
per cent of the imports effected in 1951 the customs duties payable 
were less than 10 per cent (see ECLA, Study oj Inter-Latin 
American Trade, United Nations Publication, Sales No.: 1956. 
II.G.3).
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its balance of payments through the establishment of 
higher import duties at the end of 1953, and later, in 
view of the relative inefficacy of this measure, through 
a general devaluation of the currency in April 1954 (by 
a little over 30 per cent, in terms of gold). At the same 
time it considerably enlarged the number of products 
that could only he imported with a licence (this regu­
lation being even applied to certain raw materials). 
Furthermore, the latter type of control was tightened 
severely in respect of imports classified as luxury or 
non-essential goods.
22. The growing complexity of these measures, how­
ever, made them increasingly difficult to apply, and often 
inoperative, even if not self-defeating, or detrimental 
to the normal development of productive activities. More­
over, as they were both adopted and applied at the 
discretion of the administrative authorities and resulted 
in exceptional gains for the sectors, groups or individuals 
they benefited, such direct controls became a source 
of favouritism and corruption. At the same time, the 
frequent modifications to which the various measures 
were subject created an atmosphere of insecurity; and 
these changes were dictated more by the pressure of 
vested interests, by conjunctural factors or by political 
considerations than by the requirements of a clearly- 
defined and co-ordinated programme.
23. As a result, there was a strong reaction in the Latin 
American countries against the application of controls 
of this type, and particularly against multiple exchange 
rates and import licences, quotas, etc. This reaction 
became still more marked in the second half of the 
fifties, when the controls in question were abolished or 
simplified in most of the countries of the region, and 
replaced by single exchange rates and by additional 
import duties or surcharges (equivalent in all to customs 
duties), as well as, in some cases, by tariff reforms 
designed to reinstate the customs tariff as the main 
instrument of import control. Stress should also be laid 
on the decisive influence exerted in this direction in 
several instances, especially during the second stage, 
by the recommendations of the International Monetary 
Fund, under the stabilization programmes put into op­
eration with the financial assistance of that agency.^®
24. Although differing, sometimes substantially, from 
one country to another, the changes described were gen­
erally brought about in two phases: during the first, 
exchange controls were maintained, but the multiple 
exchange rates previously enforced were replaced by 
two— the official market and the free market rates— the 
whole or the bulk of the country’s foreign trade being 
conducted on the basis of the former; in actual fact, 
however, a number of real exchange rates sometimes 
persisted, inasmuch as foreign exchange was provided 
through the official market at a base value or price 
officially established for the particular product con­
cerned. Quantitative restrictions were eliminated or re­
duced to permits (nominal in several cases) for certain 
goods; but import embargoes were kept in force through 
the non-inclusion of some items on the schedule of 
authorized imports. At the same time, or somewhat later,
15 By 1960 eleven Latin American countries had assumed the 
commitments specified in article VIII of the IMF Charter, which 
consisted in the maintenance of currency convertibility, and the 
avoidance of restrictions on current payments as well as of 
multiple exchange rates and monetary practices of a discriminatory 
character.
other restrictions were established in the shape of import 
surcharges or supplementary taxes, and prior deposits.
25. During the second phase, exchange controls were 
abolished, exchange rates were unified in a single, free 
and fluctuating market, such quantitative restrictions 
as still existed (licences, prohibitions) were abolished, 
and surcharges or supplementary taxes equivalent in 
their effects to customs duties were levied. In some 
instances, the prior deposits established during the first 
stage were eliminated, but in others they were maintained 
or even introduced for the first time.
26. Such was, in broad outline, the course pursued 
in Argentina with the reforms of October 1955 and 
December 1958; in Chile with those of April 1956 and 
January 1959;'® in Bolivia with those of May 1953 
and December 1956; in Uruguay with those of August 
1956 and December 1959; and in Paraguay with those 
of February 1956 and July 1957.
27. Brazil, in August 1957, carried out at one and the 
same time an exchange reform and a tariff reform, by 
means of which a considerable proportion of the pro­
tection formerly accorded through the exchange system 
was shifted to the custom tariff. The exchange system 
was simplified, as although the auctioning of foreign 
exchange still went on, the categories of products were 
reduced from six to two only; in addition, however, 
a preferential or subsidized exchange rate was established 
for imports of wheat, petroleum and petroleum products, 
newsprint, etc. The import licence was maintained only 
in a nominal guise, as a means of checking the accuracy 
of the data declared by the importer. The system of 
auctioning foreign exchange was abolished later, in 
March 1961, and all imports are now effected through 
the free market, although goods classified in the special 
category need an import licence; this is extended to 
holders of “ promissory permits” , which have to be 
bought at auction on a basis of aggregate quotas. Con­
sequently, in order to import products included in the 
special category, a considerable surcharge on the free 
market exchange rate has to be paid.
28. Accordingly, in contrast with the prevalence of 
the use of exchange controls, quantitative restrictions 
and multiple exchange rates in Latin America in the 
early fifties, the import régimes of the Latin American 
countries ten years later are characterized by the absence 
of controls of those types. In fact, if Cuba, where State 
trading is the rule, is not taken into account, exchange 
controls, multiple exchange rates and quantitative re­
strictions (import licences and prohibitions) are main­
tained only by Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and 
Venezuela. In all these countries, however, exchange 
controls are simple and exchange rates few in number, 
and import permits are, at least in Ecuador’s case, a 
nominal requirement. Mexico uses the licensing system 
as its chief instrument of control; and Chile re-established 
de facto, in January 1962, dual exchange areas and 
import embargoes.
29. In all the other countries there is a complete 
absence of exchange controls, multiple exchange rates 
and quantitative restrictions (except of a nominal kind, 
or exceptionally or occasionally applied). They all effect 
their imports at a single exchange rate, either fixed or
In the middle of 1959 prior deposits amounting sometimes 
to as much as 1 500 per cent for 90 days, began to be gradually 
superseded by supplementary taxes.
free and fluctuating; and import restrictions other than 
customs duties— which in several countries continue to 
play a minor or negligible role— consist in surcharges 
and supplementary taxes with equivalent effects, and, 
less frequently or as a secondary recourse, prior deposits. 
The last-named instrument is used by Brazil, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay and, to a much 
more significant extent, by Chile."
30. In several South American countries (for ex­
ample, in Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay), a third 
phase in the evolution of import restrictions is now 
under way, in the shape of a tariff reform, aimed at 
substituting customs duties for the various kinds of taxes 
and charges (by now complex and numerous in many 
cases) which are applied to imports, and adopting an 
up-to-date tariff nomenclature suited to the purposes 
of making the customs tariff an effective— and pri­
mary— instrument of trade policy.
31. Notwithstanding these changes, however, the 
nature and predominant characteristics of the protec­
tionist policy pursued by most of the Latin American 
countries remain essentially the same as when the chief 
import controls were exchange and quantitative restric­
tions and multiple exchange rates; that is, domestic 
industry is still accorded excessive and indiscriminate 
protection, basically geared to import substitution at 
any cost. Embargoes, quotas, permits, etc., have in fact 
been replaced by extremely high and often prohibitive 
charges (including prior deposits), the aim of which 
is to prevent or restrict as far as possible imports of 
non-essential goods or items competing with or replace­
able by domestic production, regardless of the adverse 
effect of such a policy on the efficient utilization of 
resources and, over the medium and long terms, on 
the trade balance itself, as will be shown later.
32. Moreover, as was the case with most of the 
former direct restrictions, these charges were generally 
established in the first place as hasty and makeshift 
emergency measures— on a temporary basis, that is— in 
order to cushion what might have been the unduly 
violent and sudden impact of the elimination of ex­
change and quantitative controls on the balance of 
payments and domestic industry; but exactly like the 
controls in question, the new charges have become 
permanent, and the subsequent modifications they have 
undergone have generally taken the form of increases, 
in response to pressure from industries desirous of ob­
taining greater protection or to new balance-of-payments 
crises.
33. Hence the structure of import duties and charges 
in most of the Latin American countries is characterized 
by its lack of rationality and by the prevalence of ex­
cessively high rates, as regards both average levels and 
those applicable to the vast majority of individual 
products. The following section will marshal evidence 
to this effect, before passing on to analyse the ways in 
which the extreme and indiscriminate protection granted 
to domestic industry in the Latin American countries, 
and the disproportionate emphasis laid on import sub­
stitution, have redounded to the detriment of their eco­
nomic development and their trade balances.
For full details of the various import restrictions applied 
in the South American countries and Mexico at the beginning 
of 1960, see ECLA, C ustom s du ties and o th er  im p ort ch a rges  and  
restr iction s  in Latin  A m erica n  co u n tr ie s : a vera ge lev e ls  o f  
in cid en ce  (E/CN.12/554 and Add.l to 11).
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B. Description and analysis of the tariff structure ®^ 
IN THE Latin American countries
34. In the preceding section of the present study 
attention was repeatedly drawn to the indiscriminate 
and excessive protection normally extended by most of 
the Latin American countries to their domestic produc­
tion. An attempt will now be made to justify this as­
sertion by means of a study of the tariff structure in 
the countries concerned, which will show that its most 
salient features are not only the high average levels of 
import duties and charges, but also the application of 
these extremely high duties to the great majority of the 
various groups of products as well as to individual com­
modities. In other words, almost all imports, with a 
few easily identifiable exceptions, are heavily taxed— at 
any rate under the law, irrespectively of the reductions 
or exemptions granted temporarily or under the aegis 
of one of the many special régimes of privileges and 
immunities.
35. The previously mentioned ECLA study entitled 
Customs duties and other import charges and restrictions 
in Latin American countries: average levels of incidence^^ 
includes a detailed description of the customs duties and 
ether import charges and restrictions of equivalent effect 
applied in eleven Latin American countries— all those 
of South America, and Mexico— about the beginning of 
1960.^® The average levels of incidence of these customs 
duties and other charges are also computed and briefly 
analysed, in relation to each individual country and to 
various groups and categories of products, and an ac­
count is given of the methodology followed in preparing 
the estimates, together with some observations on the 
nature and significance of the levels in question.
36. All that will be undertaken here, therefore, is 
to call attention to the findings of the study in question, 
in so far as they serve to characterize the tariff struc­
ture of the Latin American countries. Only occasionally 
will reference be made to the problem of how far simple 
arithmetic means or weighted averages are really ade-
Unless otherwise specified, the epithet “ tariff”  will be used 
here to designate not only customs duties proper, but also other 
duties and charges of equivalent effect.
19 The first part of this study, containing the descriptive matter, 
over-all analysis and conclusions, was reproduced in volume f of 
Multilateral Economic Co-operation in Latin America, United 
Nations Publication, Sales No.: 62.II.G.3.
99 It must be pointed out that since the date when import 
charges and other restrictions were recorded for the above- 
mentioned study, they have undergone some important modifica­
tions, generally in the shape of increases in existing surcharges 
or the imposition of new ones. This has taken place principally 
in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, since early in 1%2. For 
example, Argentina established additional surcharges of 100 per 
cent on the c.i.f. value of a number of products classified as 
non-essential or luxury goods, and 40 per cent on machinery not 
domestically produced (formerly exempt from su“charges), plus 
a subsequent over-all surcharge of 20 per cent on practically all 
imports. Chile, which had replaced almost all prior deposits by 
surcharges of supplementary taxes of up to 200 per cent, re­
introduced the deposits at rates of up to 5 000 per cent, while 
at the same time it increased the aforesaid supplementary taxes 
and struck about 700 products off the schedule of authorized 
imports. In Uruguay, the surcharges of 40, 75 and 150 per cent 
which had replaced exchange controls and direct restrictions were 
raised early in 1963 to 60, 100 and 300 per cent, while in addition 
a 20 per cent surcharge was established for a number of 
products preyiously exempt, and the prior deposit was increased 
from 100 to 2(X) per cent. These increases or new surcharges 
were, howeyer, temporary in a few cases.
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quate modes of expressing tariff levels, especially for 
the purposes of international comparisons. With the same 
end in view, these findings will be supplemented with 
other data and background information concerning the 
duties and charges applied in the Latin American coun­
tries to a large number of products deemed to be repre­
sentative; averages of duties and charges calculated 
for three countries (Argentina, Brazil and Chile) on the 
basis of the whole of their tariff items, expressed in terms 
of a common nomenclature; and, for purposes of com­
parison, tariff levels in European countries.
37. In order to facilitate the recapitulation of the 
findings and conclusions reached in the ECLA document 
referred to above, the first two tables in that study are 
reproduced as tables 2 and 3 in the present paper; they 
relate respectively to the weighted averages and to the 
simple arithmetic means of the theoretical incidence of 
customs duties and other duties and charges of equivalent 
effect applicable to the c.i.f. value of imports in eleven 
Latin American countries, in respect of a sample of 
products that represented at least 85 per cent of each 
country’s total imports in a selected year or period. 
For the averages shown in table 2, the weighting factor 
used was the value of imports of the various com­
modities included in the sample. These products were 
classified in the three categories envisaged in the recom­
mendations that the Working Group on a Latin Ameri­
can Regional Market formulated at its meeting in Mexico 
in February 1959, in connexion with the structure and 
basic principles of the Latin American common market®  ^
and within those categories were further broken down 
into several groups, so that partial tariff incidence 
averages could be computed for each such subdivision.
38. What first strikes the attention in tables 2 and 3 
is that the majority of the levels of incidence shown 
are very high. This is indeed the most characteristic 
feature of the tariff structure in nearly all the Latin 
American countries— or at least, those included in the 
tables in question— which emerges constantly and unmis­
takably, whether it is the duties and charges applicable 
to imports of individual products that are considered 
or the averages of those duties and charges. To give 
some idea of their real magnitude, they are afterwards 
compared, both individually and in terms of averages, 
with those applied in several European countries.
39. Even in the case of Mexico and Uruguay whose 
levels of duties and charges are the lowest among those 
included in tables 2 and 3, the real magnitude of the 
import restrictions applied is much greater than the 
figures suggest. Mexico, for instance, which shows the 
lowest level of aggregate incidence and the lowest or next 
to lowest partial levels in almost all the groups and 
categories, prefers to use the licensing svstem as its 
chief instrument of import control; so much so, that in 
mid-1960 apnroximately 40 per cent of its customs tariff 
items and 60 per cent of the total value of imports 
effected in 1957-58 (if the average for the period is 
taken) corresponded to products for which import per­
mits were required. And in the case of Uruguav, the 
average incidences given in tables 2 and 3 would have 
been substantially higher if in computing them account 
had been taken of the surcharges of 40, 75 or 150 per 
cent (raised at the beginning of 1963 to 60, 100 and 300
91 See The Latin American Common Market, United Nations 
Publication, Sales No.: 59.II.G.4, pp. 38 et seq.
Table 2
W e ig h t e d  a v e r a g e s  o f  t h e o r e t ic a l  in c id e n c e  o f  c u s t o m s  d u t ie s  a n d  o t h e r  d u t ie s  o r  c h a r g e s  o f  e q u iv a l e n t  e f f e c t  o n  t h e  c .i .f .
VALUE o f  i m p o r t s  IN SELECTED L a TIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES“
(Percentages)























Duties and charges in force as at: 30.IV.60 31.XII.59 31.VIII.60 15.III.60 30.IX.59 1.IX.59 31.XU.59 30.IX.60 15.IX.59 15.VII.60 23.11.60
Category /. Primary commodities .................... 18.5 9.9 2.9 202 283 24.7 4.7 26.8 14.5 9.4 35.6
Group 1. Unprocessed foodstuffs ................... 40.6 8.7 1.1 14.2 45.6 23.9 4.1 24.4 12.9 11.0 20.3
Group 2. Raw materials ................................. 42.7 16.6 22.0 16.1 19.3 36.2 63 50.0 22.7 12.4 68.1
Group 3. Unprocessed fuels ........................... 1.0 12.1 0.8 34.1 f f 1.4 51.5 f 0.1 f
Category / / .  Capital, intermediate and durable 
consumer goods ................................................. 64.7 13.4 369 39.6 28.3 40.7 14J 61.9 18.6 19.3 12.6
Group 1. Intermediate products ..................... 49.6 7.6 26.1 40.6 32.9 38.0 19.2 54.6 18.6 15.8 232
Group 2. Processed fuels ................................. 1.2 14.1 22.8 40.1 12.1 70.2 6.9 76.2 15.4 15.9 32.0
Group 3. Capital goods..................................... 78.2 13.3 45.6 37.3 22.2 29.2 11.7 53.1 15.1 22.3 5.2
Group 4. Durable consumer g ood s................. 699.7 29.4 79.1 83.7 113.7 75.2 56.2 72.6 33.3 20.3 14.3
Category III. Current consumer manufactures.. 66.5 342 40.4 56.8 482 62.3 303 599 359 192 663
Group 1. Processed foodstuffs and tobacco.. 142.4 19.1 50.5 62.8 160.5 114.0 132.8 55.4 26.2 23.3 87.3
Group 2. Chemical and pharmaceutical pro­
ducts ................................................................ 62.9 20.8 35.4 14.7 24.6 42.0 9.8 49.2 20.4 9.5 37.5
Group 3. Other current consumer goods . . . . 63.6 62.6 37.3 55.1 41.1 59.1 24.0 64.6 44.3 18.4 61.3
Total ................................................................ 52.8 20.4 28.8 382 32.1 46.7 13.8 56.1 21.8 15.9 28.0
S o u r c e : ECLA, Customs duties and other import charges and restrictions in Latin 
American countries; average levels of incidence (E/CN.12/554 and Add.1-11).
® Except in the case of Chile, the eost of financing prior deposits in eountries 
applying this type of restriction (Colombia, Paraguay and Uruguay) is included 
among duties and charges of equivalent effeet to an import duty. In respect of Paraguay 
and Venezuela, the incidence on the f.o.b. value is eonverted into terms of the equivalent 
incidence on the c.i.f. value.
b Excluding the higher cost of foreign exchange for imports in the speeial category 
and the cost of financing advanced payment of the agio or premium on foreign 
exchange purchased under the auction system.
<1 Excluding the incidence of the cost of financing prior deposits and of the sup- 
plemetary tax or surcharge, since it could not be computed owing to difficulties with
respect to tariff classification equivalences; but including the 3 per cent or 30 per cent 
ad valorem duty on the value of the nationalized goods.
Average incidence on the statistical value, not on the value as recalculated at 
official prices.
® Including the sales tax, whose incidence on the c.i.f. value of total import is 
approximately 8 per cent as a weighted average tmd 12 per cent as a simple arithmetic 
mean. Incidences are expressed in terms of their equivalents in relation to the c.i.f. 
value.
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Duties and charges in force as at: 30.IV.60 31.X1I.59 31.VIII.60 15.111.60 30.IX.59 1.IX.59 31.x n 59 30.IX.60 15.1X59 15.V n .60 13.IL60
C a tegory  /. P rim a ry  com m odities ................. 54 .2 2 U 13.4 40 .8 4 3 3 34 .0 7.8 4 8 3 1 8 1 1 2 3 5 2 3
Group 1. Unprocessed foodstuffs ................... 40.4 17.8 9.5 33.5 68.0 32.9 12.8 47.1 15.1 13.8 38.0
Group 2. Raw materials ................................. 65.0 27.0 19.7 45.1 30.9 35.8 7.0 50.0 225 12.4 75.7
Group 3. Unprocessed fuels ........................... 6.9 12.0 10.2 53.5 t t 2.0 525 f 0.1 f
C a teg ory  II. C apita l, in term ed ia te and durable  
consum er good s  .......................................... 96.9 17 £ 4 0 3 45.9 33.9 4 4 3 16.8 5 8 3 22.0 24.0 2 2 3
Group 1. Intermediate products ..................... 62.1 12.1 31.0 4 5 3 35.9 43.7 17.2 59.1 23.6 22.7 40.4
Group 2. Processed fu e ls ................................. 4.0 14.8 29.3 45.5 11.4 61.0 7.1 59.1 15.9 21.2 40.3
Group 3. Capital goods..................................... 84.7 17.4 46.1 405 265 32.7 14.9 52.6 17.6 265 10.9
Group 4. Durable consumer goods................. 612.2 37.1 60.0 83.4 100.9 1065 46.7 72.7 35.2 24.1 14.7
C a teg ory  III . C u rren t consum er m a n u fa ctu res .. 110.0 5 2 b 50.4 6 6 3 58.9 73.1 3 3 3 6 6 1 4 0 3 22 .7 111.6
Group 1. Processed foodstuffs and tobacco.. 136.4 35.9 56.3 126.4 137.6 124.8 121.6 7 0 3 29.1 18.4 287.0
Group 2. Chemical and pharmaceutical pro­
ducts ................................................................ 102.7 37.8 25.0 165 30.8 59.3 10.9 58.9 20.6 10.1 121.1
Group 3. Other current consumer goods . . . . 108.6 58.7 52.0 64.5 57.1 67.6 28.3 65.5 47.9 26.0 74.0
T otal ........................................................ 9 1 b 3 0 3 4 0 J 4 9 3 41 .3 5 4 3 18.1 6 1 b 2 8 3 2 1 1 56.0
Source: A s for table 2.
“ Except in the case of Qiile, the cost of financing prior deposits in countries 
applying this type of restriction (Colombia, Paraguay and Uruguay) is included 
among duties and charges of equivalent effect to an import duty. In respect of Paraguay 
and Venezuela, the incidence on the f.o.b. value is converted into terms of the equivalent 
incidence on the c.i.f. value.
b Excluding the higher cost of foreign exchange for imports in the special category 
and the cost of financing advanced payment of the agio or premium on foreign 
exchange purchased under the auction system.
'  Excluding the incidence of the cost of financing prior deposits and of the sup- 
plemetary tax or surcharge, since it could not be computed owing to difBculties with
respect to tariff classification equivalences; but including the 3 per cent or 30 per cent 
ad  valorem, duty on the value of the nationalized goods.
 ^Average incidence on the statistical value, not on the value as recalculated at 
official prices.
® Including the sales tax, whose incidence on the c.iJ. value of total import is 
approximately 8 per cent as a weighted average and 12 per cent as a simple arithmetic 
mean. Incidences are expressed in terms of their equivalents in relation to the c.Lf, 
value,
* There were no imports of sufficient magnitude to warrant their inclusion in 
the sample.
per cent, respectively) and the cost of financing the prior 
deposit, introduced as from the end of September 1960 
to replace the exchange controls and import permits and 
embargoes which had previously been in use, especially 
before the December 1959 reform.
40. Quantitative or direct import restrictions are 
also more or less extensively applied by Colombia, Ecua­
dor and Venezuela (principally in the form of import 
licences and embargoes) and, recently, by Chile. In 
Colombia, for example, at the end of 1962, approximately 
30 per cent of the tariff items consisted of products 
whose importation was prohibited, and another 30 per 
cent of goods that could not be imported without a per­
mit; the number of these latter has considerably in­
creased since then. Again, where Brazil was concerned, 
in the computation of the average levels of incidence 
of duties and charges appearing in tables 2 and 3, the 
higher cost of foreign exchange for imports in the special 
category— or, since the beginning of 1961, the cost of 
purchasing the “ promissory permit”  at auction— (equiva­
lent in mid-1962 to a surcharge of over 200 per cent of 
the value of the product) was not taken into account, 
and neither was the cost of financing the prior deposit 
of 100 per cent for 150 days. Nor, in Chile’s case, did 
the estimates incorporate the cost of financing the prior 
deposit (which once again acquired considerable im­
portance for a number of products, with the re-establish­
ment of deposits of up to 5 000 per cent early in 1962), 
or the supplementary tax or surcharge of up to 200 per 
cent of the c.i.f. value of the product. If these items 
(which had to be excluded on account of the difiBculty 
of establishing equivalences with the tariff classification) 
had been included in the levels of duties and charges 
for Chile, the latter would have exceeded the figures 
appearing in tables 2 and 3 by at least an estimated 
50 per cent.
41. Admittedly, moreover, to form a more accurate 
idea of the relative levels of averages of duties and 
charges in the various countries, other background data 
would have to be taken into account: in particular, the 
effect of the exchange rate, and the extent to which 
the aforesaid duties and charges are actually applied 
in practice. Both these problems are fully discussed in 
the ECLA document to which reference has already been 
made (paras. 34-39, 62 and 63). It is pointed out that 
an artificially high exchange rate represents an import 
subsidy, and as such offsets or reduces, coramensurately 
with tbe extent to which the currency is over-valued, 
the restrictive effect of duties and charges, whereas an 
exchange rate based on under-valuation of the currency, 
on the contrary, is equivalent to an additional duty; 
and a suggestion is made that the relative over-valuation 
or under-valuation of currencies might possibly be esti­
mated through the relation between their levels of pur­
chasing power. This method had been previously used 
in another ECLA secretariat study.®* Accordingly, it 
may be stated, for purely illustrative purposes, that the 
high level of incidence of import duties and charges in 
Venezuela is largely compensated by the fact that imports 
are effected at exchange rates based on a considerable 
over-valuation of the currency; the same situation was 
observable in Chile before the October 1962 devaluation.
22 See “A measurement of price levels and the purchasing power 
of currencies in selected Latin American countries 1960-62” , 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol. VIII, 1963.
42. With regard to the practical application of the 
duties and charges legally in force, the document cited 
also points out that considerable proportions of the 
Latin American countries’ imports are effected under 
the aegis of special régimes of reductions or total exemp­
tions, so that the real incidence of duties and charges 
is often a good deal lower than their theoretical incidence. 
The extreme cases in point are those of Argentina and 
Chile, where the real incidence represented, in the selected 
years, only 35-40 per cent of the estimated theoretical 
incidence. However, as the study indicates, the proce­
dure whereby reductions or total exemptions are granted 
is in many instances tantamount to a system of permits 
or licences, whose restrictive effect would correspond 
to that of the duty theoretically applicable, which there­
fore may justifiably be taken into account in preference 
to that actually applied.*®
43. While the foregoing considerations must be borne 
in mind in assessing (individually or as averages) the 
relative levels of incidence of import duties and charges 
in the Latin American countries, they do not invalidate 
— on the contrary, in some instances they corroborate—  
the statement made in paragraph 38 to the effect that 
the most characteristic feature of the tariff structure 
in the countries of the region is the excessive magnitude 
of the duties and charges in question. Mexico, certainly, 
would appear to be an exception to the rule; but it 
must be remembered that in Mexico it is the permit or 
licensing system that is the main instrument of control, 
not custom duties or other import duties and charges. 
If any country were to be excluded, it would have to 
be Peru— and perhaps, with some reservations, Bolivia—  
since apart from the fact that the import duties and 
charges applied in these countries are relatively low in 
comparison with the corresponding levels in other Latin 
American countries, they constitute virtually the only 
import restrictions in force.
44. A few comparisons may be adduced in support 
of this assertion. In contrast with the total weighted 
averages shown in table 2, which are higher than 25 per 
cent in most countries and in some even exceed 50 per 
cent, the average level (weighted by 1958 imports) of 
the European Economic Community’s external tariff, 
prior to the Dillon negotiations, was 7.6 per cent;*'* the 
average of the duties in force in the United States as 
at 1 January 1953, weighted by 1952 imports, was only
23 The exemptions generally benefit machinery and equipment 
which are to be used for the installation of new or the expansion 
of existing industries or which represent foreign capital invest­
ment, as well as machinery and implements for agriculture or 
for certain specific industries— steel making, the petroleum 
industry, the manufacture of fertilizers, etc.— and, less frequently, 
certain raw materials or foodstuffs (to an amount equivalent to 
the deficit in internal supplies). Imports effected by State and 
semi-public bodies (railways, etc.) are also usually exempted, 
under the law or de facto (see again E/CN.12/554, paragraphs 
26 to 33, and annexes).
24 See EEC Statistical Office, Informations Statistiques, 1960, 
No. 3. The average incidence of the duties in force in the States 
members of EEC as at 1 January 1957, weighted by their imports 
from third countries in 1958, was according to the same publica­
tion, 8.1 per cent.
If EEC’s imports in 1958 from the Contracting Parties of 
GATT are taken as the weighting factor, the average level of 
the Community’s common external tariff was originally 9.1 per 
cent, and was then reduced to 8.6 per cent as a result of the 
concessions it granted at the GATT Tariff Conference in 1960- 
61 (Dillon negotiations). See United Nations, Economic Bulletin 
for Europe, vol. 14, No. 1, September 1962, p. 57.
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5.1 per cent;*® and the average incidence of duties on 
industrial products (excluding foodstuifs and certain 
other commodities such as petroleum, essences and cos­
metics, etc.) under the Swedish tariff in 1954, and 
weighted by 1950 imports, was 9.1 per cent.*®
45. But weighted averages of duties and charges do 
not adequately reflect the real tariff level, for the very 
reason that the weighting factor— the value of imports 
of each product or tariff item— is largely and often de­
cisively determined by the amount of the duty applicable 
to the product concerned. In other words, the weighted 
average does not give an accurate idea of the level of 
duties and charges, because it is little influenced by high 
duties, if at all. The simple arithmetic means shown in 
table 3, calculated as they are on the basis of a sample 
which excludes all products that are imported in small 
quantities or not at all, and therefore all those on which 
extremely high or prohibitive duties are payable, are 
also unsatisfactory for the same reasons. Far more repre­
sentative of the tariff level are simple arithmetic means 
computed on the basis of the duties and charges on all 
products, but expressed in terms of a standard nomen­
clature for the various countries and properly balanced, 
so as to minimize the effects of attaching equal weight 
to the duty on an article of minor significance and to 
that payable on a much more important product.*'^
46. These estimates were prepared in the ECLA secre­
tariat, by a special study group on economic analysis 
of customs tariffs, for three Latin American countries 
(Argentina, Brazil and Chile), as well as for France, 
the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature (BTN) being adopted. 
To this end, the first step was to determine the arithmetic 
means of the individual duties and charges (in ad 
valorem terms) legally applicable in each of these four 
countries at the beginning of 1960, under the most­
favoured-nation clause, to products classifiable under 
each BTN item, and thus to obtain the ad valorem duty 
that approximately corresponded to each item in each 
country.*® The simple arithmetic means of the said duties
25 See United States Tariff Commission, Effect of Trade Agree­
ment Concessions on United States Tariff Levels Based on Imports 
in 1952, Washington, D.C., 1953.
2® Swedish Tariff Commission, Revision oj the Swedish Customs 
Tariff, Stockholm, 1957.
2T See again E/CN.12/554, paragraphs 40 to 52, dealing with 
the nature and significance of average tariff levels.
28 As pointed out elsewhere, these duties and charges may not 
be identical with those applied in practice, but in many instances 
may be reduced or even eliminated by virtue of special exemption 
régimes or administrative decisions. It should also be noted that 
the reclassification in BTN terms of duties and charges applicable 
under the tariff nomenclatures of the several countries present 
serious difficuities (especiaily in the case of a nomenclature as 
out-of-date and unsatisfactory as that used by Argentina), which 
often had to be overcome by resorting to subjective appraisals 
of the relative importance of the various products included under 
a BTN item, to estimates of the level of duties and charges 
applicable to the products in question, and to certain other 
simplifications. Consequently, the results obtained are merely 
approximate figures, which serve, however, to give an adequate 
idea of the order of magnitude of the average levels of duties 
and charges in the different countries concerned.
In the case of Brazil, onlv the duties established in the customs 
tariff (which are almost entirely ad valorem) were taken into 
account; the customs clearance rate (5 per cent of the c.i.f. value 
for almost all products) was not included, and neither was the 
higher cost of foreign exchange for products classified in the 
special category (constituting about one-third of the total number 
of items in the Brazilian tariff), which at the time of preparing
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and charges were then computed for the whole of the 
Brussels Tariff Nomenclature and for each of its chapters 
and sections.
47. The results obtained are presented in annex II 
of the present study (tables A and B ). A glance at the 
figures given in the tables reveals a really striking differ­
ence between the averages computed for the three Latin 
American countries on the one hand, and for France on 
the other, the former being remarkably high. If the 
over-all averages, corresponding to the BTN items in 
the aggregate, are considered, Argentina’s is 151 per cent, 
Brazil’s 60 per cent, and Chile’s 93 per cent, even with 
the exclusion of the increase in the surcharges applied 
by the first of these countries during 1962, the higher 
cost of importing goods classified in the special category 
in the case of Brazil, and the supplementary tax or cost 
of financing the prior deposit— substantially increased 
during 1962— in that of Chile. For example, as regards 
the last-named country, if account had been taken of 
the supplementary tax or cost of financing the prior 
deposit in force before the 1962 increases, the average 
incidence of duties and charges would probably have 
exceeded 150 per cent. In contrast, the corresponding 
figure is only 18 per cent for France, which among the 
European countries is traditionally regarded as one where 
duties are high.*®
48. Such differences are not only observable in rela­
tion to the over-all averages, but systematically recur 
in respect of almost all the BTN items, chapters and 
sections, thus ratifying the previous assertion that in 
the Latin American countries very high duties and 
charges are not of rare occurrence, but are applied to
tbe estimates (early in 1960) was approximately equivalent to a 
surcharge of 200 per cent on the c.i.f. value of the product.
For Chile, only specific duties (in terms of ad valorem equi­
valence) were taken into consideration, together with the ad 
valorem duties established in the Customs Tariff, on the basis 
of the computations and the reclassification under BTN items 
carried out by the Office of the Superintendent of Customs in 
preparation for a tariff reform. Consequently, neither prior deposits 
nor the supplementary taxes which in many instances replaced 
them were included. At the beginning of 1960, prior deposits 
fluctuated between 5 and 1500 per cent of the c.i.f. value, for 
periods of 30 to 90 days, and the cost of financing them was 
estimated, in the case of a prior deposit of 1 500 per cent for 
90 days, at 90 per cent of the c.i.f. import value. In the course 
of 1962 yet higher prior deposits were reintroduced; at the 
beginning of 1963 the maximum deposit was 10 000 per cent. 
Supplementary taxes, for their part, ranged from 5 to 200 per 
cent of the c.i.f. value of the merchandise.
In Argentina’s case the ad valorem customs duties were taken 
into account (not the specific duties, since their incidence was 
very slight), together with the exchange surcharges in force at 
the beginning of 1960. During the year 1962, the latter were 
increased, since additional surcharges of 40 per cent on machinery 
not produced in Argentina and 100 per cent on luxury goods were 
imposed, and to these was subsequently added a further surcharge 
of 20 per cent on practically all imports.
29 On the basis of a similar procedure, the Swedish Tariff 
Commission worked out the following arithmetic means of duties 
and charges, expressed in terms of the Standard International 
Trade Classification (SITC), in accordance with data supplied 
to GATT by the countries concerned: Denmark, 4 per cent; 
Sweden, 6 per cent; Benelux countries, 9 per cent; Canada, 11 
per cent; Norway, 12 per cent; Federal Republic of Germany, 
14 per cent; United Kingdom and United States, 15 per cent; 
Austria, 16 per cent; France, 17 per cent (comparable with the 
18 per cent estimated by the ECLA secretariat) ; and Italy, 21 
per cent (see Swedish Tariff Commission, op. cit., p. 38). The 
arithmetic mean of the new Spanish tariff would seem to be, in 
BTN terms, 24 per cent (see Panorama de la Economia 
Argentina, vol. II, Year IV).
the great majority of individual products. For example, 
according to the average of duties and charges com­
puted for each of the 99 chapters of the BTN and pre­
sented in annex II, table B, for only one chapter is the 
average level of Argentina’s duties and charges lower 
than 50 per cent, whereas it exceeds 100 per cent in 
relation to 93 chapters, and of these 64 show averages 
ranging from 150 to 200 per cent. With respect to Brazil, 
the average incidence of duties and charges falls below 
10 per cent in the case of 5 chapters, and reaches more 
than 50 per cent in that of 70, of which 20 register 
averages higher than 100 per cent; the corresponding 
figures for Chile are 2, 74 and 37 chapters respectively 
(the average exceeding 150 per cent for 11 chapters, 
and 200 per cent for 9 of these). Where France is con­
cerned, on the other hand, average incidences are less 
than 10 per cent in respect of 17 chapters, between 11 
and 20 per cent for 42, and between 21 and 30 per cent 
for 36, rising above 30 per cent only in the case of 
3 chapters.®®
49. For purposes of comparison, the arithmetic means 
of the duties and charges applied in Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile and France were also computed, in terms of BTN 
items, which were, however, classified under the cate-
S® For some comparisons of levels of duties and charges 
applicable in these four countries to individual BTN items, see 
footnote 36.
gories and groups adopted in tables 2 and 3; the results 
obtained are given in table 4, together with the weighted 
averages and simple arithmetic means calculated in tables 
2 and 3 for the three Latin American countries, on the 
basis of the products that represented at least 85 per 
cent of their imports. As was to be expected, in almost 
every case the arithmetic mean of duties and charges 
■was higher for the BTN items in the aggregate (see 
column III), and as a rule a good deal higher, than 
the weighted average or simple arithmetic mean of the 
duties and charges applicable to products of some signifi­
cance within each country’s imports (see columns I 
and II). The only exceptions to this rule are traceable 
to imports of products on which the duties and charges 
legally in force are high, but which are effected under 
special or over-all systems of reductions or exemptions: 
for example, the capital goods enumerated in chapter 84 
of the Brazilian tariff, and parts and spare parts for 
passenger cars, lorries and tractors, as well as for un­
assembled passenger cars, in Argentina.
50. Although it was impossible, on account of the 
great and in some instances insurmountable difficulties 
arising, to prepare similar calculations of tariff levels 
for other Latin American countries, it may be assumed 
that the differences between weighted averages and simple 
arithmetic means noted in table 4 in respect of Argen­
tina, Brazil and Chile would recur in their case. Presum-
Table 4
COMPAJUSON OF AVERAGE LEVELS OF INCIDENCE OF IMPORT DUTIES AND CHARGES IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE AND FRANCE
( )Feighted averages and simple arithmetic means)
Category and group
Argentina Brazil^ Ckile^ France
; II III I II III I II III III
Category I. Primary commodities 18.5 54.2 131 2.9 13.4 40 20.2 40J8 93
1. Unprocessed foodstuffs . . . . 40.6 40.4 145 1.1 9.5 43 14.2 33.5 114 21
2. Raw materials ..................... 42.7 65.0 129 22.0 19.7 38 16.1 45.1 86 5
3. Unprocessed fuels ................ 1.0 6.9 34 0.8 10.2 29 34.1 53.5 30 1
Category II. Durable, intermediate 
and capital goods....................... 64.7 96.9 138 36.9 40.8 45 39.6 45.9 67
1. Intermediate products ........ 49.6 62.1 138 26.1 31.0 43 40.6 45.3 73 17
2. Processed fuels .................... 1.2 4.0 95 22.8 29.3 30 40.1 45.5 89 7
3. Capital goods ....................... 78.2 84.7 130 45.6 46.1 45 37.3 40.5 44 19
4. Durable consumer goods.... 699.7 612.2 181 79.1 60.0 75 83.7 83.4 104 24
Category III. Current consumer 
manujactures ............................. 66.5 110.0 175 40.4 50.4 87 56.8 66.2 126
1. Processed foodstuffs and to­
bacco ..................................... 142.4 136.4 180 50.5 56.3 91 62.8 126.4 188 25
2. Chemical and pharmaceuti­
cal products ......................... 62.9 102.7 151 35.4 25.0 69 14.7 16.5 82 20
3. Other current consumer goods 63.6 108.6 175 37.3 52.0 88 55.1 64.5 118 19
Over-all total .................... 52.7 91.5 151 28.8 40.1 60 38.2 492 93 18
Sources: For columns I and II, tables 2 and 3 above; for 
column III, ECLA, estimates prepared by the special study 
group on the economic analysis of tariffs.
Note: Column I: Weighted averages (weighting factor, imports) 
in respect of sample representing at least 85 per cent of total 
imports in certain recent years.
Column II: Simple arithmetic means of duties and charges 
on products included in the sample referred to above (i.e., 
excluding goods that are imported on a small scale or not at all).
Column III: Simple arithmetic means of the duties and charges 
that would correspond to each and all of the BTN items re­
classified in the categories and groups adopted in the present 
table.
“ Brazil: excluding higher cost of foreign exchange for imports 
in the special category.
Chile: Not including additional tax or cost of financing prior 
deposit.
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ably, then, tariff levels, expressed in terms of simple 
arithmetie means of all duties and eharges, would be 
substantially higher for all the Latin American countries 
included in tables 2 and 3 than for the countries of 
Western Europe, even those where the levels in question 
are highest, such as France, Italy and Spain.
51. For example, the weighted average of the inci­
dence of import duties and charges on raw materials 
other than foodstuff in the Latin American countries 
referred to in tables 2 and 3 ranges from 6.5 per cent 
for Mexico to 43 per cent for Argentina, 50 per cent 
for Paraguay and 68 per cent for Venezuela, whereas 
the corresponding average is nil in the United Kingdom 
and almost nil in the external tariff of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and of most countries in 
Western Europe. As regards the weighted average of the 
incidence of import duties on capital goods, only in four 
of the Latin American countries considered— Bolivia, 
Mexico, Peru and Venezuela— is it lower than 20 per 
cent; it is as much as 45 per cent in Brazil, 53 per cent 
in Paraguay and 78 per cent in Argentina (where, more­
over, an additional surcharge of 40 per cent on all ma­
chinery not produced in the country was introduced at 
the beginning of 1962), whereas it reaches only 10.9 
per cent in the United States, 13.8 per cent in the external 
tariff of EEC,^  ^ and 9.6 per cent in that of Sweden.®  ^
The differences are even more marked and significant 
in the case of levels calculated as simple arithmetic 
means of duties and charges on all products, in BTN 
terms, for Argentina, Brazil, Chile and France, see again 
table 3, column III. Much higher levels are observable 
in the three Latin American republics than in the Euro­
pean country, not only for durable and current consumer 
goods, but also for unprocessed foodstuffs, non-industrial 
raw materials, intermediate products and capital goods.
52. To justify the assertion that the duties and charges
applicable to most individual products are likewise very 
high, and also to give a more exact idea of the tariff 
structure in the Latin American countries, annex III 
of the present study shows the approximate incidences, 
in ad valorem terms, of the various duties and charges 
levied in the countries members of the Latin American 
Free-Trade Association (ALALC) (with the exception 
of Uruguay), and under EEC’s external tariff, on im­
ports of 125 products considered to be the most repre­
sentative of the production and foreign trade of the 
countries concerned. These products, designated in terms 
of BTN items, were classified in the following three cate­
gories: I. Primary commodities and capital goods;
IL Semi-manufactured products and durable consumer 
goods; and III. Current consumer manufactures. Within 
these categories they are broken down into various 
groups, and the simple arithmetic mean of each country’s 
duties and charges on the products included in each 
group is shown.®® In addition, where a product is subject
These average levels for the United States and EEC cor­
respond to BTN section XVI (machinery and mechanical 
appliances; electrical equipment and parts thereof), according to 
data published hy the Committee for Economic Development, 
A New Trade Policy jor the United States, Washington, D.C., 
April 1962.
32 Swedish Tariff Commission, op. cit., average weighted hy 
imports corresponding to chapter 84' of the BTN (machinery and 
mechanical appliances).
33 It should he stressed that owing to the many and substantial 
difficulties encountered (to which extensive reference is made in 
document E/CN.12/554, op. cit.), mainly as a result of the wide
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to the import licence requisite or to prohibition in any 
given country, the letter (L) or (P) is appended to the 
corresponding duty or charge.
53. Analysis of the figures presented in annex III 
therefore confirms that, as has been pointed out on 
various occasions the following are characteristic features 
of the tariff structure in the Latin American countries 
it covers:
(а) With a very few exceptions, all imports, includ­
ing raw materials and capital goods, are dutiable, at 
any rate under the law, although in many instances the 
studies are not applied. The rare exceptions to this rule, 
which are not, incidentally, common to all countries, 
relate to such commodities as livestock for breeding 
purposes, certain unprocessed fuels— coal, crude petro­
leum— some fertilizers, newsprint, books and some kinds 
of agricultural machinery or equipment. Such a situation 
is in marked contrast to the conditions prevailing in the 
countries of Western Europe and in the United States, 
where raw materials are as a general rule exempt from 
all duties and charges or subject to a very low duty, 
in accordance with what is a basic principle in a rational 
tariff.®  ^ In the case of the Latin American countries, in 
process of development and producing capital goods on 
a small scale or not at all, the same principle should apply 
to these latter;
(б) Contrary to what might logically be expected, the 
products on which the heaviest import duties and charges 
are payable in Latin America usually include all or 
almost all those which are traditionally exported by each 
of the countries of the region, and which are therefore 
produced on a sufficiently competitive basis to make 
any form of protection presumably needless. Thus, in 
annex III it may be noted that in Argentina the level 
of import duties and charges on livestock for consump­
tion, meat, butter, lard, preserved meat, wheat, leather, 
linseed oil, etc., is about 2(X) per cent (although here the 
reason might be that it was not felt necessary to include 
such products among those exempt from surcharges— an 
argument which is not applicable, however, to other 
countries) ; the Brazilian tariff establishes customs duties 
of 60 to 100 per cent on bananas, coffee, maté, sugar, 
cacao, cotton, etc., all of which products (with the ex­
ception of the last-named) are, furthermore, classified 
in the special category, which implies an additional sur­
charge of over 200 per cent; in Colombia, imports of 
coffee are liable to a 135 per cent duty, and, moreover, 
are prohibited; Mexico levies duties of 39 per cent on 
imports of coffee, 53 per cent on those of sugar and 
23 per cent on those of cotton; in Chile, duties of 52 per 
cent, 30 per cent and 39 per cent respectively are payable 
on imported wood, electrolytic copper ingots, and copper 
bars and sheet, besides which, imports of all these
variety of duties and charges, dissimilar and defective classifica­
tions, etc., the levels of duties and charges given in annex III 
are often only approximate estimates, which should be taken as 
mere indications of orders of magnitude. Furthermore, some 
products—for example, cotton textiles, tools, etc.—which it would 
have been desirable to include in the table had to be left out 
because of the impracticability of satisfactorily identifying a type 
representative of them in the majority of the countries. As far 
as Uruguay was concerned, the difficulties of properly determining 
the duties and charges applied to various products were so great 
that this country had to he excluded altogether.
34 See the treatment accorded to raw materials under EECs 
external tariff (annex III, last column and footnote 38) and by 
certain European countries (table 6).
products are at present prohibited. Although it is true 
that these duties and charges have no real significance, 
they would be legally applicable, and, more important 
still, they are representative of a fundamental principle 
in the protectionist policy pursued by the majority of 
the Latin American countries— the idea that imports 
of all goods which are or may be produced in the coun­
try concerned should be prohibited, or subject to pro­
hibitive duties;
(c) The vast majority of the duties and charges on 
individual products are high, and in many instances 
exceptionally so. For example, while duties rarely exceed 
20 per cent in the EEC tariff, they seldom fall below 
that level in the Latin American countries to which 
annex III relates, and the exceptions are mostly con­
fined to Peru. If the processed foodstuffs group is ex­
cluded, under EEC’s external tariff only 11 out of the 
other 111 products included in annex i l l  pay duties of 
more than 20 per cent (5 of them belonging to the 
durable consumer goods group), and out of the whole 
list of 125, only one (sugar) is subject to a duty of 
over 30 per cent. In Peru (the country whose tariff 
structure and levels of duties on the goods comprised 
in annex III are closest to those of EEC) and in Mexico, 
duties of more than 20 per cent are payable on 48 and 
66 products respectively, and on 15 and 41 of these the 
duties exceed 50 per cent. At the other extreme, in 
Argentina (irrespective of the increases introduced in 
1962) only 24 of the 125 products under consideration 
are liable to duties of less than 50 per cent, while the
duties on 15 of them range from 50 to 100 per cent, 
and on the remainder rise above 100 per cent.®® It 
should be noted, moreover, that in Mexico and Colombia 
most of the products included in annex III are subject 
to the import licence requisite or to prohibition (and, 
in a lesser degree, to prohibition in the case of Ecuador 
and Chile).®®
When more than one duty or charge is registered for a 
product in annex I, the arithmetic mean is taken.
Similar comparisons can be made on the basis of the esti­
mates of the simple arithmetic means of duties and charges 
prepared in terms of BTN items for Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
France, and shown in annex II and column III of table 4 above; 
under the French tariff, only 16 products are subject to duties 
exceeding 35 per cent, and of these, only 4 (refined and semi- 
refined sugar, carpets and tapestries) pay duties of more than 
50 per cent, whereas for approximately 50 per cent of the items 
on Brazil’s customs tariff the duties payable are higher than 
35 per cent (excluding other additional charges, such as the 
5 per cent customs clearance rate and the heavier cost of foreign 
exchange for imports in the special category). In BTN terms, 
about 269 products (i.e., one-fifth of the total number of BTN 
items) are subject to customs duties of over 100 per cent in 
Brazil (again without taking into account the higher cost of 
foreign exchange for goods in the special category), about one- 
third of the Brazilian tariff items being classified under these 
BTN heads. In Chile, duties and charges of over 100 per cent 
are levied on some 258 BTN items, irrespective of the supple­
mentary tax or the cost of financing the prior deposit. In 
Argentina, most products pay a duty of over 100 per cent; to 
only 20 per cent of the BTN items would an average surcharge 
or supplementary duty of 40 per cent or less correspond, and 
this proportion has been sharply reduced by the additional 40 
per cent surcharge on machinery not produced within the country.
Table 5
Simple arithmetic means of approximate inodence (in ad valorem terms) of duties and charges applied in Latin American
COUNTRIES AND UNDER EEC’s EXTERNAL TARIFF TO SELECTED PRODUCTS, BROKEN DOWN AS IN ANNEX I
Category and group Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Ecuador Mexico Peru Paraguay EEC
Category I (51 products)
Primary commodities and capital goods........ 96 134 58 64 35 32 18 69 13
1. Non-processed foodstuffs (13 products).. 123 264 46 185 37 65 21 99 21
2. Industrial raw materials (10 products) — 55 106 111 57 52 38 20 63 1
3. Capital goods (28 products).................... 98 84 45 18 27 14 16 57 13
Category II (43 products)
Semi-maiiufactured and durable consumer 
goods ................................................................ 139 143 96 48 56 58 25 84 10
1. Semi-manufactured goods (including 
fuels), other than products of traditional 
industries (32 products)............................. 95 80 98 28 48 28 23 77 7
2. Durable consumer goods (11 products).. 266 328 90 108 80 147 30 104 19
Category III (31 products)
Current consumer manufactures..................... 176 260 328 247 117 114 72 77 17
1. Processed foods (14 products).................. 192 280 436 359 145 110 41 76 19
2. Others (including semi-processed products 
of traditional industries (17 products).. 163 244 239 154 75 117 98 78 15
Over-all average (125 products)............ 131 168 J38 112 62 61 34 76 13
Source: See annex III.
Note: This differs from the three preceding tables in that the duties and charges applied by Brazil and Chile which are 
shown in annex III, and on the basis of which the average incidences given above were calculated, include ibe customs clearance 
rate (5 per cent for almost all products) and the higher cost of foreign exchange for imports in the special category in the case 
of Brazil, and the supplementary tax or cost of financing the prior deposit in that of Chile.
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54. This basic characteristic of the tariff structure in 
most of the Latin American countries— i.e., the frequency 
with which very high duties and charges are applied 
not only to final consumer goods, but also to edible 
and industrial raw materials, capital goods and semi­
manufactured products— is apparent in table 5, which 
sums up the situation revealed in annex III, giving the 
simple arithmetic means of the duties and charges applied 
to the products specified in the said annex, by groups 
and categories and in the aggregate.®^ For example, 
whereas for EEC the average of duties and charges by 
groups of products is lower than 20 per cent in every 
instance, with the single exception of the unprocessed 
foodstuffs group (where this level is just exceeded),*® 
for the eight Latin American countries it is higher than 
20 per cent in every case and for aU groups, the only 
exceptions being the industrial raw materials group in 
Peru and the capital goods group in Colombia, Peru 
and Mexico. What is more, the average in question is 
more than 50 per cent for aU groups in three countries 
(Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay) and for the majority
The averages in question should be interpreted with caution, 
however, since they are based on a limited and insufficiently 
representative sample of products (affected in number and com­
position by such factors as the possibility of identifying them 
properly in the various customs tariffs and lists of supplementary 
duties and charges of the several countries concerned). Even so, 
within the limits indicated, these averages give an approximate 
idea of the order of magnitude of the duties and charges 
applicable in each country to each of the several categories of 
products. There are grounds for believing that if in computing 
the averages all products (in terms of BTN items) were taken 
into account, instead of only those Included in annex III, levels 
higher than those appearing in table 5 would be obtained in any 
event (see, for example, the averages shown for Argentina in 
table 4, column III).
The discrepancies between the average incidences of import 
duties and charges shown in table 5 on the one hand, and in 
tables 2, 3 and 4 on the other, are largely attributable to the 
following factors: in the case of Brazil and Chile, the incidences 
are relatively much higher in table 5 because the higher cost 
of foreign exchange for products in the special category in the 
case of Brazil, and the supplementary tax or the cost of financing 
the prior deposit in that of Chile, were included. The relative 
decreases in the positions of Ecuador and Paraguay in table 5 
as compared with table 2 and 3 seemed to be attributable to the 
fact that in both countries there are several fairly high additional 
charges that are uniformly applied to all or almost aU products, 
so that in both the composition of imports affects average levels 
of incidence much less than in other countries. Exactly the 
opposite occurs in Mexico’s case. This country’s extensive use of 
the import licence (together with the narrower scope of its 
exemption régimes) tends to encourage imports of products on 
which the charges payable are relatively low; hence it is that 
the average incidences of duties and charges obtained for this 
country in tables 2 and 3 (where the composition of imports plays 
a preponderant role) are less, in relation to those of other 
countries, than the average shown in table 5.
88 According to Informations Statistiques, op. cit., for each of 
the several categories of products, the average incidence of the 
common external tariff of EEC, weighted by the imports effected 
by member countries from third countries in 1958, is as follows:
PeTCenUtgt
Foods ............................................................................ 15.1
Raw materials ...................................................................  0.1
Semi-manufactured products ..........................................  7.0
Capital goods................................................................  12.8
Other fully manufactured goods ................................ 17.3
Total ...............................................................................  7.6
The close correspondence, especially as regards relative orders 
of magnitude, between these averages and those given for EEC 
in table 5 can be noted in respect of each of the several 
categories of products.
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of the groups in four others (Chile, Colombia, Ecuador 
and M exico); Peru is the sole exception to this rule, 
and furthermore is the only one of the eight countries 
whose over-all average of duties and charges for the 
products included in annex III is lower than 60 per cent. 
Moreover, in these eight countries, the average incidences 
of duties and charges on products in the groups com­
prising durable consumer goods, processed foods and 
other current consumer manufactures is in all instances 
(except in Peru, in the case of the first two groups) 
higher than 75 per cent, and in the majority more than 
100 or even over 150 per cent, whereas in EEC the 
corresponding average for these three groups does not 
exceed 19 per cent. In respect of the other four groups 
— unprocessed foodstuffs, industrial raw materials, capi­
tal goods and semi-processed products— the position is 
not quite as extreme, but even so, the average incidence 
of duties and charges is higher than 50 per cent in 
most cases.
55. Although it has been seen, in the tables analysed 
so far, that as a rule the average levels of import duties 
and charges in the Latin American countries are lower 
for raw materials than for semi-manufactured or inter­
mediate products, and less for these latter than for manu­
factured goods, and that consumer manufactures are 
the most heavily taxed of all, these differences are not 
usually great enough, and exist not beeause the duties 
and charges on primary eommodities are relatively low 
but because those on manufaetured goods are exceed­
ingly high. Consequently, in most of the Latin American 
countries there is no adequate differentiation between 
the import duties and charges applicable to products cor­
responding to various phases of a given production 
process (nor, as a rule, between those applicable to 
various products at one and the same stage of process­
ing). Both in this respect and as regards the levels of 
such duties (whether averages or for individual prod­
ucts) , there is a marked contrast between the situations 
prevailing in the Latin American countries on the one 
hand, and in the European countries on the other— for 
example, in EEC, whose external tariff levels are given 
in annex III, as well as in the last column of table 5 
and in footnote 38, and in three European coimtries 
selected as being representative of appreciably different 
degrees of tariff protection, to judge from the data pre­
sented in table 6.
Table 6
Import duties in three European countries
(Percentages of value of imports, by groups or categories 
of products)
Kingdom of
Category or group Untied Kingdom the Netherlands Portugal
Raw materials .............. 0 0 or 3 to 6 Up to 5
Semi-processed products. . 0 to 15 10 to 12 Up to 15
Manufactured goods . . . . 15 to 20“ 15 to 24 Up to 30
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 
Committee on the Development of Trade, Report on the Special 
Meeting on the Organization and Techniques of Foreign Trade 
(TRADE/84), Geneva, 29 June-3 July 1959, annex IV.
» Higher duties are payable on motor vehicles, clocks and 
watches, musical instruments, cinematographic films and products 
of the so-called “key industries” , such as optical instruments, 
some chemical products and glass ware for scientific purposes. 
In these last-named groups the rate of the duty is usually 
33 1/3 per cent.
56. In this connexion it must be pointed out that 
the protectionist or restrictive effect of a customs tariff 
derives not so much from the existence of high duties 
or of a high average level as from the tariff structure 
itself, and in particular from the differences between 
the duties applicable to products corresponding to the 
various stages of a single production process, as well 
as to different products at one and the same stage of 
processing: at a given average level, the greater these 
differences the more markedly protectionist is the tariff. 
In other words, the measure of the real or net protection 
accorded to a specific industry is given not by the level 
of the import duties applicable to goods it produces, 
but by the difference between those and the duties ap­
plicable to the inputs absorbed by the industry in ques­
tion, and also by the ratio between that difference and 
the percentage of value added; given a certain difference, 
the lower the percentage of value added in the manufac­
turing process concerned, the greater is the net pro­
tection the industry receives.^® Thus, heavy duties on 
raw materials or semi-manufactured products reduce the 
degree of real protection enjoyed by finished goods; 
and a tariff with standard duties for aU products gives 
protection to none, but is equivalent to the application 
of a higher rate of exchange for imports, and conse­
quently is purely fiscal in its effect.
57. The prevalence of high import duties and charges 
in the Latin American countries in respect of both 
raw materials and semi-manufactured and manufactured 
goods, and the consequent lack of adequate differentia­
tion between such duties and charges would therefore 
seem to corroborate the opinion that their structure 
leaves much to be desired, and does not meet the re­
quirements of a rational policy of protection. On the 
other hand, the situation described is apparently at vari­
ance with the statement made on several previous oc­
casions to the effect that the protection accorded to 
domestic industries by the countries of the region is 
usually excessive and indiscriminate, since, according 
to the conclusions reached in the preceding paragraph, 
the real protection enjoyed by home industry must be 
substantially reduced by the high duties and charges 
on raw materials and intermediate products, as well as 
on capital goods. Admittedly, this is exactly what does 
happen in the Latin American countries in many cases 
(and instances of actually negative net protection can 
be found in respect of certain manufactured goods). 
But it should be noted that, as was mentioned in para­
graph 53 above, many and perhaps the majority of the 
duties and charges applied in the countries in question 
to raw materials and other primary commodities are 
unnecessarily high, and have little or no effective im­
pact on the internal price, which means that they do not 
affect the real protection enjoyed by the industry using 
them; and also that this real protection, apart from 
often being much greater than necessary (and thus de­
priving industry of the stimulus of competition from 
similar foreign lines of production) frequently benefits
39 This point is discussed in greater detail in section D, which 
also states the formula for determining the percentage of net 
protection accorded to an industry, given the import duties 
applicable to the products which it uses as inputs on the one 
hand and to the goods it produces on the other, and the per­
centage of value added in the industry concerned. It should be 
pointed out here that this percentage of real protection is 
generally higher, and even in many instances a good deal higher, 
than the rate of the import duty or charge.
industries which are very inefficient, or do not give rise 
to any real saving of foreign exchange, or ought to be 
given a low priority under an economic development 
programme. Moreover, precisely on account of the con­
sideration formulated a few moments ago, the protection 
accorded to these industries diminishes and even at times 
wipes out real protection for other more efficient or 
desirable industries whose inputs are supplied wholly 
or in part hy the former group.
58. In conclusion, it seems fully justified to assert 
that the structure of import duties and charges in most 
of the Latin American countries is lacking in rationality, 
and to describe the protection habitually granted to do­
mestic production as excessive and indiscriminate, since 
not only is it extended through extremely high duties 
and charges (supplemented in some countries by severe 
direct restrictions), but it has not as a rule been founded 
on selection of the industries that it is most expedient 
to protect in the light of criteria and objectives prede­
termined in accordance with a rational industrialization 
and economic development policy.'*® On the contrary, 
the industrialization and consequently the protectionist 
policy pursued in the Latin American countries has been 
predominantly based on an extempore import substitution 
process effected at any cost, and generally on the pre­
vention or minimization of imports of whatsoever items 
are or could be produced in the country concerned, 
as well as of all products classified as luxury or non- 
essential goods.'*^ Instead of protection for the most 
efficient industries, what has often been provided is 
protection for inefficiency, in accordance with the prin­
ciple that the less capable an industry is of withstanding 
foreign competition, the more protection it merits.
59. Apart from this, it must he remembered that the 
protection under discussion has been and still is com­
monly the outcome not of a deliberate decision to en­
courage this or that line of production, but of restrictions 
adopted as emergency measures for balance-of-payments 
reasons. Not only have no systematic endeavours been 
made to prevent or offset the protectionist effect of the
*0 See section D for some of these criteria and objectives.
It is this idea that imports of any good which the country 
produces or could produce should be prohibited that most 
commonly and systematically serves as a guiding principle for 
protectionist and import substitution policy in the Latin American 
countries. It is sometimes qualified, when provision is made 
through legal or administrative channels, to ensure that supplies 
of the domestically-produced article must fulfil certain requisites 
in respect of quality, quantity, delivery deadlines, etc.; but the 
application of these provisions is usually very flexible and of 
only relative practical efficacy. Furthermore, with rare exceptions, 
nothing is said of the price at which the domestic product can 
be obtained. By way of illustration, it may be pointed out that 
under the pertinent regulations the first of the stipulated con­
ditions on which the Office of the Secretary of State for Industry 
and Trade, in Mexico, will authorize imports of goods for which 
a licence is required (as is the case with most items in that 
country’s customs tariff) is that “ the said goods cannot be 
replaced by domestically-produced substitutes” . This stipulation 
is qualified later, elsewhere in the same regulations, since pro­
vision is made for cases in which the domestically-produced goods 
that might replace their counterparts from abroad are, in the 
opinion of the above-mentioned Office, insufficient to satisfy 
domestic consumption, or obtainable only on terms that are less 
favourable for the purchaser than those offered by imported goods 
as regards quality and delivery deadlines. It should be noted that 
no mention whatever is made of the price that has to be paid 
for the domestically-produced article, although according to some 
of the information received this factor is in practice taken into 
account by the Office, at least in certain cases.
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restrictions in so far as it was undesirable or excessive, 
but also these restrictions have usually been perpetuated 
for specifically protectionist purposes (prohibitions and 
other quantitative restrictions being at most replaced 
by surcharges and other very high duties and charges), 
regardless of whether the industries emerging under 
their aegis are really desirable and represent a net benefit 
for the economy, and without any attempt to reduce pro­
tection to more appropriate levels.
C . T h e  e f f e c t s  o f  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  p o l i c y  o n  t h e  i n ­
d u s t r ia l  STRUCTURE AND CAPACITY TO IMPORT OF THE
L a t i n  A m e r i c a n  c o u n t r ie s
60. It has repeatedly been pointed out that anxiety 
to relieve the chronic shortage of foreign exchange has 
induced many Latin American countries to pursue an 
industrialization policy essentially geared to import 
substitution; and that the substitution process has not 
been effected gradually, in accordance with a plan, and 
in anticipation of development requirements, but in 
makeshift fashion, frequently to meet emergencies, and 
on the basis of excessive and indiscriminate protection. 
Consequently, in many instances it has been carried a 
good deal beyond the economically advisable limits, 
with the result that serious distortions have been in­
troduced in the economic structure of the countries con­
cerned, and the development of more efficient and pro­
ductive activities has been adversely affected, to the 
special detriment of export possibilities, as will be shown 
later.
61. In other words, although import substitution has 
played and will indubitably continue to play a pre­
eminent role in the economic development of the under­
developed countries in general and those of Latin 
America in particular, it is obvious that as a rule the 
substitution process has been put into effect without due 
regard to its implicit costs in terms of alternative uses 
of resources, and that the resulting industrial structures 
are characterized by lack of efficiency and high costs. 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Far East notes this problem in the following passage: 
“ The adverse effect on productivity of indiscriminate 
use of the policy (of import substitution) may then 
defeat the very purpose of growth in productive capacity: 
domestic production is not really a substitute for im­
ports in the economic sense. It is also too narrow a point 
of view to conceive of import substitution in the static 
framework of the existing market. The mere exclusion 
of foreign supplies is a negative approach, and inade­
quate; the aim should rather be to enlarge the domestic 
market through a co-ordinated growth in income and 
output. .  . This means that a proper growth policy must 
be based on something broader than mere import sub­
stitution. The dynamic effects of trade interference ulti­
mately depend upon what happens in the domestic 
economy in the matter of investment and productivity.” ^^
62. Similarly, ECLA, although stressing the role of 
import substitution as a dynamic factor in the economic 
development of the Latin American countries, began 
to point out almost from the date of its inception that 
the substitution process was taking place extempore, as 
the result of emergency measures, and has consistently
ECAFE, Foreign trade in economic development planning 
(E/CN.11/DPWP.8/L.3), August 1963, pp. 16-17.
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emphasized the need for it to be effected on the basis 
of a far-sighted policy, advantage being taken of periods 
when foreign exchange is relatively plentiful to import 
capital goods, in accordance with a well-thought-out 
economic development programme, whose fundamental 
objective should be the more rational utilization of the 
scanty resources available for the acceleration of the 
country’s development.^®
63. Thomas Balogh also underlines this problem with 
the remark that “ in the absence of conscious planning and 
the encouragement during favourable times of import 
substitution, the process is likely to take place in periods 
of crisis, owing either to the failure of foreign supplies 
(e.g., as a result of wars) or to balance-of-payments 
difficulties and heavy political pressure” . And he adds: 
“ Thus it will be difficult to prevent the emergence of 
unnecessarily large profit margins as a result of the 
exploitation of newly-created monopoly power. It is not 
improbable that the degree of protection granted might 
be far greater than necessary merely to implement the 
changed structure of comparative costs through a suitable 
modification in the relationships between money costs 
and prices.” ^  Attention has already been drawn here 
to this tendency to accord industry more protection than 
it really needs; a little later, reference will be made to 
the effects of such excessive protection.
64. The emphasis laid on import substitution, regard­
less of the limits beyond which, far from being advan­
tageous, it is positively harmful for the country’s eco­
nomic development, has had its counterpart or logical 
complement in a policy of industrialization at any cost, 
based on the belief that industrialization and economic 
development are necessarily synonymous, and that every 
new industry implies a net addition to the domestic 
product and is intrinsically desirable and beneficial. It 
may fairly be argued that industrialization is on many 
occasions the most effective and sometimes the only 
medium of growth— especially when outward-looking 
development, stimulated by the export sector, is no 
longer a possibility— and that within fairly wide limits 
any expansion of industrial output does represent a net 
addition to the total product. But it cannot and must 
not be overlooked that this is true just in so far as in­
dustrial growth results in the more intensive and efficient 
utilization of available resources. It becomes a fallacy 
when industry is developed at the expense of other more 
productive activities, or when the establishment of a new 
industry has detrimental effects on others that are more 
efficient; for in such cases the expansion of industrial­
ization signifies a decline in productivity and a decrease
■13 See, for example, the Economic Survey of Latin America, 
1954, United Nations Publication, Sales No.: 1955.II.G.1, pp. 20-21. 
Subsequently, in the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1956, 
United Nations Publication, Sales No.: 1957.II.G.1, pp. 115-163, 
ECLA presented a detailed study and analysis of the effects 
of industrialization in the post-war period on the composition 
of imports and external vulnerability in Latin America. This 
was brought up to date, although in summarized form, in Part 
Three of the document entitled Algunas características del 
desarrollo industrial en el período 1950-60 (E/CN.12/602).
In his article “ Economic development or monetary stability: 
the false dilemma” , ECLA, Economic Bulletin for Latin America, 
vol. VI, No. 1, March 1961, Raúl Prebisch also comments on the 
makeshift character of import substitution policy and the limits 
to the economicity of substitution on such lines.
^  Thomas Balogh, “Economic policy and the price system”. 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol. VI, No. 1, op. cit., 
pp. 50-51.
rather than an increase in the total product. Nor is it 
possible or permissible to disregard the fact that even 
within those industries whose development may generate 
such an increase, there is usually a range of alternatives, 
and if the desired end is to obtain the maximum incre­
ment in the product, it is the development of the most 
efiBcient industries that must be promoted.
65. A policy of industrialization and, more broadly, 
of economic development may and generally does also 
pursue other objectives, different from and even incom­
patible with that of securing solely or primarily an im­
provement in the efficiency of utilization of resources 
and an increase in the total product. But these objectives 
and tbeir order of priority must in any event be clearly 
and rationally predetermined, and on them must be 
based tbe selection of tbe indutries or lines of production 
whose development is to be encouraged. Naturally, care 
must also be taken to see that tbe measures adopted to 
promote tbe industries in question (in particular those 
of a protectionist nature) are not applied in such a way 
as to militate against the attainment of essential ends 
(e.g., greater effciency in the utilization of resources).
66. That the foregoing considerations have not been 
duly taken into account in the import substitution and 
industrialization policies followed by most of the Latin 
American republics is evidenced by the excessive and 
indiscriminate protectionism which, as has been shown, 
the countries of the region commonly accord to their 
industries. Or rather, this kind of protectionism would 
seem to suggest that the sole or primary objective pur­
sued through industrialization in Latin America is the 
attainment of self-sufficiency; for then, and only then, 
can any import substitution industry be regarded as 
admissible, and economic considerations be relegated 
to a secondary plane.
67. Among the effects produced by this type of 
protectionism on the industrial structure of the Latin 
American countries (effects which are, as might be ex­
pected, especially manifest— although in varying degrees 
of intensity— in the more highly industrialized of these 
economies), mention may first be made of the encourage­
ment given by indiscriminate protection to the devel­
opment of inefficient industries, as well as of some others 
to which a very low priority would be assigned under 
a rational economic development programme. Entrepre­
neurs have no inducement to select those activities which 
are most expedient or desirable from the economic stand­
point, since cost considerations are of little significance 
when high prices can be charged.^®
68. Furthermore, as has just been pointed out, one 
of the basic principles of the protectionist policy fre­
quently pursued in the Latin American countries is that 
the lower an industry’s level of effciency, that is, the 
less capable it is of withstanding external competition, 
the more protection it merits. What has thus been pro­
tected is largely inefficiency, with the result that in the 
countries of the region many industries have been de­
veloped which may be described as “ hothouse”  activities, 
inasmuch as they have germinated and survived only 
in the shelter of extreme and even total protection against 
the rigours of external competition.
69. In view of the relative shortage of resources, 
which is much more marked, at least as regards capital, 
in under-developed than in developed countries, indus­
tries whose priority or whose level of effciency is low 
are often established with resources that might have 
been used for other more effcient or higher-priority 
activities, which consequently cannot be installed or de­
veloped. In other cases, the effect of the establishment 
of inefficient lines of production is to make other ac­
tivities relatively ineffcient, by compelling them to use 
raw materials or intermediate products obtained at a 
very high cost, or unsatisfactory from the standpoint of 
quality, specifications, and so forth.^
70. In turn, the excessive protection extended to in­
dustries which do not need it, or need it in much lesser 
measure, has a very bad effect on their productivity, 
inasmuch as it deprives them of the incentive that might 
be provided by actual or potential competition from 
foreign products. In the majority, but above all in the 
more highly industrialized, of the Latin American coun­
tries, there are many industries which could produce 
efficiently, and even compete successfully with their for­
eign counterparts, but fail to do so for want of any induce­
ment, since they can rely on having the domestic market 
reserved for them. In some instances this effect has been 
counteracted, at least in part, by the development of 
internal competition, when the market of the individual 
country concerned is broad enough for such competition 
to be effective; but in many other cases, especially when 
the domestic market is relatively narrow, the concentra­
tion of production in a few firms gives the latter mono­
polistic or oligopolistic powers which enable them to 
use the margin of protection they enjoy largely in order 
to sell at high prices and avoid taking any trouble to 
produce efficiently.
71. The foregoing situation has been aggravated by 
the over-diversification— not only of the whole range 
of manufacturing activities, but also within many in­
dividual industries, especially those producing consumer 
goods— to which indiscriminate protection, and the defi­
nite bias towards self-sufficiency frequently characteriz­
ing import substitution and industrialization policy, have 
often conduced. This lack of specialization substantially 
increases production costs and prevents the Latin Ameri­
can countries from making the best of their industries’ 
possible advantages in respect of comparative costs, 
besides depriving them of the benefits that might accrue
This point is emphasized by the ECLA secretariat in the 
Provisional Report of the Seminar on Industrial Programming 
(E/CN.12/663), paragraph 76, where it is also pointed out that 
“ inflexibility in the formulation and application of protectionist 
policies (in Latin American countries) often resulted in pre­
venting or hampering the establishment of new industries and, 
moreover, tended to perpetuate high levels of protection which, 
in turn, discouraged greater efflciency in production” .
"*6 An example is afforded by the duty of over 100 per cent 
levied in Argentina on imports of sulphur, in order to protect 
a small output produced at a very high cost. Hence, the price 
of sulphuric acid is three or four times higher in Argentina 
than on the international market; this in turn has a heavy 
incidence on the many chemical products based on sulphuric 
acid, and, of course, on the industries that have to use those 
chemical products as inputs. Similarly, the protection afforded 
in the same country to the caustic soda industry, by means 
of a 150 per cent duty (which is applied to an ajoro or official 
price higher than the world market quotation, and therefore 
signifies a real surcharge of over 200 per cent) adversely affects 
the manufacture of soap and makes this industry relatively 
inefficient. Cases likes this are extremely common in the Latin 
American countries.
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from trade based on a broader and more rational division 
of labour.^^
72. Thus, the over-hasty and premature extension of 
the range of industries— a^ll the more hasty and prema­
ture, in so far as the capacity to import has been inade­
quate, since in such circumstances the need to develop 
new import substitution industries is regarded as more 
urgent— has led to the establishment of industries whose 
technology is relatively complex (e.g., those manufactur­
ing durable consumer goods), frequently in the absence 
of essential requisites (such as a broad enough market, 
a satisfactory infrastructure, etc.) for the attainment of 
appropriate economic dimensions and the achievement 
of sufficient external economies; and, furthermore, with­
out adequate supplies of entrepreneurial talent, skilled 
manpower, and so forth, for whose training a relatively 
broad base of artisan industry is required, and a more 
gradual and selective industrialization process. In addi­
tion, the channelling of investment into new manufactur­
ing activities has deflected resources from existing in­
dustries (and even from primary production), whose 
consolidation and modernization or re-equipment has 
thus become more difficult or more costly, if not alto­
gether impossible. In their turn, the new industries, 
whose output (and profits) tend to increase rapidly 
during their import substitution period, soon reach a 
precocious “ maturity”  when the substitution process is 
completed, and can continue to expand only on the 
basis of an increase in domestic demand, at the peak 
of which they lapse into monopolistic indolence, with 
lower rates of profit, little investment and ageing plant 
and equipment.^®
73. Consequently, industrialization based on over­
emphasis on import substitution and excessive and indis­
criminate protectionism has caused severe distortions in 
the economies of many Latin American countries and
This is evidenced in the low level of imports of manufactured 
consumer goods effected by the more highly industrialized of the 
Latin American countries; for example, registered imports (i.e., 
excluding contraband) of cotton textiles are practically non­
existent, owing to the prohibitively high duties and other 
restrictions. As a result, the domestic textile industries have 
indulged in over-diversification and have forgone specialization, 
with the consequent adverse effects on their efficiency and export 
possibilities; cotton textiles, besides not being imported, are not 
exported either, except in marginal quantities. In contrast, the 
industrialized countries, whose textile industry is more highly 
developed and more efficient, not only export but also import 
large quantities of cotton textiles. For instance, the aggregate 
cotton textile exports of the countries members of the Organiza­
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development represented 
19.2 per cent of their output in 1959, and imports 17.2 per cent. 
In the case of the United Kingdom, the corresponding pro­
portions were 22.8 and 39.2 per cent, respectively (see Economic 
Survey of Europe in 1960, United Nations Publication, Sales 
No.: 61.II.E.1, chapter V, table 17).
See David Felix, Monetarists, Structuralists and Import Sub­
stituting Industrialization: A Critical Appraisal, a paper presented 
at the Conference on Inflation and Development in Latin America 
held at Rio de Janeiro from 3 to 11 January 1963. It is precisely 
to this process, characteristic of industrialization on the basis of 
import substitution, that Felix attributes the inability of even 
the more industrialized countries in Latin America to develop 
their exports, and the failure of the International Monetary 
Fund’s stabilization programmes in Argentina and Chile, inasmuch 
as these programmes only accelerated the flow of investment 
— especially from abroad—towards the more complex industries, 
which offered better opportunities for immediate and substantial 
profits, so that the range of industries was still further extended 
at the expense of the existing and particularly the traditional 
activities, and of industries with export potentialities.
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has conduced to an industrial structure characterized 
by inefficiency and high costs. But it is not only with 
regard to the efficient utilization of resources that the 
effect of this industrialization has been largely negative 
rather than positive; far from having contributed to the 
effective solution of some of the chronic problems be­
setting the Latin American economies, it has resulted 
in their aggravation.
74. This is strikingly true of the very problem to whose 
alleviation and solution the industrialization process has 
been primarily geared, through the stress laid on import 
substitution; that is, the bottleneck implicit in the inade­
quacy of the capacity to import and the consequent trend 
towards a chronic balance-of-payments deficit. For in 
the first place this type of industrialization has hampered 
and in many cases prevented the development of export 
industries, and has even adversely affected traditional 
lines of production for export in some important cases, 
over and above the effects of inflation, of exchange 
policies, of the lack of export incentives and promotion, 
and of the anti-export bias frequently displayed by de­
velopment programmes. Secondly, it has not reduced re­
quirements in respect of imports, but, on the contrary, 
has augmented them and altered their composition, giving 
them an increasingly rigid or inelastic structure which 
makes it difficult and disastrous to restrict them in 
emergencies.
75. In relation to the first of these points, it has 
already been mentioned that as a rule the Latin American 
countries have not endeavoured, by means of a suffi­
ciently far-sighted long-term policy, to keep import 
substitution within the limits of the economically ad­
vantageous, and supplement it with the development of 
export industries,^® but have confined themselves to act­
ing under the pressure of emergencies (i.e., serious bal­
ance-of-payments deficits), through the adoption of meas­
ures within their immediate reach, namely, import 
restrictions, and the consequent encouragement of in­
discriminate substitution of domestic production for 
imported goods. It has also been pointed out that this 
latter policy has introduced grave distortions in the 
structure of prices and of production, and has promoted 
the development of many relatively inefficient industries, 
whereas, directly or indirectly, it has had an adverse 
effect on other industries, existing or potential, which 
might be efficient enough to export on a competitive 
basis. In other words, in response to the pressure of 
trade deficits, action has been taken with respect to only 
one term of the equation— imports— and systematic 
action with respect to the other term— exports— has been 
neglected. The alternatives of developing export indus­
tries as against developing import substitution industries 
have never been properly weighed. On the contrary, 
in some countries (e.g., Argentina) industrialization 
was deliberately promoted during certain periods at the 
expense of the more productive traditional export ac­
tivities, while no attempt was made to replace these by 
developing other export lines.
49 This means, inter alia, carrying import substitution to the 
point at which the development of new lines of production to 
replace imports would require more capital and labour than the 
production of goods of export to the value of the foreign ex­
change saving that would result from the contemplated sub­
stitution (see the suggestions formulated in this context towards 
the end of the following section).
76. Furthermore, precisely because the import sub­
stitution process has as a rule been indiscriminate, the 
industries established have not necessarily, or even in 
the majority of cases, been those that might have gen­
erated the maximum saving of foreign exchange. In fact, 
it has been by no means unusual for the industries 
installed to produce no real savings whatsoever, and even 
to result in dissavings, because the value of the inputs 
imported for the new industries turned out to exceed 
that of the goods replaced by domestic production. The 
positive balance would be much smaller, or the negative 
greater, if the direct effects produced on specific exports 
by the establishment of a given import substitution in­
dustry were also taken into consideration— for example, 
the decrease in exportable balances of raw materials used 
by the industry in question; the impossibility for in­
dustries to continue exporting when their production 
costs were considerably increased because they were 
compelled to use inefiSciently manufactured inputs of 
domestic origin; and so forth.
77. At the same time, as has also been pointed out, 
industries that might be efi&cient enough to export have 
been deprived of the incentive of competition by ex­
cessive and even unnecessary protection, and have been 
allowed to become relatively inefficient. Even in cases 
— which in spite of everything are fairly numerous in 
the Latin American countries at a relatively more ad­
vanced stage of economic development— ^where industries 
do produce at costs that would permit them to compete 
with their foreign counterparts (especially if marginal 
production costs are taken into account), the fact that 
industrialization policy is geared entirely to the domestic 
market, the snug position in the reserved home market 
enjoyed by entrepreneurs, the lack of a clear-cut and 
systematic policy of incentives to industrial exports 
— which, on the contrary, are often discouraged by 
over-stringent restrictions and controls, especially of 
an administrative type— and other similar considerations 
have prevented or hindered entrepreneurs from becoming 
export-minded. The vast majority of them are inclined, 
as is natural, to prefer the reserved and protected do­
mestic market to the risks and the keen competition of 
export markets and the efforts required to gain a foot­
hold in these. Moreover, Latin American entrepreneurs 
suffer from a pronounced inferiority complex with regard 
to their chances of competing successfully on foreign 
markets, which is no doubt very largely imputable to 
the fact that in the domestic market they can rely upon 
a degree of protection usually far higher than they need.
78. To the above-mentioned obstacles is frequently 
added another constituted by exchange rates based on 
over-valuation of the currency, which used commonly 
to result— at any rate for certain categories of products—  
from multiple exchange rate systems, and which nowa­
days are mainly, although not exclusively, found in 
countries where there is inflation, primarily because 
of the practice of stabilizing the exchange rate for lengthy 
periods while the internal level of costs and prices is 
continually rising. Artificially high exchange rates of 
this type have effects similar to those of an export duty, 
and although the systems of single exchange rates now 
prevailing in almost all the Latin American countries 
are applied to all exports alike, their unfavourable reper­
cussions are stronger in the case of those lines of pro­
duction in which the countries of the region are relat- 
tively less efficient, i.e., manufactured goods. It is not
uncommon, however, for even traditional exports to be 
hampered, and at times actually prevented, by the ap­
plication of exchange rates based on over-valuation of 
the currency, particularly under systems of multiple 
exchange rates.®®
79. While it is true that in some circumstances and 
on some products an export duty is recommendable and 
even necessary, and that the mechanism of multiple 
exchange rates may constitute a flexible and convenient 
technique for taxing exports on a selective basis, the 
abuse of this practice has defeated its own ends.*  ^ Its 
effects are still more serious when exports are uniformly 
and indiscriminately taxed through single exchange rates 
based on over-valuation of the currency, since this 
handicaps not only the expansion but also the diversifi­
cation of exports, by stopping the outflow of new 
products which could be offered on foreign markets at 
competitive prices if the exchange rate were more favour­
able and more realistic.®*
80. The adverse effect of the foregoing factors (indis­
criminate import substitution, over-protection of domestic 
industry, maintenance of artificially high exchange rates, 
etc.) on the expansion and diversification of the Latin 
American countries’ exports is apparent in the very low 
level of exports of manufactured goods from the region, 
despite the considerable degree of industrialization at­
tained by some of the countries concerned. For example, 
in 1959-60 exports of fully manufactured goods®® aver­
The inflationary process has an adverse effect on exports 
of manufactured goods not only as a result of the stabilization 
of the external value of the currency while its internal value is 
continually depreciating (a problem that could be solved through 
a more appropriate and rational exchange policy), but also on 
account of the general atmosphere of uncertainty to which infla­
tion gives rise, and which discourages efforts to secure a foothold 
in foreign markets. Moreover, inflation encourages speculative 
activities at the expense of productive activities, and makes for 
decapitalization, in respect of both basic social capital and the 
fixed capital of industries, whose equipment becomes obsolete 
and ineflScacious.
From the standpoint of imports, the misuse of multiple 
exchange rates has played an extremely important part in 
introducing or aggravating distortions in the structure of prices 
and production in many Latin American countries, and has been 
one of the main instruments for the promotion of indiscriminate 
import substitution, as was pointed out in section A.
See Roberto de Oliveira Campos, “Two views of inflation 
in Latin America” , Latin American Issues, A. Hirschmann, 
Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1961. The author of this 
article points out that in practically all the Latin American 
countries where inflation exists, development programmes have 
shown an anti-export bias, especially in Argentina and Brazil 
and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in Chile; and he suggests 
that these two factors—inflationary policies and anti-export 
development programmes— have seriously aggravated the problem 
of the inadequacy of the capacity to import in the countries 
concerned. Thus, he attributes the severe contracting of the 
capacity to import in the cases of Argentina and Brazil to the 
following causes: (a) over-taxation of exports through multiple 
exchange rates or price distortions; (fe) a misguided import 
substitution policy; and (c) mistaken procedures for the financing 
of the import substitution in question. Mexico and Venezuela, 
on the other hand, whose development policies have not taken 
this anti-export line, have not been troubled by serious limitations 
of their capacity to import.
Raúl Prebisch, too, in the article previously cited, underlines 
the fact that the import substitution process as it has taken 
place in Latin America has discriminated against exports. See 
also David Felix, op. cit.
On the basis of the classification of export commodities 
under primary (or crude), processed or semi-manufactured, and 
fully manufactured products adopted in the World Economic
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aged barely $8.7 million in the case of Argentina, 
$10 million in that of Brazil, $5 million in that of Chile 
(newsprint) and $31.4 million in that of Mexico (aver­
age for 1958-59; this figure includes some important 
items— e.g., $5 million for aircraft— which are obviously 
re-exports). In contrast, during the same years Australia’s 
exports of fully manufactured goods amounted to $108 
million. Again in 1961, exports of semi-processed and 
semi-manufactured articles (excluding processed or pre­
pared foodstuffs, non-ferrous metals and fuels), classified 
as products of light industries and products of heavy 
industries, were as follows (in terms of millions of 
dollars) : (a) products of light industries: Argentina, 
3.1; Brazil, 5.4 (2.2 of which correspond to textile goods, 
mainly yarns) ; Mexico, 51.5 (34 for textiles, mainly 
yarns) ; Australia, 52.8 (mainly miscellaneous manu­
factured goods, classified in chapter 8 of SITC) ; (6) 
products of heavy industries: Argentina, 35.8 (23.4 
representing quebracho extract and casein) ; Brazil, 35.4 
(mainly chemical products such as alcohols and essential 
oils) ; Mexico, 58.6 (approximately 50 per cent consti­
tuted hy chemical products, especially hormones) ; and 
Australia, 199.4 (75 corresponding to iron and steel 
in various forms, 39 to machinery and 29 to transport 
equipment, particularly motor vehicles)
81. On the import side, the indiscriminate encourage­
ment of the substitution process through a markedly 
autarkical policy has brought about changes in the com­
position of imports which have imparted an increasing 
rigidity to their structure, inasmuch as imports of non- 
processed consumer goods and of non-essential products 
have been considerably reduced, and in some countries 
almost entirely eliminated, whereas external purchases 
of goods essential for economic activity have increased, 
hy virtue of the substitution and industrialization process 
itself. In several Latin American countries where this 
process has reached a more advanced stage— e.g., in 
Argentina and in Brazil— imports are almost entirely 
confined to a few essential items for direct consumption 
(foodstuffs) and production goods (raw materials, fuels, 
semi-processed or intermediate products, and capital 
goods) ; and even where production goods are concerned, 
imports have had to be cut down to the minimum in­
dispensable for the maintenance of economic activity, 
owing to the stagnation of exports.
82. The extreme rigidity in the structure of imports 
places domestic industry in a highly vulnerable position 
vis-à-vis fluctuations in the available supply of foreign 
exchange; for any reduction of imports to meet critical 
external imbalances can only be achieved by restricting 
external purchases of goods that are essential for pro­
duction, with the consequent harmful effects on economic
Survey 1961, United Nations Publication, Sales No.: 62.II.G.1 
(see note to table 1-24 in that document). Accordingly, 
manufactured goods, are not taken to include preserved 
foods and other food preparations, petroleum derivatives, chemical 
and pharmaceutical products (e.g., quebracho extract and casein), 
yam, iron and steel, copper and other metals in bars, plate 
and other primary forms, etc.
84 Statistics taken from GATT, International Trade 1962, 
Geneva, 1963, appendix, tables C-1, C-3, C-5 and C-11.
Another case in point is the contrast between the almost 
complete absence of exports of footwear from Argentina, and the 
development of Italy’s exports of these goods, whose value rose 
from a very small figure at the beginning of the fifties to $113 
million in 1960, and, in 1962, to $143 million, distributed as 
follows: $50 million to other EEC countries, $39 million to 
States members of EFTA and $38 million to the United States.
activity. Limited supplies or an increase in the prices 
of imported materials, parts, spare parts, machinery, 
etc. compel industries to lower their level of output and 
to operate with an unduly wide margin of idle capacity, 
or preclude their re-equipment or expansion.®® Moreover, 
the supplies in question are erratic and unreliable (espe­
cially when imports are subject to licences and other 
direct controls or restrictions), since they may he 
suspended or impeded at any moment by balance-of- 
payments problems, and this creates a climate of un­
certainty and instability in the world of industry. Con­
sequently, many firms take advantage of periods when 
foreign exchange is relatively plentiful and import policy 
is easy-going to expand their purchases of equipment 
at a rapid rate or to pile up stocks of imported ma­
terials in quantities much greater than they normally 
need; a procedure which, besides raising their pro­
duction costs, results in an unduly large volume of 
imports and speeds up the advent of external disequi­
librium.
83. Thus, the way in which the import substitution 
and industrialization process has been carried out in a 
number of Latin American countries has aggravated 
the bottleneck represented by the lack of capacity to 
import and has intensified instead of mitigating the 
external vulnerability of the economies concerned,®* 
partly because the process in question has discriminated 
against exports, and partly because it has itself intro­
duced a growing element of rigidity in the composition 
of imports, that is, has increased the difiEculty of restrict­
ing their volume in emergencies.
84. In contrast with a frequent contention which is 
indeed implicit in the economic development policies of 
most Latin American countries, the limitation of the 
capacity to import is not a phenomenon entirely uncon­
nected with development, nor is it a factor of exclusively 
or primarily external origin; except over the very short 
term, it is essentially the outcome of deliberately anti­
export policies, based on import substitution and indus­
trialization at any cost, on excessive and indiscriminate 
protectionism, on internal inflation combined with ex­
ternal devaluation, and so forth. It is the adverse in­
fluence of such policies on the efficient allocation of 
resources and on the development of production for 
export, and, more generally, the severe distortions they 
have introduced in the structure of prices and produc­
tion, that are indubitably the chief or among the chief 
causes underlying the stagnation or what may even 
be described as the wane of economic development in 
several Latin American countries during recent years.
85. These distortions and bottlenecks, the unduly high 
cost at which import substitution has been effected, the 
inefficiency and the heavy costs characterizing the struc-
85 This was made abundantly clear, for example, by Argentina’s 
experience in 1962, when the depletion of foreign exchange 
reserves led not only to a severe devaluation of the currency, 
but also to the imposition of high additional surcharges on all 
imports, including raw materials, parts and spare parts, machinery 
not produced in Argentina, etc.
86 Furthermore, this external vulnerability is of a different type 
from that traditionally affecting the Latin American economies; 
for whereas the impact of external fluctuations was formerly most 
direct and most marked in the case of export industries and 
consumption of imported goods, nowadays it makes itself felt 
directly and immediately in the industries producing for the 
domestic market, and thus affects a much wider range of 
economic activities.
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ture of industry, and other allied faetors, have also 
played a vital part in generating the inflationary process 
which is chronic in some Latin American countries, 
especially in those cases where, as seems to he true of 
Argentina and Chile, the process is due to costs inflation. 
And it is further stimulated hy the excessive protection 
accorded to domestic industry, since the absence of 
competition resulting from the complete reservation of 
the domestic market and the monopolistic or semi- 
monopolistic powers enjoyed by many enterprises permit 
and encourage uncontrolled price increases.
86. As long as the Latin American countries continue 
to grant their industries excessive and indiscriminate 
protection, any measures they may adopt to combat 
inflation will prove relatively inefiScacious and even self- 
defeating, since the mere restriction of credit reduces 
the tempo of economic activity but does not bring down 
prices. These, on the contrary, are pushed yet farther 
upwards, since the decline in production, by aggravating 
the operational inefficiency of industries, leads to stiU 
greater increases in costs. At the same time the lack 
of external competition enables industry to transfer any 
cost increment to prices, even magnifying it on occasion.
87. While it is true that import substitution neces­
sarily brings about a rise in prices, and that protection­
ism conduces, by definition, to the inefficient allocation 
of resources, those higher costs and this inefficiency, as 
well as the bottlenecks and distortions in the structure 
of prices and production, might on the other hand be 
reduced to reasonable levels and temporary status by 
virtue of a far-sighted and properly programmed sub­
stitution policy, and protection on rational lines. More­
over, industrialization would not then militate against 
the export trade, but on the contrary, would stimulate 
it, since the development of efficient industries would 
be promoted. In the following section a procedure is 
suggested for drawing up a rational protectionist tariff 
precisely to that end: promotion of the development of 
the more efficient industries.
D . T h e  d r a w in g  u p  o f  a  r a t i o n a l  p r o t e c t i o n i s t  
t a r i f f : c r i t e r ia  f o r  s e l e c t in g  in d u s t r ie s  t o  b e
PROTECTED AND FOR FIXING TARIFF LEVELS
88. The starting point and also one of the funda­
mental principles for drawing up a rational protectionist 
tariff is that customs duties must be fixed in such a 
way that the tariff level is the expression of the Gov­
ernment’s protectionist policy (which, in turn, expresses 
its industrial and commercial policy), to which the private 
sector of the economy must adapt itself.®'^  Consequently, 
in order to frame and give effect to a rational pro­
tectionist policy, the Government must determine, in the 
light of national objectives for the general distribution 
of resourees according to the economic policy adopted 
(e.g. between produetion for investment and for con­
sumption, production for import substitution or for 
export, etc. in order to achieve a certain rate of eco­
nomic development, a certain degree of stability, an 
adequate balance between imports and import capacity, 
etc.), the general or average tariff level which it is ad­
This principle is precisely the converse of that followed 
hitherto by the great majority of Latin American countries 
which, as indicated in earlier sections, consists fundamentally 
of fixing import duties in such a way as to meet the protection 
“ needs”  of each industry, however inefficient it may be.
visable to establish, and must decide how to allocate 
among specific industries the protection resulting from 
the tariff level. In other words, what has to be determined 
is which industries must be protected, and to what ex­
tent, in order to ensure that the objectives of the general 
economic policy are achieved. Here an attempt will be 
made to determine the procedure and criteria for achiev­
ing the most adequate distribution of protection.
89. The question of determining which industries 
should be protected, and to what extent, can only be 
posed and solved in terms of another, more generic, 
problem which is fundamental to any economic system: 
how to ensure “ optimum” distribution or allocation of 
the resources (both actual and potential) available to 
the country.
90. Although there are distinct criteria (some of them 
conflicting with others) for identifying an optimum 
allocation of resources, the most important and most 
generally applied criterion is no doubt that of efficiency, 
the aim being to obtain the highest possible output. 
According to this, the optimum allocation of resources 
requires, from the economic point of view, that the 
industries which should be protected and stimulated are 
those representing the most efficient utilization of such 
resources. Although this criterion is not sufficient in 
itself to determine the optimum allocation of resources, 
it will be taken as a starting point and as a standard 
or guide for solving the problem of deciding which 
industries should be protected, and to what extent. Other 
criteria, some of which are aimed at objectives other 
than the maximization of output, will be mentioned 
later, as they can clarify or make more effective, sup­
plement and sometimes modify the criterion of efficiency. 
Thus, if taken into consideration they may cause the 
rates of duty determined on the basis of the initial 
criterion to be changed.
91. As will be seen, the identification and proper 
application of such criteria requires a measure of eco­
nomic planning while remaining within the bounds of 
an economy based on free enterprise (to which the 
following analysis will necessarily be limited),®* so that 
the criterion of efficieney can, at least theoretically and 
within certain limits, be applied automatically, with a 
minimum of governmental interference and of decisions 
concerning specific industries, through the free play of 
the price system in the manner indicated below.
92. From the economic point of view and in accord­
ance with the basic criterion under consideration the 
optimum allocation of resources requires that the in­
dustries to be protected should in principle and as a 
general rule be the most efficient. But these are precisely 
the industries which least need protection. They can be
The case of a socialist economy (the so-called “ centrally 
planned economies” ) will not be considered here because in 
those countries imports are entirely in the hands of the State 
or of State agencies, and thus the customs tariff cannot act as 
an instrument of protection—or at least not in the same way as 
in a free enterprise economy—since imports are made according 
to the needs of national economic planning. The purpose of a 
customs tariff in a socialist economy would not be protection; 
it might serve as an instrument of social accountancy, as a 
measure for collecting resources for investment, or to facilitate 
the differential treatment of imports according to origin (by way 
of illustration, see the official or semi-official statements made 
concerning the new customs tariffs introduced in the second 
half of 1961 in the Soviet Union and in Hungary, which may be 
found in the Economic Bulletin for Europe, vol. 14, No. 1, 
United Nations Publication, Sales No.; 62.II.E.7, p. 53).
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identified more or less automatically by establishing a 
uniform level of net protection. Efficient industries will 
find this level adequate, and will be able to develop, 
while inefficient ones, for the very reason that they re­
quire higher levels of protection in order to exist, wiU 
be unable to establish themselves or will tend to disap­
pear. Such a procedure fulfils the basic principle that 
the tariff level reflects the government policy to which 
the private sector of the economy must adapt itself, while 
at the same time, automatically and within the criterion 
of the most efficient use of resources, it solves the prob­
lem of selecting the industries to be protected, i.e., the 
problem of the optimum distribution of tariff protection 
between the various types of products and sectors of pro­
duction. It may be said that a process of “ natural selec­
tion”  takes place, which enables efficient industries, but 
not inefficient ones, to survive.®®
93. It will be observed that reference has been made 
to a uniform level not of duties or charges but of net 
protection. This is the protection actually received by 
a given industry in connexion with its processing or 
manufacturing activities as represented by the cost of 
such manufacturing, i.e., by the value added by the in­
dustry. Inasmuch as the import duty applies to the total 
value of the product, thè level (in percentage terms) 
of effective protection which the duty implies for the 
industry is usually greater, and in many cases appre­
ciably so, than the percentage or rate thereof.®® Con­
sequently it is determined not only by the amount of 
the rate but also by the proportion of value added by 
the industry (cost of processing or manufacture) in
69 In this connexion see the report of the Swedish Customs 
Tariff Commission on the revision of the Swedish tariff, presented 
in May 1956 (Revision of the Swedish Customs Tariff, Stockholm 
1957). The revision of the Swedish tariff was carried out 
precisely on the basis of affording uniform net tariff protection 
for all classes of products.
The uniform level of net protection in principle prevents any 
distortion in the price structure as a result of protection, or at 
least keeps it to the minimum. Of course, if there are any 
protected industries, the distribution of resources will not be the 
same as it would be without such protection. Without protection, 
or with free trade, and on the assumption of perfect competition 
and full employment, the resources would be used in the industries 
which offer the greatest comparative advantages to the country; 
that is to say, the selection of industries would be made 
automatically on the basis of comparative costs (in relation to 
industries in other countries). Conversely, where there is pro­
tection, industries develop which— at least in the initial stages—  
cannot offer comparative cost advantages. The criterion of 
efficiency referred to above is not therefore synonymous with the 
most efficient use of the resources which would supposedly take 
place in a system of free trade, but is fairly close to it or at 
least does not differ excessively.
60 This will occur whenever the duty applied to the manu­
factured product is higher than the duty established for the 
raw materials and intermediate products used in its manufacture 
(in other words, whenever D > d  in the formula shown above), 
which must furthermore be the general rule in a rationally 
constituted tariff, except in those exceptional cases in which it 
is considered justified to afford greater protection for the pro­
duction of the raw material than for the processing of the product. 
But even in such exceptional cases, care must be taken to avoid 
negative protection of the manufactured product as would occur 
if the proportion or relation between the duty on the raw material 
and that on the manufactured product were greater than the 
proportion between the value of the raw material and the total
d 100— V
cost of the product (in other words — > ----------  in the formula
D 100
shown above). In such cases it would prove more advantageous 
to import the processed product than to produce it domestically.
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the final price of the product, and by the charge applied 
(and actually levied) on imports of the raw materials 
and intermediate products used by it, in accordance with 
the following formula:
100 ( D - d )
P = ------------------+  d
V
where
P  is the percentage of effective protection on the 
processed or manufactured product
D the rate of duty applied to the importation of the 
said product
d the rate of duty applied to the raw material when 
imported
V the percentage of value added (cost of processing 
or manufacture in relation to the final value of 
the product)
94. Accordingly, the formula for determining the 
duty D which must be established on imports of the 
processed or manufactured product in order to afford 
protection P  to the domestic industry is:
PV d(lOO-V)
D = -----  -------------------
100 100
PV
In this-----gives us the net protectionist part of the duty
100
(which, as may be seen, is directly proportional to the
d(lOO-V)
percentage of value added) and ---------------- represents
100
the part corresponding to the compensatory duty, i.e. 
the amount by which the net protectionist part of the 
charge must be increased in order to compensate the 
industry for the higher cost of the raw material or in- 
termediate products in the event that imports of these 
are also subject to duty. Accordingly, the compensatory 
duty is equivalent to the incidence on the final cost of 
the product of the charge levied on imports of the raw 
material and intermediate products. If this charge is zero 
(duty-free import) or if the raw material used is pro­
duced domestically at international prices (e.g., wool 
or leather in Argentina)®^ the compensatory duty would 
also be zero, since tbe manufacturer would obtain sup­
plies at the same prices as would foreign producers.
95. Thus if one wishes to give a certain industry an 
effective protection of 30 per cent (which would permit 
it to develop provided its processing or manufacturing 
costs do not exceed by more than 30 per cent those of 
similar foreign industries), and the value added by it 
represents 70 per cent of the final value of the product.
61 Wherever reference is made to the elahoration of a rational 
tariff, it is assumed that if the country produces the raw material 
at international prices (as would usually he the case if this 
raw material were normally exported), imports thereof will not 
be subject to duty since in principle the duty would be without 
purpose or effect. Conversely, if imports of the raw material are 
subject to duty, whether for fiscal or protectionist reasons, it 
will result in a higher effective price for the user.
In order to permit the development of efficient industries, 
imports of raw materials should as a general rule be duty-free, 
or if subject to charge then the duties should be low (e.g., not 
in excess of 5 or 10 per cent) in the case of those whose domestic 
production requires protection. Otherwise the costs of the 
industries could be increased unduly.
while the raw material used is subject to a 10 per cent 
duty, then the customs duty on the processed product 
would have to be fixed at 24 per cent: 21 per cent 
corresponding to the net tariff protection, plus 3 per 
cent of compensatory duty. If the value added were only 
15 per cent, the import duty need be fixed at only 13 per 
cent (4.5 per cent of net tariff protection, plus 8.5 
per cent of compensatory duty). On the other hand, if 
the value added amounted to 90 per cent, the duty would 
have to be 28 per cent (27 per cent of protection plus 
1 per cent of compensatory duty).®*
96. In undertaking the uniform distribution of pro­
tection, the first problem to be solved is to determine 
or fix the value of P, i.e., the normal coefficient of pro­
tection or the general level of effective protection which 
the Government is as a rule disposed to grant to the 
industry (and which in the examples given in the pre­
ceding paragraph is 30 per cent). How far, up to what 
level or degree of relative inefficiency can there be 
justification for support, through protective measures, 
of industries which could not survive in conditions of 
full competition with similar foreign industries? Is it 
desirable from the economic point of view, and as a 
general rule, that industries whose manufacturing costs 
are more than 20, 30 or 50 per cent higher than those 
of similar foreign industries should be protected?
97. This level, which constitutes the primary ex­
pression of the protectionist policy to be followed by 
the Government, must be determined on the basis of 
the Government’s general economic policy and, in par­
ticular, its industrial policy, and having regard to the 
peculiar characteristics and stage of development of the 
national economy. The most that can be said in this 
connexion is that a fairly high level (and this, all too 
often, is the case of most of the Latin American coun­
tries) can result in an excessive flow of resources into 
relative inefficient activities, to the detriment of the 
general level of productivity of the economy, while a 
fairly low level may severely limit the process of indus­
trialization.®®
98. The determination and use of a normal coefficient 
of protection as a basis for drawing up the customs 
tariff is closely linked with an argument in favour of 
protectionism which has been fairly popular in recent 
years, mainly in order to justify protection in a devel­
oping country. This contention, which is an amplification 
or generalization of the argument based on the necessity 
or desirability of protecting new industries, is that in 
a country where industrial development is just beginning 
(i.e., in what is termed a “ young”  economy) new in­
dustries find it difficult to compete, not so much because
On the assumption that as a rule d is less than P  in the 
formula given above (since at least in an under-developed 
economy, production of raw materials usually reauires less 
protection than that of intermediate products which in turn 
requires less than that of finished products), the sum of the 
protectionist duty plus the compensatory duty, i.e., the total 
charge applicable to the manufactured product, will also as a 
rule be less than the percentage of effective protection granted 
— in other words D < P . Thus, in the examples given above, the 
rate of duty needed to afford effective protection of 30 per cent 
to a product will be less than 30 per cent whenever the raw 
materials and other components are liable to an import duty of 
less than 30 per cent.
63 Thirteen per cent was the usual coefScient of protection used 
by the Swedish Tariff Commission for computing the normal rates 
of duty in the preparation of the Swedish Draft Customs Tariff 
in 1956. Swedish Customs Tariff Commission, op. cit., p. 49.
of their own inefficiency as because of the general ineffi­
ciency of the economy itself as a result of its state of 
under-development so that the general level of produc­
tivity (particularly in the industrial sector) is lower 
than that of the developed economies. This general ineffi­
ciency of the young economies is due to factors such 
as deficiencies in the infra-structure or basic social 
capital (inadequate transport facilities, shortage of elec­
tric power, etc.), low purchasing power in the commu­
nity (limiting the market for the majority of manufac­
tures), absence of a properly organized capital market, 
high cost of credit (caused by lack of confidence in 
industry, insufficient credit facilities, etc.), inefficient 
marketing and, basically, low capitalization, i.e., low 
amount of capital per person employed, shortage of 
managerial skills and qualified manpower, etc. This 
general state of under-development and relative ineffi­
ciency of the economy, as well as the absence of other 
factors making for external economies by which in­
dustries in a developed economy benefit, results in lower 
productivity and therefore in a higher over-all level of 
costs for industrial activities there which consequently, 
in order to develop, require a sufficient over-all level of 
protection to offset the incidence of the factors mentioned 
above.
99. According to this, the normal coefficient of pro­
tection should fundamentally represent an approximate 
quantification of the average impact which the lower 
efficiency of a developing country’s economy as a whole, 
as compared with the economies of the industrialized 
countries, has on the production costs of industries in 
the country concerned.
100. In principle, the same effect could be achieved 
by modifying the rate of exchange since a devaluation 
is equivalent to a uniform charge on all imports and 
also a uniform subsidy on all exports. In other words, 
the difference between the general level of productivity 
of a young or under-developed economy and that of a 
developed or industrialized economy is reflected in differ­
ences in the financial costs of the respective industries 
at a given rate of exchange, differences which could be 
offset by a change in the exchange rate.
101. Adjustments in the rate of exchange, however, 
are not always practical or desirable. Where the young 
or under-developed economies are relatively inefficient 
is in industrial production and not necessarily in primary 
production, an area in which they can be— and in the 
majority of cases are— relatively efficient, particularly 
in the sectors geared to the export trade. In these cases 
a measure having so uniform an impact as devaluation 
may not be the most appropriate instrument for correct­
ing differences in productivity affecting only part of the 
economy (unless a selective devaluation is made, by 
means of multiple exchange rates, which requires the 
use of direct controls, with all their concomitant prob­
lems and disadvantages). Moreover, devaluation would 
be of special benefit to the exporting sectors, which in 
many cases are controlled by foreign interests, or it 
could cause a drop in the international price of exports, 
and hence a deterioration in the country’s terms of 
trade.®'*
6* Some of these objections (e.g., the drop in prices of export 
products and consequent deterioration in the terms of trade, with 
its adverse effects on capitalization) arise with respect of the 
procedure for off-setting lower productivity by lower wages. This 
procedure would also be impracticable for political and social
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102. Through the use of the normal co-efiScient of 
protection, on the other hand, an element compensating 
for the general differences of productivity as between 
the under-developed and the developed economies can 
be introduced in those very sectors where such com­
pensation is really necessary, i.e., the industrial sector. 
Furthermore, as will be seen below, it enables adequate 
consideration to be given to cases in which additional 
or special protection is justified for certain branches 
of production, or where less protection would be justified 
for others. But this in no way implies that the importance 
of the rate of exchange is not recognized; on the con­
trary, both the determination and the use of the normal 
co-e£Scient of protection implies, as an essential prere­
quisite, that the rate of exchange must be so adjusted 
as not to cause undue inflation in the cost level in terms 
of foreign currency (as happens with an overvalued rate 
of exchange)®® and which at the same time ensures 
normal equilibrium in the balance of payments at the 
tariff level selected.®®
103. Once the normal coefiScient of protection to be 
applied in drawing up the customs tariff has been de­
termined, the procedure indicated above should be 
applied to calculate the normal rates of duty (on the 
basis of the percentage of value added by each industry 
and of the imjmrt duties chargeable on the raw ma­
terials and intermediate products) which, as was shown, 
consist of net tariff protection plus compensatory duties, 
and represent a uniform level of protection for the dif­
ferent industries.®'^
104. These normal rates of duty are not, however, 
necessarily decisive or final but may be subject, in cer­
tain cases, to adjustment either upwards or downwards, 
in order to grant special protection to some industries 
or reduce the protection given to others. In other words, 
the duties to be fixed definitively in the customs tariff 
may not in all cases, and perhaps even in an appreciable 
number of cases, be the normal rates. However, the 
normal rates are always taken as a point of reference 
in establishing these duties.
105. The revision and modification of the normal 
rates of duty (and accordingly any deviations from the 
principle of uniform distribution of protection) may be 
justified on practical grounds (including those of a 
political and social nature as well as those of a strategic 
kind, e.g., preparations for an emergency) or alterna-
reasons, further reduce the domestic market for manufactured 
products and render more difEcult the creation of an adequate 
supply of skilled manpower, etc.
In this connexion see the concept of a “ neutral”  rate of 
exchange in the study on “ Customs duties and other charges 
and restrictions on imports of Latin American countries, and their 
average levels of incidence” , in Multilateral E cotwttuc Co-operation 
in Latin America, op. cit., paragraphs 34-39.
The application of import restrictions for balance-of-payments 
reasons is briefly considered below, in terms of its protectionist 
effect.
The computation of these normal rates of duty is a com­
plicated matter and requires extensive and detailed information. 
Part of this can be obtained from industrial censuses and from 
specialized organizations and publications, but most of it must 
be furnished by the industrial sector itself as regards the various 
cost components of production in each industry, so that the 
cost of manufacture or value added in each one, and the raw 
materials and intermediate products used, can be determined. In 
Annex I a simplified and relatively uncomplicated procedure is 
suggested for determining such normal rates with an acceptable 
degree of accuracy.
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lively by reason of essentially economic considerations 
aimed at achieving a better distribution of resources 
than would automatically result from the uniform level 
of protection.
106. Justification on practical grounds implies the 
recognition that, however rational one might wish the 
customs tariff to be, it is not drawn up in a vacuum, 
and the de facto situations, distortions and vested in­
terests already existing in the economy cannot be 
ignored. Thus, when the level of some existing charges 
in the current tariff is appreciably higher than the 
normal rates, it may be prudent to raise the latter some­
what so as to avoid unduly sharp adjustments, or at 
least to resort to the procedure of fixing variable duties 
which can be reduced gradually but automatically until 
they reach the desired level.®® In general, however, prac­
tical or political considerations cannot by definition be 
taken into account in the elaboration of a rational pro­
tectionist tariff. The most that can be said here in this 
regard is that changes in the normal duty rates made 
solely or essentially to protect vested interests or which 
in any other way militate against the more efficient use 
of resources, should be limited as far as possible both 
in number and in degree.
107. The economic considerations which may justify 
changes in the normal duty rates, have in common the 
fact that they imply a denial that the free play of the 
price system can automatically bring about the optimum 
use of resources from the purely economic standpoint, 
and that the only industries which can develop under 
uniform protection are the most economically efficient 
and suitable industries, or that those which cannot de­
velop or survive with that protection are the most un­
suitable ones (also from the economic standpoint).®® 
Some of these considerations also mean that the criterion 
of efiffciency (at least as a static concept, under present 
conditions and with reference to industries taken in-
In the case of the majority of Latin American countries the 
principal obstacle to the elaboration and implementation of a 
tariff affording rational protection, in other words one that 
contains relatively moderate tariff levels based on the principle 
of uniform protection, is that the adoption of such a protectionist 
policy would imply a radical change in the policy applied so far 
and would bring about violent changes in the economic structure 
because the latter suffers sharp distortions resulting mainly, as 
seen in earlier sections, from protection which is usually extreme 
and indiscriminatory. On the other hand, this same situation 
makes it even more urgent that measures be adopted to eliminate 
or reduce these distortions, in particular by means of the rationa­
lization of protection. In order to achieve this and at the same 
time avoid violent and sudden changes which would be econo­
mically and socially costly and would meet with possibly 
insurmountable resistance on the part of vested interests, it is 
suggested that the tariff, once rationally drawn up, should be 
made effective gradually, for example over a period of five years. 
In other words, the tariff levels to be effective at the end of five 
years would be fixed and announced, and the difference between 
the existing level of duties for a given product and that established 
in the new tariff would be automatically reduced by 20 per cent 
per annum.
As an economic argument which might justify fixing a 
customs duty higher than the normal rate, it can hardly be 
contended that greater protection would be needed to maintain 
a given industry at its present level. At any rate that would not 
in itself be a sufficient reason (except perhaps from the political 
and social point of view) since such a necessity merely Indicates 
that the said industry should be considered as relatively inefficient 
and that it is therefore desirable (from the economic standpoint) 
that it should disappear or reduce its activities, unless the 
desirability of its survival is based on other economic con­
sideration.
dividually) cannot alone provide a sufficient basis for 
determining the optimum allocation of resources. Even 
supposing that price levels provide an adequate indication 
of the relative shortages (which, as will be shown below, 
does not occur in many economies, particularly the 
under-developed ones), such prices reflect current con­
ditions without taking into account the structural changes 
caused by the process of economic development itself 
or which may be brought about through economic plan­
ning. A fundamental objective of the latter is precisely 
to bring about changes in the quantity and quality of 
available resources; accordingly, current price conditions 
are themselves subject to change and may not be an 
adequate guide for the optimum allocation of resources 
in a dynamic environment.
108. This last remark is basically an amplification 
of the argument which justifies protection for new in­
dustries and leads again to the argument of the young 
economy to which we have already referred. According 
to the latter, if levels of duty are fixed in such a way 
as to afford protection to the most efficient industries, 
those which at first are relatively inefficient cannot be 
taken into account. These are the industries which have 
high costs to begin with but may later become efficient 
once they have improved production conditions both 
at the level of the firm itself (i.e., after greater expe­
rience has been gained in production, organization and 
administration, technical staff and workers have been 
trained, the product has been firmly established in the 
market, and a more economic production scale has been 
achieved, etc., with the consequent internal economies), 
and at the level of the particular branch of industry 
and of the economy as a whole (development of sub­
sidiary activities, changes in the structure of demand, 
development of infrastructure and necessary basic 
services, more efficient marketing, better banking and 
credit organization, etc.) with the consequent external 
economies.
109. The price system, for its part, usually suf­
fers— particularly in the economically under-developed 
countries— from rigidities, imperfections and distortions 
(caused by lack of integration in the markets for the 
factors of production, the relative immobility of re­
sources, monopolistic situations, etc.) as a result of which 
it does not adequately reflect the relative scarcities of 
production factors. In this case the expected rate of re­
turn on capital is not an appropriate indication as to 
the relative efficiency of the alternative applications of 
resources; in other words, those that are the most profit­
able or lucrative are not necessarily the most efficient. 
In addition, in the under-developed economies, which 
are frequently characterized by a lack of enterprise, the 
profit incentive is often not enough to encourage invest­
ment in activities which offer the greatest possibilities 
of gain.
110. On the other hand, efficiency is a relative and 
complex concept. Apart from the possible conflict just 
mentioned between efficiency and profitability, the effi­
cient utilization of resources from the point of view of 
private entreprise (which finds its primary expression 
in the monetary cost of production) may not be so from 
the social point of view or from that of the economy as 
a whole. Furthermore, the industries most appropriate 
for the country at a given moment are not necessarily 
those representing the most efficient allocation of re­
sources in absolute terms, but those representing the most
efficient allocation of resources as between the industries 
meeting certain general criteria on which the develop­
ment policy is based. Industries of this kind are those 
using domestic raw materials and those which make 
more intensive use of the resources in most abundant 
supply (generally manpower in the economically under­
developed countries) ; industries which permit greater 
savings of foreign currency, either because they utilize 
domestic raw materials or because they produce sub­
stitutes for imported manufactures; industries which 
can earn foreign exchange through exports;™ industries 
which afford a certain stability to the economy and reduce 
the external vulnerability of the latter; industries which 
form part of a group of projects (industrial complexes) 
and are efficient if established simultaneously or in rela­
tion with other industries (even if inefficient on their 
own) ,'^ 1 or which are essential for the efficient develop­
ment of other industries (e.g., the so-called “ basic indus­
tries”  and more generally those which, even if unable to 
become competitive on the international market, may 
nevertheless provide an incentive for development in 
other sectors), etc.'^ ^
111. As may be appreciated, these and other similar 
considerations of an economic nature (which in various
The alternative of developing industries for import sub­
stitution as against export industries is considered below, and 
a procedure is suggested for calculating the “ indices of foreign 
exchange efficiency” of individual industries.
'^ 1 These are the industries for which external economies are 
particularly important. However, the intense advancement of such 
economies for purposes of industrial development complicates the 
problem of selecting industries, and becomes one of selection 
between different configurations or combinations of investment 
(i.e., different industrial complexes) rather than between specific 
projects.
Such basic industries should not, however, be established 
regardless of their efficiency, lest they constitute obstacles rather 
than incentives to the development of other industries, and have 
a serious effect on the production costs of the latter. Thus, an 
iron and steel industry with high production costs hinders rather 
than facilitates the development of metal manufacturing industries.
A. O. Hirschman in his work The Strategy of Economic 
Development (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1958) 
emphasizes in particular the role which may be played in 
economic development by certain investments that generate or 
stimulate others through complementarity of external economies, 
and also the desirability of assigning priority in protection to 
industries with the greatest “ backward and forward linkage”  
which accordingly stimulate investment in other sectors related 
through a situation of interdependence (as consumers or suppliers, 
through the purchase of raw materials and intermediate products 
—backward linkage—and the provision of raw materials or 
intermediate and finished products—forward linkage). In this 
connexion he cites the studies by Chenery and Watanabe on the 
degree of interdependence of certain industrial sectors in Italy, 
Japan and the United States. According to these, at one end 
of the scale there is final primary production (fishing, transport, 
services and trade) with a very low index of backward and 
forward linkage, and at the other end intermediate manufacture 
(intermediate processing of primary products, textiles, chemicals, 
paper, etc. and in particular, the iron and steel industry) with 
a high index of both types of effect. In the centre of the scale 
are found intermediate primary production (metal mining, 
petroleum and coal extraction, agriculture, forestry, electric 
power, etc.) with high forward linkage and low backward linkage, 
and final manufacturing industries (machinery, shipbuilding, mills, 
wool and leather industries, etc.) with low forward and high 
backward linkage. These interdependencies are mainly determined 
by means of a statistical analysis of input-output matrices.
For a relatively detailed statement of some of these considera­
tions and of others which can and should be taken into account, 
see World Economic Survey, 1961, op. cit., chapter I, in particular 
the section on “ Problems in the choice of industries” .
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forms are often presented as arguments in favour of 
protectionism) presuppose the existence of a devel­
opment policy and, if due account is to be taken of them, 
require a measure of economic planning since they imply 
that there should be a considered policy in respect of 
investments, which must not be left to the free play 
of the price system nor in some cases to the spontaneous 
decisions of entrepreneurs. Such planning may range 
from the mere selection of a few industries to a situation 
in which for various reasons, such as those indicated 
above, special protection (i.e., protection higher than 
that normally accorded to other industries) is considered 
desirable, to the complete planning of investments in 
which the price system (and accordingly the automatic 
action of tJie tariff based on the principle of uniform 
protection) plays a secondary or almost non-existent 
role in the allocation of resources.
112. Development planning thus implies a substantial 
reduction in the autonomous action of the tariff based 
on the principle of uniform normal protection, leading 
to a “ natural selection”  of industries through automatic 
protection of the most efbcient. Even though the normal 
rates of duty calculated according to this principle can 
and should be taken as a starting and reference point 
for fixing customs duties, the latter should ultimately 
correspond to the selection, by means of the development 
programme, of the industries to be protected. Thus the 
customs tariff is one of the various measures by which 
industrial development is encouraged and guided, and 
is used in combination with other instruments (e.g., 
credit policy, fiscal policy, etc., as well as direct invest­
ment by the Government) to implement the investment 
programme which is considered to represent the optimum 
allocation of resources in the light of the objectives of 
the Government’s economic development policy.
113. In the event of changes in the standard rates 
of duty to give additional or special protection to new 
industries (this being traditionally considered the prin­
cipal if not the only valid argument in favour of pro­
tection), the higher charges must be provisional (that 
is to say they must be temporary development tariffs), 
and this because the costs of the industries concerned 
are expected to become lower as experience is gained, 
a more economic scale of production is achieved, and 
the initial difficulties of organization and operation are 
overcome. Experience shows, however, that duties are 
never or hardly ever reduced, since it is most unusual 
for an industry to admit that it has matured and is 
thus no longer in need of protection; in fact, it is usually 
the traditional industries that demand the most pro­
tection, thus implying that over the years they have 
become less rather than more efficient. This happens 
mainly in relatively limited domestic markets, where 
internal competition does not develop sufficiently to 
offset the lack of external competition. As long as the 
industries concerned receive protection, they are under 
no obligation to achieve greater efficiency or to reduce 
their prices,
114. In order to overcome these problems, the special 
protection granted to new industries should be reduced 
gradually but automatically. For the purpose stated, a 
period of five years seems quite appropriate. The in­
dustry concerned would thus be compelled to become 
efficient and competitive. Failure to do so would simply 
mean that the industry was not economically viable and 
did not deserve the special protection it was receiving.
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In such cases, optimum utilization of resources would 
require the elimination of the industry.
115. In any event, such additional protection should 
be granted on a highly selective basis and should be 
limited to industries likely to become economically viable 
in the future and of great value to the national economy 
by making an appreciable net contribution to national 
income. Moreover, the additional protectionist charge 
should not take effect until the industry’s first major 
project becomes a commercial operation. The knowledge 
that this special protection will be granted for a stated 
period (preferably with automatic annual reductions, as 
already suggested) will enable the investor to calculate 
the profitability of the undertaking on the basis of 
reliable data.''®
116. As regards the development of industries for 
the purpose of alleviating or solving the problem of 
inadequate import capacity, it has already been stated 
in earlier sections that this was perhaps the principal 
incentive and objective of the industrialization process 
in most of the Latin American countries. However, since 
the solution of the problem was envisaged merely in 
terms of import substitution regardless of cost, indus­
trialization has merely aggravated the problem over the 
long term, instead of solving it.
117. The problem, if posed rationally, should be 
approached with a view to obtaining an optimum struc­
ture of imports and exports, either compatible with or 
as part of a programme designed to achieve the best 
possible system of resource allocation. This means, in 
the first place, that equilibrium between import needs 
and import capacity should not be sought solely through 
import substitution but also through the expansion of 
exports, which would permit the development of efficient 
industries directed at least in part towards external 
markets.’''* Secondly, in granting protection to industries 
producing import substitutes, priority should be given 
to those which permit the greatest net saving of foreign 
exchange under acceptable conditions of operational 
efficiency. In other words, in production for export, as 
well as for import substitution, preference should be
■73 There is much to he said in favour of the alternative 
frequently proposed—that of using subsidies instead of customs 
duties in order to help new industries to meet foreign competition 
successfully during their first few years of existence. Subsidies 
do not present any great problems if the number of firms requiring 
this form of aid is relatively smalL By openly reflecting such 
assistance, they provide a clearer indication of its cost which 
can thus be more easily calculated. Subsidies must be periodically 
renewed and therefore justified. This enables conditions to be 
set, such as those leading to greater efficiency, which the enter­
prise, must achieve in order to receive a subsidy. The cost of 
subsidies can be allocated in a rational manner instead of being 
haphazardly charged to possible consumers of the protected 
product (this is particularly important in the case of foodstuffs 
and other essential goods or consumer items). Subsidies do not 
introduce any distortion in the price structure and, since they 
do not directly affect the price of the product, cannot have an 
adverse effect on demand and hence on the achievement of an 
economic scale of production.
One of the major defects of economic development planning, 
as carried out in the Latin American countries, is the fact that 
the growth rate of exports is normally considered, from the stand­
point of those countries, as an independent and variable factor, 
determined principally by demand in the industrialized countries. 
This is so because export projections are in almost every case 
limited to traditional exports, little or no attention being paid 
to the possibility of developing new exports, least of all those 
based on the development of a few manufacturing industries 
in efficient or competitive conditions.
given to industries with high indices of foreign exchange 
efiSciency. Such indices indicate the relative local cur­
rency cost of the foreign exchange obtained or saved 
by the production of various goods for export or for 
import substitution.
118. These indices would be somewhat similar to 
those computed in some socialist countries (e.g., Poland) 
in order to determine the relative “ efEciency”  of different 
industries in relation to the foreign exchange they 
produce or save.'^ ® On the export side the criterion of 
efficiency would be achievement of the maximum net 
foreign exchange earnings (gross foreign exchange earn­
ings from exports less the foreign exchange cost of im­
ported components) per unit of production cost of the 
exported article, that is to say, in relation to the cost 
of manpower and of domestic inputs. If the calculation 
is carried further so as to relate the value added at each 
stage of the production process (gross cost at that stage 
less the cost of material inputs at the beginning of the 
stage) to the net value in foreign exchange of the goods 
at the end of that stage (gross value in foreign exchange 
at the end of the stage less the gross foreign exchange 
value of inputs at the beginning of it, whether or not 
imported), the index of “ net foreign exchange efficiency”  
of production is obtained.
119. The same procedure can be applied, of course, 
in order to determine such indices in the case of import 
substitution industries, by comparing the value added, 
or cost of processing, with the net saving in foreign 
exchange. The latter is equivalent to the gross saving 
(cost in foreign exchange of the goods the imports of 
which are replaced by domestie production) less the 
foreign exchange forfeited by reason of the use of com­
ponent materials which could otherwise be exported 
(value of exportable raw materials used in production) 
and the foreign exchange cost of the imported compo­
nents. A comparison of the indices obtained for export 
industries, on the one hand, and for import substitution 
industries, on the other, will make it possible to deter­
mine, from the standpoint of efficiency, which industries 
should be developed in order to economize or earn 
foreign exchange. Import substitution should give way 
to the development of export industries when the pro­
duction cost per unit of foreign exchange saved thereby 
is greater than the production cost per unit of additional 
foreign exchange receipts resulting from more exporting.
120. Reference should also be made to the problem 
which, from the standpoint of efforts to introduce a 
rational protectionist policy, is posed by restrictions 
applied for balance-of-payments reasons. Although such 
a policy would make a considerable and perhaps decisive 
contribution towards reducing balance-of-payments dis- 
equilibria and alleviating or even eliminating the chronic 
trend towards such disequilibria, the latter will inevi­
tably continue to occur with a certain frequency and 
intensity, particularly over the short and medium term 
and, at least in a sporadic and temporary manner, even 
over the long term. This will make it necessary to resort 
to emergency measures to limit imports, unless some 
effective international mechanism can be established to 
offset temporary contractions in import capacity.
121. Although such restrictions are introduced be­
cause of balance-of-payments problems, they have a 
strong incidental protectionist effect which may not only 
encourage undesirable investment, or investment in sec­
tors of secondary priority, but may also accustom in­
dustry to excessive protection, thus depriving it of the 
necessary incentive to beeome efficient and hence off­
setting or nullifying to a considerable degree the efforts 
to achieve a rational protectionist policy. One of the 
essential conditions of such a policy is, therefore, the 
adoption of measures to counteract or reduce as far as 
possible an undesirable protectionist effect.
122. In the first place, the Government must state 
clearly and categorically that the restrictions adopted 
for balance-of-payments reasons are temporary measures 
designed solely to protect foreign exchange reserves 
and that they will not be maintained for protectionist 
purposes; that accordingly any claims by industries 
alleging that they cannot continue to operate if they 
can no longer count on the incidental protection offered 
by such measures will in principle be rejected.”^® Sub­
sequent action should of course conform to those state­
ments, for otherwise they would no longer have the 
desired effect.
123. At the same time, some system of supervision 
and guidance must be applied to investments; in its 
simplest form this could be limited to fiscal incentives, 
credit facilities etc., for industries whose establishment 
or development should be promoted, and/or higher taxes, 
credit restrictions etc., for investments which are to be 
discouraged (such measures should, moreover, form part 
of any economic development programme, and in this 
regard we have already indicated that tariff protection 
is only one of various instruments which could and 
should be used), but in case of need more direct control 
measures may also be included such as the requirement 
of prior permits for establishing new industries or im­
porting machinery and other capital goods, price control 
to prevent established industries from raising their prices 
under the additional protection which they receive, etc.“^”^
124. Finally, to avoid stimulating the establishment 
or expansion of domestic production of certain articles.
f®In this connexion, see the information on foreign trade 
organization and methods given by the Polish delegation to the 
eighth session of the Trade Development Committee of the 
Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva, 29 June-3 July 1959, 
document TRADE/84, annex IV.
This would mean a complete reversal of current practice in 
the Latin American countries which, as indicated in sections A 
and B, consists of transforming temporary or emergency restric­
tions introduced for balance-of-payments reasons into permanent 
protective measures, replacing quantitative or direct restrictions 
by rather high charges or customs duties.
Thus, in New Zealand the establishment of new industries 
is regulated by a system of licences for imports of machinery 
and other capital goods, which are only granted upon approval 
by the Department of Industry and Commerce; one basic factor 
taken into consideration for the granting or refusal of the licence 
is the price at which the industry hopes to be able to produce 
and sell. In principle, the price and quality of the domestic 
product must be comparable to those of similar foreign products. 
In order to prevent established industries from becoming relatively 
inefficient within a reserved market because of restrictions adopted 
for balance-of-payments reasons, or to prevent them from taking 
advantage of the monopolistic situation which they enjoy, three 
kinds of measures are applied; (a) fixing and control of prices: 
any increase in the price established in agreement between the 
industry and the Government (such agreement being a pre­
requisite for permission to import capital goods) requires prior 
approval by the Government; (6) imports may be permitted of 
goods which compete with those of the domestic industry so as 
to oblige the latter to lower its prices; (c) establishment of 
other firms in competition with existing firms is allowed.
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one must consider the alternative of reducing imports 
thereof through higher internal consumption taxes rather 
than through higher customs duties or quantitative re­
strictions on imports. It should, nevertheless, be borne 
in mind that such charges and, in general, the use of 
the tax and subsidies systems, like that of customs 
duties, may not always prove an effective guide for 
investments, particularly in under-developed countries.
where market forces are often not sufficiently active or 
responsible to channel supply and demand in desirable 
directions— and this problem is considerably aggravated 
when the economy suffers from an inflationary process. 
In such cases it may be advisable to apply quantitative 
and direct controls on imports, despite their well-known 
disadvantages and shortcomings, though this must 
essentially he a temporary measure.
ANNEXES
Annex 1
S i m p l if ie d  p r o c e d u r e  f o r  c o m p u t in g  s t a n d a r d  r a t e s  o f  d u t y
1. As has been shown, in order to draw up a tariff based on 
the principle of granting a uniform level of protection to the 
various industries, standard duty rates must be calculated, 
composed of (a) a percentage representing net tariff protection, 
plus (6) a compensatory duty to counterbalance tbe use of raw 
materials and intermediate or semi-manufactured products which 
are protected and are therefore purchased at a price higher than 
the world market quotation.
2. The computation of such standard rates, and in particular 
of the proportion corresponding to net protection (which is 
obtained for each industry by multiplying the standard or 
uniform coefficient of protection by the cost of manufacture or 
processing—i.e., the value added—in the industry concerned) calls 
for a wealth of data, mainly furnished by industrialists, with 
regard to the various components or the production cost, including 
profits, so that through subsequent processing and analysis, the 
price and quantity of the raw materials and intermediate products 
used, and the amount of the value added or manufacturing cost, 
can be determined for each industry and sometimes for specific 
products.
3. Apart from being lengthy and laborious, such a procedure 
is unquestionably difficult to apply in under-developed countries, 
which frequently have neither adequate technical and adminis­
trative facilities nor trade and industrial organizations capable 
of furnishing the necessary basic information and co-operating 
effectively in other aspects of the work.
4. Furthermore, in the particular case of the majority of 
Latin American countries, where the structure of import duties 
and charges is characterized by irrationality and excessively high 
levels, there would be no point in too much precision in 
determining standard duty rates, which would have to undergo 
many substantial modifications in order to avoid unduly sudden 
corrections of the serious distortions now existing. Moreover, 
even if substantial reductions were made in the present duties 
and charges, it would be wise to maintain a fairly high tariff 
level for a few years, which means that the differences between 
the standard rates determined more or less approximately and 
those which would result from detailed research are of minor 
importance. Again, it would be more useful to devote a con­
siderable part of the resources available to improving customs 
administration, for unless that is properly organized no customs 
tariff, however rational and scientific, can be effectively applied.
5. Accordingly, a simplified procedure is suggested for drawing 
up a relatively rational customs tariff. A preliminary step would 
be the adoption of the scales of duties (minimum and maximum 
levels) to be established for each of the several major categories 
of products; duties would be fixed within those limits for each 
product, group of products or branch of industry, taking into 
account; (a) whether in their manufacture use is made of raw 
materials or semi-manufactured products which are subject to
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import duties and, accordingly, are presumably obtainable at a 
cost exceeding the world market price by the amount of that 
duty; and (b) the estimated or approximate value added to the 
product by processing or manufacturing (i.e., cost of manufacture 
alone, given by the total cost of the product less the cost of the 
raw materials and intermediate products used).
6. For example, duties could be fixed within the following 
scales:®
(а) Raw materials, including foodstuffs, whether or not 
processed: from 0 to 10 per cent. Raw materials would in 
principle be duty-free, except when it was deemed necessary 
to protect domestic production of a specific item;
(б) Intermediate or semi-manufactured products: from 0 to 
20 per cent. The duty would be applied, however, in such a 
way that real protection accorded to production of such goods, 
i.e., to the processing industry concerned, should not exceed 
25 per cent or 30 per cent, which would permit the development 
of industries whose manufacturing costs were higher by up to 
that percentage than those of comparable foreign products.'* 
The duties to be actually fixed (net protectionist duty plus 
compensatory duty for utilization of dutiable raw material) would 
be determined by a procedure similar to that indicated below 
for fully manufactured goods.
(c) Fully manufactured goods: from 10 to 40 per cent. The 
maximum duty of 40 per cent would in any event ensure effective 
protection of at least 40 per cent, on the extreme (and theoretical) 
assumption that the value added were 100 per cent, or that the 
raw materials and intermediate products used were also dutiable 
at the rate of 40 per cent. In all other cases this maximum duty 
would imply effective protection in excess of 40 per cent, as 
will be seen below.
7. The establishment of the basic duty (i.e., the net tariff 
protection, not including the compensatory duty) between the 
minimum of 10 and the maximum of 40 per cent would be based 
on the following scale, which would ensure for the majority of 
manufactures a level of protection ranging from 50 to 60 per 
cent, and in any case exceeding 40 per cent:
® No consideration is given here to the question of estabRshing 
fiscal duties or duties imposed for exchange purposes. With 
respeet to the latter, it is assumed, as a prerequisite, that the 
rate of exchange is so fixed or adjusted that, at the tariff levels 
selected, equilibrium is normally achieved in the balance of 
payments.
'> In practice, the margin of difference, that is, the degree of 
effective protection, would be higher than the said 25 or 30 per 
cent, since the c.i.f. cost of importing the foreign product (not 
including customs duties) would be augmented by transport costs 
and delays in transit, customs clearance, etc. The same con­
sideration applies to manufactured products.
Percentage of value 





Percentage o f effective 
protection granted 
{100 X D f V )
Less than 20 per cent 10 per cent From 50 to 100 per cent, or more
From 20 to 30 per cent 15 per cent From 50 to 75 per cent
From 30 to 40 per cent 20 per cent From 50 to 66 per cent
From 40 to 50 per cent 25 per cent From 50 to 62 per cent
From 50 to 60 per cent 30 per cent From 50 to 60 per cent
From 60 to 70 per cent 35 per cent From 50 to 58 per cent
More than 70 per cent 40 per cent From 40 to 57 per cent
8. Should the imported raw materials or intermediate products 
used be dutiable, a compensatory duty would be added to the 
basic duty indicated above; to obtain this, the rate of duty 
payable on the raw material or intermediate product would be 
multiplied by the percentage of the total cost of the product 
which the value of such inputs represented (or, as shown else-
d(lOO-V)
where, ---------------- , in which d is the rate of duty on the raw
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material or intermediate product and V the value added in 
manufacture, so that 100—V is the value of the raw materials 
and intermediate products used). Thus, a raw material subject 
to a duty of 5 per cent which represents 20 per cent of the total 
value of the manufactured product increases the cost of the 
later by 1 per cent, and this should accordingly be the amount 
of the corresponding compensatory duty. The same calculation 
would be repeated for the various raw materials and inter­
mediate products used in manufacturing a specific article; the 
sum of the results obtained would give the total compensatory 
duty which should be added to the net protectionist duty in 
order to compute the standard rate of duty applicable to the 
said manufactured article.
9. In order to calculate this compensatory duty, and likewise 
the basic duty or percentage of net tariff protection, the 
approximate composition of the total cost of the product must 
be ascertained, i.e., the proportions corresponding to the various 
raw materials and intermediate products on the one hand, and 
to the cost of manufacture, or value added, on the other. This 
information can be obtained from industrialists, technical ex­
perts or specialists in various industries, and also from data 
collected or studies carried out in other countries. As it is not 
a matter of arriving at exact results but merely at more or less 
approximate figures, the task is considerably simplified.'^
10. In the foregoing table it may be seen that while the 
basic duty percentages suggested are appreciably lower than 
those commonly applied to imported manufactured goods in the 
Latin American countries, they represent very high levels of real 
net protection, which in almost all cases are above 50 per cent. 
In actual fact, such rates could and should be considered ex-
" The United States industrial censuses constitute and excellent 
source of basic and reference data, especially that taken in 1947, 
since it indicates for each industry the proportion of the final 
price of the product represented by the raw material and inter­
mediate products used (although in global terms). Also very 
useful are the input-output matrices drawn up for various 
industries and sectors in several countries. Data from these and 
other similar sources could be taken as a starting-point, and 
industrialists could be required to state separately the value added 
by them.
cessive, since they would afford protection to industries whose 
manufacturing costs were as much as 50 per cent heavier than 
those of comparable foreign industries.** Nevertheless, in view 
of the serious distortions characterizing the economic structures 
of the Latin American countries and the numerous industries which 
have developed in the region under the shelter of much greater 
protection, it might perhaps be neither wise nor practicable to 
suggest lower tariff levels for the time being.
11. At the same time, moreover, the rationalization of the 
tariff structure, in particular the substantial reduction or the 
elimination of duties on raw materials and intermediate products, 
will itself cause a considerable drop in the level of protection 
required by a number of industries.
12. In cases in which it is considered that a marked and 
rapid reduction of the duty, and, consequently, of the level of 
real protection, might do serious harm to some important 
industry, movable duties could be established, which could 
gradually but automatically be reduced to the desired level over 
a period of, say, five years. What is more, this procedure could 
be more generally applied, through the formulation and promulga­
tion of the tariff which could enter into force in full in five 
years’ time by virtue of automatic annual reductions of the 
current duty rate, each amounting to 20 per cent of the difference 
between that rate and the one adopted in the new tariff.
13. Apart from this, the calculations referred to would make 
it possible to determine standard duty rates, which could be 
revised either upwards or downwards in certain cases where 
such a proceeding was considered to be warranted on economic 
and/or political and social grounds. In some Instances it will be 
found expedient to grant certain industries, even if only on a 
temporary basis, a level of protection higher than that adopted 
as the standard or maximum; and in other—perhaps fairly 
numerous—cases it may prove feasible to fix a duty rather lower 
than the standard rate, because the industry concerned does not 
require the whole of the protection this would give.
14. The principal merit of the procedure suggested is that 
it permits a relatively simple (although somewhat modified) 
application of the principle of uniform distribution of tariff 
protection and, above all, that it enables customs duties to be 
fixed in such a way as to grant industry real protection up to 
a certain deliberately and rationally determined level which 
indicates the maximum degree of inefficiency that a government 
is prepared to tolerate in industries, which is compatible with 
over-all economic policy and to which the private sector must 
adapt itself.
** It has already been pointed out in footnote 63 that the 
standard coefficient of protection used by the Swedish Tariff 
Commission as the basis of the draft customs tariff drawn up 
in 1956 was 13 per cent.
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Annex II
A. Simple arithmetic means, by sections of the Brussels Tariff Nomenclature, of the import duties and charges legally
APPLICABLE IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE AND FRANCE®
(Duties and charge in force at the beginning of 1960, expressed in ad valorem terms as percentages of c.i.f. value)
Section and description of contents Argentina^ Brazil^ ChiLe  ^ France
I. Live animals and animal products........................................................................................ 158 43 119 13
II. Vegetable products ............................................................ ..................................................  144 56 115 17
in . Animal and vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edible fats;
animal and vegetable waxes.....................................................................................................  169 58 74 16
VI. Prepared foodstuffs; beverages, spirits and vinegar; tobacco..............................................  168 89 236 26
V. Mineral products ................................................................................................................... 120 25 86 4
VI. Products of the chemical and allied industries.....................................................................  124 30 63 19
VII. Artificial resins and plastic materials, cellulose esters and ethers, and articles thereof;
rubber, synthetic rubber, factice, and articles thereof...........................................................  147 66 80 16
VIII. Raw hides, skins, leather, furskins, and articles thereof; saddlery and harness; travel
goods, handbags and the like; articles of gut........................................................................  192 95 270 13
XI. Wood, wood charcoal and articles of W'ood; cork and articles of cork; manufactures of
straw, of esparto and of other plaiting materials; basketware and wickerwork................  167 84 79 15
X. Paper-making material; paper and paperboard, and articles thereof.................................  160 68 74 18
XI. Textiles and textile articles.................................................................................................... 167 93 112 17
XII. Footwear; headgear; umbrellas and sunshades; artificial flowers and articles of human
hair; fans ..............................................................................................................................  194 127 183 20
XIII. Articles of stone, of plaster, of cement, of asbestos, of mica and of similar materials;
ceramic products, glass and glassware...................................................................................  174 80 101 18
XIV. Pearls, precious and semi-precious stones; precious metals, roUed precious metals, and
articles thereof; imitation jewellery; coin.............................................................................  168 35 116 12
XV. Base metals and articles thereof...........................................................................................  152 66 68 19
XVI. Machinery and mechanical appliances; electrical equipment..............................................  115 49 43 18
XVII. Transport equipment ............................................................................................................. 167 40 50 19
XVIII. Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical and 
surgical instruments and apparatus; clocks and watches; musical instruments; sound
recorders and reproducers....................................................................................................... 173 44 71 23
XIX. Arms and ammunition...........................................................................................................  195 76 78 14
XX. Miscellaneous goods and manufactured articles, not specified or included elsewhere........  187 109 105 23
XXI. Works of art, collectors’ pieces, and antiques...................................................................... 164 0 19 0
Over-all average ..........................................................................................................................  151 60 93 18
“ In order to calculate the simple arithmetic means (by BTN «Only the duties established in the customs tariff (which are
sections and chapters) presented in this and in the following almost exclusively ad valorem) are taken into account. Neither
table, the first step was to determine the average of the individual the customs clearance rate (5 per cent of the c.i.f. value for
duties and charges (in ad valorem terms) applicable in each almost all products) nor the heavier cost of foreign exchange for
country to the products classifiable under each BTN item. This imports in the special category—which at the time of preparation
reclassification of the duties and charges applicable under the of the table was approximately equivalent to a surcharge of 200
different national nomenclature in terms of BTN items presents per cent on the c.i.f. value of the product—was included in the
serious difficulties—specially in the case of so out-of-date and calculations. In the case of petroleum and petroleum derivatives,
unsatisfactory a nomenclature as that used in Argentina which iinports of which are subject to the so-called “single duty”, the
often had to be overcome by recourse to subjective appraisals differences between that duty and the internal tax on similar
of the relative importance of the various products included under domestically-produced goods are taken as customs duties,
a given BTN item, to estimates of the ievel of duties and charges Covering only the specific dunes (in terms of valorem
applicable to the products in question, and to certain other equivalences) and ad vdorem duties established in the customs
■ T£ Tn- 1 . ua • j  au X • tarin, on the basis oi the computations and the reclassificationsimplifacations. Ihe results obtained are thereiore mere approxi- , ti't-tvt • • j i t r^cr r i
mations, which serve, however, to give an adequate idea of the items carried out by the Office of the Superintendent
, j  . j r  j-rr . M Customs in preparation for a tariff reform. Neither priororder of magnitude of average duties and charges in the different supplementary taxes which in many instances
countries concerned. replaced them are taken into consideration. At the date when the
The charges taken into account for the purposes of these table was drawn up (early in 1960), prior deposits varied between
calculations are the customs duties and duties and charges of 5 and 1 500 per cent of the c.i.f. value, for periods of 30 to 90
equivalent effect indicated for each country in the following notes, days, and the cost of financing, for example, a prior deposit of
in force at the beginning of 1960, and legally applicable under 1500 per cent of 90 days was estimated at 90 per cent of the
the most-favoured-nation clause. They may not correspond to those c.i.f. import value. The supplementary taxes ranged at that time
applied in practice, which in many instances are reduced, or even from 5 to 200 per cent of the c.i.f. value of the goods. The prior
lifted altogether, by virtue of special exemption regimes or deposit, which from mid-1959 to the end of 1961 had been almost
administrative decisions. Nor are preferential duties taken into entirely superseded by supplementary taxes, was reintroduced at
account beginnmg of 1962 tor a large number of products (although
the supplementary taxes were maintained) at rates of up to 5 000, 
b Including ad valorem customs duties (not specific duties, and, for a time, up to 10 000 per cent of the c.i.f. value. Further-
which are excluded on account of their low incidence) and more, about 700 products were struck off the schedule of
exchange surcharges. authorized imports.
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B . S im p l e  a r i t h m e t i c  m e a n s , b y  c h a p t e r s  o f  t h e  B r u s s e l s  T a r if f  N o m e n c l a t u r e , o f  t h e  i m p o r t  d u t ie s  a n d  c h a r g e s  l e g a l l y
APPLICABLE IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE AND FRANCE«
(Duties and charges in force at the beginning of 1960, expressed 
in ad valorem terms as percentages 
of c.i.f. value)
Chapter and description of contents Argentina Braal Chile France
80 27 25 20
185 61 38 25
170 60 51 25
175 53 175 19
170 35 185 1
96 60 106 23
153 56 173 15
167 63 234 14
137 73 64 19
142 52 105 27
175 62 131 32
126 37 8 10
110 24 36 5
135 46 40 1
169 58 74 16
191 110 180 14
177 99 171 60
118 86 90 26
188 86 140 31
185 115 358 26
186 102 133 17
192 121 301 26
195 18 451 12
174 82 226 0
136 41 106 3
144 9 10 7
78 25 67 3
128 19 89 20
102 13 34 23
151 42 13 17
75 11 29 7
132 55 71 21
138 65 53 14
151 74 142 17
164 45 64 19
140 89 63 7
138 22 45 18
125 26 46 17
128 55 76 21
155 76 83 13
190 88 441 10
192 102 86 18













































Meat and edible offals............................................................................................................................
Fish, enistaeeans and moUuses.............................................................................................................
Dairy produee, birds’ eggs and natural honey...................................................................................
Produets of animal origin, not elsewhere speeified or ineluded......................................................
Live plants and produets of florieulture.............................................................................................
Edible vegetEibles, plants, roots and tubers.........................................................................................
Edible fruit and nuts; peel of melons and eitrus fruit....................................................................
Coffee, tea, maté and spiees..................................................................................................................
Cereals .....................................................................................................................................................
Produets of the milling industry; malt and starehes; gluten; inulin.............................................
Oil seeds and oleaginous fruit; miseellaneous grains, seeds and fruit; industrial and medieinal
plants; straw and fodder........................................................................................................................
Vegetable raw materials for use in dyeing or tanning; laes; gums, resins, and other vegetable
saps and extraets......................................................................................................................................
Vegetable plaiting and carving materials, and other vegetable products not elsewhere specified
or included .............................................................................................................................................
Animal and vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared edihle fats; animal
and vegetable waxes................................................................................................................................
Preparations of meat, fish, crustaceans or molluscs..........................................................................
Sugars and sugar confectionery.............................................................................................................
Cacao and cocoa preparations..............................................................................................................
Preparations of cereals, flour or starch; pastrycooks’ products......................................................
Preparation of pulses, vegetables, fruit and other plants or parts of plants...................................
Miscellaneous edible preparations.......................................................................................................
Beverages, spirits and vinegar...............................................................................................................
Residues and waste from the food industries; prepared animal fodder.........................................
Tobacco ...................................................................................................................................................
Salt; sulphur; earths and stone; plastering materials, lime and cement.......................................
Metallic ores, slag and ash..................................................................................................................
Mineral fuel, mineral oils and products of their distillation; bituminous substances; mineral
waxes .......................................................................................................................................................
Inorganic chemicals; organic and inorganic compounds of precious metals, of rare earth




Tanning and dyeing extracts; tannins and their derivatives; dyes, colours, paints and var­
nishes; putty, fillers and stoppings; inks...........................................................................................
Essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetics and toüet preparations...............................
Soap, organic surface-active agents, washing preparations, lubricating preparations, artificial 
waxes, prepared waxes, polishing and scouring preparations, candles and similar articles,
modelling pastes and dental waxes .....................................................................................................
Albumincidal substances; glues ..........................................................................................................
Powders and explosives; pyrotechnic products; matches; pyrophoric alloys; certain com­
bustible preparations ............................................................................................................................
Photographic and cinematographic goods...........................................................................................
Miscellaneous chemical products.........................................................................................................
Artificial resins and plastic materials, cellulose esters and ethers, and articles thereof..............
Rubber, synthetic rubber, factice, and articles thereof....................................................................
Raw hides and skins, and leather.........................................................................................................
Articles of leather; saddley and harness; travel goods, handbags and the like; articles of
animal gut ...............................................................................................................................................
Furskins and artificial fur; manufactures thereof............................................................................
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T a b l e  B {continued)
Chapter and description o f contents Argentina Brazil CJnU France
44 Wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal.......................................................................................
45 Cork and articles of cork.......................................................................................................................
46 Manufacturers of straw, of esparto and of other plaiting materials; basketware and wickerware
47 Paper-making material ..........................................................................................................................
48 Paper and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, of paper or of paper-board...............................
49 Printed books, newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry; manuscripts,
typescripts and plans..............................................................................................................................
50 Silk and silk waste................................................................................................................................
51 Man-made fibres (continuous)............................................................................................................
52 Metallized textiles ..................................................................................................................................
53 Wool and other animal hair..................................................................................................................
54 Flax and ramie........................................................................................................................................
55 Cotton .....................................................................................................................................................
56 Man-made fibres (discontinuous).......................................................................................................
57 Other vegetable textile materials; paper yarn and woven fabrics of paper yam...........................
58 Carpets, mats, matting and tapestries; pile and chenUle fabrics; narrow fabrics; trimmings;
tulle and other net fabrics; lace; embroidery...................................................................................
59 Wadding and felt; twine, cordage, ropes and cables; special fabrics; impregnated and
coated fabrics; textile articles of a kind suitable for industrial use.............................................
60 Knitted and crocheted goods.................................................................................................................
61 Articles of apparel and clothing accessories of textile fabric........................................................
62 Other made-up textile articles..............................................................................................................
63 Old clothing and other textile articles; rags.....................................................................................
64 Footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles......................................................................
65 Headgear and parts thereof...................................................................................................................
66 Umbrellas, sunshades, walking-sticks, whips, riding-crops and parts thereof...............................
67 Prepared feathers and down and articles made of feathers or of down; artificial flowers;
articles of human hair; fans................................................................................................................
68 Articles of stone, of plaster, of cement, of asbestos, of mica and of similar materials..............
69 Ceramic products ..................................................................................................................................
70 Class and glassware................................................................................................................................
71 Pearls, precious and semi-precious stones, precious metals, rolled precious metals, and
articles thereof; imitation jewellery...................................................................................................
72 Coin .........................................................................................................................................................
73 Iron and steel and articles thereof (including pig iron and cast iron).........................................
74 Copper and articles thereof...................................................................................................................
75 Nickel and articles thereof....................................................................................................................
76 Aluminium and articles thereof............................................................................................................
77 Magnesium and beryllium and articles thereof..................................................................................
78 Lead and articles thereof......................................................................................................................
79 Zinc and articles thereof.........................................................................................................................
80 Tin and articles thereof........................................................................................................................
81 Other base metals employed in metallurgy and articles thereof......................................................
82 Tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of base metal............................................................
83 Miscellaneous articles of base metal...................................................................................................
84 Boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances.................................................................................
85 Electrical machinery and equipment; parts thereof..........................................................................
86 Railway and tramway locomotives, rolling-stock and parts thereof; railway and tramway 
track fixtures and fittings; traffic signalling equipment of all kinds (not electrically powered)
87 Vehicles, other than railway or tramway rolling-stock, and parts thereof.....................................
88 Aircraft and parts thereof; parachutes; catapults and similar aircraft launching gear; ground
flying trainers ........................................................................................................................................
89 Ships, boats and floating structures.....................................................................................................
90 Optical, photographic, cinematographic, measuring, checking, precision, medical and surgical
instruments and apparatus; parts thereof...........................................................................................
91 Qocks and watches and parts thereof...............................................................................................
92 Musical instruments; sound recorders and reproducers; parts and accessories of such
articles .....................................................................................................................................................
166 86 70 13
159 54 46 26
192 103 207 14
101 49 42 11
175 79 81 22
144 53 67 13
126 100 75 9
160 71 104 22
163 85 73 22
176 65 76 6
133 96 53 11
160 102 47 12
155 75 145 21
148 75 106 15
187 127 158 26
170 74 52 20
185 120 199 26
195 120 247 24
185 120 187 23
185 30 19 10
194 120 99 21
190 113 289 18
194 123 131 21
200 150 169 21
167 76 69 14
182 82 144 19
173 82 97 22
169 42 116 13
150 0 — 0
144 65 51 17
181 55 119 18
125 27 91 15
152 66 72 22
38 31 23 27
185 60 91 16
166 54 83 16
124 63 54 12
51 38 37 23
163 67 56 21
188 93 62 22
102 47 40 18
147 52 49 20
136 35 43 17
192 82 74 25
145 2 25 19
177 9 20 10
158 23 35 24
181 106 171 21
200 59 66 25
94
T able B (continued)
Chapter and description o f conterus Argentina Brazil Chile France
93 Arms and ammunition; parts thereof................................................................................................. 195 76 78 14
94 Furniture and parts thereof (including medical, dental, surgical and veterinary furniture); 
bedding, mattresses, mattress supports, cushions and similar stufEed furnishings...................... 166 105 115 21
95 Articles and manufactures of carving or moulding material............................................................ 193 139 153 15
96 Brooms, brushes, feather dusters, powder-puffs and sieves............................................................ 195 96 106 29
97 Toys, games, and sports requisites; parts thereof.............................................................................. 188 117 86 29
98 Miscellaneous manufactured articles................................................................................................... 187 94 88 22
99 Works of art, collectors’ pieces, and antiques.................................................................................... 164 0 19 0
Unclassified products ............................................................................................................................ 180 — — —
Over-cdl average .................................................................................................................................. 151 60 93 18
“ For a description of the procedure adopted and the duties and charges taken into account in the calculation of these averages, 




Approximate iNaoENCE (in ad valorem  terms) of the import duties and charges on selected products from third countries applied in
States members of ALALC and under EEC’s common external tariff
BTN
items Argentina Bradi Chile Colombia Ecuador Mexico Peru Paraguay EEC
Category I: Primary commodi­
ties and capital goods
G roup  I .  U n p rocessed  food stu ffs
01.02 Live animals of the bovine 
species (breeding stock).
01.02 Live animals of the bovine 
species (beef stock). . . .
01.04 Live sheep and goats (for 
consumption) ..................












Raw sugar ..  
Cacao beans
S im ple a rith m etic  
fo r  G ro u p  I - l  . . . .
L L 12 L (L ) 17 L (L) 14 39 L
174 250 23 20 (P) 17 13 (P) 13 39 16
156 276 103 L (L ) 20 10 14 39 15
170 276 58 160 (P) 30 15 (P) 12 66 20
197 266 30 (P) 550 (P) 47 n o  (L) 12 99 8
40 286 42 260 (P) 18 350 20 99 20
26 326 22 135 (P) 18 (P) 39 38 52 16
114 326 22 710 (P) 99 39 (L) 26 52 25
194 276» 39 53 (L) 26 10 (L) 12 25 20
156 276 58 99 (P) 36 (P) 80 (L) 11 78 16
200b 306 14 238 (P) 50 (P) 53 (L) 56 87 80
34 285 87 40 (L) 43 95 24 559 9
137 285 92 145 66 28 and 30 17 48 30
123 264 46 185 37 65 21 99 21
G roup  2, In d u stria l raw  m aterials
25.03 Sulphur of aU kinds, other 
than sublimed sulphur, 
precipitated sulphur and
colloidal sulphur.............. 102 L 750 100 (P) 224 212 (L) 16 136 L
26.01 Iron ore ........................... 11 286 108 (P) 32 23 L 16 63 L
27.01 Coal ................................... L 50« 51 35 and 55 (P) 29 2 16 44 4 (L )d
27.09 Crude petroleum ............ 20 L‘ 7 L 70 L 16 52 L
31.02 Sodium nitrate, naturiJ.. 20 L 43 3 17 1 (L) 14 106 L
40.01 Natural rubber, raw........ 14 36 39 10 and 20 (L) 55 66 41 __ L
41.01 Raw bides and skins of 
bovine animals.................. 192 276 6 23 (L) 12 (P) 7 (L ) 23 9
44.03 Wood in the rough........ 54 306 52 (P) 80 (P) 30 (P) 60 (L) 18 and 30 62 5 (L)
53.01 WooL not carded or 
combed
, 4
22* 35 50 40tof0 33 3 to 9 (L ) 22 . L
VO< ï
55.01 Raw cotton..........* ........... 60 and 170 75 4
S im ple  arith m etic  m ean  
fo r  G roup  1 -2 .................. 55 106 111
G roup
84.01
3. C apita l g ood s
Steam and other vapour 
generating boilers .......... 40 and 156 45 and 75 58
84.06 Internal combustion en­
gines ................................. L to 150 45 and 95 51
84.10 Pumps for liquids............ 40 and 150 95 and 65 50 (L) (P)
Pumps fitted with measur­
ing devices for distribu­
tion of liquid fuels.......... 197 96 55
8420 Weighing machinery (ex­
cluding precision bal­
ances) ............................... 45 and 150 305 50 (L)
8422 Forklifts ........................... 150 45 and 75 35 (P)
84.23 Scrappers ......................... 152 26 36
8424 Ploughs of any kind........ 150 10 and 30 44
84.25 Harvesting machinery.. . . 150 26 and 46 39
84.25 'Winnowing and threshing 
machinery......................... 150 16 and 26 39
84.26 Dairy machinery (cheese­
making) ........................... 150 16 31 (P)
84.26 Milking machines............ 150 16 33
84.36 Textile spinning machines 60 45 41
84.36 Cotton gins........................ 54 76 44
84.37 Looms ............................... 43 and 153 45 and 75 45
94.41 Sewing-machines (indus­
trial) ................................. 150 375 66 (P)
84.45 Engine or universal lathes 152 46 and 76 39 (P)
84.45 Metal-working presses... L to 150 46 to 76 46
84.45 Wire-drawing machinery 150 (L) 45 46
84.52 Calculating machines.... 20 and 100 45 37
85.01 Electric motors.................. 129 (L) 65 and 115 50 and 58
86.02 Electric rail locomotives.. 40 45 33 (P)
86.05 Luggage vans.................... 192 285 51 (P)
86.07 Goods wagons.................... 192 55 51 (P)
86.09 Straight axles (gearing 
or wheel train)................ 150 56 38
86.09 Wheels and parts thereof 40 56 37
87.01 Tractors for agriculture.. 1008 L 35
87.02 Lorries ............................. 150 95 and 305 65 (P)
S im ple a rith m etic  m ean  
fo r  G roup  1-3.................. 119 84 45
26 (L) 25 23
P
16 67 L
37 52 38 20 63 1
26 24 16 (L) 14 44 14
10 29 15 (L) 14 44 10 to 22
24 and 10 23 5 to 15 14 49 12 to 16
32 35 9 49 49 12 to 16
25 (L) 30 9 to 43 16 159 15
25 (L) 23 12 (L) 14 • • • 8
13 (L) 23 10 (L) 14 55 9 to 15
L 22 2 (L) 11 and 13 35 11
L 22 1 (L) 14 35 11
20 22 L (L) 14 35 11
20 17 14 (L) 14 29 11
L 17 14 (L) 14 29 11
15 (L) 22 10 (L) 14 44 11
3 17 52 (L) 14 35 11
25 (L) 21 10 (L) 14 44 10 and 13
70 (L) 63 6 14 and 17 75 12
28 (L) 23 12 14 34 10
25 (L) 20 14 14 29 12
10 (L) 23 12 14 29 4 and 10
20 and 31 (L) 58 and 68 15 (L) 14 74 11 and 14
10 and 25 19 and 38 8 to 75 14 54 12 and 14
L 22 2 12 99 14
25 (L) 28 20 and 30 (L) 16 99 13
25 (L) 28 20 and 30 (L) 16 11 10 and 14
10 20 12 17 99 15
10 20 12 17 99 15
L 23 4 (L) 14 35 12 and 20
10 and 50 (P) 25 to 47 29 and 46 (L) 14 97» 28
118 27 14 16 57 13
co Anne:
BTÌi
iiQ m s Argentina Brazil
Category I I : Semi-manufac­
tured PRODUCTS AND DURABLE 
CONSUMER GOODS
Group 1. Semi-manufactured pro­
ducts (including processed fuels) 
other than products of traditional 
industries
ChiU
11.07 Malt ................................. 173 31 82 (P)
15.07 Linseed oil....................... 187 286 and 306 142
22.08 Ethyl alcohol..................... 147 325 33 and 255 (P;
23.05 Fish meal (non-edible).. 194 18 160 (P)
25.03 Sulphur of all kinds, 
other than sublimed sul-
phur, precipitated sulphur 
and colloidal sulphur.. . . 120 11 820
28.08 Sulphuric acid................. 77 275 116 (P)
28.09 Nitric acid....................... 60 55 134 (P)
28.16 Ammonia in solution___ 187 35 113 (P)
28.17 Sodium hydroxide (caustic 
soda) ............................... 150 25 65
31.02 Potassium sulphate.......... 40 L L
31.02 Superphosphates .............. 40 35 and 55 L
32.01 Quebracho extract............ 192 66 71 (P)
36.02 Prepared explosives........ 150 305 75
38.02 Animal black................... 38 40 61
47.01 Wood pulp for paper­
making ............................. 28 36,46 and 305 (P)
48.01 Newsprint......................... L 1 88
53.05 Wool tops........................... 173 36 39
70.06 Ordinary flat glass.......... 130 55 and 96 66 and 95 (P)
73.01 Iron ingots (pig iron) . . . 20 57 109
73.02 Ferro-manganese........ .. 111 66 35
73.07 Billets (iron)................... 37 66 121 (P)
73.10 Bars (iron)....................... 60 66 60 and 249
73.13 Steel plate......................... 44 66 123
73.16 Railway track................... 60 36 35
74.01 Electrolytic copper ingots 11 and 109 26 30 (P)
74.031
74.04J■ Copper bars and sheet... 163 and 191 26 and 56 39 (P)
78.01 UnwTought lead............... 111 661 40
79.01 UnwTought zinc, .  j .......... 111 26 35
c III (continued')
Colombia Ecuador Mexico Peru Paraguay EEC
40 (L) 76 35 18 44 20
36 (L) to 124 (P) 65 7 17 99 5 to 8
200 (P) 122 63 (L) 39 £ind 56 » . . 2 and 3
88 28 25 31 102 L
30 (L) 97 3 (L) 31 55 10
30 (L) 46 8 (L ) 46 35 4
40 (L) 34 13 (L) 23 35 15
25 24 1 (L) 19 60 15
23 28 19 (L) 23 70 14
3 42 1 (L) 14 106 5
3 17 20 (L) 14 106 10
44 (L) 52 15 13 52 L
11 73 13 and 18 (L) 14 62 16
10 24 8 20 . . . 7
29 and 32 26 5 and 50 (L) 15 and 17 . . . 6
3 20 5 (L) 12 35 16
18 38 20 (L) 19 99 3
46 38 124 and 150 (L) 106 and 141 159 10
5 (L ) 37 3 and 6 (L) 16 58 5 to 7
3 31 17 and 23 (L) 18 • . . 2 to 6
10 (L) 37 50 (L) 14 58 4 to 10
10 (L) 42 32 (L) 14 58 6 to 10
12 32 8 (L) 14 58 10
22 21 30 14 65 6 to 101
12 36 160 (L) 14 62 L
16 63 30 (L) 26 67 10
45 (L) 33 3 and 22 20 193 3
30 a ) 46 96 22 58
k
6
80.01 Unwrought tin .................... L 96 30
27.10 Petrol (g a so lin e ).............. 150 21 40
27.10 Kerosene ............................. 20 50 30
27.10 Diesel oil ............................. 20 40 38 (P )
Simple arithmetic mean 
for Group II-l.................. 95 80 98
Group 2. Durable consumer goods 
84.15 Househould refrigerators. 235 266 58 (P )
84.40 Washing-machines ........... 196 336 33 (P)
84.41 H ousehold sewing- 
machines ............................. 150 375 66 (P )
85.06 Liquefiers and b ea ters .. . 193 336 47 (P )
85.06 Floor-polishers .................. 197 345 126 (P )
85.12 Electric iron s...................... 196 336 31 (P )
85.15 Television reception ap­
paratus ................................. 194 316 105 (P )
85.15 Radio-broadcasting recep­
tion a p p a ra tu s .................... 150 and 200 325 94 (P )
87.02 M otor cars (not including 
public-service type ve­
hicles) ................................. 470 to 1250 ' 302 and 375 239 (P )
87.09 M otor scooters and m o­
torcycles ............................... 442 and 4921 316 82 (P )
87.10 Bicycles ............................... 150 316 n o  (P )
Simple arithmetic mean 
for Group I I -2 .................... 266 328 90
\o
VO
Category HI: Current con­
sumer MANUFACTURES
Group 1. Processed foodstuffs
04.02 Concentrated milk, in
liquid form or powder.. 197
04.03 Butter ...............................  197
04.04 Ordinary cheese................ 152
11.01 Wheat flour........................ 197
15.01 Pork lard...........................  197
15.07 Cotton seed oil................ 187
15.07 Sunflower seed oil........... 197
15.07 Olive oil.............................  197
16.02 Prepared or preserved
meal .................................  200
16.03 Meat extracts...................  197
16.04 Prepared or preserved























23 29 (L) 16 S2 L
L (L ) 93 L (L ) 16 124 G
L (L) 93 1 (L) 14 82 G
L (L) 83 10 (L) 17 82 G
28 48 28 23 77 7
85 (L) 30 240 (L) 32 44 13
no (L) 44 163 (L) 19 187 19
70 (L) 63 29 (L) 14 and 17 75 12
no (L) 72 388 (L) 59 107 19
76 (L) 37 100 (L) 45 107 19
104 (P) 89 100 46 207 19
90 (P) 136 144 (L) 23 90 22
150 (P) 122 180 25 77 22
150 and 200 71 to 122 30 to 155 (L) 30 and 40 96 10 and 29
107 (L) 115 125 (L) 21 87 26
no (P) 76 50 (L) 15 71 21
108 80 147 30 104 19
158 (P) 35 and 63 20 to 36 12 and 13 83 and 73 18
138 (P) 24 (P) 37 and 39 (L) 15 76 24
150 (P) 158 250 (L) 45 74 23
100 (L) 83 6 (L) 13 31 13
850 (P) 357 54 and 77 (L) 12 86 20
120 (P) 33 5 (L) 14 77 10 and 15
113 (P) 34 80 (L) 15 77 10 and 15
71 (L) 68 11 (L) to 32 21 77 17 and 20
900 (P) 359 240 (L) 66 88 20 to 26
100 (L) to 600 (P) 114 38 (P) 38 . . . 2-9 and 24




items Argcniina Brazil Clule Colombia Ecuador Mexico Peru Paraguay EEC
20.01)
20.025
Prepared or preserved 
vegetables ....................... 185 346 1330 (P ) 630 (P ) 152 212 (L) 106 92 18 to 24
20.06 Prepared or preserved 
fruit ................................. 193 326 1 330 (P) and 30 900 (P) 186 Numerous 93 92 17 to 32
22.05 Wine (non-vintage)........ 202 346 290 (P) 250 (L) 172
varieties 
216 and 280 (L) 75 and 80 62 13 to 19
Simple arithmetic mean 
for Group III-l................ 192 280 436 359 145 n o 41 76 19
Group 2. Other current consumer 
goods (including semUmanujac- 
tured products of traditional 
industries)
34.01 Toilet soap......................... 197 325 842 (L) 200 (P) 141 122 (L) 145 64 19
36.01 Matches ........................... 195 336 322 (P) 300 (P) 188 (L) 650 23 103 14
37.02 Film, sensitized, unex­














31 to 44 (L and P) 10 to 90
21
37 to 41 88 19
40.11 Inner tubes for vehicles.. 122 106 128 to 288 64 44 to 58 (L and P) 10 to 90 37 to 41 120 22
42.02 Leather travel goods........ 195 336 394 (P ) 340 (P) 210 (P) 288 (L) 580 93 19
49.01 Books ............................... L 25 and 150 (L) 22 and 250 30 (L) L 240 (L) L L L
53.06 Woollen yarn................... 170 295 115 (P) 48 (P) 61 57 66 73 6 and 10
53.11 Woollen fabrics................ .  .  . 336 123 (P) 130 (P) 53 (P) 79 (L) 91 and 136 76 16 and 20
55.05 Cotton yarn....................... 100 325 30 (P) 150 (P) 62 6 and 8 (L) 70 79 10
56.01 Man-made fibres.............. 174 and 243 75 33 (P) 50 (L) 28 (L) 18 44 14
61.03 Men’s and boy’s under 
garments ......................... 197 345 324 (P) 500 (P) 82 (P) 64 to 200 (L) 186 104 20
61.04 Women’s and girl’s under 
garments ......................... 197 345 1079 (P ) 360 (P) 82 (P) 64 186 104 22
64.02 Footwear with outer soles 
of leather, ruhher or 
plastic material............... 197 345 60 (P) 300 (P) 67 to 82 (P) 90 to 157 (L) 136 and 156 20
83.03 Safes, strong-boxes and 
the like............................. 197 325 130 (P) 30 (L) 56 and 100 51 (P) 28 62 17
85.20 Electric filament lamps or 
arc lamps........................... 195 316 37 (P) 65 (L) 25 and 62 29 77 15
94.03 Metal furniture for office 
u s e ..................................... 209 336 152 (P) 140 (P) 136 (P) 152 (L) 41 48 18
Simple arithmetic mean 
for Group III-2............... 163 244 239 154 76 117 98 78 15
I^OTZ«
Argentina. Information brought up to date as of March 1962. The ad valorem  totals 
noted include ad valorem  customs duties, exchange surcharges and rate of payment 
for statistical services. On the other hand, the following were not incorporated: 
the 20 per cent surcharge imposed on all imports under the terms of Decree No. 
8158/61 and 11260 (subsequently abolished) ; ad valorem  equivalence of the specific 
duty and the various specific surcharges on forestry and steel-making development 
plans. Where a product did not seem to fit into any of the items established in 
the tariff, a duty of 42 per cent was assigned to it, and one of 150 per cent if it 
was not included in the schedule of the exchange surcharges.
BnAzn.. Information brought up to date as of March 1952. The ad valorem  total 
includes tariff duties; rate of customs clearance; dues payable on improvement of 
port facilities and the additional cost (estimated at 200 per cent of the c.i.f. value) 
of foreign exchange for goods classified in the Special Category. The following 
were not taken into account: mercantile marine replacement levy; the financing of 
the prior deposit, of which the approximate cost is 9 per cent; consular fees, 
amounting to Î25 for import values reaching Î1 000, plus an additional $4.00 for 
every fraction of $500 over and above that sum.
Chile. Information brought up to date as of June 1962. The ad valorem  total includes 
customs duties, tax on value of nationalized merchandise (expressed in terms of 
the c.i.f. ad valorem  equivalent), supplementary tax, and cost of financing prior 
deposits; these last range from 10 to 1000 per cent c.i.f., which, at a rate of 
interest of 1.5 per cent over a period of 90 days, gives an ad valorem  equivalence 
of 1 to 45 per cent. The consular dues of 2.5 per cent f.o.b. were not taken into 
account, and neither was the loading and unloading tax of $0,206 per quintal or 
the 3 per cent freight tax. At the present time there is a specific schedule of 
authorized imports and the understanding is that imports of goods not appearing 
on it are prohibited.
Colombia. Information brought up to date as of March 1962. The ad valorem  total 
noted includes customs duties, consular dues, and development quotas. The follow­
ing, on the other hand, were excluded: cost of financing the prior deposit, since 
the amounts to be imposed were to come into force as from 1 September 1962; 
the ad valorem  equivalent of these deposits were to range from 1 to 4 per cent 
of the c.i.f. value. The régime to which each item is subject is indicated as 
follows: prohibition of imports (P) ; import licence (L ).
Ecuador. Information brought up to date as of 2 May 1961. The charges included are 
tariff duties, consular and harbour dues, special duties for allocation to the southern 
and eastern provinces, and electrification taxes (all expressed in ad valorem  c.i.f. 
terms). As these duties and charges are applied on an f.o.b. basis, for conversion 
purposes it was assumed that the c.i.f. value exceeded the f.o.b. value by 12 per 
cent. The supplementary taxes of 6 per cent and 11 per cent on the c.i.f. value 
of products listed in Schedules 1 and II, respectively, were also taken into account. 
Imports specified in Schedules I and II are affected through different exchange
markets; one controlled, with a selling rate of 15.15 sucres to the dollar, and 
the other free, with a rate of 18.18 sucres to the dollar. This disparity in the cost 
of exchange coverage is not incorporated in the figures presented. It is understood 
that imports of goods not appearing in Schedules I and II are prohibited.
Mexico. Information brought up to date as of March 1962. As the Mexican customs
tariff is mixed in character, combining specific and ad valorem duties, and also
including an official price of each item, for the purposes of the present study this
tax structure was expressed in terms of an ad valorem total by means of the
following procedure. The application of an ad valorem duty to an official price 
gives in practice a specific duty equivalence; by the addition of this value to the 
existing specific duty a specific total can be obtained, and if this in turn is 
related to the unit price, an ad valorem equivalent of the total duty will result. 
An indication is given of the legal regime to which each item is subject, through 
the import licence requisite (L ).
Paraguay. Up-to-date information was not available on the import régime in respect 
of prior deposits, sales taxes, etc., nor were the foreign trade yearbooks that were 
needed in order to obtain unit prices, which are an indispensable requisite for 
expressing a specific duty in terms of its ad valorem equivalent. In the majority 
of cases, therefore, it was necessary to resort to the data collected for the ECLÁ 
secretariat study on customs duties and other import restrictions and charges 
(E/CN.12/554/Add.8) and to information furnished in the course of the first 
ALALC conference at Montevideo. Apart from customs duties, the following are 
included: exchange surcharges, sales taxes, cost of financing prior deposit, consular 
dues and stamp duties.
(P) Imports prohibited.
(L) Imports subject to licensing.
s Imports duty-free within a quota established annually to cover the deficit in 
domestic production. Duty-free imports of 750 000 tons per annum have been negotiated 
under GATT.
•> Calculated on the basis of a duty of 122 per cent (22 per cent customs duty plus 
surcharge of 100 per cent) applicable to an official price (aforo) of $140 per ton, 
the real c.i.f. value being estimated at $85 per ton.
Imports to meet tie-in or mixing requirements, duty-free.
4 European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) tariff.
® Subject to import quotas.
* Excluding exchange surcharge, which is under study.
8 For tractors of less than 85 h.p. import licences are required.
Also pay special taxes of 10 000 to 150 000 guaranies each.
* Imports of vehicles with a unit value of more than $3 500 are prohibited.
i A specific duty of $3.00 and $3.50 per kilogramme represents in practice an 
ad valorem duty of 300 and 350 per cent, since the unit price is $1 per kilogramme.

TAX INCENTIVES IN LATIN AMERICA*
by Pedro Mendive
1. Introduction
Technically speaking, the financing of development 
means steadily increasing an economy’s productive re­
sources, and mobilizing them and allocating them in the 
most appropriate manner. Thus the aim of such financing 
is to channel physical productive resources and transfer 
them from given forms of use to other forms. In fact 
in a modern economy this mobilization of physical 
resources cannot be efifected directly, in the way that 
one can take a chessman and move it to another square; 
the resources must be made use of by indirect methods, 
in the form of measures of economic policy that can 
channel and direct their movements. In brief, the task 
is to use instruments of a financial, economic and fiscal 
nature to influence relative prices and channel monetary 
income.
Economic activity is, of course, guided by means of 
decisions based on relative prices of goods and factors, 
on profits, interest, wages and other components of the 
national income, and on other financial funds that may 
be available to the economy. Thus development financing 
is based on the possibility of allocating physical resources 
through action on factors that guide the decisions of 
producers and consumers (relative prices), and on 
factors that make it possible to carry out those decisions 
(flow of monetary income and other funds) ; the second 
group of factors operates within the private sector, but 
also affects the transfers of resources that can and should 
take place between the private and public sectors.
It should be noted that tax revenue constitutes a de­
duction from private income. A direct tax is levied on 
income (theoretically) at the moment when it is earned, 
and an indirect tax at the moment when it is used or 
spent. Hence a change in the tax system tends to modify 
the personal income available and the structure of prices 
and, as a result of its unequal incidence on the groups 
receiving the income and on the various goods, can lead 
to a redistribution of this income, a change in the struc­
ture of production and final demand, and even an 
alteration in the proportions in which the income is 
distributed between consumption and savings.
Thus the tax instrument can play a not insignificant 
role in the task of mobilizing and allocating resources, 
and help to achieve three aims:
(a) The financial aim of taking resources from the 
private sector, in the form least prejudicial to the sound 
functioning of the economy and to a progressive dis­
* This is a revised version of document CPF-DS-5, which was 
presented under the same title to the Conference on Fiscal Policy 
(Santiago, Chile, 5 to 14 December 1962) organized under the 
OAS/IDB/ECLA Joint Tax Program. Although the author is a 
staff member of the Economic Commission for Latin America, 
the views expressed in this article are his own, and do not 
necessarily reflect those of the ECLA secretariat.
tribution of income, for the purpose of enabling the 
State to finance increasing public expenditure.
{h) The aim of discouraging certain types of con­
sumption and encouraging the propensity to save of 
individuals and enterprises, and providing incentives to 
investment.
(c) The aim of channelling productive resources into 
activities of higher priority.
Item (a) above goes beyond the scope of the present 
document, whereas the other two points constitute its 
main theme, since both relate to extra-fiscal or economic 
aspects of taxation and are directly concerned with the 
various types of tax incentive.
The most common forms that such incentives can take 
in the various types of tax legislation may be briefly 
summarized as follows:
(a) General development legislation, aimed at the es­
tablishment and encouragement of certain activities, 
which are usually distinguished according to the various 
degrees of economic priority allocated to them, and for 
which a series of tax exemptions are granted, such as a 
partial or total remission of income tax for a given 
number of years, exemption from import duty on imports 
of capital goods for setting up the enterprise, and on 
any raw materials and other production items it uses, etc.
(b) The use of indirect taxation, with high levels of 
internal taxation and customs duties on certain luxury 
items of consumption to promote increased personal 
savings; differential treatment of different items in the 
sales tax, for the purpose of changing the structure of 
final demand.
(c) The use of direct taxation to promote greater 
savings by enterprises, through inclusion in the legis­
lation of special treatment for undistributed profits, 
authorizing the use of special depreciation systems (ac­
celerated depreciation, voluntary depreciation, etc.), 
granting special credits in excess of the investment in­
volved on amortization funds, etc.
{d) Special agricultural taxation, in view of the eco­
nomic and social features of this activity in Latin 
America, in order to promote higher productivity and 
facilitate subdivision of land.
(e) Preferential treatment of foreign investment, for 
the purpose of attracting foreign capital to supplement 
domestic savings in promoting more rapid economic 
development.
The combined action of some or all of these various 
types of incentive will have the following economic con­
sequences. First, there will be increased domestic in­
vestment, provided that the incentives lead to increased 
savings and an inflow of foreign capital, and that they 
result in more favourable economic conditions for do­
mestic investment. Second, they will be conducive to
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a long-term increase in the product-capital ratio,^ once 
they have had the effect of reallocating domestic pro­
ductive resources (by encouraging certain activities that 
are highly productive from the social standpoint, dis­
couraging others that are not, and changing the regional 
allocation of resources). The increases in the investment 
coefiELcient and in the product-capital ratio that result 
from these incentives will lead to an increase in the 
domestic product.
To ensure that all these results wiU follow, two basic 
conditions are required. The first is that no irreconcilable 
conflict arise between the equity of the tax burden and 
the need to collect sufficient tax revenue to ensure that 
the State can finance, on a stable basis, an increasing 
level of public expenditure, required by the urgent need to 
develop the basic social capital that the country needs. 
The second is that the incentives system operate efficiently.
Lastly, it should be emphasized that if the incentives 
system is to be effective in achieving its aims, it must 
be applied to taxes that are high enough to make the 
exemption or preferential treatment sufficiently attrac­
tive from the standpoint of the motives that determine 
savings and affect the decisions of investors; in addition, 
there must be an efficient tax administration, well or­
ganized and with sufficient resources.
With respect to the first of these two points, the use 
of the tax instrument alone is not likely to be decisive 
with respect either to the propensity to save or to invest­
ment. There is a series of economic, psychological and 
technological considerations that together can either sup­
plement the tax incentive in encouraging savings and 
investment, or else work against that incentive or even 
completely nullify it. In fact this complex of factors 
appears in all cases to have a more decisive effect than 
that of the tax incentive.
The tax incentives will be effective only in so far as 
the tax administration and the level of education of the 
taxpayer permit a minimum degree of tax evasion. 
Otherwise it will still pay the taxpayer to continue to 
evade the tax laws rather than to take advantage of the 
exemptions, which generally involve some administrative 
costs through the need to produce the proof required 
for the granting of the exemption, and also imply some 
degree of intervention, by the body concerned, for 
checking purposes, in the affairs of the enterprise that 
benefits from the incentive.
2. General development legislation
The Latin American countries are convinced that eco­
nomic development must be accompanied by a more 
rapid growth of industrial than of primary activities, 
at least until a given balance has been reached between 
the various production sectors. Consequently the present 
general legislation on development has tended to aim 
almost exclusively at encouraging manufacturing, so 
much so that the legislation concerned is generally known 
as industrial development legislation.
Most of the Latin American countries have such 
legislation, some of recent date and some enacted earlier. 
It is based on preferential tax treatment of the activities 
that are to be encouraged. In some of this legislation 
any activity that qualifies for the benefits in question
1 The product-capital ratio for the economy as a whole is 
obtained by taking the weighted average ratios for each production 
sector.
is specified as an “ essential”  activity, and this term is 
defined in the legislation itself. Other legislation refers 
only to some of the requirements that must be met, and 
the specific definition is left to the authority entrusted 
with the application of the legislation.^
Practically aU the laws or decrees of this type now 
in force in Latin America cover seven basic common 
points, although they vary, sometimes considerably, as 
to the generosity and scope of the tax franchises and 
exemptions. This applies to the development laws in 
Colombia (1961), Costa Rica (1959), Ecuador (1962), 
El Salvador (1961), Guatemala (1959), Honduras 
(1958), Mexico (1954),® Nicaragua (1958), Panama 
(I960) and Peru (1957).
The five Central American countries have recently 
enacted uniform industrial development legislation and 
agreed to apply it with a view to the economic integra­
tion and the joint and co-ordinated development of the 
area, and this legislation incorporates aU the modern 
ideas of the typical tax incentives that can be included 
in such legislation; consequently the Central American 
legislation will be used as a basis for reference in the 
comments that follow.
Whatever form the legislation takes, it covers the 
following basic point, in one form or another: (a) the 
purpose of the legislation; (6) an implicit or explicit 
definition of the enterprises that qualify to receive the 
benefits; (c) a definition of the activities concerned 
according to the degree of priority allocated to them 
in promoting development; (d) the nature and amount 
of the tax benefits granted to each category of activity, 
and the period covered; (e) the procedure for qualifying 
for the benefits; ( /)  control by the competent authority 
with respect to the fulfilment of the legal requirements, 
and (g) penalties that apply when the tax exemption 
is used for purposes other than those laid down in the 
legislation. Of the above point, only {a) and (d) need 
to be examined in some detail.
The aims pursued are those of establishing or ex­
panding manufacturing industries that in some way con­
tribute to the country’s economic development. For this 
purpose it is generally laid down that these activities 
must produce capital goods, raw materials or consumer 
goods needed for this development that are not produced 
domestically or are produced in insufficient volume, 
that use a specified proportion of domestic factors (con­
tain a high level of domestic value added), and that 
help to improve the balance of payments, either by im­
port substitution or by promoting a higher level of 
exports. In other words, the aim of such legislation is 
an expansion of the industrial product such as to imprint 
a particular pattern on the structure of industry, with 
some types of manufacturing developing more rapidly 
than others that are considered less essential from the 
standpoint of the economy as a whole.
To achieve this group of objectives the following tax 
exemptions are usually granted: (a) Total or partial 
exemption from duties and other charges on imports 
of machinery and equipment and on inputs needed for 
the enterprise’s production, and (b) exemption from
2 Where there is no basic development legislation, as in 
Argentina, for example, there are special acts or decrees to 
encourage individual activities or enterprises in certain regions.
8 The first provisions of a systematic nature in Mexico date 
from 1939.
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taxes on income and wealth for the enterprise and for 
its partners or shareholders. These exemptions are 
granted for a number of years (usually for a maximum 
of ten years) according to the degree of priority accorded 
under the legislation to each activity. Similarly, the 
same exemption is usually granted, for all the enterprises 
regarded as qualified for the purposes of the legislation, 
in respect of reinvestment in plant expansion. Under 
some legislation the reinvestment effected in a given 
year by any enterprise that qualifies for the benefits can 
be deducted from the profits for that year for income 
tax purposes.
It can be seen that the benefits granted by these de­
velopment laws affect two different though related aspects 
of the factors that govern decisions to invest and to 
undertake certain productive activities, namely costs, 
and the possibility of net profits (after tax). The first 
type of exemption has the aim of ensuring that during 
the first stage of activity, until the recipient enterprise 
attains a certain level of efficiency, it can compete with 
foreign products or with more or less similar domestic 
substitutes that are considered to have less economic 
priority. This eliminates some degree of uncertainty as 
to the prospect of future profits, at least for a given 
number of years; that is, it has the effect of buttressing 
one of the motives that governs investment and the estab­
lishment of an economic activity. The second type of 
exemption, by increasing the available income of the 
enterprises and of its partners or shareholders through 
exemption of taxes on income and wealth, is intended 
to make possible not only higher relative profits for these 
enterprises (in relation to others) in order to have an 
even greater impact on the investment motives, but also 
increased savings that can be used for a self-financed 
expansion of production plants. As the tax benefits pro­
vided for this purpose are graduated according to cate­
gories of activity, the aim is specifically to promote a 
more rapid development of certain branches of industry 
at the expense of others considered less essential.
The tax exemptions granted under some laws are so 
extensive that they can fairly be described as excessive. 
They approach the problem of providing an incentive 
by granting total exemption (whose application goes 
even beyond the enterprise itself) from all the main 
taxes for which the enterprise is liable.
To assess the efficiency of the results from the stand­
point of the aims pursued by the legislation, the enter­
prises must be considered in three groups: (o ) those 
that for one reason or another would obtain high profits 
even if no tax incentive were granted; (b) those that 
would not obtain profits for most of the period for 
which the exemptions are granted; and (c) those that 
would obtain low profits.
Since an enterprise in the first group would in any 
case expect to obtain high profits, the granting of 
exemptions provides no additional incentive to establish 
it. Here the tax exemption constitutes an unfair tax 
discrimination without any real justification, Eind its 
only effect is to deprive the State of revenue. It should 
be noted that the high profits obtainable are sufficient 
indication that the enterprise is at a competitive ad­
vantage, and it may even be, as is usually the case, that 
the enterprise does not in fact have to face any com­
petition, either at home or abroad, because of the defi­
ciencies of the domestic market or because of protec­
tionist measures, which are usually more effective than 
tax measures.
In the second case, if there is no prospect of profits, 
it is unlikely that they can be conjured up by tax 
exemptions. Here the exemption from direct taxes is no 
more than a dead letter, and exemption from import 
duties in most cases does not, by reducing costs, help 
to make profits possible to an extent sufficient to en­
courage enterpreneurs to embark on the activity in 
question.
In the third case the position is somewhat different. 
It is quite possible that the low level of profits, after 
taxes, could be considerably raised if tax exemptions 
were granted, and that the activity in question might 
then become sufficiently attractive, compared with others, 
on the basis of the benefits granted by the development 
legislation. For all practical purposes, then, the effec­
tiveness of incentives is confined to the activities that 
fall into the last category considered.
The implicit idea of increasing savings through this 
type of development legislation by increasing the amount 
of personal and corporate income available (after taxes) 
may be effective from the standpoint of the savings of 
the enterprises and individuals that benefit, but it is less 
likely to have a decisive effect in increasing national 
savings.
The exemptions of tax on income and wealth granted 
by a number of laws to enterprises and to their partners 
or shareholders are so extensive that there is a sub­
stantial difference between the income of these taxpayers 
before and after taxes. The exemption will thus have 
the practical effect of considerably increasing the avail­
able income of the persons and enterprises that benefit 
from the development legislation. The increase in avail­
able income will lead to an increase in the capacity to 
save of these enterprises. Whether savings will in fact 
increase will depend, for enterprises, on their dividend 
distribution policy.^ For individuals the increase in 
savings will depend on the marginal propensity to con­
sume— or, looked at from the opposite standpoint, to 
save— at the new level of available income for each 
person.
No definite a priori conclusion can be reached on the 
last point, but it is relevant to record the general im­
pression existing in Latin America that the high-income 
classes have a high propensity to consume. Consequently 
many Latin American economists advocate penalization 
of excessive consumption, rather than tax incentives, to 
obtain the same results, that is, an increase in savings.
As regards the factors that affect national savings, 
two different considerations must be borne in mind; 
(a) that the original investment in each enterprise cov­
ered by the legislation meant, at the time it was made, 
not investing the corresponding sum in another activity, 
or in other words, at that point the available savings 
were transferred from one use to another: (b) that the 
exemption represents an equivalent amount of tax reve­
nue that the State loses. In practice it is difficult to 
reduce the State’s current expenditure, especially short­
term expenditure; hence, if the Government does not 
reduce its expenditure on investment (which would have
In order to encourage a more conservative policy, some 
legislation, like the Central American uniform legislation, provides 
for exemptions on undistributed profits.
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the effect of transferring State resources to those who 
benefit from the tax exemptions, there will be a transfer 
of real savings from other private sectors to the sector 
that benefits by the exemptions, through the State’s 
recipient-expenditure operations.
This point can be made clear as follows. From the 
standpoint of the monetary economy the enterprise that 
receives a tax benefit thereby receives a monetary 
savings exactly equal to the monetary loss suffered 
by the State through granting it. But these savings 
or monetary resources, considered from the stand­
point of the real economy, represent the power to 
dispose of a given quantity of real resources, in 
accordance with current prices. If the State refrains 
from spending a sum equal to the monetary resources it 
fails to receive, this amount of real resources remains 
at the exclusive disposal of the enterprise that receives 
the exemption, and the process ends without any reper­
cussion on the other savers. If, on the other hand, the 
State resorts to its capacity to spend in excess of current 
income, and thus maintains its level of expenditure, 
certain other savers will suffer a reduction in their real 
purchasing power, either through the financing of the 
government loan, or through an increase in the price 
of real resources. This must be so because a given 
quantity of real available resources cannot meet two 
demands at the same time (that of the State and that 
of the enterprise receiving the exemption).
Consequently it is unlikely that the tax exemptions 
contained in such legislation can lead to an increase 
in national savings. On the other hand, if they are 
effective in promoting greater savings in the activities 
covered by the legislation, they may also lead indirectly 
to a redistribution of savings among the various savers.
A criticism often made of tariff exemptions on ma­
chinery and equipment imported under franchises ac­
corded by industrial development laws is that to some 
degree they alter the relative prices of factors of pro­
duction in favour of capital at the expense of labour. 
In Latin America, of course, capital is the scarce factor 
and labour abundant. As a number of economists have 
already shown, in economies of this type there is a basic 
economic advantage in making the maximum use of 
the abundant factor and economizing the scarce factor. 
All the more so since— as has been shown on a number 
of occasions, mainly in relation to industry— there is 
a tendency to underutilization of installed capacity, which 
means that to an unsuitable combination of factors is 
added a failure to make proper use of capital equipment.®
Latin American experience has furnished only certain 
qualitative data on the results obtained from the exist­
ing legislation. There are no statistics to make possible 
a specific analysis. But it is unquestionably true that in 
no case has such legislation resulted in a mass move­
ment of enterpreneurs and investors seeking the benefits 
it confers. In Mexico, for example, where the earliest 
legislation dates from 1939, it is recognized that the 
number of enterprises that have taken advantage of the 
development exemptions has never been anything but 
very small, in comparison with the country’s spectacular
growth since that date. In other countries the information 
available indicates a similar state of affairs.® As already 
stated, despite the considerable exemptions granted by 
the legislation, the benefits have not been applied for 
on any large scale. However, it is true that the enter­
prises that have applied for the benefits or exemptions 
include a number of outstanding importance, particularly 
as a basis for the country’s economic development, such 
as the steel industry and other heavy industries.
As to the practical results that can be obtained with 
such exemptions, Puerto Rico stands out as the definitive 
and conclusive example. Apparently amazing results have 
been obtained from the tax incentive in that country.'^ 
Nevertheless, the view is taken here that this is an 
atypical case and cannot be advanced as an argument 
in discussing the particular case of Latin America. What 
has happened in Puerto Rico is really a case of regional 
rather than national development. Puerto Rico has in 
fact been economically integrated into the existing United 
States market, and there is a marked mobility of re­
sources and goods between the two countries, thereby 
conferring on Puerto Rico, in addition to tax privileges, 
a potential market for nearly 200 million people with 
an extremely high purchasing power. Thus the tax ex­
emption there has meant granting preferential treatment 
to the Puerto Rico “ region”  and to its factors, enter­
prises and goods. This should be regarded as an example 
of a regional redistribution of resources.
To some extent the case of the Nordeste region of 
Brazil is similar; here, too, the tax incentive system is 
giving excellent results. But in this case there are a 
number of factors contributing to the region’s develop­
ment, of which the tax system is only one. In the Nordeste 
region there is a special concentration of national efforts 
to develop this area; there is a plan or programme on 
a considerable scale, well defined and constructed and 
vigorously executed; a number of economic policy meas­
ures for this purpose have been adopted; ample resources 
are available to finance the programme, and general 
interest has been aroused in the plan to transform a 
market of 20 million people with very little purchasing 
power into an important producer and consumer market. 
Thus the basic conditions for the region’s development 
have been established, or are being established, with the 
result that the tax instrument can operate with some 
degree of efficiency in conjunction with all the other 
factors referred to above. In addition, the method of 
using these factors is different from that used in the 
typical development legislation.
Thus although the basic legislation on the SUDENE 
(the body responsible for the development of the Nor­
deste region) includes provisions similar to those laid 
down in the more or less typical development legislation 
of Latin America, the former contains provisions that 
are not included in the latter. The similar provisions 
include (a) exemption from the various categories of
® It should be noted that such machinery is produced in the 
large industrial countries in the light of their markets and their 
interest in replacing manpower, which is a scarce factor, by 
capital, which is abundant; thus the equipment is not always 
suitable to economic conditions in Latin America.
6 It should also be noted that in those cases where the number 
of enterprises taking advantage of the exemptions offered by 
development legislation is fairly large (in Central America as 
a whole there are about 500 such enterprises) this is no sure 
indication that the incentive has been effective. The most it 
shows is that the “ cost” of applying for the exemption was less 
than the benefits conferred. There is no way of telling whether 
or not the activity in question would have been undertaken in 
the absence of tbe tax incentive.
Its capacity to absorb foreign capital is deal with in section 4.
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income tax for the new industries specified in the basic 
legislation, provided that these are established prior 
to December 1963, and (b) exemption from import 
duties for SUDENE for equipment intended for the 
Nordeste region, mainly equipment for basic industries 
and food industries, provided that the equipment is not 
second-hand or reconditioned, and that no similar equip­
ment is manufactured domestically. But in addition the 
Executive Board of SUDENE can propose to the Presi­
dent of Brazil: (a) that he grant a favourable exchange 
rate for imports not covered by foreign currency, in 
respect of imports of equipment for the Nordeste region;
(b) that he make available 50 per cent of the convertible 
foreign currency obtained from exports from the Nor­
deste region to be used for importing goods needed 
for the region, and (c) that SUDENE announce 
the priorities to be granted with respect to equipment. 
These last provisions represent a marked departure from 
incentives relating only to taxes, particularly in a country 
like Brazil where foreign exchange is in such short supply.
In addition, a large eontribution of capital from other 
regions of Brazil is being furnished by virtue of the 
application of Act No. 3995 of 1961, which provides that 
a corporate body with a capital that is 100 per cent 
Brazilian can deduct up to 50 per cent of the income 
tax for which it is liable, provided that the amount of 
the exemption is to be invested in industries that are 
being promoted by SUDENE. This shows clearly that the 
aim is to develop a particular region of the country, to 
which preferential tax treatment is granted.
3. The use of indirect taxation
Indirect taxation can be regarded as an instrument 
of economic policy for changing a given structure of 
prices, and consequently a given structure of final de­
mand, to bring them into line with a predetermined 
pattern of production. The objective or goal of the policy 
of using indirect taxation in this way is to obtain the 
changes in the existing structure of demand and of 
production that are called for by preconceived plans.
However, the results that can be obtained by the 
use of this instrument of economic policy are very diffi­
cult to foresee, and may even be exactly the opposite of 
those sought.
In the first place, if a general indirect tax at a single 
rate is applied to all goods dealt with in an economy, 
the first reaction of the enterpreneur will be to transfer 
the whole of the tax to the price of the goods. But as 
this also involves a reduction in the real purchasing 
power of the consumer, at the new supply prices, there 
will result a change in the structure of demand in ac­
cordance with the elasticity of supply for each type of 
goods. The eventual effect of this process wiU be a 
change in the price structure, followed by a correspond­
ing change in the structure of production.
Yet this is not all; it represents at most what might 
be termed the first impact of the levying of such a tax. 
It must also be borne in mind, in the second place, 
that in so far as the tax is transferred to the price of 
intermediate goods, it spreads throughout the economy 
(to a progressively extent) through what are known as 
inter-industrial relations, in the form of the tax com­
ponent of each input. Obviously, the difficulty of pre­
dicting in practice what final form the new structure 
of prices, demand and production will take is further
increased if the tax discriminates between different types 
of goods by means of different rates. This is so even 
though at first sight it would appear that the articles 
taxed most lightly could well be favoured by the tax 
discrimination.
As regards goods for final consumption, the idea de­
veloped by some economists of using indirect taxation 
with high rates on some goods consumed by the upper 
income brackets, together with heavy duties on imports 
of such articles, has not been applied in Latin America, 
at least in the way that these economists envisage for 
such a form of taxation. In fact this idea aims at dis­
couraging certain types of consumption and certain pro­
duction lines and imports, at least in relative terms. 
If the demand for such goods is relatively elastic, the 
duty will restrict the demand, and consequently produc­
tion and imports of these items. The reduction in ex­
penditure on these goods will free a proportion of 
income that could be devoted to increased personal 
savings. If, on the other hand, the demand is inelastic, 
the goods in question will continue to be bought, but 
in this case the State will obtain additional funds, from 
the heavy taxes on the articles, and thus it will be the 
national exchequer that is in a position to increase 
savings, ft must be emphasized that this tax formula 
has never been applied in Latin America on an organized 
and systematic basis. Indirect taxation has in fact been 
used only to apply certain principles of control, or 
of a moral or social nature. In fact, apart from tariff 
duties, indirect taxes have been aimed only at discour­
aging consumption of certain items such as tobacco, 
alcohol and luxury articles, or at facilitating in some 
way the purchase of the goods habitually consumed by 
the lowest income groups. And although cases may be 
cited where such taxation has been used with the aim 
of encouraging a particular activity, they are quite 
exceptional.
Import duties, on the other hand, have been made 
use of fairly generally, for protective purposes, although 
not in any well defined way. The method varies from 
country to country, and in some cases the protectionist 
aim has coincided with pressing needs for additional 
revenue and for import reductions to redress serious 
balance-of-payments deficits.
Consequently it is not easy to determine whether 
tariffs have been used in Latin America for protectionist, 
revenue-earning or balanee-of-payments purposes. But 
it can be established that tariffs have been applied not 
only in the form of the ordinary standard customs duty 
but also in other more complicated forms, such as ex­
change controls, multiple exchange rates, interest on 
prior deposits of considerable magnitude, etc.
In general there has been a certain tendency to use 
mixed tariffs, that is, a specific duty combined with an 
ad valorem duty. The exceptions to this are Brazil, where 
only ad valorem duties are applied, and Venezuela, which 
has only specific duties.
It should be noted that the specific duties are com­
pletely inelastic to price changes in that they are ex­
pressed in fixed values per given measure of voliune or 
weight, or per unit. Ad valorem duties, on the other 
hand, are expressed in terms of the prices of the im­
ported articles, and thus tend to mirror fluctuations in 
those prices. Of course they suffer from the administra­
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tive disadvantage that it is not easy to establish a trust­
worthy tax base, that is, the external priee of the goods.
Thus the Latin American countries, when introducing 
heavy duties on imported products that are similar to 
those whose domestic production is desired, usually 
combine them with exemptions from and reductions of 
customs duties and other taxes or quasi-taxes of similar 
effect, in a way that makes it very diflScult to judge 
the effective incidence of tariffs on the various groups 
of goods affected.
In a study carried out by the Economic Commission 
for Latin America (ECLA)® it was determined, on the 
basis of an approximate effective incidence of the various 
charges on imports, (a) that in most of the eleven coun­
tries studied the average taxation on primary com­
modities was less than that on manufactured goods for 
current consumption, not because the former duty was 
low, but because the latter was very high, (b) that 
taxation on raw materials was high, and (c) that except 
for two countries the rate of tax was higher on capital 
goods than on raw materials.
Clearly these conclusions are what might generally 
be expected in countries that are promoting their eco­
nomic development. In the first place they wish to pro­
tect their consumer-goods industries from foreign com­
petition, and secondly, they favour imports of raw 
materials, although without losing sight of revenue needs. 
As regards capital goods, which usually get preferential 
treatment when there is no balance-of-payments problem, 
their position during the years covered by the study 
referred to was not particularly favourable. Thus for 
imports of such goods the incidence of the tax on their 
price placed them at an advantage compared with manu­
factured consumer goods, but at a disadvantage com­
pared with raw materials. The changes brought about 
by the effective tax rate during this period in the struc­
ture of the prices of imported capital goods were more 
or less in line with the economic interest of those coun­
tries in not favouring the prices of such goods in relation 
to the labour factor, as indicated elsewhere. However, 
this was not, of course, invariably true.
In any case, there is no doubt that tariff duties and 
related charges have been used in Latin America for 
protectionist purposes, and thus for the promotion of 
certain domestic activities.
4. The use of direct taxation
The taxing of corporation profits tends to lessen the 
private sector’s incentive to invest and to drain its 
investment funds.
The first result, that is, its adverse effects on the in­
centive to invest, is explained by the fact that the com­
parison beween the present worth of the income that 
the investment is expected to yield and the cost of the 
investment is less favourable after taxation. The second 
result derives from the fact that a profits tax necessarily 
reduces the amount of income available.
It has long been recognized that the taxation of profits 
is apt to have these effects. Efforts have consequently
8 See “ Customs duties and other import charges and restrictions 
in Latin American countries: average levels of incidence” . 
Multilateral economic co-operation in Latin America, vol. I 
(E/CN.12/621), United Nations publication, Sales No.: 62.II.G.3, 
paras. 77-79.
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been made to find tax devices for counteracting them, 
without, however, discounting the need for the tax, which 
brings a large amount of money into the Treasury.
One way of offsetting such effects would be to refrain 
from taxing profits that are retained, or, in other words, 
undistributed, by business concerns. This would be a 
form of incentive which, so far as is known, has never 
been used in practice. Another method of neutralizing 
them would be to adopt one of the various systems of 
accelerated amortization. Yet a third way would be to 
grant credits on funds that have actually been invested.
The implicit intention of a system for exempting un­
distributed profits from taxation is to give enterprises 
an incentive to increase their internal savings; more, 
it does actually increase them inasmuch as the profits 
are left untaxed. The endeavours to promote the forma­
tion of savings by enterprises instead of by individuals 
bear out the observation made in a number of indus­
trialized countries, as, for example, the United States, 
that a high percentage of manufacturing investment is 
financed by funds provided by the enterprises themselves 
(self-financing). In that particular country nearly 70 per 
cent of fixed investment by companies is based on in­
ternal resources, and in the case of a few heavy indus­
tries the proportion is as much as 80 and even 90 per 
cent. It is thought that much of the fixed investment in 
Latin America (excluding that of foreign companies) 
is financed from the enterprises’ own funds. This is 
particularly true in the case of medium and small-scale 
firms that have less access to outside sources, and all 
the more so in view of the fact that capital markets in 
the Latin American countries are not very well con­
structed and still in their infancy.
The objections to this system of encouraging enter­
prises to save are threefold: (a) the mere fact of retain­
ing profits does not guarantee the investment of an 
equivalent sum; (b) reasons of control; and (c) reasons 
of equity. The fact that the enterprise does not distribute 
profits in a certain year or period of time does not 
mean that it is disposed to invest an equal amount. The 
funds thus retained may be used for a variety of pur­
poses such as augmenting stocks or simply increasing 
liquidity. Thus, the act of saving on the part of an enter­
prise may be turned to account in a number of ways. 
The choice of one alternative rather than another will 
depend on circumstances that need not be entered into 
here.
The second objection concerns the loss of virtually 
irrecoverable income to the Treasury. Let it be assumed, 
for instance, that an enterprise has 100 monetary units 
of profit in a given year. Let it also be assumed that 
the tax rate is 20 per cent and that the enterprise retains 
10 units of profit. Without a tax incentive, it would pay 
the Treasury 20 tax units. Let it be further assumed that 
the undistributed profits are tax exempt and therefore 
increase to 20 units. In these circumstances, the tax 
liability will be 16 units. The revenue accruing to the 
State is thus reduced by 4 units. If the 20 undistributed 
units are assumed to be invested, and the rate of return 
on the new investment is 20 per cent— which seems 
to be usual rate in Latin America— the enterprise will 
therefore increase its profits by 4 units. For the State 
to make good its initial loss of income the marginal 
rate for taxing the additional profits would have to be 
100 per cent. Even if a firm operated at a much higher
marginal rate of profit, it would still be essentially 
absurd to apply such high tax rate.
The third objection relates to the concession of prefer­
ential tax treatment to a particular social class, which 
is contrary to the first principles of tax equity. Given 
the special distribution of wealth in some of the Latin 
American countries, where it is in the hands of certain 
families that are, moreover, very few in number, a 
preferential system would tend to bring about an even 
more intensive concentration of wealth and economic 
power.
Accelerated depreciation would be another way of 
providing tax incentives for investment to counter­
balance the adverse effect that income tax might have 
upon it. The gist of this method is that it allows for 
a larger write-off than the straight-line system during 
the first few years after the installation of equipment, 
although at the end of the equipment’ s useful life, calcu­
lated according to the tax schedule, only 100 per cent 
of its original value would have been amortized, as in 
the case of the straight-line system.
Systems of this kind have been adopted by a num­
ber of European countries, Canada and the United States. 
During the Second World War, the latter used this 
method of promoting investment in enterprises connected 
with the production of strategic war materials and, in 
1954, established it on a general basis. Of the Latin 
American countries, only Mexico incorporated it into 
its business taxation system at the time of the tax reform 
in 1962.
Two of the many forms that the depreciation system 
can take are (a) the decreasing balance— or a simplified 
substitute for this in the shape of the sum of the digit- 
years of useful life of the amortizable equipment; and 
(b )  voluntary depreciation, whereby the entrepreneur 
can, for tax purposes, write off the depreciating capital 
in one year or more as he chooses.
The straight-line system allows for the annual uniform 
deduction of a sum equal to the original value of the de­
preciating asset divided by the number of years of life 
accorded to the asset by the tax legislation. Under the 
decreasing balance system decreasing deductions are 
made for amortization, at a rate that may be three or 
more times as much as that applicable under the straight- 
line system. If the rate is assumed to be 10 per cent, 
the system would operate as follows: during the first 
year, the rate of 10 per cent would be applied to the 
original value of the equipment, in the second year, it 
would be charged on the balance, and so on in suc­
cession. A simplified version is the so-called method of 
the sum of the equipment’s taxable digit-years of life. 
Annual amortization is calculated by applying a decreas­
ing fraction to the cost of the equipment. The numerator 
of the fraction would be the number of years of useful 
life remaining to the equipment, and the denominator, 
which would be constant, would be the sum of the afore­
mentioned digits. If the equipment has ten years of 
useful life left, the fraction for the first year would 
have a numerator of 10 and a denominator of 55 
( l - j - 2 - j - 3 - | -  . . .  + 1 0  =  55). In the second year 
the fraction would be 9/55 and so on thereafter.
Edmonds has drawn up a table which, with an amorti­
zation rate of 5 per cent under the straight-line system 
and of 10 per cent under the other two, gives the depre­
ciation figure for equipment with a useful life of 20 
years.®




I 5 10 9.5
5 25 41 43
10 50 65 74
15 75 79 93
20 100 88 100
Voluntary amortization would be undertaken by the 
entrepreneur on his own judgement, and could be com­
pleted in the first year, or the original cost of the depre­
ciating asset could be calculated on a pro rata basis for 
the number of years that would be most convenient for 
him. This system is supposed to give the greatest incen­
tives to invest in new amortizable equipment, though it 
is admittedly apt to enhance some of the undesirable 
effects of the other systems of accelerated depreciation.
Before going any further it should be pointed out 
that, from a strictly fiscal point of view, accelerated 
depreciation simply means the postponement of tax pay­
ments to the last years of the equipment in question. 
If depreciation reduces the amoimt of profits liable to 
taxation, it is clear that a sliding scale system with high 
annual amortization payments in the early stages cuts 
taxable profits during that period, and increases them 
in later years when the amortization quota is less.
As explained before, accelerated depreciation systems 
approach the question of encouraging investment from 
two different standpoints. One aim is to make the invest­
ment more attractive and the other to increase the enter­
prise’s own resources for financing.
In what way or through what means can accelerated 
depreciation help to create or increase investment 
incentives?
The fact that these systems give entrepreneurs a chance 
to write off a substantial part of the equipment’s cost 
in the early stages means that they can recover their 
original outlay far more quickly by deferring payment 
of tax (see Edmonds’ table in which he demonstrates 
that 74 per cent of an asset’s original cost can be re­
covered in half its useful life with a low amortization 
rate of 10 per cent).
The entrepreneur thus has two facts in his favour: 
first, the risk is less and, secondly, the outlay implicit 
in his calculations for covering the cost is smaller and 
the interest rate chargeable on the equipment is lower. 
The upshot is that the depreciating equipment invested 
in for the purpose of plant expansion will cost less in 
real terms from the point of view of the entrepreneur.
If the decision to invest is based on a comparison 
between the present worth, at the prevailing interest rate, 
of the returns that are expected from the investment and 
the actual cost of making it, the lower the cost the more 
attractive the investment will be. Thus, the enrepreneur’s 
decision will be governed by his chances of making a 
profit, by the interest rate and by the cost.
It is evident that the higher the rate of amortization, 
i.e., he shorter the time in which the hulk of the equip­
ment’s cost can be recovered, the lower will be the real
»See William J. Edmonds, National Tax Journal, vol. VIII, 
March 1955.
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cost of the equipment and the greater the incentive to 
invest. Consequently the terms of the accelerated depre­
ciation system should be liberal enough to achieve its 
oh j ectives.
In the United States at least, systems of accelerated 
depreciation with rates that are not particularly high 
do not seem to have been noticeably successful in stimu­
lating investment. The article by Edmonds gives the 
findings of a survey carried out when the accelerated 
depreciation system was adopted in 1954. This survey 
indicates that 60 per cent of the enterprises questioned 
did not intend to speed up their capital expansion pro­
gramme, 27 per cent hoped to do so to some extent and 
only 13 per cent actually planned to accelerate it.
The way in which the depreciation mechanism works 
makes it possible for more investment to be self-financed. 
The fact that it allows for more amortization than the 
most extensive straight-line system— in Latin America 
at least— represents a tax advantage whereby the enter­
prises have more funds at their disposal to invest if 
they wish. But, as pointed out before, there is no certainty 
that the funds will be used for that purpose.
Admittedly, in enterprises that invest at a constant 
or increasing rate, tax payments are constantly post­
poned. From this point of view, i.e., the expansion of 
investment funds, the system of accelerated depreciation 
becomes more favourable the higher the rate at which 
expansion takes place. Of course the fraction of tax that 
the State refrains from collecting from the enterprise 
is also larger. Consequently, the general revenue accru­
ing to the national exchequer will be less than it was 
before the introduction of the tax incentive, unless a 
substantial autonomous increase takes place in invest­
ment. And the higher the rate of amortization, or, to 
put it another way, the shorter the time in which the 
bulk of the asset can be written off, the greater will be 
the revenue loss in the case of enterprises in rapid ex­
pansion. The fact that the shortening of the amortization 
period to ensure that the incentive will be effective may 
conflict with the need to obtain revenue is one of the 
criticisms that is constantly being levelled at the system 
of accelerated depreciation.
Apart from a blanket reduction in the tax rate, there 
are some practical alternatives to accelerated deprecia­
tion. There is, for instance, the United Kingdom system 
of establishing a tax credit on the cost of investment 
in the year in which the investment takes place. The 
credit would be 10 per cent on real property and 20 per 
cent on machinery and equipment, and in itself con­
stitutes an incentive to such investment. The advantage 
of this system of incentives is that the credit percentages 
can be varied in accordance with economic conditions, 
thus giving the system greater flexibility. In Cary Brown’s 
opinion^® it is more effective as a stimulus than the 
accelerated denreciation system established by the United 
States in 1954. Another point in its favour is the fact 
that the enterprise’s systems of fiscal depreciation and 
book-keeping would coincide, thereby doing away with 
the problem of different systems for determining fiscal 
and commercial value.
The system of total or partial tax exemption for in­
vested profits is fairly widespread in Latin America;
it acts essentially as a tax credit for investment and could 
be assimilated into the system of accelerated deprecia­
tion.^  ^ What is now being done in the United States is 
to establish a credit over and above the level of invest­
ment on depreciation each year. This implicitly favours 
the dynamic enterprises that are adding to their capital.
It has been contended, on economic grounds rather 
than for purposes of equity, that credit systems should 
differentiate between types and sectors of activity. The 
reason is that every development programme tries to 
push some sectors or activities ahead more rapidly than 
others, and that this may even lead to the creation of 
“ disincentives”  in the case of the latter. The discrimina­
tory application of incentives can be managed more 
flexibly through the use of credits than through accel­
erated depreciation.
5. Tax incentives for foreign investment
A low volume of savings and inadequate capacity to 
import have limited the investment coefficient in Latin 
America, and thus made it difficult to speed up the rate 
of development. If inflation is ruled out as a deliberate 
device for increasing the coefficient, the only way the 
Latin American countries can supplement their domestic 
savings and add to their capacity to import in order 
to develop more rapidly is to attract capital from abroad. 
This basic principle has been enshrined in one form 
or another in every body of tax laws. For instance, 
special laws have sometimes been promulgated to create 
in a systematic fashion a suitable climate for investment 
(Argentina) ; in other cases, preferential tax treatment 
is accorded implicitly or explicitly by the development 
laws (Central America, Colombia, E c u a d o r A g a i n  
preferential treatment may go hand in hand with the 
right to exploit certain natural resources, as, for instance, 
in the case of the mining companies in Peru.
When a country grants tax immunity to a foreign 
agency, thereby sacrificing part of its capacity to collect 
tax revenue, it does so with the aim of expanding the 
national product and its capacity to import. The merits 
of a system of tax incentives for foreign investment 
should therefore be weighed in the light of the incentive’s 
actual effectiveness and the extent to which the product 
grows as a result of the investment.
For this purpose, it is useful to make a classification, 
even on a broad basis, of the activities that offer a good 
field for foreign investment, dividing them into three 
groups as follows; (a) those that produce for the home 
market extensive use of domestic factors; (6) those that 
produce mainly for export and also employ a consid­
erable amount of domestic factors; and (c) those pro­
ducing mainly for export but employing domestic fac­
tors on a very small scale. The efficacy of the incentive 
will first be determined, and then its effects in each of 
the three cases.
10 See E. Cary Brown, National Tax Journal, vol. VIII, 
March 1955.
11 Financial claims have at times triumphed over attempts to 
stimulate investment. In Argentina, profits invested in certain 
fixed assets have been tax-free for many years. But on 29 
August 1962 the exemption had to be lifted—except in the 
agricultural sector—for urgent financial reasons.
12 These laws seldom discriminate between the national and the 
foreign investor. At the very most, they refrain from extending 
all the inamunities to the foreigner who is taxed in his own 
country on his foreign investment income. The reason for this 
is that the tax nullifies the incentive that the development laws 
are attempting to provide.
110
The economic reasons for which capital seeks an outlet 
in other countries stem from the fact that a higher 
rate of profit is obtainable there than in its country 
of origin. The greater the risk in investing abroad, the 
more difference there has to be between the two rates 
of profit. Political and social tensions, economic in­
stability and the prospect of recurring devaluation in a 
country— whether they actually exist or are liable to 
arise— raise the degree of risk to the point where a 
high rate of profit no longer holds out any attraction. 
What is more, in many developing countries, the profits 
from foreign investment are subject to payment of 
income tax, and if a similar charge is levied in the 
country where the investment is made, the difference 
between tbe two rates of profit will have to be increased 
by the amount of the double taxation.
Given the different economic characteristics that ob­
tain as regards the relative supply of factors in the 
investing and recipient countries, the rate of return is 
likely to be much higher in the latter. In fact, if the 
remuneration of the individual factors depends on their 
relative availability, in countries such as those of Latin 
America, where labour is abundant and capital scarce, 
capital remuneration will be relatively higher. In the 
developed countries, which have plenty of capital but 
little labour, the rate of yield will be lower. This provides 
the requisite economic base for creating an international 
flow of capital, but whether the flow will materialize 
depends on the adverse factors that reduce the rate of 
profit in itself.
Tax exemptions may be a means of totally or partially 
offsetting the effects of these adverse factors. Their 
efficacy will depend on the difference between the amount 
of the exemption and the degree of risk involved. In 
many cases exemption thus becomes completely imprac­
ticable. But certain countries where the degree of risk 
is likely to be high continue to receive a flow of private 
foreign investment. This is often because the capital 
is granted certain privileges that are marginal or sup­
plementary to tax incentives, such as exclusive rights 
of exploitation, concessions or the like, thereby distort­
ing the market in favour of activities holding out pros­
pects of high profits. Naturally these market imperfec­
tions can, and actually do, constitute a more powerful 
force than tax incentives for luring capital from abroad. 
But the question that immediately presents itself is 
whether it is politically, economically and socially ex­
pedient to create market imperfections in order to favour 
foreign investment.
To sum up, in the countries where the degree of 
risk is low because of their political, social and economic 
stability, tax exemptions may act as a stimulus to foreign 
investment.
In this respect, Puerto Rico is often held up as a case 
in point. But it should be stressed again that it is not 
applicable to the Latin American countries considered 
individually and not as a region. The case of Puerto 
Rico is in fact, one of a regional reallocation of resources 
for the reasons given in section 1. Let it now be assumed 
that all the Latin American countries grant equal fran­
chises to foreign capital. This will not be a special in­
centive to foreign capital from the standpoint of the 
individual countries since the same treatment is given 
by each one. By definition, an incentive requires the 
existence of comparative advantages, which would dis­
appear should a blanket franchise be granted by the 
whole region. Foreign capital would continue to flow 
into Latin America, but to specific countries, and cer­
tainly not in response to the tax incentive, but because, 
from the investor’s point of view, the economic conditions 
are more favourable in one country than in another. 
The same result would presumably be obtained if the 
rate of tax— exclusive of exemptions— were the same 
everywhere.^®
This argument explains one of the main differences 
between the case of Puerto Rico, which forms part of 
the United States market with its relative tax advantages, 
and that of the Latin American countries, which are 
struggling to attract that capital.
To a certain extent the economic effects of the tax 
incentive will vary in the three groups of activities open 
to private foreign investment. They are reviewed below 
in the corresponding order.
(а) If the activity selected by foreign investment pro­
duces primarily for the home market, undertakes import 
substitution and employs a large proportion of domestic 
factors, it will undoubtedly be boosting internal income. 
It does this directly through payment of the factors em­
ployed. And if, in addition, the bulk of the inputs used 
by the activity are domestic in origin, the investment 
will have a beneficial side-effect by stimulating allied 
activities and derived income jrayments on the factors 
used in them. Even if some of the inputs are imported, 
it v/ould always be advantageous for the value added 
to them to be national. This would also have a favourable 
effect on income and balance of payments (even with 
remittances of profits abroad included). An additional 
advantage occasionally crops up in that a certain type 
of technology may be introduced into the country 
together with the capital and will result in the training 
of a particular kind of skilled worker.
In this case, then, the fact that the State’s capacity 
to collect revenue may be temporarily diminished will 
be compensated by the benefits to the country of a larger 
volume of resources and a higher national income level.
(б) The second group comprising activities mainly 
geared to external markets, but using a high proportion 
of domestic factors, is similar to the first, the main 
difference being that one produces for export and the 
other for the home market. But their ultimate influence 
on income and the balance of payments would be the
same.
(c) The third group is entirely different. Here, the 
activity’s contribution to the domestic product and bal­
ance of payments depends to an overwhelming extent 
on the way it is taxed and the use which the State makes 
of the resulting revenue.Consequently, substantial tax
13 Tax incentives granted by the importer countries do not have 
the virtue of increasing the supply of capital in the exporter 
countries. Within certain narrow limits, the amount available for 
investment abroad is primarily dependent on internal factors in 
the countries that export capital. Thus tax incentives granted on 
an equal basis by the countries importing capital cannot do more 
than bring about a geographical redistribution of eapital. This fact 
should be borne in mind before intensifying the tax incentive 
push that is a common feature of under-developed countries and 
concluding an international agreement establishing equivalent tax 
treatment for foreign capital.
1^  It should be remembered that the economic activities included 
in the hypothesis make very little use of domestic factors of 
production.
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exemptions would greatly reduce the desirability of such 
investment, particularly when it is directed towards the 
exploitation of non-replenishable natural resources.
This will be made clearer if a specific example is 
given, as, for instance, large-scale copper mining in 
Chile in 1954. This activity employed less than 1 per 
cent of the active population in the country and con­
tributed less than 2 per cent to the gross product through 
internal factor payments— so-called local costs. Never­
theless, the net value of production was approximately 
19 per cent of the net figure for the country as a whole. 
And copper exports represented 60 per cent of Chile’s 
over-all external sales. If the State had not taxed copper 
mining, the total contribution made by this activity to 
the Chilean economy would have been 2 per cent of the 
product and not more than 11 per cent of the capacity 
to import.
With taxation, the picture changes altogether. The 
contribution actually made by mining to the gross 
product was about 12 per cent— through the revenue 
collected and its expenditure by the State— and a little 
more than 60 per cent to the capacity to import.
Now if Chile had reduced the tax rate on this activity 
by 50 per cent to stimulate copper production, what 
would the level of production have had to be merely 
to compensate for the loss sustained by the gross product 
and capacity to import? From about 350 000 tons, output 
would have had to climb to more than 600 000 tons. 
For technical and market reasons, and given the inter­
national production and price policies followed by the 
international mining consortia, it would not have been 
easy for Chile to produce the necessary quantity of 
copper over the short term, and the result would have 
been a net loss for the economy.
Peru is at the other end of the scale from Chile, which 
levies heavy taxes on its big copper-mining companies. 
In Peru the tax rate is extremely low in comparison 
with the Latin American standard, and can be regarded 
as a potent incentive.
Up to 1962 at least, copper mining in Peru has, in 
fact, been subject to a general law on income tax.^ ® In 
1947, income tax, which was 7 per cent for mining, was 
supplemented by a tax of 14 per cent on excess profits. 
For copper mining, excess profits were defined as the 
balance over and above the profits obtained by the 
companies in any year from 1944 to 1946 inclusive. 
Later, in 1952, the law exempted mining in general from 
payment of the excess profits tax, and since then, copper 
mining has paid 7 per cent on its level of profits in 
any year between 1944 and 1945. In other words, this 
activity has been enjoying the benefits of a fixed rate 
on a fixed taxable base. Consequently, whatever their 
level of activity the mining companies pay what is in 
effect a fixed amount of tax. This substantial incentive 
is made even greater by the fact that amortization for 
depletion of the deposits is added to the cost of pro­
duction.
The same system was applied to the Toquepala com­
pany, although the taxable base was fixed by the Gov­
ernment on the basis of unknown estimates as the concern 
did not exist in 1944-1946.
Production trends did not follow the same course in 
the two countries. In Peru copper output increased by 
40 per cent between 1947 and 1952 and by 70 per cent 
between 1952 and 1959, while in Chile it remained at 
the same level until 1952, rising thereafter by 35 per 
cent. But, as taxation is the medium through which 
copper mining shares in the domestic economy, the in­
fluence exercised by the production increment on the 
national product and the balance of payments has been 
far greater in Chile than in Peru, given the real rate of 
tax in each case.^®
6. Agricultural taxation
There is a consensus of opinion today to the effect 
that for the last twelve years agricultural production 
in most of the Latin American countries has registered 
a relative stagnation, or at best a slow rate of growth. 
In some countries this is particularly true of agricultural 
production for export, and in others of production for 
domestic consumption. An analysis of this phenomenon 
and its causes would be out of place here, but studies by 
experts ascribe it to the operation of the following 
factors, separately or in conjunction: (a) problems de­
riving from the shortcomings of the land tenure system; 
(h) the lack of entrepreneurial spirit, in many cases, 
among landowners; (c) the primitive nature of the tech­
nology applied; and (d) diversion of resources to other 
sectors. The last two factors are generally linked to the 
effects of relative prices, which have acted as disincen­
tives to agricultural production.
Given this state of affairs, some thought must be 
devoted to the part the tax instrument can play— if any—  
in eliminating such handicaps to the development of 
the sector.
The fact that relative prices have been unfavourable 
to the agricultural sector may have been due to two 
basic causes; (a) depressed price levels on the markets 
concerned (the world market in the case of export items, 
or the domestic market in that of commodities produced 
for home consumption); and (h) the official imposition 
of low prices as a means of subsidizing specific branches 
of consumption or specific social classes. With regard 
to depressed markets for agricultural commodities, it 
is possible— although not certain, to judge from Latin 
America’s experience— that better prospects in respect 
of profits (price minus costs, including taxation) may 
do something to encourage production in the agricultural 
sector. Thus a tax reduction might improve the prospects 
in question. But in view of the established fact that the 
taxes to which agriculture is subject are low in almost 
all the countries of the region this improvement would 
not be very great, in terms of absolute values. It might 
even fail to make any difference whatever, for example, 
to the technology applied at present. '^^
18 At one time there was a small tax on exports, but it was 
considered, in practice, as an advance on the final payment.
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18 In Chile the rate is 50 per cent, with a variable additional 
charge which is used to stimulate production. This charge, which 
can be as much as 25 per cent, is proportionately reduced as 
production increases. Chile thus makes sure of obtaining tax 
revenue and also provides a certain amount of incentive to 
expand output.
11 The case of Argentina is worth citing in this connexion. 
From 1940 to 1945 the agricultural sector was affected by the 
export difficulties deriving from the Second World War. The 
Government had virtually to subsidize farming in order to 
maintain its future production possibilities. In the years im­
mediately following the war, the Government took advantage of
Some interest in the possible links between agricultural 
taxation, the land tenure system and production incre­
ments is now becoming apparent, although the literature 
on the subject has not yet systematically and exhaustively 
covered the ground. It does, however, advocate a specific 
form of the ancient land tax, with heavier rates, so that 
penalization of the sector would be used as an “ incentive”  
to attain the targets established.
The tax base would then be the imputed value of the 
potential production of the land held, and that value 
could be established either individually for every plot 
of land or by assigning to each holding the average 
potential value determined for the area in which the 
land is situated. Prerequisites for assessment on this basis 
are a cadastral survey and the consequent availability of 
such individual values or area averages. Another prob­
lem involved is that of periodic reassessment, which of 
course becomes easier if the base is established in terms 
of the average for each area. In any case, given a certain 
degree of price stability, reassessment would be neces­
sary only at fairly long intervals. The cadastral survey 
system, whose merits have been exalted by European 
economists ever since Maria Theresa of Austria intro­
duced it in Lombardy, implies the assumption that values 
will remain constant for periods of not less than ten 
years, if it is to produce the desired effects on the level 
of agricultural output. Should price instability processes 
continually recur, the base constituted by the average 
assessment for the area, and price indices for agricultural 
commodities, would facilitate the necessary periodic re­
assessment without too much trouble or unduly high 
costs.
The tax base thus established, some of the supporters 
of this type of taxation advocate the levying of a propor­
tional tax, while others maintain that progressive rates 
should be applied, or that the two should complement 
each other, as in the case of personal income tax.
Given the tax base in question, the idea of a propor­
tional tax is to promote an increase in agricultural pro­
ductivity and consequently in the sector’s total output. 
If the rate of taxation is sufficiently high, it will compel 
landowners to farm by more intensive and rational meth­
ods in order to reduce the real incidence of the tax 
and avert the losses or curtailment of their present 
profits.^® To supplement such a proportional rate with a 
progressive system would not only serve the objective 
of expanding production, but would also, after its own 
fashion, further the redistribution of agricultural land 
and income. The establishment of a tax schedule by 
virtue of which higher marginal rates are applicable as
the upward trend in world prices to finance its own expenditure 
by appropriating, through the exchange rate and official purchases 
of crops, the potential profits of the agricultural sector. From 
1955 up to the present date the authorities have continued to 
provide agriculture with aU sorts of incentives, even promoting 
a mass internal redistribution of national income in favour of 
this sector. Nevertheless, production has not responded, and still 
less have there been any large-scale efforts to improve the 
technology applied. On the other hand, there have been no 
cases of selling of land or decreases in the relative values of 
agricultural property, even in the periods when “ disincentives”  
were strongest for this activity.
18 The criticism levelled at this proportional rate is that it 
would not be equitable, since the average rate applied is the 
same whatever the potential value of the land held. Even if 
smallholders were taxed at a lower rate or exempted, other 
taxpayers would stiU be carrying unequal shares of the burden.
land values increase, determines de facto that the average 
rate rises with these values. Thus, in the last analysis, 
given a particular structure of the progressive scale of 
rates, the landowner will find it expedient gradually 
to get rid of some of his land when its aggregate value 
exceeds a specific tax base, so that he may move into 
a lower tax bracket, where he is subject to a less burden­
some average rate. Since, in addition, the trend of 
property taxes is towards capitalization (at the dis­
counted value of the tax in accordance with the prevail­
ing rate of interest), the sales value of the land will 
consequently decline, and this will facilitate its sub­
division. Again, as will readily be understood, progressive 
rates would operate, as in all cases of progressive taxa­
tion, as an instrument of income redistribution, or 
rather, of equalization of income.
Of course, if a tax of this kind is to be given an 
organic and efficient structure, the following basic ele­
ments must be available: (a) a good soil map, preferably 
prepared on the basis of aerophotogrammetry; (6) a 
good cadastral survey; and (c) a satisfactory cadastral 
assessment consistent with the presumed or potential 
value of each farm’s yield.
The structural and organizational complexity of this 
tax base, its cost and the technical elements entailed, in 
conjunction with other factors, have precluded the 
creation of a favourable atmosphere for the introduction 
of this tax in Latin America. Throughout the region 
there is a tendency to cling to obsolete models, character­
ized by defective cadastral surveys, under-assessment 
and low tax rates. The sole exception, up to a point, 
will shortly be the case of Chile, which already possesses 
the aerophotogrammetrical and cadastral surveys with 
the assessment referred to, an agricultural tax bill having 
been presented to Congress (in 1962) on this basis. 
As far as is known at present, a single rate will be 
applied, and will not be very high.
In any event, until the above-mentioned basic elements 
are available, there are alternative ways of taxing agri­
culture on more rational bases, which, taking into con­
sideration the principle of penalization, will he conducive 
to expansion of this sector’s output and the tax revenue 
accruing therefrom.
7. Clash between the provision of incentives and the 
collection of tax revenue
Broadly speaking, the provision of tax incentives 
— through exemption, derating, credits, deductions, pref­
erential treatment, etc.— means that during a preliminary 
phase the State collects less tax revenue than it would 
obtain if such incentives were not granted. Over the 
longer term, if the operation of the incentives has been 
effective and has promoted an expansion of national 
income, and if the tax system is sufficiently flexible, the 
State can recoup itself, by virtue of this dynamic growth 
process, for its initial loss of revenue. Hence it is es­
sential to ascertain the extent to which the tax incentive 
is really efficacious, and its influence on the elesticity 
of the tax system.
The considerable and increasing share of the public 
sector in the total national expenditure of the Latin 
American countries is a statistically proven fact. For 
an objective evaluation, a few statistical data will suffice. 
In such countries as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
etc., between 15 and 25 per cent of total national ex­
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penditure is effected by the State. From 20 to 30 per 
cent of this expenditure is channelled towards fixed 
capital formation, so that public investment averages 
5 per cent of the national product. What is more, gen­
erally speaking, in Latin America investment by the 
(public sector tends to constitute over 30 per cent of 
total investment, and in some instances even exceeds 
40 per cent.
The high proportion of national expenditure repre­
sented, according to the foregoing figures, by the ex­
penditure of the public sector is not due to fortuitous 
causes or purely arbitrary decisions. On the contrary, 
it is the inevitable result of the peculiar social and 
economic characteristics of the Latin American coun­
tries. In all of them there is a burning need to expand, 
improve and develop all the fixed social capital required 
for the process of economic growth. The formation of 
this capital, in the main if not entirely, is de facto 
incumbent upon the State.
In consequence of the low levels of national income 
prevalent in the countries of the region, of its regressive 
functional distribution and of the high propensity to 
consumption of the upper income brackets, national 
¡savings too are low, and are concentrated in a few 
hands: in the small high-income groups and (in the 
shape of undistributed profits and reserves) in enter­
prises which are also largely controlled by the same 
group of income recipients. In almost aU the Latin 
American countries, the vast population sectors whose 
income levels are low have virtually no savings capacity 
whatever. Thus, as a general rule, the requisite bases 
for the establishment of broad and efficient capital 
markets are lacking. These limited and concentrated 
private savings are of course channelled partly towards 
productive activities whose rate of return is high, but 
partly also towards investment whose social productivity 
is negligible.
By its very nature, investment in basic social capital 
entails a rate of saving too intensive for most private 
investors to reach, in default of the capital markets 
referred above. Since, moreover, the financial yields to 
be expected from such investment are low, and usually 
take a long time to mature, it is completely without 
interest for private capital. For the same reason, and 
others that there would be no point in adducing here, 
this type of investment holds no attraction for foreign 
private capital (direct investment) either. Moreover, a 
considerable proportion of the fixed social capital in 
question is of such a nature as to fall within what, 
in Latin America, is regarded as the exclusive province 
of the State.
Fundamental as is the importance of such public in­
vestment in social capital, other causes are responsible 
for the increasing significance of State expenditure within 
total national expenditure. Professor Schumpeter devel­
oped the idea of the “ entrepreneur-innovator”  as the 
motive force behind the industrial revolution in the 
developed countries. Singer, in his turn, introduced the 
concept that in the under-developed countries the “ entre­
preneur-innovator” has been partly superseded by the 
“ innovator-State” , meaning by this that in such coun­
tries the public sector has become one of the dynamic 
factors in their internal economy. In most of the Latin 
American countries this is an established fact and must 
be accepted as such.
Either directly, or in co-operation with private capital, 
the State has been discharging the role of entrepreneur 
in Latin America in many productive activities which 
are highly capital-intensive and which, in one way or 
another, had to be undertaken, for over-riding reasons 
of economic policy, without much regard for their short­
term financial yield, since they merited high priority 
from the standpoint of an effective basis for more rapid 
economic development.
This cursory explanation may serve to give some idea 
of an important— although not the only— aspect of the 
contribution the State must make to economic develop­
ment, the magnitude of the non-inflationary resources 
that it must tap, mobilize and channel in a process of 
development combined with stability, and the complexity 
of execution of this State function.
The counterpart of the allocation of real resources 
which such real capital formation ultimately signifies 
is the financial fact that a proportion of the national 
product must be periodically tapped. The size of the 
proportion thus appropriated by the State for the fi­
nancing of the public sector will be determined by the 
rate and pattern of economic growth. But, to judge from 
the experience of the few Latin American countries 
whose development in the recent past has proceeded 
steadily and at a satisfactory pace, such resources are 
likely to absorb an increasing share of the product in 
the future. If, as is logical, the possibility of resorting 
to a swift expansion of public credit, or to an equally 
rapid inflationary process, is not entertained as a means 
of procuring the additional real resources needed by 
the State, the conclusion must be reached that the rate 
of growth of tax revenue must be higher than that of 
the national product.
Thus, the first purpose that must be served by the 
tax system is that of providing the State with the 
resources it requires: in other words, fulfilling an essen­
tially fiscal or financial function.
The effective discharge of this primary function has 
been hampered in the past by two different factors:
(a) the external vulnerability of many tax systems; {h) 
the low income-elasticity of these systems.
To judge by what can be seen, the tax system in many 
Latin American countries is highly vulnerable externally. 
In other words, the fluctuations in the external sector 
have a potent and similar effect on tax revenue. When 
such vulnerability exists, the tax system and revenue 
collection rely to a great extent on taxes on the external 
sector. For instance in Chile, Peru and Venezuela, they 
bring in 40 to 60 per cent of total tax receipts. Moreover, 
in a large number of Latin American countries, import 
duties alone account for 15 to 25 per cent of over-all 
tax proceeds.
The annual fluctuations that took place in Latin 
America’s foreign trade from 1948 to 1959 averaged 
more than 10 per cent, whereas those in the gross product 
barely amounted to 2.5 per cent. When tax revenue was
1® The income-elasticity of the tax system, or, more shortly, 
its “ elasticity coefficient” , may be defined as the ratio between 
that percentage of the increment in tax revenue which derives 
from the growth of the national product and the percentage of 
total revenue represented by the whole increment. If this ratio 
or coefficient is less than unity, the system is inelastic, and if 
it is greater than unity the system is elastic. Of course, the 
higher the coefficient the more elastic the system will be.
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obtained largely from foreign trade, it was affected far 
more profoundly than when it depended on the gross 
product. This, together with the system’s low income- 
elasticity, which derives partly from the same circum­
stances and partly from others that need not be enlarged 
upon here, make it extremely dilEcult to finance the 
public sector without inflation.
In view of the magnitude of the resources required 
to finance a volume of public expenditure that should 
increase more than the gross product in the near future, 
the problem presented by the inflexibility of the system 
is only too clear. When there is tax rigidity, any infla­
tionary process will keep public revenue lagging behind 
expenditure.^® And even without inflation, rapid eco­
nomic growth in the present state of the tax system 
will also mean that receipts will be less than public 
expenditure and the national product.^^
Both the external vulnerability of the tax system and 
its inability to adopt to the growth of the product give 
rise to induced fiscal deficits which are, of course, very 
different in their origin and effects from those volun­
tarily incurred by the State to fulfil certain aims in its 
general economic policy. In fact, induced deficits have 
played a part in the undesirable processes of internal 
and external instability from which the Latin American 
economies have been suffering, by aeeentuating them 
when they already exist or by helping to create them 
in the first instance.
These few considerations will show the magnitude 
of the contradiction between the urgent need to finance 
an ever-larger volume of public expenditure and the 
broadening system of incentives, the first effect of which 
is to enhance tax rigidity. This contradiction can be 
evaluated from two points of view; the static, which 
limits analysis to the initial impact of the system, or the 
dynamic, which entails an investigation of the relation 
between ineentives, a continuous process of economic 
growth and the elasticity of the tax system. As the 
dynamie approach is the most appropriate for the 
problem, it will be dealt with in more detail.
20 From the standpoint of the real economy, physical resources 
can be allocated to the State as always, but on the basis of fresh 
inflation.
21 There is also a close relationship between tax policy and 
monetary policy. In actual fact, a chronic fiscal deficit precludes 
the possibility of evolving an autonomous monetary policy. Fiscal 
requirements, which cannot be opposed, in the last issue, by any 
central bank, lead to an expansion of tbe primary money supply, 
and eventually to the formation of a whole supply pyramid through 
credit expansion. To prevent this dilation from taking place, a 
restrictive credit policy would have to be imposed on the private 
sector. Without such a measure, the motivating factor in inflation 
would be reactivated. It is evident that the autonomy of the 
monetary policy is considerably jeopardized by fiscal benefits. 
In any case, it is believed that a restrictive monetary policy has 
a more unfavourable effect on private investment than a higher 
average rate of tax. Tbe depressive effects of the latter are felt 
at the level of the marginal rates that are related with the 
substitution effect of the tax, since a system with a high average 
rate of tax that maintains the marginal rates at a prudent 
maximum will not necessarily have an adverse effect on invest­
ment (income effect of tax). On the other hand, the depressive 
effect of restrictive monetary policy is not simply the result of 
limitations on investment credit but of its repercussions on the 
rate of interest and marginal utility of capital, i.e., on the motives 
at the very root of the propensity to invest. Consequently, once 
it is believed that public expenditure has to be increased over and 
above the gross domestic product, taxes must obviously be raised 
and the tax system made more elastic.
Let us assume that a system of tax ineentives achieves 
two of the basic objectives that it can aim at: to increase 
the investment coefficient (and of course the private 
savings coefficient), and to increase the product-capital 
ratio over the long term. This would promote economic 
development, in the sense of a process that brings about 
not only a more rapid increase in the product than in 
the population, but also a change in the structure of 
production.^2
The constant increase in production that is achieved 
means in fact that there is a constant broadening of the 
tax base of the economy. As far as direct taxes (income 
and wealth taxes) are concerned, this broadening is 
due to the increase in national wealth and income at­
tained through economic development. As regards indi­
rect taxes it is due to the larger volume of internal 
transactions and imports that development entails. But 
what is the effect on the amount of tax revenue actually 
received by the Treasury? The incentives system by 
definition contributes to some extent in reducing the 
system’s elasticity. If the development process does not 
play its part in offsetting these effects, tax revenue, on 
the basis of the already very inelastic systems that prevail 
in Latin America,^® will tend to increase less than the 
gross product and than public expenditure, as already 
indieated. Thus it must be determined whether economic 
development can endow a given tax system with more 
elasticity.
First it is useful to summarize what are some of the 
factors that affect the system’s elastieity:
(а) The elasticity is reduced when prices increase, 
through the time difference between the moment at which 
the tax obligation is incurred and the moment when 
the tax is aetually paid.
(б) The elasticity is associated with the rate structure 
of the prineipal taxes.
(c) The elasticity is restricted in so far as there are 
substantial taxes based on a fixed or specific value.
{d) The elasticity is affected by the changes in 
the structure of production that result from economic 
growth.
There is no prospect that economic development, that 
is the growth of the product, will correct the rigidity 
factor referred to in item (c ) , since this factor is inherent 
in the tax system itself. On the other hand it can affect 
the elasticity of the system through factors (a ), ib) and
(d ), which will now be examined in that order.
(a) It has been the general experience in Latin 
America that where a steady and rapid growth of the 
product is achieved, it is accompanied by some price 
increases. Venezuela might be cited as one of the few 
countries that in the fairly recent past has attained 
such a growth in conjunction with marked price stability. 
This is not the place to analyse the reasons for the 
positive correlation between economic growth and the 
level of domestic prices. However, the reference to this 
point is important, since if there is the same association,
22 In this last respect attention is drawn to earlier references 
to the reallocation of productive resources by sectors in order 
to achieve the long-term increase in the product-capital ratio.
23 As far as is known only two complete studies have been 
made on the elasticity of the tax system, in Chile and Colombia. 
In both cases it was shown that in the long run the system is 
Inelastic. Incomplete studies made in other countries lead to the 
same conclusion.
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or a similar one, between prices and development in 
the future, the time difference between the incurring 
of the liability and the payment of the tax must have 
a negative effect on the tax revenue-gross product ratio. 
In view of the difference in this respect between direct 
and indirect taxes, the negative effect is likely to be 
more marked in systems based on direct than on indirect 
taxes: for direct taxes the time lag between the incurring 
of the liability and the payment of the tax varies, but 
is always considerable; for indirect taxes, on the other 
hand, there is practically no time lag, and consequently 
the revenue-gross product ratio is not affected by price 
increases. Practically all the Latin American countries, 
apart from Colombia, base their tax systems on indirect 
taxes, and are therefore less subject to a reduction in 
the elasticity of the tax system through this factor alone.
(b) The rate structure relates mainly to income tax, 
and its effect on the elasticity of the system must be 
studied in the light of how broad the base of this tax is.
As already shown by such writers as Slitor, Musgrave, 
etc., there is a close relationship between the elasticity 
of income tax and its progressive, proportional or regres­
sive nature. A  tax with progressive rates is elastic, one 
with a proportional rate has an elasticiy of imity, and 
a tax with regressive rates is inelastic. This is because 
in the first case, as personal income increases it passes 
into brackets with increasingly higher marginal rates, 
so that the increase in personal income determines the 
application of a higher average rate. If on the contrary 
the tax is proportional, the average rate is the same 
whatever the level of personal income. If the system is 
regressive, the average rate will be lower for each in­
crease in personal income; this is true of a fixed equal 
rate for all income levels.
All systems of personal income tax in Latin America 
can be assumed to be, by and large, of a progressive 
type, and thus economic development will result in a 
more rapid growth of tax revenue than of the gross 
product. That is, the elasticity of the system will be 
greater, the more progressive the tax rates applied to 
the higher income brackets, for a given pattern of income 
distribution. But if the distribution itself is changed by 
the development process, the tax base will also be changed, 
and consequently the inelasticity of the tax system.
Whether the elasticity increases or decreases with the 
redistribution of the expanding personal income will 
depend on the broadness of the base, the form in which 
income is concentrated in the various groups of recipi­
ents, and the progressiveness of the marginal rates for 
each of these groups.^ In any case it seems likely that a 
process of economic development whose benefits extend 
to all social strata will have a favourable effect on the 
elasticity of the tax.^ ®
(c) It is easy to see why the elasticity of the tax 
system is changed by the structural changes in pro­
duction and imports that result from development. The
total elasticity of the system is represented by the 
weighted average of the elasticities of the various taxes, 
the weighting factor being the product of each tax. In 
other words, if there is a change in the relative contribu­
tion of each tax to total tax revenue, there is consequently 
change in one of the elements that determines the elas­
ticity of the system as a whole. And such changes in 
the contribution of individual taxes can easily result from 
the structural changes brought about by economic devel­
opment.
As regards imports, the changes in this respect that 
have taken place in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, 
for example, have meant the replacement of purchases 
of consumer goods (mainly durable) by domestic pro­
duction, the goods in question having yielded their place 
in the import schedule to raw materials and capital 
goods. The measures of encouragement used to assist 
these import substitution processes have included, at 
least in a limited form, preferential tariff treatment of 
raw materials and capital goods. Thus the changes in 
the structure of imports have presumably been accom­
panied by changes in the contribution of the duties on 
each group of goods to the total revenue from import 
duties. It is understandable that these changes will have 
had a corresponding effect in reducing the elasticity of 
the tariff system as a whole.
The effect produced on the elasticity of the other taxes 
by the changes that have been taking place in almost all 
the Latin American countries is less clearly marked than 
in the case of imports. But in view of the reduction in 
the relative importance of agriculture nearly everywhere, 
particularly in relation to industry and to certain services, 
and the lower taxes traditionally levied on this sector in 
the past (even including the export taxes levied in some 
countries in place of an income tax), it is possible that 
the structural changes that have occurred have led to an 
increase in the elasticity of the tax system as a whole, 
or a reduction in its rigidity.^®
If any conclusion had to be drawn respecting the 
relations between economic development and the elas­
ticity of the tax system, it could not be of hard and fast 
nature. From some standpoints an increase in elasticity 
might be expected, and from others a decrease.
This lack of any definite conclusion unquestionably 
indicates that a study should be carried out in each 
case to establish this relationship which, as previously 
indicated, is one of the main factors that offsets the 
relative rigidity that the use of incentives imposes, or 
can impose, on the tax system. All the more so since 
the above discussion fails to provide any clear indication 
that incentives invariably operate efficiently, instead 
of sometimes representing a pure and simple loss of tax 
revenue.
24 All this is on the assumption that the non-taxable minima, 
deductions and allowances provided for in personal income tax 
remain at fixed levels. Any variation in those conditions would 
also alter the tax base.
2BThis is also due partly to the fact that the present base 
appears somewhat narrow in certain countries.
28 No analysis has been made of the various taxes on wealth 
and property, because these are generally taxes on a fixed 
assessment base, established for a period of at least several years. 
Moreover, in those cases where the base is readjusted periodically 
in line with increases in prices, the adjustment always involves 
a time lag. Thus it can be assumed that the real increases in 
revenue from sHch taxes are due solely to increases in wealth, 
and consequently the rate of the former cannot exceed the rate 
of the latter.
116
CENTRAL AMERICA: INDUSTRIAL POUCY PROBLEMS* 
INTRODUCTORY NOTE
During the fifth extraordinary session of the Central 
American Economic Council, held at Guatemala City in 
August 1963, the Ministers for Economic Affairs, after 
discussing questions related to the industrialization 
policy that has been followed within the Common Market, 
decided to devote a meeting early in 1964 exclusively 
to consideration of the main problems facing economic 
integration in this sphere. The present text presents 
some background data and criteria on which such an 
analysis could be based.
It seems tbe right moment to examine the form and 
measure in which economic integration objectives are 
materializing in so far as industrial development is con­
cerned, and the extent to which the Common Market 
is being provided with its own bases of production ca­
pacity that will make the most of the incentives and 
opportunities created by free trade, customs tariff equal­
ization and the other instruments established for that 
purpose. Such a study would make it easier for Govern­
ments to formulate guiding principles as to the best way 
of consolidating wbat bas already been achieved, over­
coming difficulties and forging ahead to the attainment 
of new goals.
In this context, reference is first made to the chief 
legal and institutional instruments on which Central 
America’s industrial policy rests, and the most important 
of the principles and objectives that shape this policy
* The text which follows (SIECA/CEC-lll/Prov.30), prepared 
jointly by the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin 
America (ECLA) and the Permanent Secretariat of the General 
Treaty on Central American Economic Integration (SIECA), was 
presented at the sixth extraordinary session of the Central 
American Economic Council (San José, Costa Rica, 29 January 
to 1 February 1964).
are formulated, on the basis of the texts of the treaties 
that have been signed.
Secondly, consideration is given to the five countries’ 
more pronounced industrial growth trends during the 
fifties and to the significance of the Central American 
Common Market for their future development. On this 
basis, general lines are laid down for industrialization 
within the regional economic unit, with emphasis on the 
need for specialization and modernization of the tradi­
tional industries and, primarily, for the promotion of 
basic industries manufacturing capital goods and inter­
mediate products.
Attention is then drawn to the necessity of applying 
the existing instruments of Central America’s industrial 
policy in new ways, through the organization of a pro­
motional effort of completely regional scope. Initially, 
this effort should pursue the establishment of basic in­
dustries for tbe expansion of tbe Common Market on 
the manufacturing side, to which end a series of meas­
ures is suggested in connexion with the determination 
of these branches of industry, the presentation of projects 
hy private enterprise, feasibility studies and the prepa­
ration of specific projects, while proposals are also put 
forward regarding the various activities that should be 
undertaken, on a co-ordinated basis, by ICAITI, the 
Central American Bank and SIECA.
Lastly, as a special case, the problems affecting the 
assembly industries are analysed, including the condi­
tions that should be sought for their establishment and 
the different kinds of provisions it would be well to 
include in the additional protocol contemplated in the 
Central American Agreement on Tax Incentives to 
Industrial Development.
I. INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA
The Central American countries have made an appre­
ciable effort, under the economic integration programme, 
to promote the industrialization of their economies. At 
the same time, advantage has been taken of this effort 
to embark on the formulation of a policy of regional 
scope, embodying clear guiding principles as to tbe in­
dustrialization pattern it is sought to promote, and 
supported by a set of legal and institutional instruments 
for putting it into effect. Tbe aim is to remedy short­
comings in national industrial policies, relating particu­
larly to their lack of standardization, their want of 
clearly-defined objectives and the indiscriminate way 
in which they have been applied, as well as to tbe limita­
tions of tbe instruments hiüierto in existence— especially 
tariff protection and tax exemption— and tbe scantiness 
of tbe resources channelled into industrialization.
1. Principal instruments
The principal legal instruments of Central America’s 
industrial policy thus far established by the Governments 
are the agreements providing for free trade, a common 
tariff in respect of imports from the rest of the world, 
a uniform régime of tax incentives, and the régime for 
integration industries (and the first Protocol thereto) ; 
the tariff provisions relating to milk products contained 
in a Protocol to the Central American Agreement on 
Equalization of Import Duties and Charges; and the 
special tariff system for the promotion of industrial 
activity. Free trade, tariff equalization and the integra­
tion industries régime are already in force, but not the 
uniform régime of tax incentives, the special tariff sys­
tem and the first Protocol to the Agreement on the
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Régime for Central American Integration Industries. 
Moreover, an additional protocol on the tax incentives 
and trade system that are to be applied to products of 
the assembly industries within the Central American 
Common Market is envisaged, and is awaiting negotia­
tion, formulation and adoption.
The Central American Research Institute for Industry 
(ICAITI) and the Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration (BCIE) are likewise two basic institutions 
for the implementation of industrial policy in the area. 
The former has been in operation since 1955, and the 
latter since 1%1.
2. Principles and objectives
Through this series of legal and institutional instru­
ments the Central American Governments are pursuing 
the joint industrialization of their economies in the form 
of a single system of regional scope. They all furnish 
important incentives whereby the action of private 
enterprise can be usefully oriented towards manufactur­
ing activities that need to be established, strengthened 
or expanded. The general instruments— providing for a 
free-trade area and a uniform import tariff— create a 
favourable climate for industrial progress in various 
directions. Those of a selective nature— the Agreement 
on the Régime for Central American Integration In­
dustries and the BCIE— within the framework of the 
Common Market, provide powerful incentives for trans­
forming the existing industrial structure through the 
establishment of industries with considerable capacity 
and advanced and complex technology, and by adapting 
the established lines of manufacture to the possibilities 
opened up by economic integration as regards larger- 
scale production, specialization, and modernization in 
respect of machinery and equipment.
(a) Structure of industry
Step by step, the existing Central American treaties 
have defined the structure of industry it is sought to 
establish in the area. As a general principle, the criteria 
followed in the formulation of a uniform tariff aim at 
encouraging domestic production, and at facilitating 
purchases abroad of the raw materials, intermediate 
products and capital goods that are needed for industry 
and cannot be produced in the area. The régime for 
Central American integration industries, for its part, is 
designed to promote the installation of branches of in­
dustry whose technical characteristics and minimum 
plant size are such that they require access to the Central 
American Common Market in order to become firmly 
established and operate on an economic footing. Under 
the Central Ameriean Agreement on Tax Incentives to 
Industrial Development, in turn, State action mainly 
favours industries producing capital goods and raw ma­
terials, and those utilizing a high proportion of labour, 
raw materials, semi-manufactured products and con­
tainers of Central American origin. Lastly, the fact that
BCIE’s operations may be concerned only with integra­
tion projects or projects of direct regional interest de­
cisively channels Central American financial resources 
precisely into the type of manufacturing activities men­
tioned above.
(b) Balanced development
The uniform import tariff and the Central American 
Agreement on Tax Incentives to Industrial Development 
also provide for equalization with a view to preventing 
productive activity from being located in certain coun­
tries in response to disparities stemming from artificial 
factors— for example, varying levels of tariff duties and 
different tax rates and benefits— rather than because 
of disparities in real costs. The régime for integration 
industries, for its part, is designed to ensure that the 
basic industries at least are always located in such eco­
nomic conditions as will guarantee the viability and 
profitability of investments, which will be so distributed 
that each of the five countries takes a share. In addition, 
BCIE’s action is calculated to help reduce the disparities 
now existing between them as regards the relative stage 
of development of their economic infrastructure. As far 
as Industrialization itself is concerned, a similar purpose 
is served by the provision contained in the Central 
American agreement on tax incentives which empowers 
two countries to extend certain benefits over longer 
periods than the others.
(c) Competitive conditions
The purpose of the Central American Governments in 
forming the Common Market has been to lay the founda­
tions for a broadly eompetitive economic system within 
the area that will establish conditions making for tech­
nical progress, increased productivity, improved quality, 
and lower costs and prices. On the other hand, in the 
case of industries which, owing to their technical and 
economic characteristics and the as yet relatively small 
size of the Common Market, are likely to install only 
one plant, or very few, such instruments as the industries 
régime and the customs tariff itself afford means of 
safeguarding the interests of the consumer. Thus it 
should always be possible to obtain satisfactory con­
ditions as to price, quality and supply, even where the 
structure of production is not competitive. What is more, 
the Central American Economic Co-operation Committee, 
in resolution 115 (CCE), declared “ practices, arrange­
ments or agreements among commercial or industrial 
enterprises tending to restrict competition or limit trade 
among the Central American countries” members of the 
Common Market to be at variance with the aims of 
economic integration, and requested the ECLA secre­
tariat and SIECA to undertake the necessary research 
and studies for the formulation of a draft protocol to 
the General Treaty defining the practices in question 
and establishing the penalties and measures applicable 
in such cases.
n . GENERAL FEATURES OF INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHIN THE COMMON MARKET
1. Industrial development and economic integration in
1950-1960
The economic integration measures adopted by the 
Central American Governments during the previous
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decade, coupled with the favourable conditions under 
which the purchasing power of exports to the rest of the 
world developed in the early post-war years, helped to 
bring about an industrialization process presenting sat­
isfactory characteristics in several respects. In so far as 
the first factor is concerned, the market expansion 
achieved through the system of bilateral free-trade 
treaties and the raising of import tariffs at the national 
level led to a sustained rate of growth of industrial in­
vestment which consistently exceeded that of total invest­
ment, while at the same time the idle production capacity 
in this sector decreased.
Industrial production was thus able to expand at an 
appreciably higher rate than the economy as a whole, 
and trade in manufactured goods became the most 
dynamic element in a process of inter-Central American 
trade which, in the aggregate, likewise grew rapidly. 
These two factors kept the percentage share of the value 
of imports in the area’s total consumption of industrial 
products at a fairly steady level, and probably also 
helped to stave off the even heavier pressures which 
demand for imports would otherwise have exerted on 
the balance of payments.
However, up to 1960 the stimulus deriving from the 
expansion of the available market through free-trade 
treaties had not yet been sufficient to promote a change 
of the manufacturing sector which, by its nature and 
scope, could lay the bases of an economic development 
process founded on industrialization.^ Throughout the 
period in question the internal structure of industry 
registered no important changes, and continued to rest 
mainly on a few traditional activities— foods, beverages, 
tobacco, clothing, textiles, wood and furniture— which 
represented a virtually unvarying proportion (approxi­
mately 85 per cent) of the sector’s total value added. 
Moreover, there was practically no increase in the in­
dustrial sector’s share in Central America’s total pro­
duction, notwithstanding the growth recorded; nor was 
there any appreciable reduction in the percentage of 
total consumption of manufactured goods covered by 
imports. The explanation of this lies in the initial small­
ness of the manufacturing sector within the economy 
as a whole.
The absence of any over-all import substitution process 
is therefore clear, if this is taken to mean satisfying 
demand with increasing proportions of domestic pro­
duction. Save in the textile industry— where the share 
of production in domestic supply rose from 30 to over 
50 per cent— in almost all the other branches manufac­
turing final consumer goods the proportion of imports 
remained at practically the same level, increasing slightly 
in the case of durable consumer goods, intermediate 
products and capital goods.
2. The Common Market as the base for transforming 
national industrialization patterns
The existing structure of industry in the Central 
American countries owes its formation to the develop­
ment of manufacturing activity within the context of 
domestic markets which are narrow on account of both 
low per capita income levels and numerically small 
populations. In this respect, the bilateral treaty system 
had the effect of considerably broadening the individual 
country markets, without, however, succeeding in giving 
them a different and completely regional dimension. Thus
1 The cumulative growth rate of the per capita gross domestic 
product in the fifties was barely 0.6 per cent annually.
the main branches of activity in existence are in fact 
the only ones it has been possible to establish on the 
basis of such markets. Moreover, the degree of import 
substitution achieved is probably the most that can be 
expected within that pattern of industrial development. 
The narrowness of the markets often meant that the 
limited production possibilities were utilized in plants 
of less than economic size, besides giving rise to duplica­
tion of investment and the existence of idle capacity.
With the Common Market, however, the Central 
American Governments have given available demand 
that regional dimension which the very nature of the 
bilateral treaties precluded, and have thereby created 
the conditions necessary for beginning the transformation 
of five circumscribed structures of manufacturing in­
dustry into a unified industrial system within the frame­
work of the Central American economy as a whole. 
These new conditions now make it possible to organize 
the traditional industries on more economic bases, and 
thus to eliminate the unfavourable characteristics result­
ing from their establishment at a mainly national level. 
Furthermore, they permit the development of a series 
of new productive activities whose installation had pre­
viously not been feasible for want, inter alia, of a suffi­
ciently wide market.
Some of these changes have already begun to take 
shape. A new spirit of enterprise is evident within the 
Common Market, actively directed towards making the 
most of the trade opportunities and the favourable con­
ditions for industrial investment which it offers. Thus, 
a start has already been made, or is about to be made, 
on such non-traditional lines of production as tires, 
metal structures, copper cable and wire, caustic soda 
and chlorine, insecticides and fertilizers, petroleum 
products and other raw materials for the chemicals 
industry.
Nevertheless, Central America’s industrialization proc­
ess is dependent not only upon the Common Market 
but also upon a network of measures, likewise of regional 
scope, which will have to be implemented on the supply 
side, inasmuch as exploitation of the industrial devel­
opment possibilities that have been created calls for a 
good deal of co-ordination, technical assistance and 
financing which may or may not materialize sponta­
neously within the Common Market. The satisfaction 
of these requirements should therefore be sought by 
supplementary means, in order to ensure the early real­
ization of the development aims pursued.
To these requisites must be added the demands made 
by economic development on industrialization, in view 
of the none-too-favourable outlook for traditional export 
activities. According to a number of studies, the im­
mediate prospects for the expansion of these exports 
to the rest of the world are limited on the whole, 
whether intrinsically or in relation to development needs, 
since their rates of growth will probably fluctuate be­
tween 2 and 4 per cent annually. On this basis, pro­
visional estimates indicate that even the attainment of 
the comparatively modest annual growth rate of 2.5 per 
cent in the per capita gross product— as laid down in 
the Charter of Punta del Este— would entail the ex­
pansion of the industrial sector at a rapid and sustained 
rate, and the share of domestic production in Internal 
supply would have to be substantially increased, by
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means of a net industrial investment of some $1000 
million over a period of ten years.^
3. Development of industries manufacturing consumer 
goods
The production of manufactured consumer goods iviU 
have to play a major part in the development of the 
Central American Common Market. The provisional 
estimates based on the above-mentioned calculations 
indicate that of the increase of nearly $980 million that 
industrial output would have to achieve between 1960 
and 1970, approximately two thirds of $658 million 
would correspond to this type of product. The attain­
ment of such large increments would necessitate, inter 
alia, taking the maximum advantage of the opportunities 
afforded by the recently established regional market 
base. In the case of traditional industries, this would 
involve plant specialization, modernization of machinery 
and equipment, and expansion of plant capacity to more 
economic dimensions. Productivity could thus be im­
proved, and consumers could be guaranteed prices more 
in line with their income levels. At the same time, avail­
able capacity could be more eflSciently utilized, and the 
import substitution process could be intensified.
Such tasks pose problems of an eminently regional 
nature, whose solution calls for the co-operation both 
of member Governments and of producers already estab­
lished in the different countries. Plant specialization in 
any given country, for example, will clearly depend on 
the decisions adopted in that field by enterprises situated 
in the rest of the Common Market area. Furthermore, 
investment in additional production capacity within the 
industries in question should also be determined from 
the standpoint of the area as a whole, in the light 
of requirements that could not be met through specializa­
tion and modernization programmes. Thus, the future 
growth of these activities, instead of resulting in wastage 
of the substantial investment already placed in them, 
would have to be founded on the transformation, mod­
ernization and expansion of the available production 
base.
Demand for consumer goods could not be satisfied 
on the basis of the existing industrial structure, owing 
to its under-diversification and its concentration in a 
limited number of light industries. Moreover, the sat­
isfaction of such demand will necessitate giving con­
tinued impetus to direct import substitution in respect 
of all those additional items where it may prove feasible 
because of the size of the market and because prevailing 
conditions justify it from the standpoint of supply. It 
should be stressed that the limitations noted so far in 
the industrialization process are related to the lack of 
dynamism of its principal components, imputable not 
only to the fact that they are directed towards satisfying
2 This means, on an average, net annual investment in the 
manufacturing sector—which in 1960 reached the figure of Í45 
million—will have to be doubled, or in other words, that its 
annual amount will have to be increased until a sum in the 
neighbourhood of $140 million is reached by the end of the ten 
years. The foregoing estimates are based on projections of 
industrial demand derived, branch by branch, from the over-all 
growth target and from the relevant income-elasticity coeflScients 
of demand. On the basis of these projections, and of the import 
capacity envisaged, the increment required in domestic production 
was calculated residually. The amount of net investment was then 
estimated with the aid of coefficients applicable to the product- 
capital ratio, by branches of industry.
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the needs of the lower income sectors, but also to the 
circumstance that, having succeeded in covering large 
proportions of domestic supply in certain cases, they 
find few additional incentives to expansion in import 
substitution.
Production of consumer goods not currently manufac­
tured in Central America would help to modify the trends 
towards balance-of-payments disequilibrium deriving 
from the conditions under which traditional exports must 
continue to develop, and from the growing import re­
quirements generated by the economic development 
process itself. The same would be true of specialization 
and the introduction of new techniques in traditional 
industries, since such a process would enable Central 
America’s production to meet a higher proportion of 
its needs.
4. Need to diversify Central America’s industrial base
Were industrialization to continue to concentrate on 
the production of consumer goods, unilaterally main­
taining the traditional pattern, its development possi­
bilities would be somewhat restricted. Except where 
demand increases as a result of cost and price reduc­
tions due to the modernization of established industries, 
unless radical changes are effected in the distribution 
of wealth and income such branches of activity will 
expand comparatively slowly in relation to population 
growth and the income generated by agricultural exports.
Moreover, the basic conditions of industrialization in 
the confines of the individual country markets have 
given rise to an incomplete import substitution process, 
which is unquestionably inadequate in its response to 
regional demand, and within which there has been con­
siderable need for external purchases of raw materials, 
intermediate products and capital goods. This partly 
explains the sector’s inability to provide the necessary 
impetus for an integrated economic development process. 
Even when traditional exports were developing along 
favourable lines, the income increments that derived, 
for instance, from higher prices or bigger sales abroad 
resulted in proportionally larger increases in imports 
than in purchases of goods produced in Central America, 
both to meet the demand for consumer goods not pro­
duced locally and to satisfy the input requirements of 
established industries. If this situation were to remain 
unchanged in Central America, the limitations of the 
capacity to import— which, as noted above, are bound 
to continue in evidence— might well obstruct even the 
growth possibilities of consumer goods industries.
Obviously, therefore, in order to attain the rate of 
industrialization required, investment would have to be 
channelled towards the establishment of activities distinct 
from those producing consumer goods, and, in so far 
as the latter are concerned, towards the creation of 
supply conditions in respect of the requisite production 
factors different from those hitherto characterizing their 
development. These two questions are closely related, 
since such new branches of industry are none other 
than those manufacturing capital goods and intermediate 
products— for example, caustic soda, sulphuric acid, pulp 
and paper, rayon fibre, insecticides, fertilizers, tires, 
cement, rubber, steel, glass, petroleum products and 
plastics— and the element of difference in the new growth 
pattern of industries manufacturing consumer goods 
would in fact be the use of inputs of Central American
origin, in addition to the processes of specialization and 
improvement of techniques referred to earlier.
Production of capital and intermediate goods in Cen­
tral America will provide a source of such inputs, enable 
better advantage to be taken of the incentives to domestic 
production deriving from increased demand, and fa­
cilitate the expansion of import substitution, which thus 
far has been limited to final consumer goods and wifi, 
now also include the products used in their manufacture. 
No less important are the growth prospects opening up 
for these industries in terms of the use of their products 
in such other sectors of the economy as agriculture, 
the building industry and public works. The studies 
carried out to date suggest that these possibilities may 
be even more significant for Central America in the 
ensuing stages of its development.
All these factors— specialization and modernization 
of traditional industries, the establishment of new in­
dustries manufacturing consumer goods and the impetus 
to production of capital and intermediate goods— would 
make substantial contributions to the gradual linking-up 
of the existing domestic manufacturing sectors in a sys­
tem of regional scope and would provide the production 
base needed for the continued growth of inter-Central 
American trade. As regards this second point, it is clear 
that once the additional demand for consumer goods 
created by free trade and tariff equalization is exhausted, 
any rapid expansion of trade would have to be accom­
panied by diversification of its present composition.
5. Development of basic industries
It is the activities producing capital and intermediate 
goods that are referred to here as basic industries; basic 
in the sense that they create material conditions con­
ducive to the development of the manufacturing sector 
and that, properly founded upon utilization of the area’s 
own natural resources, they free economic activity in 
other fields, such as those mentioned above, from the 
handicaps that might stem from a limited capacity to 
import the industrial inputs required.
The basic nature of these industries derives from rela­
tions of interdependence that link them with one another 
and with other branches of industry and sectors of pro­
duction. Their products are utilized in a series of allied 
and collateral activities, from which they themselves 
obtain a considerable proportion of the factors of pro­
duction they need. Thus, the growth of any one com­
ponent will have favourable repercussions on the rest, 
through an increase in demand for their products or 
lower prices and better supply conditions in respect of 
their input requirements. Instead of petering out in a 
single phase, the industrialization that might be achieved 
as the result of an expansion of demand— whether this 
were due to increased export earnings or, as in Central 
America, to the establishment of the Common Market—  
would become a much longer process, and would branch 
out into new phases and other productive activities.
Just as important as these industries’ entry into pro­
duction is their establishment in satisfactory conditions 
as to size, location, techniques and the composition of 
output itself. In practice, these conditions are determi­
nants of the pattern to be followed by the industrial 
sector’s subsequent growth. For example, the adoption 
of relatively out-of-date processes or the selection of 
unduly small plant sizes in the basic branches of industry
might result in low levels of efficiency and in increases 
in costs that would tend to hinder the establishment of 
collateral activities, to reduce the expansion possibilities 
of those already in existence and to weaken the com­
petitive position vis-à-vis other countries.
Accordingly, it is necessary to select groups of indus­
tries in which the installation of a factory will create 
conditions favouring the emergence of others, which in 
turn will tend to strengthen the position of those pre­
ceding them, thus forming a nucleus of vigorous growth. 
The separate evaluation of an individual technique or 
production process may, therefore, lead to mistaken con­
clusions, if account is not taken of the whole combina­
tion of advantages deriving from a series of comple­
mentary activities. Industrial complexes provide a clear 
illustration of this point. Thus, for example, while the 
decision to install a refinery of a given capacity, based 
on certain technical processes, may seem unimportant 
if considered unilaterally, the outlook might change 
radically if the project were analysed as a possible focal 
point for the growth of a range of allied activities geared 
to the Common Market.
Industrialized areas whose structure of production 
has reached a high level of diversification and comple­
mentarity are in a good position to facilitate the invest­
ment process by virtue of the fact that the new plants 
or projects established can benefit forthwith from the 
favourable conditions created by earlier investment. The 
situation is different in the developing countries, where 
a predominant feature is the weakness of the links be­
tween different sectors and branches of activity. Hence 
it is that the promotion of complementary enterprises 
and activities is of major importance, often an essential 
requisite for the placing of investment. This is particu­
larly valid for the Central American industrial sector, 
since the characteristics of the individual country markets 
have precluded the establishment of a number of basic 
industries and, in general, the forging of solid intercon­
nexions between the various branches of the sector.
6. Relation between Central America's industrial and 
trade policies
The expansion of the manufacturing sector during 
the next ten years will derive its main impetus from 
import substitution within the Central American Com­
mon Market. Nevertheless, if the regional economy is 
to attain a growth rate capable of raising the popula­
tion’s level of living and absorbing the manpower surplus 
in primary activities or in unproductive services, indus­
trialization policy cannot be based solely on the pos­
sibilities afforded by the Common Market. The reason 
is that the Central American market is not broad enough 
to support certain basic industries for the development 
of which the area offers plenty of natural resources, such 
as forest and fish resources and certain mineral deposits. 
Even in the case of industries producing consumer 
goods, Central America’s demand will tend to set limits 
to the degree of specialization necessary for the achieve­
ment of substantial increases in productivity.
If to these considerations is added the need to 
strengthen the external sector of the Central American 
economies, it becomes obvious that industrialization 
policy will have to be grounded in future on an active 
trade policy aimed at promoting exports of manufactured
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goods to other countries or groups of countries. In this 
respect. Central America’s policy would not be confined 
to the conclusion of trade agreements for the opening-up 
of additional export markets. An equally important step 
would be the establishment of agreements with third 
countries or groups of eountries on capital investment 
and the transmission of techniques that would contribute 
to the industrial sector’s growth.
An attempt would thus be made to expand the struc­
ture of industry on a selective basis so that, through 
exploitation of the advantages offered by modern tech­
nology and efficient use of the area’s natural resources, 
at least a certain group of industries eould be assured 
of a competitive position in external markets. Concur­
rently, a pattern of foreign trade specialization would
gradually be established which was less dependent on ex­
ports of primary eommodities and increasingly oriented 
towards manufactures in whieh satisfaetory levels of 
productivity could be attained. An industrialization policy 
of this nature would not be directed towards import 
substitution merely for the sake of achieving a maximum 
of self-sufficiency. On the contrary, it would be neces­
sary to induce a struetural reform in domestic production 
and in foreign trade that would open up new or better 
growth prospects. Neither would it be solely a matter 
of increasing external income by expanding exports of 
manufactured items. An equally or even more important 
aim of the policy described would be to encourage the 
development of further investment projects and the 
establishment of other productive activities.
III. NEED FOR INDUSTRIAL PROMOTION ACTIVITIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA
There are certain important requirements for the 
establishment, under suitable conditions, of basic in­
dustries in Central America, and, in general, for the 
transformation of the pattern of industrialization in the 
countries of the area. To meet them, it is essential first 
to implement thoroughly all the basic treaties estab­
lishing the Common Market. This implies expediting 
the complete liberalization of trade and the full applica­
tion of the uniform import tariffs; giving effect, as soon 
as possible, to treaties— such as that on tax incentives 
and the first protocol to the Agreement on the Regime 
for Integration Industries— which have not yet been put 
into practice; and drawing up and signing those that 
are still lacking, such as the protocol on assembly 
industries.
It is equally clear that another indispensable requisite 
is to improve the procedures for applying the treaties 
and other instruments that have been adopted and estab­
lished. The passive nature of the existing agreements, 
by reason of which the possibility of their incentives’ 
materializing is dependent on moves that may or may 
not be undertaken or carried through, and the absence 
of any regional measures for applying tbe instruments 
in question in the interests of an entirely Central Ameri­
can industrial development programme, might in prac­
tice detract from their efficacy. This would mean that 
investment efforts would tend to be concentrated at the 
national level, and no advantage would be taken of 
the potential force and dynamism of a combined effort 
by all the countries.
A distinction must be drawn between general integra­
tion instruments and those covering specific fields and 
objectives. Application of the general instruments— those 
providing for free trade and the uniform import tariff—  
is automatic and coercive. Their fimction is to create a 
suitable climate for regional development, and they 
establish conditions— also of a general nature— calcu­
lated to foster the expansion of productive activities. 
From this point of view, their application has had sig­
nificant repercussions which, even during the brief period 
they have been in force, have been reflected in relatively 
satisfactory increments in industrial production and, 
above all, in inter-Central American trade in manufac­
tured goods.
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However, it is likewise clear that these instruments 
fail to provide sufficient inducement for industrial in­
vestment to be made on the necessary scale or in the 
fields that need to be covered. Obviously, the attainment 
of this objective will depend on many other factors as 
well, i.e., financing, availability of technical resources, 
organization and knowledge of the market, etc.
In its turn, the use of the specific instruments is in 
every case subject to submission of the relevant applica­
tion. As regards both the integration industries régime 
and the agreement on tax incentives, for example, the 
granting of benefits and the very possibility of their 
influencing the actual economic situation are dependent 
upon the action that industrial enterprise takes to that 
end. Similarly, ICAITI’s activities and the BCIE credit 
programmes are at present determined by the level and 
nature of the signs of demand for their resources ex­
hibited by Central America’s still incipient industrial 
groups.
The foregoing considerations suggest that the area’s 
industrial policy might not be sufficiently efficacious if, 
relying solely on its existing legal and institutional instru­
ments, it continued to depend on their passive applica­
tion. They also show that to eliminate this risk does not 
necessarily entail the conclusion of additional treaties, 
or the setting-up of new institutions.
The solution must be sought elsewhere, and spe­
cially— given the body of instruments existing at pres­
ent— in such methods of applying them as will ensure 
effective fulfilment of their aims. It would consist in 
making them really operative by means of a deliberate 
effort to channel a sufficient volume of Central American 
savings and capital funds from abroad into industrial 
investment, and in due course to establish productive 
activities that would bring about a sweeping change in 
Central America’s industrialization pattern.
In actual fact, this idea has been under consideration 
virtually since the inception of the integration pro­
gramme, and has lain behind some of the measures 
taken by Governments in tbis field. The question would 
now be to develop it completely and, above all, to convert 
it into an integrated effort in terms of specific objectives.
Therefore, the first step would be to decide which 
industries should be established within specific periods 
of time and with specific priorities and to organize 
concerted efforts for their promotion, enlisting the co­
operation of the private industrialists in whose hands 
they would be, and, where appropriate, establishing 
suitable links with industrialists and investors outside 
the area; collaborating in the setting-up of the enterprises 
in question; ensuring the preparation of projects under 
satisfactory technical conditions; raising and allocating 
the financial resources needed, both credit and capital 
(including working capital) ; in due course forming 
teams of trained and specialized personnel; and supple­
menting all these measures by the prompt granting of 
all benefits existing under the law, both at the national 
and at the regional level.
There is a close relationship between executive pro­
motional measures and this mode of procedure as re­
gards the implementation of treaties and the operation 
of institutions, which should find expression in a united 
effort to further and accomplish regional industrializa­
tion. Once the necessary treaties and mechanisms are 
established, their existence obviously acquires its full 
significance— t^heir possibilities gaining in depth and 
scope— only in relation to the promotional measures 
taken to give effect to their constitutive clauses and 
statutes.
This type of effort involves important requirements 
which would have to be formulated and met under na­
tional industrial development programmes, whereby 
greater efficacy would be lent to the activities now being 
carried out at that level. But this would not be enough 
to give the necessary impetus to industrialization, or to 
bring the structure of industry into line with economic 
development needs. The development of basic industries 
and the introduction of specialization and up-to-date 
methods in the traditional branches at least would call 
for the pooling and organization of all the resources 
at the disposal of the five countries in the performance 
of a joint task.
In the Central American countries, the small size of 
their commodity markets is not the only obstacle to 
development on a national base. Their capital and 
entrepreneurial resources are also limited. Logically, 
therefore, an organic relationship exists between do­
mestic market possibilities, on the one hand, and the 
capacity— also domestic— to exploit them, on the other. 
With the conversion of the five individual country 
markets into a single regional market, and the ensuing 
multiplication and improvement of investment oppor­
tunities, the capacity in question must also expand so 
that they can fie turned to account.
With a view to the establishment of a new relation­
ship consistent with the possibilities offered by the 
Common Market, the technical, legal, institutional and 
financial resources must also be pooled to provide it 
with the appropriate production base, the first step being 
to channel the scanty national resources into a single 
regional flow.
This requirement relates both to specialization in the 
existing traditional industries and to the establishment 
of the new branches of activity that will provide the 
basis for future industrialization, but it is particularly 
marked in connexion with the latter. Consideration wiU 
show that a groundwork of knowledge on production, 
processes and possibilities in the traditional industries 
already exists in Central America, and will in some 
degree facilitate regional efforts to expand the installed 
capacity of the larger plants, and to specialize pro­
duction, replace out-moded equipment and introduce 
the most up-to-date techniques. The picture is very 
different, however, as regards the basic branches of 
activity, since in their case it is a matter of establishing 
in Central America unfamiliar forms of industrialization, 
which involve complex technology and make heavy de­
mands in respect of specialized and skilled personnel; 
whose investment requirements are far greater than 
entreprenuers in these countries are accustomed to meet­
ing; and which pose new marketing and market 
problems.
It must not be forgotten that the multilateral economic 
co-operation movement in Central America, as distinct 
from others elsewhere, does not pursue trade aims alone. 
Another objective—-which is in fact an essential requisite 
for ensuring the viability of a process of sustained growth 
in the member countries— is to turn five economies 
that are precariously founded on national bases into a 
system of production with broader possibilities. As 
regards industrialization, the Common Market may lead 
to some measure of development and improvement of 
the existing manufacturing sectors. But the result is 
hardly likely to be full exploitation of their most im­
portant opportunities, owing partly to the dispersion of 
the efforts made, and partly to their probable tendency 
to cancel one another out. In this sense, a development 
process organized on the basis of keen competition be­
tween countries conflicts with the essential aim pursued: 
the economic unification of Central America.
The reorganization of industrial promotion in the 
two fields indicated above would make it possible to 
judge the different projects on their own merits and 
from a Central American standpoint, that is, viewed 
not by one of the parties only but by all five member 
countries. Thus, superimposed on the idea of each in­
dividual country’s taking advantage of the opportunities 
offered by economic integration in the national interest 
and by means of national efforts, would be the other 
idea of turning them to account in the interests of the 
whole area, on the basis of broader and more vigorous 
promotional activities of regional scope. This would 
be conducive to a greater community of interests, and 
narrow aspirations for industries to be established in 
certain countries would then be over-ridden by a unani­
mous desire to locate them in the most appropriate 
places and under the requisite conditions, since on this 
will ultimately depend, in large measure, the nature and 
pace of future economic development.
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rV. PRINCIPAL FACTORS FOR THE PROMOTION OF BASIC INDUSTRIES
1. Nature and scope of industrial promotion in Central 
America
The industrial promotion activities envisaged in sec­
tion III are conceived as a joint effort on the part of 
the agencies concerned with integration, in which the 
Common Market instruments are brought into play with 
a view to encouraging private investment and channelling 
it into those economic activities that are most vital to 
Central America’s development. If this work is to he 
effective, clearly the promotional machinery adopted 
should not he restrictive, with rigid procedures tending 
to hinder or impede action hy investors. On the contrary, 
what is required is to pave the way for private enter­
prise, pointing out investment possibilities, providing 
the financial and technical support needed for the exe­
cution of its projects, promoting external financing, etc.
The impetus to industrial development at a completely 
Central American level would have to be confined to the 
establishment and development of basic industries on a 
regional scale, and to the specialization and moderniza­
tion of the main traditional industries. In the broad 
field represented by import substitution in respect of 
consumer goods and by the expansion of production 
of such items in terms of industries of sub-regional size 
and of those exporting to the rest of Central America 
but based primarily on a national market, the promotion 
effort would continue to be incumbent on each individual 
country.
On the other hand, as the national industrial devel­
opment plans that are being drawn up on a co-ordinated 
basis in the five countries, with the advisory assistance 
of the Joint Central American Programming Mission, 
are gradually completed, it will be possible for the re­
gional aspects of industrialization to be formulated more 
precisely and to be incorporated in Central America’s 
promotional effort, for which they will provide guide­
lines.
It would fall to the industrial development banks and 
institutions of the individual countries to perform a key 
role in this regional promotion effort, besides the im­
portant part they have been playing, and must continue 
to play, in this connexion at the national level.
The following pages deal with the measures that could 
be taken in relation to basic industries. The question of 
specialization and improvement of techniques in the 
traditional industries could be considered later, in the 
light of the relevant studies being carried out by SIECA, 
the ECLA secretariat and the Joint Mission.
2. Schedule of promotional measures
(a) Definition of basic industries
A first step in the task of industrial promotion would 
be to decide which branches of activity are destined 
to play a strategic part in the ensuing phase of Central 
America’s industrialization process and would be given 
the strongest support by existing regional bodies, in 
order to ensure their establishment during the coming 
decade.
The studies on which the ECLA secretariat has been 
engaged since 1955, with the help of United Nations 
technical assistance experts, have made it clear that such
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branches of activity would correspond mainly to the 
chemical and metal-transforming industries; they would 
produce raw materials, intermediate products and con­
tainers for other manufacturing industries, agriculture 
and the building industry, and lay the foundations for 
the first Central American industrial complexes. Indus­
tries producing mainly for export would also be included, 
as well as some of the assembly industries which— as 
will be seen in section V— would in certain cases con­
stitute a preliminary phase in the establishment of basic 
industries on a regional scale.
Such studies would make it possible to draw up a list 
of basic industries together with the relevant data and 
criteria, supplementing the studies already carried out 
hy the ECLA secretariat with those that the Joint Central 
American Programming Mission is preparing, and others 
made in the different member countries. In view of the 
data and information already available, this task could 
be completed within the space of a few months, and stUl 
cover the principal branches of industry to be estab­
lished, say, over the next ten years.® Upon completion, 
the project in question would be subject to examination 
and revision by the Executive Council of the General 
Treaty, and would then be submitted for consideration 
and final approval, where appropriate, by the Central 
American Economic CounciL
The Economic Council’s approval of the list of basic 
industries would commit the Governments to the con­
tinued adoption of a joint approach to any projects 
presented and of joint decisions in connexion therewith, 
and likewise to giving calculated impetus and top 
priority to the establishment of such branches of industry 
on the lines best suited to Central America.
This does not mean that only projects for industries 
included in the list would be the object of promotion. 
Undertakings which, in the light of exactly the same 
criteria, are of equal importance to the region obviously 
merit the same treatment. The list would therefore serve 
as a frame of reference for co-ordination of industrial 
development policy at the Central American level.
(b) Presentation of projects hy private enterprise
Once the list had been approved, it would be circulated 
as widely as possible for the purpose of guiding inter­
ested parties in the preparation of projects. At the same 
time, an active and vigorous promotional campaign 
would be launched in the sphere of private enterprise. 
Initial dead-lines could also be set for the presentation 
of projects, with due regard both to the characteristics 
of each industry, and to the progress achieved in fea­
sibility studies for given branches of industry.
Projects would be submitted directly at the Central 
American level and would be dealt with jointly by the 
Governments through the economic integration institu­
tions. Similarly, any applications presented to national 
authorities would be transmitted by them to the regional 
agencies, so that decisions were always adopted in 
relation to the Common Market as a whole. This would 
tend to eliminate the current practice of many investment
8 The ECLA secretariat, for its part, in compliance with 
resolution 121 (CCE), will emhark in 1964 on a new programme 
of research on Central America’s industrial sector.
promoters of travelling through the five countries, often 
with the aim of selecting the most suitable site, not from 
the point of view of regional development, but from the 
angle of where the maximum profits might be obtainable.
It is vitally important that no time should be lost in 
making an evaluation in depth of the projects presented, 
and in furnishing them, where appropriate, with every 
available means of support to ensure their prompt execu­
tion. To that end, once the stipulated periods had elapsed 
and the relevant studies had been completed, the Eco­
nomic Council, aided by the Executive Council and 
other integration agencies, would select those best adapted 
to conditions and requirements in the region, and, also 
within pre-determined time limits, would in due course 
adopt the pertinent decisions, indicating the economic 
integration benefits and instruments applying in each 
case. In so far as the rest of the projects are concerned, 
it should be made clear that their non-selection did not 
imply that their establishment would be prohibited, but 
merely that they would not be promoted by the Central 
American Governments.
(c) Studies by branches of industry
The adoption of a list of basic industries by the Eco­
nomic Council would further estabbsh an order of 
priority for the allocation of resources and for all other 
measures taken by the Central American integration 
agencies to promote manufacturing industry. It might 
sometimes happen that the projects submitted were 
limited at first as to number and stage of preparation. 
In that case it would be suggested that the said agencies 
should encourage their completion and, where appro­
priate, the preparation of any additional projects needed. 
For that purpose, the agencies in question would need 
to possess basic information on the existing industrial 
structure in Central America, on the lines along which 
its development should be channelled in the future in 
terms of the present and potential size of the market, 
and on supply conditions in respect of the region’s 
natural, technical and human resources. This would 
entail embarking on a series of studies, by branches 
of industrial activity, in order to acquire the necessary 
criteria for estimating the number and capacity of the 
plants it would be expedient to establish during specific 
periods, and in relation to similarly specific market 
dimensions. A fund of detailed information would also 
be built up with respect to raw materials, containers, 
semi-manufactured products and capital goods of Central 
American origin which could be utilized as being readily 
available, or whose production might well be undertaken 
as a result of the installation of these industries. Fur­
thermore, conclusions would be drawn as to the nec­
essary criteria for selecting techniques and estimating 
investment needs, cost and price conditions, and pre­
dictable effects on the balance of payments,
(d) Studies on the feasibility, preparation, financing 
and execution of projects
Research by branches of industry would supply data 
for the proper evaluation of the projects submitted.'* In
None the less, there is clearly no reason to delay the promotion 
of certain industries that are obviously viable and of direct and 
urgent importance to Central America, until such time as the 
findings of this research are available.
addition, however, it would serve as a basis for the 
furtherance of the promotional effort, primarily through 
the preparation of comprehensive feasibility studies and 
the formation of groups of interested investors, and, 
later, through the formulation of plant design and en­
gineering projects, the constitution and financing of 
enterprises, the construction of plant and the initiation 
of the production and distribution activities concerned. 
Once the analyses by branch of industry and the fea­
sibility studies were available, it would be essential for 
national development banks and institutes to take an 
active part in this whole process, side by side with the 
regional integration agencies.
In this way, the promotion of basic industries would 
be established in the form of a complete process, begin­
ning with the assessment of investment possibilities and 
continuing uninterruptedly until it culminated in the 
execution of the projects.
3. Institutional machinery and technical and financial 
resources required
In order to put into practice in its entirety this effort 
to promote basic industries in Central America, the 
Governments would have to focus their action on three 
main points. It would be necessary in the first place 
to co-ordinate the activities of the regional development 
and integration institutions; secondly, to form a nucleus 
of high-calibre technical experts, duly supplemented and 
reinforced by technical assistance services from abroad; 
and, lastly, to have sufficient funds to cover the costs 
incurred in the work of preparation and evaluation of 
projects, and to back their execution with contributions 
from the Central American countries themselves. In 
relation to these three focal points, the activities of 
private enterprise, both regional and foreign, would have 
to be encouraged, as well as those of national industrial 
development bodies, while at the same time advantage 
would be taken of the experience of other countries, 
through close co-operation with technical and financing 
institutions similar to those already existing in the area.
( a ) Institutio nal machinery
One favourable factor is that the necessary elements 
for establishing an institutional base such as that re­
quired already exist in Central America, in the form 
of the various economic integration agencies which the 
Governments have set up over the past few years. ICAITI, 
BCIE and SIECA, guided either directly by the Eco­
nomic Council, or, respectively, through the Board of 
Directors of the Institute, the Board of Governors of 
the Bank and the Executive Council of the General 
Treaty, would be called upon to play a decisive part 
in all the tasks referred to, the first two within their 
particular spheres of activity, and SIECA by virtue of 
its functions in respect of the administration and applica­
tion of the treaties and agreements in force.
In this connexion, it would be expedient to set up 
a committee composed of the Director of ICAITI, the 
President of BCIÉ and the Secretary-General of SIECA, 
which, operating both directly and through technical 
working groups, would establish proper co-ordination 
among the three bodies, as well as between them and 
national industrial development institutes, at the opera­
tional level of their respective programmes of work, and
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would lay the foundations for effective implementation 
of the promotion programme. Its immediate tasks would 
also include studies designed to indicate the basic in­
dustries that should be promoted, whence it would pro­
ceed to the evaluation of projects, the orientation of 
studies on individual branches of activity, and the other 
measures that make up the whole complex of the tech­
nical, economic, legal and financial aspects of industrial 
promotion.
In ICAITI’s case, the formulation of specific objectives 
as regards the types of industries it is intended to estab­
lish and the priority to be assigned to them would clearly 
demarcate its immediate specialized personnel require­
ments in its capacity as an advisory agency concerned, 
in addition, with the evaluation of projects,® and would 
also determine the magnitude and nature of the tech­
nological and industrial research services that should be 
sought abroad. Similarly, it would serve to define the 
content of the Institute’s natural resources research pro­
gramme, which would be parallel or complementary to 
the longer-term studies included in the cadastral project 
sponsored by BCIE. ICAITI could likewise determine 
the needs of the basic industries to be established, in 
so far as specialized technical and administrative per­
sonnel and skilled labour were concerned, and on that 
basis could formulate and duly implement the necessary 
training programmes.
BCIE, for its part, could then quantify the financial 
resources needed during specific periods for the estab­
lishment of basic industries, and analyse and estimate 
the possibilities of internal financing. It could also make 
recommendations for the channelling of Central Ameri­
can savings into such industries on the necessary scale; 
examine the sources of external financing and draft the 
most appropriate procedures for obtaining the amount 
required; and, in general, decide what part the insti­
tution itself would have to play in the whole process.
In this respect, BCfE could serve to cement Central 
American capital, by helping to organize groups of local 
investors,® encouraging their participation in terms of 
specific targets for each industry, contributing out of 
its own resources to the capital formation of certain enter­
prises and granting them credit facilities, acting as an 
intermediary in the sale of bonds and other securities, 
and devising the financial organization and other features 
of the enterprises that would have to be set up. BCIE 
could further serve as a catalyst in the process of obtain­
ing the necessary foreign capital, arranging credit from 
different sources, attracting non-Central American in­
vestors and promoting their association with local groups.
(b) Technical personnel requirements
The formation of a regional nucleus of technical per­
sonnel and of appropriate supplementary services is 
perhaps the fundamental requirement to be fulfilled in
® Moreover, this is one of the most important functions that 
ICAITI will have to fulfil in the future, in order not only to 
facilitate the dissemination of present-day technology in Central 
America, but also to discharge in full the duties laid upon it 
in this field under various economic integration treaties.
® This is one of the major requisites that would have to he 
met in any attempt to secure the participation of local capital 
in new industries on a regional scale. Experience shows that, in 
view of the magnitude of the investments required, such par­
ticipation can be brought about only through the fusion of 
national interests in stronger groups at the regional level.
any effort to promote industry, ICAITI has made some 
headway during the past few years in training tech­
nological and industrial research workers. BCIE, during 
the brief period it has been in existence, has already 
succeeded in forming its first teams of specialists, and 
the national development institutes in some countries 
have made satisfactory progress in the same direction. 
The question would be to establish, on the basis of these 
achievements, on the one hand, a minimum groundwork 
of technical assistance resources in the Central American 
agencies themselves, and, on the other, to procure what 
was lacking— which would be a major proportion— from 
external sources.
This task would be facilitated in the case of ICAITI 
if the recommendation formulated by the recent United 
Nations survey mission to the effect that Special Fund 
technical and financial assistance be extended for a 
further five years as from 1965 were approved. As 
regards BCIE, it would be worth while considering the 
immediate setting-up of an industrial promotion depart­
ment as a specialized instrument to help the Bank to 
fulfil the function assigned to it in this field under the 
agreement establishing it. This department would be 
endowed with financial resources, both of the Bank’s 
own and of foreign origin, distinct from and supple­
mentary to the funds already available for BCIE’s exist­
ing credit programme. In line with the concept of a 
rational division of labour, the best course would be 
to staff this department with specialists in finance, credit, 
organization and promotion of enterprises, assigning 
to ICAITI experts on the technical aspects of industry 
as such. Working groups from both agencies and from 
SIECA could then pool their efforts and take joint action 
in relation to specific projects of their own or emanating 
from other sources.
While the teams of technical experts of the economic 
integration agencies would necessarily be larger than 
at present, they would still be small, both intrinsically 
and in relation to actual needs, owing to financial and 
other limitations. As stated above, they would constitute 
a minimum nucleus, whose activities, except in a few 
cases, would be concerned in general with the evaluation 
of investment projects and not with the carrying out of 
detailed studies by branches of industrial activity,'  ^ or 
with the preparation of projects. Obviously, this last 
task would require additional human resources which 
the agencies in question would not have at their disposal, 
because of the number of experts and wide range of 
specialities needed. It is precisely these services that 
would have to be secured from abroad, through the 
negotiation of contracts with well-reputed firms of con­
sultants, the establishment of working relations with 
other technological and industrial research institutes, 
and the conclusion of co-operation agreements with de­
velopment institutions and international and foreign 
financing agencies. In the case of development institu­
tions in the Latin American countries, this type of 
agreement might have the advantage of facilitating the 
expansion of the regional market base, and might pos­
sibly lead to the creation of favourable conditions for
t The relevant studies being carried out under the auspices of 
the Joint Central American Programming Mission should supply 
comprehensive data on various basic branches of industrial 
activity.
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the establishment of Central American industries pro­
ducing manufactured goods for export to some of the 
countries concerned.
(c) Legal instruments
The agreements already adopted by the Governments 
of the area in the context of economic integration, in 
particular those relating to a uniform import tariff, tax 
incentives, the integration industries régime and the 
special tariff system, are the legal instruments that would 
be used in promoting the development of basic industries 
in Central America. The question of which particular 
instrument or combination of instruments should be 
applied would be for the Economic Council to decide.
in each individual case, during the initial phase of the 
promotion campaign.
It should be stressed that, as far as the integration 
industries régime and special tariff system are concerned, 
the specification of the basic industries to be established 
within the Common Market would afford a good op­
portunity for Governments to demarcate once and for 
all their sphere of application, which should be confined 
exclusively to these branches of activity, though not nec­
essarily covering each and all of them, as has been 
suggested. It would thus be made clear that neither the 
industries régime nor the special tariff system would 
apply to all other manufacturing activities, which would 
be subject only to the general integration agreements.
V. A SPECIAL CASE: ASSEMBLY ACTIVITIES
Viewed as the initial phase in a gradual process of 
transformation into manufacturing industries, activities 
concerned with the assembly of certain industrial prod­
ucts are of importance for the economic development 
of Central America. In so far as they became an integral 
part of the structure of production for the common 
.market, they might provide incentives for the installation 
and development of other industries, facilitate significant 
technological progress in the countries of the area, and 
make an appreciable contribution to import substitution 
and to the industrialization of the Central American 
economic unit in general. Considered from this stand­
point, some of the activities in question might be classified 
in the group of industries considered to be of basic 
importance for the growth of manufacturing activities 
in the area, appearing as a special case within that 
category. Central American policy in respect of assembly 
industries would not then he conceived solely in terms 
of the creation of conditions which would permit their 
establishment. It would also take the shape— just as in 
the case of basic industries— of an effort of regional 
scope, aiming at their installation in accordance with 
the needs of Central American economic integration.
In the seventh transitional article of the Central Ameri­
can Agreement on Tax Incentives to Industrial Devel­
opment, the five contracting parties undertook to sign 
an additional protocol specifying (a) the system of in­
centives to be applied to assembly activities; (b) the 
trade régime to which the various assembled articles 
should be subject within the Central American Common 
Market; (c) the requirements and obligations to which 
assembly enterprises should be subject as regards the 
production or use of parts of regional origin; and (d) 
the producer activities to which the régime might apply. 
Until the protocol comes into force, assembly activities 
to which the above-mentioned transitional article is ap­
plicable will enjoy privileges and immunities for three 
years in respect of imports of machinery and equipment.
Assembly activities constitute a starting-point for the 
pursuit of specific objectives of Central American in­
dustrial policy, whose attainment will in practice depend 
upon whether the activities in question are established 
in such a way that they can be gradually absorbed into 
the production base of the common market, and upon 
the conditions laid down for their incorporation from 
the outset.
The background material presented below may 
facilitate the formulation of the additional protocol 
within the broad outlines stipulated in the seventh 
transitional article. It has been prepared on the assump­
tion that the structure of the protocol will be similar 
to that of the Agreement, and that there will be a basic 
relationship between the provisions of the two texts. 
In that sense, the protocol would seem to be essentially 
a supplementary instrument.
1. Field of application
The protocol would relate solely to such assembly 
activities connected with the metal-transforming indus­
tries, and with any other branches of industry com­
prising similar assembly operations, as might be estab­
lished in Central America with a view to their gradual 
transformation into manufacturing activities. Accord­
ingly, a distinction would have to be drawn between these 
enterprises and assembly operations pure and simple 
on the one hand, and, on the other, manufacturing 
proper. It would also be necessary to stipulate that the 
relevant regulations should in each case include quan­
titative criteria for making this differentiation. Strictly 
speaking, these criteria would relate to what minimum 
proportions of the total manufactured inputs used by 
the plants concerned were represented by inputs they 
themselves manufactured. But in the present case, they 
would obviously refer to minimum proportions of inputs 
produced in Central America.
The establishment of quantitative criteria would facili­
tate the administration of the protocol and would avert 
difficulties that might otherwise derive from the applica­
tion of its provisions in the case of those same indus­
tries, either to assembly activities pure and simple, 
which are of much less importance to the area, or to 
manufacturing industries, which merit more support. 
It would thus be made clear that assembly operations 
pure and simple, and manufacturing proper, were both 
outside the scope of the protocol.
2. Scheduling of enterprises
In the light of criteria established in defining the field 
of application of the protocol, it would seem that the 
conditions laid down in article 4 of the Agreement on 
Tax Incentives would be equally applicable to assembly 
activities. These conditions are as follows: (i) use of
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modern and efficient technical processes, compatible, in 
this case, with high employment levels; (ii) production 
of articles reqiured for the development of other pro­
ductive activities, or to meet the basic needs of the 
population; (iii) generation of a value added by the 
industrial process that is substantial in absolute or 
percentage terms; and (iv) furtherance of increased 
use of national or regional raw materials or semi­
manufactured products and, in general, of Central 
America’s natural, human or capital resources.
As specific criteria for the scheduling of assembly 
enterprises, the protocol should stress the technological 
enrichment of the Central American economy, the pros­
pects for rapid conversion into manufacturing industry 
and the stimulus given to the development of other 
productive activities.
3. Classification of enterprises
Since not all assembly activities are of equal signifi­
cance for the economic growth of Central America, it 
would be necessary to differentiate between them with 
a view to graduation of the benefits obtainable, so as 
to give sufficient encouragement to those whose impor­
tance was greatest. Consideration should be given to the 
establishment of two categories, on the basis of the 
nature and use of the goods assembled: the first would 
comprise capital goods and intermediate products, and 
the second, durable consumer goods.
This classification would be consistent with two criteria 
that are important for Central Aimerica: (i) the relation 
of the assembly industry to the development of other 
productive activities; and (ii) the importance of the 
products assembled from the standpoint of the defence 
of the balance of payments.
In the latter connexion, it should be borne in mind 
that the Central American countries’ requirements in 
respect of capital goods and intermediate products are 
likely to continue to expand at a rapid rate. In these 
circumstances, it would be feasible, provided that the 
resultant cost and price levels did not exceed given 
limits, to start the encouragement of domestic production 
by beginning with assembly operations, since imports, 
either of parts or of finished articles, would still have 
to be effected in any event.
The situation is different as regards durable consumer 
goods, inasmuch as the industries concerned, by defini­
tion, do not produce articles on whose existence the 
efficient operation of other branches of activity depends. 
Similarly, their products are typically for consumption 
by the high-income groups, and imports might be re­
stricted in case of need without the infliction of undue 
hardship on the bulk of the population.
4. Integration of assembly industries
Under the provisions of the above-mentioned transi­
tional article, the assembly enterprises covered by the 
protocol will be subject to requirements and obligations 
as regards the production or use of parts of regional 
origin, which would have to be specified for each in­
dustry, and would be applicable to producers both of 
capital goods and intermediate products, and of durable 
consumer goods. Similarly, they would relate not only 
to the initial proportion of parts produced in Central 
America, but also to the increase of that proportion
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and the progressive use of other products likewise of 
Central American origin, deadlines being specified for 
the completion of the various phases into which this 
process was to be divided. Neither the initial proportion 
of locally-manufactured parts nor the higher percentages 
subsequently reached would necessarily have to be ob­
tained through the activities of the assembly plant itself, 
but could be covered, in part at least, with the output 
of other Central American industries. Certain advantages 
would attach to this policy, inasmuch as it would foster 
a wider diffusion of industrial ownership, and at the 
same time would open up new possibilities for private 
enterprise in the area. Moreover, in the case of assembly 
activities already established, whose limited capacity 
might make it difficult for them to meet the requirements 
of the protocol directly, the use of parts manufactured 
in other plants might facilitate their compliance with 
its stipulations and enable them to enjoy the benefits 
of larger-scale production.
If parts manufactured in other Central American plants 
are to be used by assembly industries, several conditions 
must be fulfilled. In the first place, programmes would 
have to be established for the standardization and typi­
fication of parts that could be produced within the area, 
as a means of guaranteeing their quality and specifica­
tions. Secondly, it would have to be decided in each 
case which parts were to be made by the assembly 
enterprise itself and which were to be purchased from 
other Central American sources. Lastly, with reference 
to the latter, industrial promotion programmes would 
have to be formulated in order to ensure timely supplies 
of the manufactures concerned.
An aspect of the problem closely linked to the fore­
going is that of the number of makes of products as­
sembled, the range of models within each make, and 
the frequency with which their designs are changed. 
In view of the characteristics of the Central American 
market, the existence of even a small number of makes 
might seriously obstruct the subsequent development 
of the industry, by splitting up demand and making it 
difficult to reap the benefits of large-scale production. 
Working on the basis of a great many models, or chang­
ing them faster than was warranted by the duration 
of the useful life of the basic equipment involved, would 
also tend to increase investment costs per unit of output. 
Accordingly, the protocol should contain provisions to 
ensure that assembly activities would be established on 
the most economic lines possible with regard to the 
number of makes and models. This might be achieved, 
for instance, by granting concessions for the establish­
ment of assembly activities on a competitive basis, the 
interested parties submitting the relevant projects so 
that the Central American authorities might select the 
one which would best serve the interests of the area.
5. Tax benefits
The exemptions granted to assembly enterprises under 
the protocol might be the same as those established in 
the Agreement on Tax Incentives, including the deduc­
tion for reinvestment in machinery and equipment. This 
would be justifiable inasmuch as the protocol— envisaged 
on the lines described— would embody selective criteria 
analogous to those adopted in the formulation of the 
Agreement, and would include supplementary provisions.
designed to ensure the attainment of exactly the same 
objectives.
With regard to the amount and duration of the 
various exemptions, it would not seem advisable to 
accord the same treatment to assembly activities as to 
the corresponding manufacturing industries. Moreover, 
in view o f the priority criteria indicated above, the tax 
incentives applicable to assembly enterprises would have 
to be graduated in accordance with the importance of 
the various assembly activities for the development 
of the Central American economic unit. To that end, 
the protocol should contain provisions by virtue of which 
the enterprises first established to assembled capital goods 
and intermediate products should be granted the beneSts 
established under the Agreement for new industries in 
group B, while those for group C should be extended 
to plants assembling durable consumer goods. Considera­
tion would also have to be given to the conditions ap­
plicable in the case of activities associated with the 
establishment of any additional assembly industry com­
plying with the terms of the protocol, and to the in­
centives they were to be granted, where appropriate.
Thus, enterprises engaged in the assembly of capital 
goods and intermediate products would be granted total 
exemption from customs duties on imports of machinery 
and equipment, during a period of eight years; exemp­
tion from customs duties on imports of fuel (other than 
petrol) for the manufacturing process, raw materials, 
semi-manufactured products and containers, including 
assembly parts (say 100 per cent for the first three years 
and 50 per cent for the next tw o ); and total exemption 
from taxation on income and profits, assets, and net 
worth, for six years. Enterprises assembling durable 
consumer goods would be granted exemption from 
customs duties on imports of machinery and equipment 
for three years.
Once the tax exemptions conceded under the protocol 
had run their term, imports effected by assembly enter­
prises would be subject to the same tariff duties as the 
corresponding finished products. This might have an 
unfavourable effect on the activities concerned as it might 
prove difficult for them to develop their substitution 
programmes on the basis of Central American produc­
tion. To overcome this difficulty, the temporary tax in­
centives might be complemented from the outset by the 
adoption of differential margins in the common import 
tariff, by virtue of which the duties established be 
higher for the finished product and lower for its com­
ponent parts. The width of these margins would have 
to be defined in each individual case, with due regard 
to the characteristics and requirements of the various 
industries, but in conformity with the general principle 
that the more privileged industries should be those as­
sembling capital goods and intermediate products, and 
that proportionately lesser tax benefits should be enjoyed 
by assembly activities producing durable consumer goods. 
To that end, assembly enterprises would have to furnish 
complete information on the costs of imported parts 
and units. The authorities responsible for the administra­
tion of the protocol, on their part, should carry out 
detailed studies on these aspects of the problem.
Periodically, and preferably at intervals coinciding 
with the different phases of the substitution programmes, 
tariff margins would have to be revised and, where nec­
essary, adjusted to the variations observable in costs and 
prices of assembly materials of Central American origin 
in relation to reliable data on their imported counter­
parts.
The existence of different duties for finished products 
and component parts would mean that enterprises both 
manufacturing and assembling parts, assembly activities 
pure and simple, and the importation of spare parts, 
all enjoyed the same benefits. To prevent this, various 
alternative possibilities should be considered in respect 
of supplementary clauses to be added to the protocol. 
On the one hand, it might be stipulated that tariff differ­
entials should be applied only to products assembled 
in conformity with the provisions and regulations of 
the protocol. For that purpose, the duty applicable to 
the assembly material would have to be adopted in each 
individual case. It should be partly ad valorem and 
partly specific, the specific proportion being established 
with the aim of maintaining a minimum level of tax 
revenue. The ad valorem element, on the other hand, 
would serve to ensure that the duties payable by the 
assembly enterprise really did tend to decrease as its sub­
stitution programmes were put into effect, and more use 
was made of parts of Central American origin. The tariff 
differential would be fixed in relation to the duty on 
the finished product and the average incidence of the 
official values (aforos) assigned to its component parts 
in the standard import tariff. The scale of these values 
would have to be based— with whatever additional 
break-down was necessary— on the establishment of ap­
propriate tariff levels for parts included in substitution 
programmes and for those that would always have to 
be imported. The tariffs would likewise be applicable 
to imports of parts for assembly activities pure and simple 
and of spare parts.
6. Regional distribution of customs revenue
Some of the products of assembly industries are im­
portant from the standpoint of the revenue at present 
accruing from Central America’s imports of such goods. 
To prevent considerable losses— a^nd irrespectively of 
the internal taxation that might be established in ac­
cordance with the legal provisions in force— it would 
be worthwhile to consider the possibility that, in cases 
where external purchases of finished products were 
superseded by imports of parts for assembly operations, 
the customs revenue accruing from the latter might be 
distributed among the member Governments propor­
tionally to the sales registered in each country. To 
begin with, the Government of the country in which the 
assembly plant was situated might assume responsibility 
for collecting the revenue in question, managing it like 
a trust fund and distributing it to the other Governments 
in accordance with suitable registers that would have 
to be established. Subsequently, as the number of as­
sembly industries in the various member countries in­
creased, and while the Central American customs union 
was still in process of formation, these functions might 
be handed over to a regional office set up expressly for 
the purpose.
7. Application of the protocol: regional regulations
Since the characteristics and requirements of assembly 
activities vary from one industry to another, the protocol
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should be confined to the establishment of a series of 
regulatory provisions and criteria, which would be for­
mulated in specific terms in an additional set of regula­
tions to be drawn up in each individual case by the 
Executive Council and the Economic Council of the 
General Treaty. In line with the principles laid down 
in the protocol, these regulations would specify, inter 
alia, the minimum proportion of Central American parts 
to be used by assembly plants on first entering operation, 
the amount by which and the time limits within which that 
proportion should be increased, tariff differentials, and 
questions relating to the number of makes and models. 
The regulations would serve as a framework for the 
formulation of agreements or decrees in respect of 
classification.
Obviously, for all these purposes comprehensive studies 
on the various technical and economic aspects of the 
establishment and development of assembly activities 
would be required. Within the regional approach de­
scribed in earlier sections of the present note, it would 
be incumbent upon ICAITI, BCIE and SIECA to carry 
out these studies. Since various projects for the instal­
lation of assembly plants in Central America are already 
being urged, an immediate start should be made on this 
research, to which end advantage might be taken of 
the present opportunity to draw up the pertinent sched­
ule and adopt appropriate measures with regard to 
procedures and deadlines.
With the creation of the body of instruments con­
stituted by the protocol and its regulations, not only 
would a proper legal and administrative framework be 
set up for channelling the activities of private enterprise 
in the field of assembly industries, but an appropriate 
basis would also be provided for Governments to pro­
mote, through the regional economic integration mecha­
nisms, the establishment of those industries which might 
play a key role in the development of Central America’s 
manufacturing sector. As a part of this effort, to sup­
plement the guiding principles already indicated, in
the formulation of the above-mentioned regulations due 
account should be taken of the practical possibilities 
of promoting assembly activities on the basis of indus­
trial complementarity agreements with other countries 
and groups of countries. The market-size limitations 
which might militate against the efficient operation of 
the enterprises concerned could thus be mitigated or 
eliminated, and better conditions would be created for 
the conversion of their activities into complete manu­
facturing processes at an earlier date.
Lastly, both the protocol and its regulations should 
be applied through decisions by the Executive Council 
establishing the terms of the contracts to be signed in 
each case between the national authorities and the benefi­
ciary enterprise. Only thus, through the application of 
the said instruments on a completely regional basis, could 
assembly activities be installed in conditions suited to 
Central America’s requirements. As has been shown, 
the initial production capacity of such plants is particu­
larly important, not only from the standpoint of the 
proper satisfaction of available market demand, but also 
from the angle of the existing possibilities for their 
gradual transformation, in due course, into manufactur­
ing industries. Moreover, pursuant to the principle of 
economic integration, better advantage could thus be 
taken of the possibilities for the production of parts 
in member countries other than that in which the 
assembly enterprise concerned was located.
8. Other provisions
In addition to the points already touched upon, the 
protocol should contain provisions establishing proce­
dures in all respects necessary to supplement those already 
laid down in the Agreement on Tax Incentives, as well 
as stipulations as to the securities that enterprises would 
have to offer in respect of implementation of their 




L WORKSHOP ON BUDGETARY CLASSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT 
IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND PANAMA*
(San José, Costa Rica, 18-30 September, 1963)
A Workshop on Budgetary Classification and Manage­
ment in Central America and Panama was held from 
18 to 30 September 1963 at the headquarters of the 
Advanced School of Public Administration for Central 
America (ESAPAC), San José, Costa Rica, under the 
auspices of the United Nations Technical Assistance 
Programme, the Economic Commission for Latin America 
(ECLA), ESAPAC, the Latin American Institute for 
Economic and Social Planning, the United Nations 
Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations (BTAO), 
and the Fiscal and Financial Branch of the United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social AffairsA
The meeting was attended by twenty-two ofiBcials 
designated by the Governments of the Central American 
countries and Panama. They aU served in an individual 
capacity as experts and their opinions did not neces­
sarily reflect those of their Governments. An expert from 
the Joint Central American Programming Mission (O AS/ 
IDB/ECLA/SIECA/BCIE) also took part.
The purpose of the Workshop was to consider what 
changes should be made in the budgetary concepts and 
practices of the Central American countries in order 
to integrate the processes of budget preparation and 
implementation with those of planning. The discussions 
were therefore centred on problems to which the intro­
duction of performance budgeting would give rise. The 
results achieved by the Central American countries in 
classifying government transactions by economic and 
functional categories were also reviewed.
The following subjects were discussed: review of the 
work of budgetary reclassification; relationship between 
medium and long-term economic development plants 
and the annual budget; the performance approach to 
government budgeting; performance budget classifica­
tions and measurement of results; performance budget­
ing and public accounting, and establishment of a system 
of performance budgeting.
The conclusions and recommendations adopted are 
set out below:
* See the report on the Workshop (E/CN.12/692).
iThis was the eighth in the series of Workshops organized by 
United Nations Headquarters in collaboration with the secretariats 
of the regional commissions, and the second for the Central 
American countries. The first of the whole series took place at 
Mexico City in 1953, with the participation of the Central 
American countries, the Antilles, Mexico and the United States. 
In May 1959 and September 1962 similar meetings were held 
at Santiago, Chile, for the South American countries. Workshops 
were also convened at Bangkok in 1955, 1957 and 1960 for the 
countries of Asia and the Far East. In 1961 the first Workshop 
of this kind for the African countries was held at Addis Ababa.
1. The Workshop noted with satisfaction the achieve­
ments of the Central American countries and Panama 
in budget reforms and development planning. The par­
ticipants laid particular stress on the need for redoubling 
the efforts being made in these fields until integrated 
mechanisms have been created for the formulation, im­
plementation and control of development plans and their 
co-ordination with annual budgets. For that purpose 
it was deemed essential that the programming process 
should be closely connected with the work of preparing 
the budgets and that adequate co-ordination machinery 
should he established.
2. The economic integration of Central America will 
create an increasing need for co-ordination between the 
national development plans designed to expedite the 
balanced growth of the different economies. The Work­
shop attached special importance to the establishment 
of planning mechanisms and budgetary systems on uni­
form technical and methodological bases aimed at 
making such co-ordination easier to achieve.
3. With those ends in mind, the Workshop recom­
mended that the technique of performance budgeting 
be adopted in the countries that had not yet done so, 
on the grounds that it was especially suited for con­
verting the budget into an effective instrument in the 
execution of economic development plans.
4. It was noted that the technique of performance 
budgeting was being introduced in accordance with the 
guidelines set forth in the Manual for programme and 
performance budgeting, which is a valuable contribution 
to the establishment of this type of system. It was 
acknowledged that general standards should be formu­
lated and applied in the Central American countries, to 
make it possible for uniform classifications by pro­
grammes and activities to be worked out, with due 
allowance for the particular circumstances and admin­
istrative systems of each country. It was considered 
advisable that the fiscal year should be the same in all 
the coimtries of the area and that it should coincide 
with the calendar year.
5. The Workshop particularly recommended the 
adaptation of public accounting systems to the imple­
mentation requirements of development plans and per­
formance budgets. Stress was laid on the importance 
of perfecting the organization and structure of national 
accoimting systems to ensure a regular flow of uniform 
data on the progress of plans and programmes, and on 
an efiBcient control of funds.
6. The Workshop was of the opinion that, to ensure 
greater efficiency in the preparation of development plans
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and their co-ordination with the annual budgets, it would 
be advisable to reorganize the central budget offices and 
to create sectoral planning offices at the ministerial level.
7. Note was taken of the progress made by the coun­
tries of the area in economic and functional classifica­
tions, as recommended by the first Workshop on Budg­
etary Classification and Management held at Mexico City 
in 1953. The recommendation put forward on that oc­
casion was endorsed by the present Workshop in the 
sense that the Manual for economic and junctional 
classification of government transactions should continue 
to be used as a guide for the work of reclassification. 
It was further recommended that the Governments should 
adopt a simplified scheme for the economic and func­
tional classification of transactions in the public sector 
and apply it throughout the area.
8. The Workshop pointed out that the classifications 
by programmes and activities and by objects of ex­
penditure should be made as uniform as possible for 
all countries. Note was taken of the definitions of pro­
grammes and activities that had been suggested by the 
Workshop on Budgetary Classification and Management 
in South America, held at Santiago, Chile, in 1962. 
The present Workshop supplemented the definitions by 
a provisional classification of expenditure by object in 
order to facilitate the introduction of the classification 
on a uniform basis and to integrate it with the system 
of performance budgeting.
9. Attention was drawn to the valuable contribution 
which the Joint Central American Programming Missions 
(OAS/IDB/ECLA/SIECA/BCIE) had made to the im­
provements in budget practices introduced in the coun­
tries of the area during 1963, and stress was laid on 
the desirability of the mission’s extending its technical
assistance activities to aU the Central American countries 
in the interests of methodological uniformity.
10. It was agreed that there was urgent need for 
training national officials in budgetary and public ac­
counting techniques, inaugurating or improving the 
relevant university courses and redoubling the valuable 
efforts being made by ESAPAC at the regional level 
through its training courses, by the Latin American 
Institute for Economic and Social Planning and by other 
international organizations.
11. In addition, it was recommended that expert 
working groups should be set up in the countries of 
the area to study specific problems connected with per­
formance budgeting, and to formulate, in the light of 
their experience, standards and methods for improving 
the practical application of the system.
12. In order to make a periodic evaluation of the 
progress achieved in standardizing budget nomenclature 
and to suggest expedient improvements, it was recom­
mended that annual meetings of experts on budgeting 
and public accounting should be held in the countries 
of the area and that information on the advances made 
in those fields should be published regularly, together 
with the pertinent statistics, by the regional organiza­
tions concerned.
13. The Workshop was considered to have provided 
a highly useful opportunity for an exchange of informa­
tion among the Central American experts and to have 
aroused fresh interest in accelerating the progress of 
budgeting techniques in the area. It was decided that 
the next Workshop should be organized for the region 
as a whole in order to make for a wider exchange of 
experience.
II. WORKING GROUP ON CLASSIFICATION OF MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS*
(Santiago, Chile, 4-15 November 1963)
Under the auspices of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America, a Working Group on Classification of 
Manufactured Products, composed of experts from seven 
countries, met at Santiago, Chile, from 4 to 15 November 
1963. The Statistical Division of ECLA was responsible 
for the organization of the proceedings, and in addition, 
one staff member from the United Nations Statistical 
Office, one from the Inter-American Statistical Institute 
(IASI), and several from the Industrial Development 
Division of ECLA, co-operated with the Group in an 
advisory capacity.
Mr. Jorge Rubén Morinelli (Argentina) was elected 
Chairman of the Group, and each of the experts acted 
as Rapporteur in respect of specific chapters of the list.
The primary object of the meeting was to consider 
the document entitled Proyecto de lista uniforme de 
productos manufacturados (E/CN.12/648), prepared by 
the Statistical Division and presented at the tenth session 
of the Commission. This draft list enumerates 2 800 
individual products comprised in Groups 201 to 399 of 
the International Standard Industrial Classification of
* See the report of the Working Group (E/CN.12/AC.57/4). 
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all Economic Activities (ISIC) and deemed to be repre­
sentative of the production of the Latin American coun­
tries. It could be used for the industrial censuses and 
surveys that are being prepared in connexion with the 
World Programme sponsored by the United Nations 
and IASI.
At its meetings, the Group reviewed every product 
included in the list, eliminating those that were not 
particularly representative and adding others whose im­
portance or production prospects made them of special 
interest.
The Group discussed the desirability of using, in the 
collection and presentation of physical output data, ap­
propriate units for each product which should correspond 
as far as possible to those of the decimal metric system, 
and, in particular, for generators, prime movers and 
other specific machinery, units of power and capacity, 
or a combination of the number of units with power 
steps, as the case might be.
Although it transpired that some products were known 
by different names in different countries, the Group felt 
it preferable to keep to the Spanish name in most com­
mon use, and suggested that in such cases a glossary
of equivalent terms might subsequently be drawn up 
for internal use in statistical ofiSces.
While considering the products included on the gen­
eral list, the Group at the same time indicated those 
that could constitute a “ minimum”  list. From this analy­
sis, a list of about 550 individual products resulted, 
representing some two thirds of the value of the region’s 
manufacturing output.
When the classification of the products by activities 
was studied, it sometimes seemed necessary to place 
in a single group products that appeared in two different 
ISIC groups; a case in point, for instance, was that of 
the processing of vegetable oils and fats, where it is 
difficult in practice to break down output by its use 
for food or in industry. In other instances, suggestions 
were put forward as to the desirability of switching a 
product from the ISIC group in which it was classified 
to another where it seemed more logically to belong.
Particular attention was devoted to the chapters of 
the list that related to machinery. In this context, stress 
was laid on the need to establish special categories, and 
within each of these to indicate the machinery and ap­
pliances that were most representative. To that end, the 
participants undertook to send the secretariat a detailed 
list of the relevant products manufactured in their 
respective countries.
The Group likewise considered the document entitled 
Propuesta de Subclasificación de los Grupos 201 y  399 
de la Clasificación Industrial Internacional Uniforme 
de todas las Actividades Económicas (ISIC). While all
the participants recognized the pressing need of a more 
detailed classification than ISIC, they agreed that recent 
national production data would have to be available 
before a useful classification could be formulated, on 
the basis of which comparable statistics could be obtained 
for the region.
In this connexion, the members of the Working Group 
discussed the criteria that should be established for a 
more detailed classification than ISIC. It was agreed 
that the goods produced by the establishments classified 
in one of the proposed sub-groups would have to repre­
sent at least 75 per cent of total output of the items 
concerned for the sub-group to be meaningful.
Lastly, the Group decided to submit the following 
requests to the ECLA secretariat:
1. That it should obtain from the largest possible 
number of Latin American countries tabulations of 
physical output broken down in detail by activities;
2. That on the basis of the material received it should 
prepare a new draft sub-classification within ISIC; and
3. That it should convene, if possible in 1964, another 
Working Group to study:
(i) Elxperience in the use of the List of Products 
during the preparation and execution of industrial sur­
veys and censuses;
(ii) Experience in the use of ISIC and national clas­
sifications of activities; and
(iii) The new draft sub-classification within ISIC 
indicated under point (2) above.
III. MEETING OF LATIN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT EXPERTS ON TRADE PO U C Y*
(Brasilia, Brazil, 20-25 January 1964)
In pursuance of resolution 221 (X ) the secretariat 
of the Economic Commission for Latin America convened 
a meeting at Brasilia, from 20 to 25 January 1964, on 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop­
ment, which was attended by specialists appointed by 
the Governments of all the Latin American countries. 
The purpose of the meeting was to promote “ more effi­
cient preparation and fuller mutual knowledge of those 
problems of the countries of the region which are to be 
discussed at the Conference” . The meeting was attended 
by 104 experts, representing the Governments of Argen­
tina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay and Venezuela. Moreover, observers from the 
following organizations attended by special invitation: 
Organization of American States (OAS), Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB), Latin American Free-Trade 
Association (ALALC), Latin American Centre for Mone­
tary Studies (CEMLA), Panel of Nine appointed by 
the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, and
* The present note is based on the relevant report of the 
secretariat (E/CN.12/694).
1 Resolution 221 (X ) , 16 May 1963, was published in the 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol. VIII (1963), in the 
article entitled “ United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development” , which also includes other background information 
on the Conference.
the Permanent Secretariat of the (General Treaty on 
Central American Economic Integration (SIEGA).
Mr. Celso Furtado of Brazil and Mr. Manuel F. 
Chavarria of El Salvador were elected Chairman and 
Vice-Chairman of the meeting, respectively.
The discussions were based on the document entitled 
Latin America and the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (E /CN .12/693), prepared by the 
secretariat with the co-operation of a group of eminent 
Latin American consultants,^ who met for the purpose 
at Santiago, Chile, in October and December 1963. 
They also took into account the report of the Extraor­
dinary Session of the Central American Trade Sub- 
Committee held in Mexico City from 6 to 11 January 
1964 (ST/ECLA/CONF.13/L.4), and the note by the 
secretariat on La posición latinoamericana ante la Con­
ferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Comercio y  
Desarrollo (ST/ECLA/CONF.13/L.3).
The discussions centred on the following topics:
1. Measures for solving primary commodity trade 
problems;
2. Diversification of the composition of exports;
2 The group of consultants was composed of the following: 
Mr. Eduardo Figueroa, Mr. Plácido García Reynoso, Mr. Adalbert 
Krieger Vasena, Mr. Julio Tacarte Muro, Mr. Carlos Lleras 
Restrepo, Mr. Marcio do Regó Monteiro, Mr. Jorge Sol and 
Mr. Enrique Gastón Valente.
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(a) Trade in manufactures and semi-manufactures;
(b) Trade in invisibles;
3. Policy with respect to the geographical diversifi­
cation of trade;
(a) Possibilities of trade with countries having a 
centrally planned economy;
(b) Possibilities of trade with other areas in the 
process of development;
(c) Regional integration and Latin American foreign 
trade;
4. Trade financing and economic development;
5. Organizations and measures for the promotion of 
world trade.
The work of the meeting was divided between two 
Committees. Committee I, under the chairmanship of 
Mr. Bernardo Grinspun (Argentina), considered items 1 
and 2, while the remaining items were dealt with by 
Committee II, whose Chairman was Mr. Carlos Valen­
zuela (Chile). A report was issued by each committee.®
During the course of the meeting attention was drawn 
to the need to establish a new structure of international 
trade with a view to ensuring the more rapid, orderly 
and steady growth of the developing countries. Within 
this new structure, trade in the developing countries 
should reach levels likely to promote the attainment and 
maintenance of growth rates sufficient to ensure for 
the developing countries a substantial reduction in the 
gap separating their income levels from those of the 
developed countries. In this resp>ect, the latter should 
grant preferences to the developing countries without 
granting them to other developed countries, besides 
recognizing their right to further exceptions to the most­
favoured-nation clause. These and other principles ap­
plicable to the institutional regulation of world trade 
were formulated explicitly by the experts.
As regards primary commodities, the meeting ob­
jected to the policy of the developed countries which, 
through restrictions, protectionism, excessive internal 
taxes, subsidized exports, etc., was the cause of distortions 
in the present structure of world production and trade 
patterns and had an adverse effect on exports from the 
developing countries. The effect of such distortions 
brought about by the industrialized countries should 
be gradually eliminated within fixed time limits. Con­
clusions were formulated in relation specifically to 
tropical and temperate-zone products, as well as mineral 
ores and fuels.
The industrialized countries should grant entry to 
imports of manufactures and semi-manufactures from 
the developing countries, whenever such imports repre­
sented not more than 5 per cent of the domestic con­
sumption of the importing country concerned, and they 
should do so by means of preferences not applicable to 
other developed countries, providing for full exemption 
from duties and other charges.
With respect to the geographical diversification of 
trade, primary consideration was given to the important 
question of the possibility of expanding trade with the 
countries having centrally planned economies, provided 
the latter undertook to establish quantitative targets in
As regards the institutional structure required for the 
new order in world trade, it was proposed to set up an 
organization within the United Nations system, which 
would have a membership open to all countries and 
sufficient authority to guarantee the implementation of 
the decisions adopted. Proposals were also put forward 
with respect to the mechanisms that should operate 
during the transition period between the Geneva Con­
ference and the establishment of the final structure.
As the outcome of the criteria set out above, the 
following conclusions were adopted at Brasilia:
A. General principles
1. The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development should attempt, within the framework of 
General Assembly resolution 1785 (X V II), to establish 
a new structure of international trade, as an essential 
condition for ensuring the more rapid, orderly and steady 
growth of the developing countries. To this end the 
Conference should:
3 Document E/CN.12/694/Add.l contains the reports of the two 
committees. It is available in Spanish only.
(i) Formulate the principles and operating rules that 
should govern world trade with the essential aim of 
transforming it into an effective means of promoting the 
economic development of the developing countries.
(ii) Establish— under the aegis of the United Nations—  
procedures and institutional machinery suitable for ensur­
ing that the Conference’s decisions are carried out, and 
in particular, that the trade problems of the developing
their long-term and short-term plans, allowed for a 
greater measure of flexibility in their conditions of pay­
ment, and granted the developing countries preferences 
comparable to those requested from the industrial market 
economy countries.
The meeting recognized the need to promote the 
regional economic integration of the less developed coun­
tries, with due regard for the special features of the 
various countries concerned, while endeavouring to 
foster mechanisms likely to facilitate payments and the 
financing of intra-regional trade. The industrialized 
countries should have a clear understanding of the scope 
of such integration and do nothing to reduce or offset 
it. The regional economic integration of the developed 
countries entailed specific responsibilities on their part 
towards the developing countries: the over-all effect 
of the obstacles which such economic groupings might 
create for the developing countries should not be more 
than it was before they were formed. ,
Financing for development— in addition to requiring a j
maximum domestic savings effort— would have to enable I
the less developed countries to achieve a rate of growth I
that would reduce the disparity between their income 
levels and those of the industrialized countries; it should 
be provided on a multilateral basis and adjusted to '
development programmes. The servicing of financing for j
development purposes should be based on the amount 
the developing countries could actually afford to p>ay, 
once the servicing of the commitments they had already 
assumed, revised on a basis of long maturity periods 
and low rates of interest, had been computed. An in­
dispensable step was to establish appropriate mechanisms 
whereby the developing countries could be compensated 
for any future loss that might result from the deteriora­
tion of their terms of trade.
134
countries are the subject of systematic, detailed and 
continuing consideration.
(iii) Adopt specific measures, in line with the aims 
referred to in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii) above, to help 
bring about an immediate increase in the external earn­
ings of the developing countries.
2. The trade requirements of the developing countries 
that are to be served both by the new structure of world 
trade and by immediate measures taken for this purpose 
are those which, if met, will promote the attainment 
and maintenance of growth rates sufficient to ensure for 
the developing countries a substantial reduction in the 
gap that separates their income levels from those of the 
developed countries, with a view to closing this gap.
3. The new structure of world trade must be based 
on the need for general, non-discriminatory preferential 
treatment in favour of all the developing countries. This 
treatment involves establishing the following basic prin­
ciples, among others:
(i) Reciprocal measures should not be required of 
the developing countries in respect of concessions or 
preferences granted by the developed countries.
(ii) The developed countries should guarantee the 
developing countries access to their markets on a non- 
discriminatory basis. Existing forms of discriminatory 
and preferential access that are considered indispensable 
in order to maintain the export earnings of certain 
developing countries should be replaced by compensatory 
financial measures.
(iii) The developed countries may grant preferences 
to the developing countries without granting them to 
other developed countries.
(iv) The developing countries may grant preferences 
to each other without granting them to the developed 
countries. These preferences shall be granted without 
prejudice to the rights and obligations deriving from 
regional associations among developing countries.
(v) In view of the different growth rates obtaining 
in the developing countries, provision should be made 
to a diflerential treatment in line with the particular 
characteristics of the countries at a relatively less ad­
vanced stage of economic development. This treatment 
should be based on the granting to such countries of 
special privileges that do not constitute a trade discrimi­
nation between developing countries.
4. The new structure of international trade should 
ensure the general expansion of world trade and promote 
its integration through the establishment of machinery 
and rules suitable for trade among countries at the same 
stage of development; at different stages of develop­
ment; and with different economic systems. The new 
rules and measures intended to serve the trade require­
ments of the developing countries should apply equally 
to all the developed countries with market economies, 
and, in an equivalent form, to all the industrial countries 
with centrally-planned economies.
5. If the trade requirements of the developing coun­
tries are to be fully satisfied, international financial 
policies must be in line with trade policies conducive 
to the new structure of international trade, and the 
competent financial bodies must co-ordinate their ac­
tivities with those of the bodies concerned with trade.
6. In view of the urgency of the problems confronting
the developing countries and the insufficiency of their 
external earnings, piecemeal measures cannot be effec­
tive. Consequently the measures set forth below, relating 
to various types of specific products and to other ques­
tions, must be regarded as components of a single 
integrated policy on world trade.
B. Primary commodities traditionally exported
1. The developed countries should abstain from taking 
measures which, directly or indirectly, constitute obstacles 
or are in the nature of reprisals against measures adopted 
by the Governments of the developing countries, by reason 
of their economic and social development require­
ments, with a view to regulating the systems of mining, 
processing and marketing of their natural resources, 
including measures involving changes in the system of 
ownership.
2. The developing countries should share increasingly 
in the benefits of technological progress, as a means of 
promoting their economic development; however, when 
their traditional trade flows are disturbed by the pro­
duction of synthetics as substitutes for commodities, the 
developed countries should take steps to offset these 
effects by co-operating with the developing countries 
in the search for appropriate solutions.
(a ) TTopical comm odities
]. The high internal taxes that the industrial coun­
tries normally apply to the consumption of tropical 
commodities severely limit expansion of demand, and 
deprive the developing countries of valuable opportunities 
to increase their exports. Consequently the aim should 
be to abolish these taxes no later than 31 December 1965.
2. The customs duties that the industrial countries 
apply to imports of such tropical commodities should 
also be abolished by 31 December 1965. Similarly, all 
forms of discrimination against exports of tropical com­
modities from Latin America should also be abolished 
by the same date. The abolition of eharges and discrimi­
natory measures should also apply to products manu­
factured from basic tropical materials.
3. The customs duties and internal taxes imposed by 
industrial countries on final products containing a high 
percentage of tropical raw materials exported by the 
developing countries should be reduced to a level that 
will not hamper the expansion of the industrial activity 
concerned in the country of origin, and will contribute 
to the expansion of internal demand in the importing 
country.
4. As soon as possible a detailed study by experts 
should be undertaken, on the reasons for the High costs 
in some industrial countries of processing and market­
ing certain tropical products exported by Latin America, 
with a view to suggesting measures to avoid mark-ups 
considered as excessive.
5. It is essential that the developed coimtries support 
the negotiation of appropriate agreements on tropical 
products, always provided that they have the basic aim 
of promoting tbe development of the developing exporter 
countries and establishing more favourable terms of trade.
(b) Temperate-zone agricultural commodities
1. The developed countries should undertake to modify 
their agricultural policies which, through such action
135
as the price mechanism, different types of import restric­
tions and discriminatory treatment of all kinds, are the 
cause of distortions in the present structure of world 
production and trade, such modifications to be effected 
by means of the abolition of protective measures in 
favour of their agricultural production.
For this purpose, the first stage should be the setting 
of an over-aU ceiling on the different forms of pro­
tection in order to bring about an improvement in the 
external purchasing power of the developing countries 
and thereby enable them to achieve their economic and 
social growth targets. The ceiling should be enforced 
before 31 December 1965, after which time the devel­
oped eountries should carry out a programme of pro­
gressive reductions in the different forms of proteetion 
with a view to their complete elimination within the 
United Nations Development Deeade.
In addition, quantitative restrictions and internal taxes 
applied to the trade of the developing countries should 
be abolished before 31 December 1965.
Similarly, subsidies for exports of agricultural com­
modities should be abolished by the same date.
2. The disposing of agrieultural surpluses on special 
terms should not be effected at the expense of the export 
opportunities and intra-regional trade of the developing 
countries or of the agricultural development prospects 
of the countries receiving such surpluses.
International co-operation should, in fact, be provided 
in such a way as to increase the purchasing power of 
those countries so that they can buy their agrieultural 
supplies where it best suits them. This will give the 
disposal of surpluses a more multilateral character which, 
in conjunction with the elimination of subsidies, will 
contribute to a better distribution of world agricultural 
production.
So long as surpluses are available for economic aid of 
this kind, their disposal should be undertaken on a multi­
lateral basis with the participation of the countries con­
cerned in each programme as well as the traditional 
supplier countries, through a special mechanism which 
should be set up by the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development.
3. In the case of commodities, with low income- 
elasticity of demand of which there is an excess supply, 
commodity agreements eould, without prejudice to the 
foregoing recommendations, contribute to improving 
world trading conditions. To be effective, such agree­
ments should conform to the following general guiding 
principles, with due regard for the type of produet 
concerned:
(i) In some cases the price paid for imported products 
and those produced domestically should be fixed at an 
appropriate level between the prices prevailing in the 
main high-cost and low-cost production areas.
(ii) In establishing prices, account must be taken 
of the interrelationship of the different products and 
the risks of substitution. In some cases this would in­
volve the conclusion of multi-commodity agreements.
(iii) Any limitations imposed on supplies should not 
be based on the assumption that the developing coun­
tries are prepared to accept the present distorted struc­
ture of world agriculture, but should ensure that these
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countries achieve a volume of exports that is sufBcient 
to meet their own development needs.
(iv) Any increase in consumption that is achieved 
in future should primarily benefit the non-subsidized 
producers, with a view to drawing progressively closer 
to what may be regarded as a rational structure for 
world production.
(c) Mineral ores and fuels
1. The industrialized countries should gradually 
abolish the measures of protection and discrimination 
of all kinds applied to basic connnodities of mineral 
origin and fuels from the developing countries so that 
these may compete on an equal footing with each other 
and with exports from and local production in the indus­
trialized countries.
These objectives should be achieved within the United 
Nations Development Decade. In any case, gradual liber­
alization should be initiated before 31 December 1965, 
by which date customs duties should have begun to be 
lowered and quantitative restrictions and internal charges 
imposed on such products should have been abolished.
2. The foregoing commitment should be extended to 
intermediate products of mineral origin in order to en­
courage a higher degree of processing of the basic 
materials in the country of origin and to enable them 
to be sold directly on the world market.
3. The developed countries should abstain from taking 
measures which, directly or indirectly, constitute obsta­
cles or are in the nature of reprisals against measures 
adopted by the Governments of the developing countries, 
by reason of their economic and social development and 
national security requirements, with a view to regulating 
the systems of mining, processing and marketing of 
their fuels and minerals including measures involving 
changes in the system of ownership.
4. The Governments of the developed countries and 
international financing organizations should support the 
concession of medium and long-term loans to domestic 
enterprises in developing countries for the prospecting, 
mining, processing, and/or marketing of their own 
fuel and mineral resources.
5. The support of the developed countries is essential 
to the conclusion of suitable agreements on this type 
of commodity, provided always that such agreements 
are necessary to raise prices or to maintain them at a 
higher level for the purpose of increasing to the maxi­
mum the foreign exchange earnings of the developing 
countries.
6. Supplies of mineral ores and metals, including 
those deriving from strategic reserves stockpiled in the 
developed countries, should be disposed of in accordance 
with international regulations designed to ensure that 
there is no dumping, that the prices of the commodities 
in question are not reduced and that world trade is not 
distorted to the detriment of exports from the developing 
countries.
C. Exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures
1. The developed countries should accord preferential 
treatment, on a non-reciprocal basis, to imports of manu­
factured and semi-manufactured products from the de­
veloping countries. The preferences should be granted by
all the developed countries in favour of all the developing 
countries, in accordance with the following provisions:
(a) Provisions applicable to finished manufactured
products
(i) The industrialized countries should forthwith grant 
entry, free of duties and other charges of equivalent 
effect, to imports of all finished manufactured products 
from the developing countries, whenever such imports 
represent, for each product, not more than 5 per cent 
of the domestic consumption of the importing country 
concerned. Moreover, any industrialized country may 
grant similar preferences to imports exceeding the above- 
mentioned limit without extending them to other indus­
trialized countries, providing that they apply them to 
imports from all the developing countries.
(ii) The duty-free import quotas referred to in con­
clusion (i) will not include imports from developing 
countries which already enjoy previously established 
preferences, without prejudice to the provisions laid 
down in point 7.
(iii) Imports from the developing countries that ex­
ceed the limits indicated in conclusion (i) shall be 
subjected to the relevant tariffs and to the application, 
when appropriate, of the most-favoured-nation clause.
(b) Provisions applicable to semi-manufactured products
The developed countries should, during the period 
provided for in the Development Decade, have gradually 
reduced and abolished the tariffs on imports of semi­
manufactured products from the developing countries. 
This process of gradual liberalization should be initiated 
before 31 December 1965.
2. In giving effect to the foregoing conclusions, the 
developed countries should determine the measures re­
quired to adapt their production pattern so as to increase 
the purchase of semi-manufactured and manufactured 
products from the developing countries, thereby co­
ordinating their trade in manufactured goods with the 
countries concerned.
3. To ensure that the benefits of the preferences 
referred to in point 1 actually reach those developing 
countries which are at a relatively less advanced stage 
of development, these preferences will have to be sup­
plemented by:
(i) The formulation of special programmes of inter­
national technical and financial assistance, to enable 
such countries to make effective use of the preferential 
treatment granted to them and to convert it into a flow 
of industrial exports to the developed countries.
In the case of the developing countries that are in the 
process of economic integration, these supplementary 
programmes should be preferably carried out, through the 
regional institutions they have established.
(ii) The relevant organs of the world trade organi­
zation that may be created by the Conference must 
periodically evaluate the extent to which such preferences 
are proving to be of benefit to the majority of the less 
developed countries; if necessary, they should suggest 
further suitable ways of extending such benefits to those 
countries which, because of their relatively less advanced 
stage of development, have not succeeded in availing 
themselves fully of the opportunities offered by the 
preferential treatment they receive.
4. In all the negotiations providing for tariff reduc­
tions in respect of manufactured products, that may be 
conducted between countries or groups of countries prior 
to the entry into force of the agreements of the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the fol­
lowing principles should be borne in mind:
(i) Products of particular importance for the export 
trade of the developing countries should in no case be 
included among the exceptions that may be made;
(ii) Full advantage should be taken of the system 
of linear negotiations to introduce, concurrently with 
any tariff reductions for finished products, at least 
equivalent tariff reductions for items at an earlier stage 
of processing;
(iii) No restrictions of any kind should be applied 
that might tend to limit the benefits to be expected from 
the tariff reductions in question.
5. The adoption by the developed countries of meas­
ures favourable to the developing countries should not 
be conditional upon reciprocal concessions by the latter.
6. The developed countries should eliminate quan­
titative restrictions and charges other than existing 
customs duties in respect of semi-manufactured products 
for final use or consumption, and should undertake not 
to establish new barriers that would lessen the efficacy 
of the concessions accorded. Similarly, they should elimi­
nate any other discriminatory measure hampering or 
preventing the free access of manufactured products from 
developing countries to the markets of the industrialized 
countries.
7. Steps should be taken forthwith to eliminate the 
preferences granted to some of the under-developed 
countries by certain developed countries, provided that 
these preferences have not already led to the creation 
of trade flows. When such trade flows have been estab­
lished, the developed countries should limit the applica­
tion of preferences to the volume of trade attained in 
the last few years, without prejudice to the gradual 
reduction and eventual elimination of such preferences.
8. As regards other obstacles to the export of manu­
factured and semi-manufactured products by the devel­
oping countries, suitable mechanisms should be estab­
lished to ensure that trade restrictions originating in 
trusts, cartels and patents do not defeat the aims of the 
different measures to promote the export of industrial 
products by the developing countries,
9. Having regard to the need for expediting the in­
dustrial growth of the developing countries so as to 
enable them to diversify their foreign trade in the short­
est possible time by exporting manufactured and semi­
manufactured products, the developing and the indus­
trialized countries should make every effort to create 
within the United Nations a specialized agency for 
industrial development.
D. Trade in invisible items
1. Developing countries should have the right to 
arrange for the maritime transport of their trade cargo 
by the media that suit them best, as well as to completely 
unobstructed freedom of transit for such cargo.
2. It should be recognized that the expansion of the 
national or regional merchant fleets of developing coun­
tries is a factor of importance for their economic growth.
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3. The principle of preferential treatment for devel­
oping countries, on a non-reciprocity basis, in all matters 
relating to transport, should be established.
4. A system should be created to ensure the effective 
participation of the Governments of developing coun­
tries in decisions affecting maritime transport conditions 
and prices.
5. Regular shipping services among developing coun­
tries, as well as between them and potential purchasing 
centres, should be instituted.
6. Developing countries should have an increasing 
share in international insurance and reinsurance transac­
tions, in the interests of their balance of payments.
7. Regional reinsurance institutions should be set up 
by the countries in question.
8. Standard clauses should be used in transport in­
surance policies, and insurance statistics in general should 
be standardized.
E. Geographical diversification of trade 
(a) Trade with the centrally planned economies
1. The centrally planned economies should undertake 
to establish quantitative targets for trade with the devel­
oping countries, and include them in their long-term 
plans and short-term policy decisions concerning foreign 
trade. These targets should be compatible with the trade 
requirements of the under-developed countries, and will 
form part of the new framework envisaged for the ex­
pansion of international trade, conducing to a more 
rational distribution of world production and trade in 
respect of certain products. In the case of manufactures 
and semi-manufactures where special procedures to en­
courage exports from the developing countries to the 
industrialized economies are required, the establishment 
of these quantitative targets should be accompanied by 
preferential systems in favour of the developing countries.
In every case, the developed centrally planned econo­
mies should grant the developing countries access to 
their markets, financing arrangements and other op­
portunities on terms not less favourable than those the 
developing countries are seeking to obtain from the 
industrialized market economies, as one of the objectives 
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel­
opment.
2. The countries with centrally planned economies 
should endeavour to conduct their operations in con­
vertible currencies and on a non-discriminatory basis, and 
to expedite, in the immediate future, the adoption of 
measures whereby balances deriving from trade op­
erations with the under-developed countries can be made 
transferable from one socialist country to another.
(b) Promotion of trade among the developing countries
1. If real advantage is to be taken of the developing 
countries’ reciprocal trade potential, preferential rules 
and principles specially designed to serve this end must 
be adopted. Developing countries should be free to grant 
one another concessions that need not be extended to 
the industrialized countries.
2. Before these preferential regulations are formu­
lated in specific terms, the developing countries in order 
to forestall difficulties of various kinds that might be
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caused by the indiscriminate extension of special prefer­
ences, should make an over-all study of the principles 
and procedures that might prove most efficacious in 
encouraging their reciprocal trade; special attention 
should be given to this subject by any relevant institu­
tional mechanisms emanating from the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, as part of the 
reconstruction of world trade that should be its ultimate 
aim.
3. The preferences accorded to certain developed 
economies by specific developing countries should be 
abolished at the earliest possible date, and at the same 
time the establishment of new preferences of this kind 
should be prevented.
4. With international co-operation, an attempt should 
be made to examine and eliminate the problems and 
practices that militate against the trade of the develop­
ing countries, such as difficulties of communication and 
transport between areas in process of development, lack 
of trade, banking and other mechanisms or ties, etc.
5. Special consideration should be devoted to illi­
quidity problems, which particularly affect the develop­
ing countries, and would hamper their reciprocal trade 
if principles of unconditional multilateralism were 
apphed.
(c) Regional integration and Latin America's 
foreign trade
1. The regional economic integration of the less de­
veloped countries should be promoted, with due regard 
for the special features of the various countries con­
cerned, as an effective way of accelerating their economic 
development and expanding their intra-regional or inter­
regional trade.
2. Care should be taken to see that, in the remodelling 
of the instruments under which world trade is con­
ducted, priority is assigned and sufficient flexibility im­
parted to the regulations and procedures required for 
the implementation or consolidation of the economic 
integration processes of the developing countries.
3. Mechanisms should be promoted whereby payments 
can be facilitated within integrated regional groupings 
of less developed economies, and their intra and inter­
regional trade can be liberally financed.
4. Every effort should be made to ensure that the 
scope and effects of the economic integration of devel­
oping countries are fully understood, in order to prevent 
certain forms of intervention on the part of the indus­
trialized countries which might reduce or offset the ex­
pansion of inter-regional trade resulting from integration 
processes, or might affect the implementation of the 
policies concerned.
F. Financing of trade and development
1. The industrialized countries must recognize their 
responsibility in respect of helping to provide the inter­
national funds which, in combination with the maximum 
domestic savings effort that the less developed countries 
can reasonably be expected to make, will enable the latter 
to achieve a rate of growth that will reduce the disparity 
between their income levels and those of the industrialized 
countries. Their minimum contributions should be suffi­
cient to bridge the gap between estimated import require­
ments of the developing countries and prospects for the
expansion of their capacity to import; a fair distribution 
of effort implies that all the industrialized countries 
should contribute an adequate proportion of their re­
spective gross domestic products.
2. Multilateralism should, as far as possible, be the 
guiding principle followed in external financing arrange­
ments with respect to amounts, mode of payment and 
procedures, which should be adjusted to development 
programmes (sectoral, national or regional) with due 
allowance for the special development requirements of 
the borrower countries and for their present levels and 
differing rates of economic development.
Consequently, external aid should not be channelled 
entirely towards the financing of specific projects, nor 
should it be contingent upon purchases by the borrower 
country from the country providing assistance. Provision 
should also be made for the possibility of partly or totally 
financing the local cost of the specific project or devel­
opment programme for which funds are needed.
3. In establishing terms for the servicing of external 
financing, account should be taken of the magnitude of 
the commitments already assumed by the developing 
countries in relation to their accrued external debt, so 
that the amount of resources they have to earmark for 
meeting their total obligations does not exceed a rea­
sonable proportion of their respective capacities for 
payment. To this end, international financing agencies 
as well as the Governments and institutions of the de­
veloped countries, should effectively contribute to a 
revision of the terms for such borrowing on a basis 
of long maturity periods and low rates of interest.
4. Efforts must be intensified and resources increased 
in order to provide countries, on request, with such 
technical assistance as will enable them to expedite their 
development and to use whatever external resources are 
made available to them with the maximum degree of 
efiBciency.
5. An indispensable step is to establish appropriate 
mechanisms whereby the developing countries can be 
compensated for any future damage to their interests 
that may result from the deterioration of their terms 
c f trade. In view of the status of the studies and dis­
cussions already carried out on this subject, it is recom­
mended that a comparative evaluation be made of the 
various existing projects, together with other suggestions 
to which thorough consideration has not yet been given, 
with a view to the adoption of a decision at the meeting 
of CECLA, which may lead to-the selection of the system 
best fitted to serve the ends in view.
6. The compensatory credit system put into operation 
by the International Monetary Fund since February 1963 
constitutes a definite step towards the solution of short­
term financing problems, but it needs radical modifica­
tion if it is to fulfil its purpose more efficiently. In this 
context, the following recommendations formulated by 
OAS (at the Meeting of the lA-ECOSOC Special Com­
mittee on Basic Products, 5 to 9 August 1963) should 
be adopted forthwith:
(i) In determining the magnitude of the decline in 
exports earnings, more importance should be attached 
to their behaviour trends in the three-year period pre­
ceding the year in which the decrease takes place than 
to projections of exports for the two years immediately 
following it;
(ii) An exception should be established whereby com­
pensatory credits are treated as completely independent 
of the structure of the gold tranche and of other suc­
cessive credit tranches, so that the fact of obtaining 
compensatory credits neither directly nor indirectly 
militates against a member’s chances of obtaining a 
current credit;
(iii) The amount allocated by the Fund to compen­
satory financing over and above its current transactions, 
should be increased from 25 to 50 per cent of the 
member country’s quota.
These proposals should be supplemented by others, 
with the aim of making the scheme more automatic in 
its operation, simplifying and standardizing the criteria 
for granting funds, improving repayment terms and spe­
cifying the requisites to be fulfilled by member countries 
wishing to make use of the facilities in question.
7. Problems relating to insufficient international 
liquidity cannot be approached from the standpoint of 
the situation of the industrialized centres alone; the 
position of the developing countries must also be taken 
into consideration, and in their case, rather than transient 
circumstances, basic problems are involved, whose solu­
tion will entail fundamental changes of direction in 
world trade flows.
8. The lack of an adequate credit instrument for pro­
moting exports from developing countries constitutes 
a factor that decisively limits their competitive capacity 
vis-à-vis exports from the industrialized coutries. The 
use of international credit, through the appropriate 
mechanisms is therefore considered necessary for the 
financing of the developing countries’ exports, especially 
those requiring medium and long-term financing. Simi­
larly, with the financial co-operation of the developed 
countries, insurance systems will have to be established 
that will cover all the risks— not merely those of a com­
mercial nature— to which the exports of the developing 
countries are exposed.
With the same end in view, the industrialized coun­
tries should facilitate the establishment of uniform ex­
port credit financing and insurance practices for the 
developing countries and co-ordinate them with the in­
ternational financing mechanisms which, by means of ap­
propriate credit systems, can strengthen— as one agency 
has already begun to do— the competitive capacity of 
the developing country.
Similarly, the capital exporting countries should ac­
cord their contribution to the financing of the less de­
veloped countries’ investment programmes on terms 
that will allow it to be used for the purchase of manu­
factured goods from developing countries, including 
the recipient, provided that the goods so purchased from 
part of the investment financed and that provision is 
made to ensure strict observance of the basic principles 
of competition as regards price, quality and delivery 
deadlines.
9. The industrialized countries should adopt policies 
designed to standardize the use of suppliers’ credit in 
tlie short and medium-term financing of exports, and 
aiming at more favourable terms for the importer, with 
regard to time limits, rates of interest and other requi­
sites, than have been in force hitherto. This will prevent 
the terms of payment from constituting a determinant
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of the direction of international trade flows, to the detri­
ment of basic considerations of price, quality and 
delivery deadlines.
G. Th e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  w o r l d  t r a d e
1. An international organization within the United 
Nations system must be set up as soon as possible to 
deal with world trade problems, and, more particularly, 
to meet the needs of development. This new organization 
should have a membership open to all countries, it 
should have sufficient authority to guarantee the fulfil­
ment of the decisions of the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development and of the United Nations 
itself in the field of world trade and development, and 
it should be capable of providing, on a permanent basis, 
the main impetus of all activities relating to world 
trade regarded as a means of economic development.
2. Until such time as the instruments for setting up 
a permanent organization of this kind have been per­
fected, it is essential to establish immediate-action bodies 
with, as their central organ, the United Nations Con­
ference on Trade and Development, which would recon­
vene within one or two years. The Conference would 
have a standing committee and a permanent and qualified 
secretariat, as well as its own budget, and ad hoc com­
mittees as required, all of which would work in close 
co-operation with the Economic and Social Council and 
with the regional economic commissions of the United 
Nations, to promote the critical evaluation, revision, and, 
in due course, the co-ordination of the world trade and 
development activities of the other international bodies 
acting in this field. This analysis should identify areas 
of duplication or inconsistency, together with any gaps 
or shortcomings in the work of these bodies, in order 
to prepare for their gradual and smooth integration 
within a new structure. The committees would also 
further the groundwork for a future trade organization, 
while in the meantime formulating, as necessary, prac­
tical rules directed towards implementing the trade policy 
that emerges from the principles adopted by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development. A num­
ber of committees would operate under the direction 
of the Conference, including:
(i) A committee concerned with the relations between 
the developed and developing countries, which would 
speedily transform the Conference’s decisions and recom­
mendations into a special agreement that would govern 
the trade relations between the two groups of countries.
(ii) A committee concerned with relations between 
the State-trading countries and the market-economy 
countries.
(iii) A committee that would function in close con­
tact with the United Nations regional economic com­
missions to strengthen the links and solidarity between 
the developing countries as a whole, particularly those 
of different continents.
During the period in question GATT, as the nego­
tiating body between its present Contracting Parties, 
should continue to concern itself with promoting world 
trade within its present sphere of competence, having 
regard to the general guideline approved by the Con­
ference.
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H. O t h e r  m a t t e r s
Ib e  meeting of Latin American Government experts 
on Trade Policy expresses its appreciation of the co­
operation afforded by the ECLA secretariat to the Latin 
American countries in their efforts to adopt a concerted 
position at the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development. Similarly, the meeting records its 
gratitude for the valuable preparatory work done by 
the secretariat, including its report entitled Latin America 
and the United Nations Conference on Trade and De­
velopment and the organization of the meeting at 
Brasilia, which are positive and substantial contributions 
towards the working out of a trade and development 
policy for the Latin American Governments.
In the light of these facts, the Meeting of Government 
Experts recommends that the ECLA secretariat should:
1. Continue to prepare papers on specific technical 
questions to facilitate the work of the Latin American 
delegations to the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development;
2. Continue to co-operate as actively as at present 
with the delegations of the Latin American countries 
during the Conference;
3. Convene a meeting of the ECLA Trade Committee, 
after the Geneva Conference, with the aim of evaluating 
the results achieved at Geneva and formulating specific 
recommendations to the Latin American Governments 
on the trade policy that should be pursued in the light 
of those results, and invite to the said meeting of the 
Trade Committee the Latin American organizations 
competent in the field of trade and development, in par­
ticular the Organization of American States (OAS), the 
Latin American Free-Trade Association (ALALC), the 
Permanent Secretariat of the General Treaty on Central 
American Economic Integration (SIECA), the Interna­
tional Development Bank (IDB) and the Inter-American 
Committee on the Alliance for Progress (ICAP).
4. Consider, at the said meeting of the Trade Com­
mittee, the establishment of a permanent Latin American 
system of consultations on trade and development, as 
suggested in resolution B-3/E63, adopted by the Inter- 
American Economic and Social Council at its second 
annual meeting at the expert level; for this purpose the 
ECLA secretariat should consult the Latin American 
Governments as soon as possible, to gather their opinions 
on the systems to be established, and should formulate 
its own suggestions which, once they have been studied 
by the Trade Committee, would be submitted to the 
eleventh session of ECLA, to be held in 1965.
As a consequence of the conclusions approved by the 
Meeting of Experts, the ECLA Committee of the Whole, 
at its tenth session, adopted resolution 241 (AC.57) on 
13 February 1964, as set out below:
241 (AC.57) U n it e d  N a t i o n s  C o n f e r e n c e  o n  T r a d e  
AND D e v e l o p m e n t
The Committee of the Whole of the Economic Com­
mission for Latin America,
Considering the need for concerted action on the 
part of the Latin American countries in the field of
foreign trade and development, particularly during 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel­
opment, and, subsequently, throughout the negotiations 
directed towards the establishment of a new order 
and new principles in international trade which will 
adequately safeguard the interests of the developing 
countries.
Taking note with satisfaction of the valuable study 
entitled Latin America and the United Nations Con­
ference on Trade and Development, presented by the 
secretariat as a background document for the Meet­
ing of Latin American Government Experts on Trade 
Policy held at Brasilia from 20 to 25 January 1964, 
and of the report by the secretariat on the said 
Meeting,
Bearing in mind the recommendations submitted 
to the ECLA secretariat by the above-mentioned Meet­
ing of Government Experts,
Decides to request the secretariat:
1. To continue to prepare papers on specific tech­
nical questions to facilitate the work of the Latin 
American delegations to the United Nations Confer­
ence on Trade and Development;
2. To continue to co-operate as actively as at pres­
ent with the delegations of the Latin American coun­
tries during the Conference;
3. To convene a meeting of the ECLA Trade Com­
mittee, after the Geneva Conference, with the aim of
evaluating the results achieved at Geneva and formu­
lating specific recommendations in the Latin American 
Governments on the trade policy that should be pur­
sued in the light of those results, and invite to the 
said meeting of the Trade Committee the Latin Ameri­
can organizations competent in the field of trade 
and development, in particular the Organization of 
American States (OAS), the Latin American Free- 
Trade Association (ALALC), the Permanent Secre­
tariat of the General Treaty on Central American 
Economic Integration (SIECA), the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) and the Inter-American 
Committee on the Alliance for Progress (ICAP), 
the Centre for Latin American Monetary Studies 
(CEMLA), and the Panel of Nine.
4. To consider, at the said meeting of the Trade 
Committee, the establishment of a permanent Latin 
American system of consultations on trade and devel­
opment, as suggested in resolution B-3/E63, adopted 
by the Inter-American Economic and Social Council 
at its second annual meeting at the expert level; for 
this purpose the ECLA secretariat should consult the 
Latin American Governments as soon as possible, 
to gather their opinions on the systems to be estab­
lished, and should formulate its own suggestion for 
submission, after consideration by the Trade Com­




ACTIVITIES OF THE LATIN AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL PLANNING
REPORT OF THE GOVERNING COUNCIL FOR 1963-1964*
Part I
G e n e r a l  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  I n s t it u t e ’ s  a c t i v i t i e s  a n d
ORIENTATION OF ITS WORK
At the outset of its activities for 1963 the Institute had 
already established the hases for its organization and 
had almost its full complement of professional staff. 
In addition it had a vigorous training programme that 
had been constantly improved during the preceding ten 
years, when it had been given by the ECLA secretariat. 
Continuing research on planning problems and tech­
niques in Latin America was an important field of 
activity in 1963 which the Institute had to expend 
progressively as far as its resources and work programmes 
permitted. Similarly, it was necessary to extend the 
Institute’s work in relation to the advisory groups.
Experience of Latin America’s problems has made 
plain what immediate needs must be met in the planning 
field. Many such needs have already been indicated on 
previous occasions, but have revealed themselves more 
clearly during the most recent period of activities.
There is one group of questions in respect of which 
planning is limited by lack of precise knowledge of the 
concepts and techniques required. A typical example is 
the programming of social sectors as an integral part 
of a general plan. Another example is the adoption and 
execution of short-term policies in a form that will con­
tribute to fulfilment of the plan’s objectives, and this 
applies especially to planning in countries that are work­
ing towards integration of their economies, to a greater 
or lesser degree, and wish to build up their plans in 
a way that will promote or assist such integration. In 
all these fields continuing research is needed to permit 
the working out of new techniques, or ways of adjusting 
and applying existing techniques, for such specific situa­
tions. From a broader standpoint this indicates the need 
for a continuing effort to improve planning techniques 
and to study the problems as they arise in Latin America.
The institutional aspects of planning, and the pneral 
need to adapt administrative machinery to planning ob­
jectives, are now coming to be regarded as at least as 
important as the working out of development plans. As 
is known, the progress made in some countries in pro­
ducing such plans has not been accompanied by equal 
progress with respect to instruments and machinery for 
their application. The Institute has dealt with this type 
of problem through the advisory groups and through 
the Training Programme. Obviously this subject must
* Document E/CN.12/AC.57/8 submitted to the ECLA Com­
mittee of the Whole at its tenth session. The annexes have been 
omitted since they are of more limited interest than the report 
itself.
be one of the Institute’s main fields of action, with a 
view to advancing towards a solution of these problems, 
or at least suggesting formulas for their solution through 
a combination of research proper and surveys in the 
field. For the same purpose valuable use can be made 
of the Latin American experience being gained in the 
Institute through seminars and special working groups. 
With a view to expanding this fund of experience it 
has been decided that the Institute will co-operate with 
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop­
ment in holding a seminar at the Institute headquarters 
during the first half of 1964, devoted to a study of the 
organizational and administrative aspects of planning.
Obviously what has been done thus far in planning 
in Latin America must be followed by a vast effort in­
volving increasing difficulties since the setting in motion 
of a planning system involves decisions of a political 
nature on the part of the Government, as well as the 
considerable work of adapting planning methodology 
to the conditions of the individual country. Moreover, 
it is noted that the main effort in this field has centred 
on instruments of guidance in the form of medium 
and long-term programmes. Clearly similar progress is 
needed in the establishment and functioning of opera­
tional machinery, especially for the formulation of spe­
cific projects. The preceding observations make clear 
the need to increase the attention the Institute is devot­
ing to the advisory groups, since as progress is achieved 
in planning tasks, new and different advisory require­
ments emerge, which do not come to an end as soon 
as the plans have been worked out.
Serious problems arise from the above situation, es­
pecially as regards the shortage of experts available in 
Latin America. This shortage has been dealt with to 
some extent on the basis of technical specialists who 
are well trained, but with limited experience, acting 
under the supervision of the chief of the advisory group 
and with the support and technical guidance of the 
Institute. The advisory groups could be strengthened 
and supported by the organization of a group of regional 
experts or advisers who have links with the technical 
staff of the Institute and are highly mobile.
Lastly, it is clear that the Institute should expand its 
sphere of activity by placing its ideas and the techniques 
it has worked out within reach of a greater number than 
hitherto. With this aim, and in line with the course 
indicated by the Governing Council on earlier occasions, 
a publications programme has been drawn up. The series 
published will include general texts and those dealing 
with common techniques, as well as manuals on sectoral 
and sub-sectoral programming. These texts include both 
those written for teaching purposes and those written
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as theses. It is also thought that the manuals may have 
an operational value through facilitating the application 
of the various techniques and the knowledge acquired 
to conditions in the Latin American countries. In 1963 
the preparation of a number of manuals was undertaken. 
It is expected that in 1964 manuals will be completed 
on projects (revised version of the existing manual), 
industrial programming, national accounts, budget pro­
gramming, and transport. The order of publication will 
be determined by the rate of progress achieved in respect 
of the various topics.
The initial experience outlined above, as well as the 
experience and knowledge accumulated by ECLA over 
the years, have provided the guidelines for the Institute’s 
activities.
The first of these guidelines is the practical turn that 
the Institute’s activities must necessarily take in response 
to the requirements of the actual situation in Latin 
America. For this purpose both the features common to 
the region as a whole and those that characterize the 
individual countries must be home in mind. Most of 
the countries of the region have established or are 
establishing planning bodies; over half of them have 
drawn up their first development plans, and in some 
countries these plans are already being carried out. 
However, there are great difficulties in their practical 
execution. Some of these difficulties arise from the 
political, economic, social and cultural structure and 
conditions in the country concerned; others are due 
to the characteristics of the plans themselves and of 
the institutional and administrative machinery needed 
to implement them; still others relate directly to the 
degree of evolution of the planning techniques that the 
Latin American countries are attempting to apply. How 
does the Institute propose to contribute to the solution of 
these problems, in accordance with the practical criterion 
referred to, without neglecting the theoretical elements 
essential to the maintenance of reasonable technical 
standards, and within the limits of its resources? This 
can be seen by studying the pattern of its main activities.
One of the most urgent problems in most of the bodies 
responsible for planning in Latin America is the lack of 
personnel trained in planning techniques. This is true 
at all levels, both in the central planning offices and in 
the other bodies belonging to the public sector. In order 
to attack this problem, the Institute has devoted the bulk 
of its resources to the Training Programme.
This Programme aims, through the Basic Course, at 
training as rapidly as possible the specialists needed 
to fill the ranks of the national planning bodies, at both 
the general and sectoral levels. The purpose of the in­
tensive courses is to make the concepts and techniques 
of development planning known to a larger number of 
officials in Ministries, autonomous institutions and State 
enterprises in every country. Through the special courses 
it is hoped to reach the sectors of education, health and 
housing, which are important in the planning of social 
development.
The work of the participants in the Basic Course, 
both in the first part that provides a common training, 
and in the part dealing with special fields, is directed 
towards the application to problems and situations in 
their own country of the instruments and techniques 
about which they are instructed in relation to the various
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subjects. In the intensive courses, on the other hand, the 
emphasis continues to be (and will be to an even greater 
extent in the future) on adjusting the actual scope and 
content of the courses to the needs and characteristics 
of the different countries where they are given. Perfect­
ing of planning techniques and progress in theory pro­
vide the basis for the practical applications in question.
As regards the work of the OAS/IDB/ECLA advisory 
groups, the practical nature of their work makes it 
advisable to apply the planning strategy considered most 
suitable to the situation in the country concerned. Thus 
in some countries there is a more extensive and detailed 
diagnosis of the economic and social problems; in others 
the aim is the rapid establishment of plans and machinery 
capable of remedying pressing problems of stagnation; 
in yet others the need is to ensure that national plans 
contribute to advanced movements of multi-national 
integration, which offer the best prospects for rapid 
development. These different lines of action do not, of 
course, reflect any difference in methodology, but merely 
a recognition of the needs of different situations.
The work of the Research Division has been concen­
trated on three main projects, that are also governed 
to some extent by the criterion of their importance to 
Latin America.
An attempt is being made to keep up to date the 
analytic knowledge of the state and progress of planning 
in every country, and in the region as a whole, in order 
to keep an up-to-date account of the main obstacles to 
the efficiency of planning in Latin America, the solutions 
applied, how far such solutions are successful, etc. This 
work began with the study carried out jointly with 
ECLA and submitted to the Commission at its tenth 
session.^
The second research project deals with the problem 
of the relationship between short-term economic policy 
and medium and long-term plans, with special emphasis 
on the operational and administrative aspects of planning.
The third project undertaken by the Research Division 
relates to another current problem of importance in the 
economic policy of the Latin American countries, namely, 
the relations between planning at the national level and 
the process of multi-national economic integration.
In all the research work carried out the aim is to 
develop flexible techniques and methodologies that can 
be adapted to the situation and stage reached in the 
various countries. Consequently the work is based on 
specific data from the countries of the region so that 
the results will be closely related to the actual situation.
The second basic guideline applied by the Institute 
is the inclusion in all its activities of the social aspect 
of economic development. The subject of social planning 
has not yet been dealt with as a whole, but some aspects 
are studied as part of the special courses in education and 
health. In addition, the fund of knowledge that is stiU 
lacking must be built up, and at the same time principles 
and methods must be formulated with a view to in­
tegrating the social and economic aspects within the 
planning framework. It is hoped that this task of in­
1 Progresos en material de planificación en América Latina 
(E/CN.12/677), available in Spanish only.
eluding the social problems in the Institute’s activities 
can also be extended to the advisory groups.
The third guideline concerns the need to make broad 
sectors of Latin America conscious of the idea of plan­
ning, and to provide for increasing participation by 
these sectors through study and discussion at the tech­
nical level. As a first step it is proposed to organize 
a seminar for trade union leaders. This project will be 
carried out in co-operation with the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO). The aim will be to enlist the co­
operation of Latin America’s labour leaders by familiar­
izing them with the practical problems of development. 
There is already an ample documentary basis for this 
task in the various studies by ECLA and the Institute. 
This basis will be used in studying the significance of 
planning and its importance for the economy as a whole, 
and in particular for the majority sections of the popu­
lation. It is hoped that the seminar will represent a first 
step that can lead to further activities in this field.
Without prejudice to the importance of other con­
siderations, it can be said that the above guidelines 
determine the basic pattern of the Institute’s activities.
Before considering the state of the Institute’s work, 
dealt with in Parts II and III of the present report, it 
should be pointed out that valuable help in meeting the 
demands of an ambitious work programme has been 
received from other international institutions and organi­
zations such as the Inter-American Development Bank 
(ID B), ECLA, the United Nations Educational, Scien­
tific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Pan 
American Sanitary Bureau, the United Nations Bureau 
of Technical Assistance Operations, the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), the Organization of American 
States (OAS), the ILO, the Agency for International 
Development of the United States Government, and 
such private bodies as the Ford Foundation and Re­
sources for the Future. This has provided an excellent 
opportunity of associating with professional and expert 
workers in other organizations. The new agreements con­
cluded in 1963 include the agreement on co-operation 
with UNESCO, and the agreement with Resources for 
the Future, and an account of both is given later in the 
present report.
The year 1963 also marked the beginning of certain 
activities in conjunction with university groups in Latin 
America. These links must be placed on a more per­
manent basis, and be established at the level of work 
programmes and specific projects of common interest. 
For this purpose it is proposed to continue in 1964 the 
contacts already established with Latin American imi- 
versities, with a view to exploring fields for initial 
co-operation.
On the basis of what has been said in the foregoing 
pages, there is now presented, in Part II, a summary of 
the Training Programme and Advisory Group activities, 
in line with the break-down adopted in earlier reports. 
Part III describes the Institute’s activities by program­
ming sectors, in a way that permits evaluation of the 
links maintained between the Institute’s research pro­
gramme, the advisory groups and the Training Pro­
gramme. Each of these sectors is making growing de­
mands on the Institute’s attention, and this is reflected 
in the Work Programme for 1964.
Part n
T r a in in g  P r o g r a m m e  a n d  A d v is o r y  G r o u p s  
Training Programme
As stated in previous reports, one of the most im­
mediate results of the establishment of the Institute was 
the marked strengthening of the Training Programme. 
This is indicated by the increase in the number of par­
ticipants in the various types of courses, as reflected in 
the following figures:
Î96Î 1962
Basic course .................. ........ 49 62 74
Intensive courses ........ ........  255 (5 )b 301 (6)b 508 (9)0
Special courses ............ ........ — 47 73
304 410 655
® Approximate figures.
The figures between brackets indicate the number of intensive 
courses in the year in question.
In February 1963 the first basic course in planning 
offered by the Institute was concluded, and between 
April and December the second was given. In addition 
there was a second course in education planning, a second 
course in health planning, a short course on manpower 
planning, and a seminar for heads of education planning 
ofllces in Latin America. There were also ten intensive 
courses, of which six were organized directly by the 
Institute; three, in Brazil, were conducted in co-operation 
with national bodies and with the ECLA/BNDE ofllce, 
and the others (in Paraguay) were given directly by 
a group of ex-participants in Institute courses.
The Institute has now reached what must be regarded 
as a maximum figure, as regards both the number of 
courses and the number of participants, since no more 
can be done with present resources. In addition, it should 
be borne in mind that as more effort is being devoted 
to research and guidance activities, and to support of 
the OAS/IDB/ECLA advisory groups, it will be difllcult 
to allocate additional resources in the current year to 
expansion of the Training Programme.
The basic aim pursued in this activity of strengthen­
ing the training programmes was to help to remedy as 
soon as possible the lack of staff that hampers planning 
work on most of the Latin American countries. Needless 
to say, it is not claimed that these programmes alone 
can solve the problem; this can only be done by a con­
tinuous and cumulative effort, based not only on the 
instruction in the courses and on the national training 
programmes, but also on the experience that the spe­
cialists are acquiring in carrying out practical planning 
work.
The Institute’s first effort in the training field is also 
reflected in the orientation of the courses, a subject 
referred to both in earlier reports and in Part I of 
the present report. Sufifice it for the moment to indicate 
certain features that are the practical evidence of the 
resolve that the fruits of the training programmes shall 
be lasting and continuous and shall be directly related 
to the actual situation in Latin America and to the 
specific requirements of economic and social planning in 
the countries of the region.
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First, the process of selecting those who are to par­
ticipate in the course has been perfected. As regards 
the Basic Course, there has been a growing tendency 
on the part of national planning bodies to propose 
candidates who are already working in fields that cor­
respond to the special subjects covered by the second 
part of the course. This helps to ensure that the knowl­
edge acquired in the courses will be applied to specific 
national planning tasks. In addition a special effort 
has been made to broaden the basis for selecting the 
candidates. For the 1963 course, 140 candidates were 
proposed, of whom 75 were chosen. This more rigorous 
selection was reflected both in the results of the courses 
and in their level.
The content of the courses, on the other hand, has 
been enriched through the experience obtained in pre­
vious courses and also in the course of the planning 
work being carried out in nearly all the countries of the 
region. Without prejudice to the necessary theoretical 
framework, and the teaching of new methods and tech­
niques that are introduced in the light of research and 
experience, increasing importance is attached to the 
execution of the plans. Another trend is the increase 
in the practical work that the participants are expected 
to carry out through seminars and exercises, based on 
most cases on specific examples drawn from the region 
itself.
With a view to strengthening and continuing the 
Institute’s link with those who take part in the courses, 
a series of measures have been adopted aiming at a more 
effective contribution to the planning work carried out 
in the various countries.
These measures include, first, the granting of post­
graduate fellowships to some of the most outstanding 
of the participants in previous courses, who act as 
assistant lecturers. Thanks to the co-operation of UNICEF 
it was possible to offer six such fellowships in 1963. 
This permitted more individual attention to participants, 
and at the same time the formation of a body of high- 
level specialists. In view of the results obtained in 1963, 
it has been agreed with UNICEF that other fellowships 
of the same type shall be made available for 1964. In 
addition OAS has allocated ten special in-service training 
fellowships to be granted to graduates of the Basic 
Course to enable them to work as assistant experts in 
the OAS/IDB/ECLA advisory groups, after a period 
of special training at the Institute.
The preparation of teaching and practical manuals, 
as explained elsewhere in this report, is another way 
of bringing to a wider audience the Institute’s teaching 
and the results of its research. The same is true of the 
national centres that are being created through the direct 
action of ex-participants in the courses, in order to 
publicize the concepts and techniques of development 
planning and extend the training of personnel at the 
local level. Special mention should be made of the work 
done in 1963 in Paraguay by a group of ex-participants 
in organizing and running an extensive training course.
In 1963 a survey of ex-participants was undertaken, 
to determine what direct experience they were having 
in applying the knowledge they had acquired from the 
courses. This survey covers over 2,000 professional 
workers in all the Latin American countries, and is one
way of maintaining a link between the Institute and 
its ex-students.
In 1963 the intensive courses were characterized by 
the following developments: (1) the continuation of a 
greater national participation in the organization and 
conducting of the courses, generally through the plan­
ning bodies and the universities; (2) the establishment 
in certain countries of permanent offices or centres for 
the conducting of such courses, generally with the aim 
of extending them to the various regions of the country; 
(3) the addition of new subjects (mathematics, statistics, 
development sociology, etc.) ; (4) the lengthening of the 
course, in some countries, and the introduction of special 
subjects such as agricultural, industrial, transport and 
education programming; (5) the holding of the first 
course for the five Central American republics, in which 
there was special emphasis on the relation between na­
tional planning and the Central American integration 
programme.
Advisory groups
The work of the tripartite OAS/IDB/ECLA advisory 
groups is now carried out in three South American 
countries— Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay— and in the five 
Central American countries, which are served by a joint 
mission. In addition there is an advisory group in 
Bolivia under the responsibility of the United Nations. 
The groups have not yet been able to make up their full 
complement, especially those in Bolivia, Paraguay and 
Peru.
The general trend of the Institute’s activities in this 
field, and the main problems that must be overcome if 
its activity is to be more fruitful, have been dealt with 
in Part I of this report. In addition, the analysis in 
Part III, by programming sectors, gives an account of 
the Institute’s activities in each of these sectors. It may 
be useful to give a brief account here for each country 
so as to show the progress made in terms of the trend 
in the individual country.
In Uruguay an analysis of the country’s economy was 
completed. Much of the work consisted of preparing 
the statistical data needed for the analysis, including 
calculations of the product and related series, and the 
data on the external sector, the public sector, and others. 
The analysis was worked out in some detail, since this 
type of work was being done for the first time and it 
was therefore considered necessary to provide a body 
of data for analysis and evaluation on the various aspects 
of the country’s growth, to serve as a basis for the dis­
cussion of development problems. It was believed more 
appropriate to provide, not a schematic outline of such 
problems, but a full study that would permit each aspect 
of the economy to be given careful consideration by 
public opinion and by the country’s experts.
In the analysis for Uruguay an attempt was made, 
although not on a full scale, to link political questions 
and short-term problems with structural questions and 
long-term problems, by including an analysis of the 
problem of inflation and of the elements of monetary 
policy.
A project inventory was also drawn up, together with 
a study and evaluation of the projects. In addition a 
list was made of the matters that, according to the analy­
sis, call for decisions that are needed as the basis of
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a development plan. The next stage will be to work out 
an investment plan for 1964-1965, while at the same time 
a more long-term programme is worked out, linked with 
the national budget.
For the analysis for Peru a different approach was 
adopted. As there were already existing studies on Peru, 
including one by ECLA, it was decided to prepare, 
within a relatively short period, a study based on the 
existing material that would be supplemented by addi­
tional material with a view to setting out, in an organized 
though summary form, the country’s basic economic 
and social development problems. In Peru, too, the aim 
was to include some important aspects of development 
that thus far had not been brought into systematic 
relation with the remainder, especially problems of re­
gional economic growth and social aspects of Peru’s 
development.
A short-term investment plan is now being prepared, 
while at the same time long-term macro-economic 
projections are being worked out.
In Bolivia a long-term plan had already been worked 
out and submitted, and the work consequently took a 
predominantly operational turn, with the aim of solving 
problems relating to the application of the plans. Thus 
in 1963 a two-year investment plan was prepared, the 
main projects covered relating to mining, petroleum, 
electricity, transport and land settlement. In addition 
the planning machinery is being strengthened, and sec­
toral offices are being set up for this purpose in each 
Ministry.
In ParagxMy work progressed on an analysis of the 
various sectors in the economy and on the organization 
of sectoral groups within the Planning Board. Planning 
work has been directed to the drafting of a two-year 
plan that will cover mainly public investments. Progress 
has also been made in the introduction of the programme 
budgeting system and in the drafting of a national 
economic budget. It is expected that in 1964 the first 
two-year plan will be completed and over-all projections 
of the economy will be undertaken that can be used 
subsequently in a plan covering a larger period. Part 
of these projections and other long-term elements will 
be used as basic parts of the plan now being drafted.
In Central America central planning ofiGces have been 
organized and have begun operating in each of the five 
countries of the area. Work has begun on organizing 
sectoral units in the various Ministries and decentralized 
bodies. Progress has been made in preparing over-all 
and sectoral analyses, of which the preliminary versions 
will be completed early in 1964. An inventory has been 
completed of public investment projects in the infra­
structure, and of private investments under the aegis 
of the Industrial Manufacturing Council. To complete 
the work at this level studies are being organized on 
the main branches of industrial activity, with the co­
operation of the ECLA secretariat, the Central American 
Research Institute for Industry (ICAITI), the Central 
American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE), and 
consultants specially recruited for this purpose. With 
the co-operation of the Advanced School of Public Ad­
ministration for Central America (ESAPAC) preliminary 
studies are being carried out to provide a basis for 
undertaking reforms in the main public administration 
activities during 1964. It is envisaged that these studies
will be finished early in 1964. In all the Central American 
countries the basis has been laid for introducing budg­
etary planning and working out national budgets on a 
programme basis in 1965.
The Joint Programming Mission for Central America 
is responsible for studies on the regional aspects of 
planning and the technical co-ordination of plans carried 
out at the national level. The mission is made up of 
eighteen experts, of whom fifteen have been recruited 
by, and act under the general direction of, an Advisory 
Committee made up of representatives of the Organiza­
tion of American States (OAS), IDB and ECLA, the 
Chairman of the BCIE and the Secretary-General of the 
Permanent Secretariat of the General Treaty on Central 
American Economic Integration (SIEGA).
Part III
T h e  I n s t i t u t e ’ s  a c t iv it ie s  in  t h e  v a r i o u s  f ie l d s  o f
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PLANNING
With the aim of providing a more complete picture 
of the Institute’s activities in 1963, and its Work Pro­
gramme for 1964, this part of the report deals with these 
activities by subject.
Industrial programming
In this field the intention is to bring together in a 
single theoretical and practical outline the main eco­
nomic and technological aspects of the manufacturing 
industry in relation to the planning process. This aim 
is reflected in the teaching and advisory activities and 
in a synthesis in the form of a document on industrial 
programming that presents in an orderly and systematic 
manner the information given in the courses, the expe­
rience now being accumulated in the course of the plan­
ning work carried out in Latin America and other parts 
of the world, and, in particular, the results of the research 
conducted at the Institute and elsewhere to clarify certain 
basic aspects of this sector. One of these aspects, measures 
of industrialization policy and the kinds of bodies through 
which such policy can be carried out, is being made 
the subject of a detailed analysis.
In 1963 the special series of lectures on industrial 
programming under the Basic Course that began in 1962 
was concluded, and from August to December the special 
courses under the 1963 Basic Course were given. An 
important innovation was the introduction of a course 
on the economy of the industrial enterprise, and short 
courses on specific industries, chosen in the light of their 
importance within the framework of Latin American 
development. These courses provide the minimum tech­
nological information needed by an industrial program­
mer. More time was devoted to seminars on the prepara­
tion and evaluation of projects, which are based on actual 
industrial cases. It is also of interest to note the use 
of certain theoretical tools— such as linear program­
ming— for the study of practical problems of alternative 
techniques and processes applicable to situations char­
acteristic of the countries of the region.
In co-operation with ECLA two documents were pre­
pared for the Seminar on Industrial Programming in 
Sao Paulo, La experiencia de los Grupos Asesores en 
la formulación de programas de desarrollo de la indus­
tria manufacturera (ST/ECLA/CONF.11/L.7), and
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Algunas notas sobre problemas de programación in­
dustrial (ST/ECLA/C0N F.11/L.2).
Within the above-described framework, the intention 
is to make a detailed study of the problems of policy 
and organization referred to, and of problems of the 
financing of industrial development and the application 
of certain mathematical models to the programming of 
the industrial sector.
Agricultural programming
In this sector particular attention is being devoted 
to factors of an institutional nature. Thus the special 
subject of agricultural programming covered such struc­
tural and institutional factors, especially through the 
study of problems of land tenure, rural sociology and 
agrarian policy. These subjects were taught after some 
information had been imparted on the instruments used 
in appraising and analysing the situation of the sector 
and its behaviour. Subsequently, at a third stage, a study 
was made of employment problems and the use of plan­
ning techniques in the agricultural sector. In 1963 various 
matters relating to the execution of agricultural develop­
ment plans were also studied, including the consideration 
of alternative policies. In 1964, although the general 
structure of the syllabus will not be changed, there will 
be greater emphasis on teaching about such tools as linear 
programming and the statistical sample.
Lectures were also given on this subject in the in­
tensive courses conducted in 1963 in Central America, 
Mexico and Peru. The shortness of these courses per­
mitted only a very general outline of agricultural pro­
gramming, but the experience gained will make it pos­
sible to improve the courses considerably in 1964.
The problems encountered in lighting upon a complete 
explanation of the difBculties of agricultural develop­
ment, and on techniques for identifying these difBculties, 
analysing them and remedying them within the frame­
work of an appropriate scheme, underline the urgent 
need to carry out an intensive research programme aimed 
mainly at throwing light on the process of agricultural 
development and working out or improving programming 
techniques applicable to Latin American agriculture. In 
this connexion work was done in 1963 on an explanatory 
model— based on past data for the Latin American coun­
tries— showing the relationship between the agricultural 
sector and the rest of the economy, especially from the 
standpoint of the allocation of resources. It is expected 
that this study, and others that will be undertaken in 
1964, will provide information that can be used in solv­
ing problems relating to the allocation of resources to 
the agricultural sector within an over-all development 
plan, to the distribution of these resources within the 
sector, and to decisions on policy measures that can be 
used to accelerate the growth of the agricultural sector, 
and convert it into a dynamic factor for general devel­
opment.
Advisory group activities in this field were limited. 
In Peru the group participated in an analysis of a pre­
liminary diagnosis of the sector, and a complete schema 
for a review was suggested. In Uruguay the diagnosis 
made by the group was studied and further research 
work was suggested on the characteristics and results 
of the price policy, on activities relating to land settle­
ment, and on pasture improvement programmes. In
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Bolivia work was done both by the expert appointed 
to the advisory group, and by the experts in the Joint 
ECLA/FAO Agriculture Division who visited Bolivia, 
on problems relating to the preparation and evaluation 
of specific projects. The assistance to the advisory groups 
in the field of agricultural development in 1964 was 
provided by the Institute in close co-operation with the 
Inter-American Committee on Agricultural Development 
and the Regional OfBce of the FAO, as well as with the 
Joint ECLA/FAO Agriculture Division.
Transport programming
During 1963 advice on this subject was given to the 
various countries, and work began on the preparation 
of the Transport Programming Manual. This manual 
is to serve both as teaching material and also as a ref­
erence text for the experts of the various countries. 
To make it more suitable for these two purposes, it will 
include an annex on transport technology and another 
on the formulation of projects in this sector.
As regards training, the special lectures on this subject 
in the Basic Course for 1962-1963 were concluded and 
courses were given in Mexico and Central America. 
Although these two courses differed as to level and 
degree of detail, in both there was great emphasis on 
methodological questions, on the formulation and evalua­
tion of programmes and projects, and on the study of 
alternative policies for the execution and review of 
programmes. The theoretical instruction was supple­
mented by considerable activity in the form of seminars 
and by research work aimed at helping the student to 
deal with the problems of his own country.
In 1964 the lectures on this special subject in the 
second part of the Basic Course will again be given, with 
emphasis on problems of programme execution, co­
ordination between short and long-term plans, and the 
formulation of transport policies aimed at integration 
of the various means of transport both with each other 
and with the rest of the economy.
The Institute also took part in the transport pro­
gramming activities in Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and 
Uruguay. In the coming year work will continue in this 
field, in which teaching and research can be based on 
specific experience in the region. For this purpose the 
Institute’s experts will work with the advisory groups 
for fairly long periods.
Natural resources
In 1963 the Institute’s main activity in this field was 
an attempt to make clear its links with planning. For 
this purpose an annotated outline was prepared, intended 
to serve as a basis for internal discussions aimed at a 
better definition of the relations between the survey of 
natural resources and the various stages and sectors 
of planning. On the basis of an internal seminar, in 
which experts from ECLA and from other bodies also 
took part, work has begun on studies to define the basic 
concepts in the field of natural resources, the techniques 
used to survey and evaluate them, the effects of tech­
nological advances on the supply and demand of natural 
resources, and an account of the role that they have 
played in the past at different stages of the development 
of certain countries.
As regards training, some short courses were included 
in the first stage of the Basic Course at Santiago, and 
in the intensive course in Uruguay.
In addition the Institute helped to determine guidelines 
for the work of the Advisory Group in Uruguay in 
analysing and diagnosing the problems relating to natural 
resources in that country.
Co-operation has begun with a mission organized by 
the IDB to determine the possibilities of economic in­
tegration in the frontier zones between Colombia and 
Venezuela. The expert on natural resources will draw 
up a preliminary inventory of resources with a view 
to a diagnosis of the limiting factors and possibilities 
as regards the integrated development of the frontier 
zone.
An agreement has been drawn up with the well-known 
United States organization Resources for the Future, 
Inc., whereby two high-level experts will be allocated 
to the Institute in 1964.
Human resources
The planning of human resources represents a new 
field of activity whose exact limits are not yet known. 
Thus this subject may be regarded, by different people, 
as covering essentially the analysis of employment prob­
lems, or of health and nutrition, or as relating to edu­
cation planning, or to analysis and projections of man­
power needs. These different interpretations indicate 
the need for a vigorous research programme, starting 
with the systematic organization of the theories and 
experience of different parts of the world, particularly 
the Latin American countries. This should pave the way 
for a complete study of the problems of planning human 
resources in Latin America, that might initially consist, 
broadly speaking, of a critical analysis of research con­
ducted and methods used in the Latin American countries 
in this field, and the needs and gaps that it reveals.
The work began in 1963 with a study of the existing 
material available on the development of technical 
instruments and models for studying problems of em­
ployment and future manpower needs.
For the first time there was a special course in this 
subject. There were also short courses on human re­
sources during the first part of the Basic Course, in 
the special course of programming in the public sector, 
in the special course on industrial programming and 
in the course on education planning. In addition a course 
on manpower planning was held in June and July, in 
co-operation with the ILO.
Project preparation and evaluation
Now that development plans have entered the stage 
of execution in a number of countries in the region, 
it has become clear that more projects must be prepared, 
on the basis of more ample background material than 
at present, and with due regard for the economic aspects. 
This problem has repercussions on important questions 
of an institutional nature, which call for special con­
sideration within the over-all framework of planning 
activities. Within the more restricted sphere of the 
preparation and evaluation of projects, efforts must be 
concentrated on two main forms of activity: assistance 
to Governments and help in training experts. The first
relates to the work of the advisory groups and the second 
to the Training Course.
In addition to the lectures and seminars given to all 
participants during the first part of the Basic Course, 
instruction this year was expanded by the inclusion of 
seminars prepared for the special subjects of program­
ming in the public sector and in the industrial and agri­
cultural sectors.
These semineirs had an essentially practical approach, 
and concentrated on the discussion of projects drawn 
from real life. More than twenty projects were discussed, 
covering electricity, transport, industry, marketing of 
agricultural products, and land settlement.
Another innovation in this field was the discussion of 
what are termed social projects. These raise problems 
of definitions and concepts that permit the preparation 
of projects in housing, health and education to be linked 
with the technique of programme budgeting. From the 
operative standpoint the problems concern not only defi­
nition, but also the setting up of machinery and institu­
tional relations for formulating and evaluating projects 
and for controlling their execution.
Experience has shown the value of including in the 
advisory groups experts responsible for promoting and 
improving the preparation of projects and helping to 
evaluate them within the framework of the general pro­
gramme. The Institute maintains contact with the ac­
tivities in question and co-operates with the advisory 
groups on them.
In this field the following developments should be 
noted ;
(a) In Uruguay the study covering the general diag­
nosis included a general list of investment initiatives 
that had reached various stages of progress. The Advisory 
Group is also working on the preparation of standard 
formulas for providing the essential minimum of infor­
mation for projects in various sectors.
(b) In Paraguay a systematic study of the subject 
was begun, with the direct participation of an official 
of the Institute.
In 1964 the aim will be that each of the advisory 
groups includes a permanent general expert on projects, 
whose work will be essentially to promote, identify and 
prepare projects, and to organize working groups to 
carry out the necessary preliminary studies. These ex­
perts will work in close contact with the sectoral spe­
cialists in the advisory group concerned, without preju­
dice to the use of specialized project experts or consultant 
firms. The general project experts will in fact help to 
carry out preliminary studies that will make it easier 
to define the tasks of the specialists and will undoubtedly 
reduce the costs of feasibility studies.
The shortage of general project experts calls for a great 
effort in the training field. Apart from the provision of 
courses in 1964, as in 1963, the Institute’s efforts will 
be centered mainly on revising and bringing up to date 
the Project Manual, with a view to publishing the revised 
version in 1964.
In addition, with the same aim of promoting project 
preparation, it is proposed to work out the organizational 
bases and content of special courses lasting six or eight 
weeks to be given in the various countries, and of semi-
149
tion of this type of project in the government sector. 
These activities were carried out mainly through the 
Training Programme, both in the Basic Course and in 
the intensive courses in Uruguay, Brazil and Central 
America, which included short courses on planning in 
the public sector.
As regards advisory services, the knowledge accu­
mulated by the Institute was passed on to the advisory 
groups in Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay, and also to 
Colombia, where help is being given in reviewing the 
public investment plan for 1964-1967.
In 1963 activity in this field was mainly instructional 
and operational; in 1964 intensive research work will 
also be undertaken.
With regard to programme budgeting, considerable 
work was done in providing guidance and assistance 
to the advisory groups, and the Institute also co-operated 
with national organizations in other countries in the 
region. Advisory services were extended to Bolivia, Co­
lombia, Costa Rica, Peru, Ecuador, Paraguay and Vene­
zuela. This work includes not only the substantive aspects
of budget reform, but also the preparation of working 
manuals, review of methods and of programme control 
and accounts, extension of the system of programme 
budgeting to decentralized enterprises and public enter­
prises, and so forth.
In the field of short-term planning a series of prob­
lems arises relating mainly to making short-term plans 
consistent with medium and long-term plans. The research 
programme concerned, which is under way, is described 
in the report of the Director General to the third meet­
ing of the Governing Council, and also in the Work 
Programme. The research begun in 1963 includes at­
tempts to adapt to Latin American conditions short­
term models and national economic budget outlines used 
in European countries.
In both the Basic Course and the intensive courses 
a study is made of possible methods of reconciling de­
cisions of economic policy and important types of spe­
cific policy (fiscal, monetary, exchange, etc.), with the 




W H E R E  
A N D  T H E
T O  B U Y  U N I T E D  N A T I O N S  P U B L I C A T I O N S  
P U B L I C A T I O N S  O F  T H E  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  C O U R T  O F  J U S T I C E
A F R I C A
C A M ER O O N :
L IB R A IR IE  DU P E U P L E  A F R IC A IN  
La G érante, B. P , 1197, Yaou nd é.
D IF F U S IO N  IN T E R N A T IO N A L E  C A M E R O U N A IS E  
DU L IV R E  ET D E  LA  P R E S S E ,  San gm e lim a.
CO NG O  (Léopo ld ville):
IN S T IT U T  P O L IT IQ U E  C O N G O LA IS  
B . P. 2 3 0 7 , Léopo ldville .
E T H IO P IA : IN T E R N A T IO N A L  P R E S S  A G EN C Y  
P. O. Box 120, A d d is A bab a.
G H A N A : U N IV E R S IT Y  B O O K S H O P  
U n ivers ity  Co llege  of G h an a, Legón, A ccra .
K E N Y A : T H E  E .S .A . B O O K S H O P . Box 3 0 1 6 7 . Nairobi. 
L IB Y A :  S U D K t E L  JE R B I  (B O O K S E L L E R S )
P. O, Box 78, Ist ik la l Street, B en gh azi.
M O RO CCO : A U X  B E L L E S  IM A G ES 
281 A venu e M oham m ed V, Rabat.
N IG E R IA : U N IV E R S IT Y  B O O K S H O P  (N IG E R IA ) LT D . 
U n ivers ity  College, Ib ad an .
N O R T H E R N  R H O D E S IA :
J .  B E L D IN G , P . 0 . Box 750 , M ufulira.
N Y A S A L A N D : B O O K E R S  (N Y A S A L A N D ) LTD .
Lontyre  H o u se, P. 0 . Box 34, B lan tyre .
SO U TH  A FR IC A :
VAN S C H A IK 'S  B O O K S T O R E  (P T Y )  LTD .
C h u rch  S treet, Box 724 , P retoria .
T E C H N IC A L  B O O K S  (P T Y .) LT D .. Faraday H ou se 
' P. O. Box 2 86 6 , 40  St. G e o rg e ’s S treet, C a p e  Tow n. 
S O U T H E R N  R H O D E S IA ;
T H E  B O O K C E N T R E , First Street, Sa lisb u ry .
T A N G A N Y IK A : D A R  E S  SA LA A M  B O O K S H O P  
P. O. Box 9 0 3 0 , D ar es Sa la a m .
U G A N D A : U G A N D A  B O O K S H O P , P. 0 . B ox 145, K a m p a la . 
U N IT E D  A R A B  R E P U B L IC :
L IB R A IR IE  “ LA  R E N A IS S A N C E  D 'E G Y P T E ’’
9  S h . Adly P a sh a . Cairo .
A L  N AH O A  EL A R A B IA  B O O K S H O P  
32  A b d -e l-K h a le k  Sarw art S t., C a iro .
A S I A
B U R M A : C U R A T O R , GOVT. BO O K D EP O T , Ran goon . 
CA M B O D IA ; E N T R E P R IS E  K H M E R E  D E L IB R A IR IE  
Im p rim erie  & Papeterie  Sa ri, P h n om -P en h .
C E Y L O N : L A K E  H O U S E  B O O K S H O P
A sso c . N ew sp ap ers of Ceylon, P . 0 . Box 2 44 , Colom bo.
C H IN A :
T H E  W O RLD  BO O K CO M PA N Y, LT D .
99  C h u n g  K in g  R oad, 1st Section , T a ip e h , Taiw an.
T H E  C O M M ER C IA L P R E S S , LTD .
211 H onan Road, Sh a n g h a i.
H O N G  K O N G : T H E  SW IN D O N  B O O K C O M P A N Y 
2 5  Nathan R o ad . Kowloon.
IN D IA :
O R IE N T  LO N G M A N S
Calcu tta , Bom b ay, M ad ras, New D elhi, H yd erab ad .
O X FO R D  B O O K & S T A T IO N E R Y  C O M P A N Y 
New  Delhi and C a lcu tta .
IN D O N E S IA :
P EM B A N G U N A N , LTD ., G u n u n g  Sah ari 84, D jakarta. 
JA P A N : M A R U TEN  CO M PA N Y, LT D .
6 Tori-N icho m e, N ihorlbash i. Tokyo .
K O R EA , R E P U B L IC  O F:
EU L-YO O  P U B L IS H IN G  CO ., LT D ., 5, 2 -K A , Chongn o, Seou l, 
P A K IS T A N :
T H E  P A K IS T A N  C O -O P E R A T IV E  B O O K S O C IE T Y  
D ac ca , East P ak istan .
P U B L IS H E R S  U N IT E D . LTO ., Lahore.
T H O M A S Sc TH O M A S, K a ra ch i.
P H IL IP P IN E S :
P H IL IP P IN E  E D U C A TIO N  CO M PA N Y, IN C .
1104 C a stille jo s, P. O. Box 620 , Q uiapo, M anila.
P O P U LA R  B O O K S T O R E , 1573 D oroteo Jo se , M anila. 
S IN G A P O R E :
T H E  C IT Y  B O O K S T O R E , LT D ., C o lly e rQ u a y .
T H A ILA N D :
PR A M U A N  M IT, LT D .
55  C h akraw at Road, W at Tuk, B a n g ko k .
N IB O N D H  Sc CO ., LT D .
New Road, S ik a k  Phya Srr, Ban gko k.
S U K S A P A N  P A N IT
M ansion 9 , R a ja d am n e rn  A venu e, B an gko k .
V IET-N A M , R E P U B L IC  O F:
L IB R A IR IE - P A P E T E R iE  XU AN  TH U  
185, rue Tu-do, B. P. 2 83 , Sa igo n .
E U R O P E
A U S T R IA :
G E R O LD  Sc C O M P A N Y. G raben  31, W ien. I.
G E O R G  FRO M M E Sc CO ., S p e n g e rg a s se  39, W ien, V.
B E LG IU M :
A G E N C E  ET M E S S A G E R IE S  D E LA  P R E S S E , S . A.
14-22, rue du P e rs il, B ru xe lles.
B U L G A R IA :
R A 2 N O Ï2N O S, 1, T za r  A sse n , Sofia.
C Y P R U S : PAN  P U B L IS H IN G  H O U SE
10 A le xan d e r the G reat Street, S lrov o lo s.
C Z E C H O S L O V A K IA :
A R T IA  LT D ., 30  ve S m e ík á c h , Prah a , 2.
D E N M A R K : E JN A R  M U N K S G A A R D , LT D .
N ijrregad e  6, K ^b e n h a vn , K.
F IN L A N D : A K A T E E M IN E N  K IR JA K A U P P A  
2 K e sk u sk a tu , H e lsin ki.
F R A N C E : E D IT IO N S  A. PED O N E 
13. rue Soufflo t, P a ris  (V»').
G ER M A N Y, F E D E R A L  R E P U B L IC  O F:
R. E IS E N S C H M ID T
S ch w an th a ler S ir .  59, Frankfu rt/M ain .
E LW E R T  UN D  M E U R E R  
H a u p tstra sse  101, Berlin  Sch ö neberg.
A L E X A N D E R  H O R N , S p ie g e lg a sse  9, W iesbad en.
W. E. S A A R B A C H , G e rtru d e n s lra sse  30, Köln (1),
G R E E C E :  K A U FFM A N N  B O O K S H O P  
28  Stad ion  Street, A th ens.
H U N G A R Y : K U L T U R A , P. 0 , Box 149. B u d ap e st 62. 
IC E L A N D : B oV a V E R Z L U N  S IG F U S A R  
E Y M U N D S S O N A R  H. F., A u stu rstraeti 18, R eyk javik. 
IR E L A N D : S T A T IO N E R Y  O FF IC E , D ub lin.
IT A L Y :  L IB R E R IA  C O M M IS S IO N A R IA  SA N S O N I
Via Gino Cap p o n i 26, F irenze.
and Via Paolo  M ercuri 19/B , Rom a.
A G E N Z IA  E .I.O .U ., Via M eravigli 16, M ilano.
LU X EM B O U R G :
L IB R A IR IE  J .  T R A U S C H S C H U M M E R  
P lace  du T h é â tre . Lu xem bourg,
N E T H E R L A N D S : N. V. M A R T IN U S  N IJH O F F  
Lange Voorhout 9, ’s-G raven h age.
N O R W A Y: JO H A N  G R U N D T  TA N U M  
Karl Jo h a n sg a te , 41, O slo .
P O LA N D : PA N , Pa4ac Kultury i N au ki, W arszaw a.
P O R T U G A L : L IV R A R IA  R O D R IG U E S  Y C IA .
186 Ru a A urea, L isb oa.
R O M A N IA : C A R T IM E X , S tr, Aristid e  Brian d  14-18,
P. 0 . Box 134-135, B u cu resti.
S P A IN : A G U IL A R  S .A . D E E D IC IO N E S  
Ju a n  Bravo  38, M adrid 6.
L IB R E R IA  B O S C H
R on da U n ivers id ad  11. B arcelona.
L IB R E R IA  M U N O I-P R E N S A , C aste llo  3 7 , M adrid.
SW E D EN :
C. E. F R IT Z E ’S  K U N G L. H O V B O K H A N D E L  A-B 
Fred sgatan  2, Stockho lm .
S W IT Z E R LA N D :
L IB R A IR IE  P A YO T, S . A., La u san n e, G enève.
H A N S  R A U N H A R D T , K irch g a sse  17, Zü rich  1.
T U R K E Y :  L IB R A IR IE  H A C H E T T E  
4 6 9  Istikla l C a d d e si, Beyoglu , Istan b u l.
U N IO N  O F S O V IE T  S O C IA L IS T  R E P U B L IC S :  
M E Z H D U N A R O D N A Y A  K N Y IG A  
S m o len ska y a  P losh ch ad , M oskva,
U N IT E D  KIN G D O M :
H. M. S T A T IO N E R Y  O F F IC E . P. O. Box 569 , Lond on, 3 .E . 1 
(an d  HM SO b ra n ch es in B e lfa st. B irm in gh am ,
Bristo l, C ard iff, Ed in b u rgh , M an ch ester).
Y U G O SLA V IA :
C A N K A R JE V A  Z A L O iB A ,  Lju b ljana, S lovenia .
D R ZA V N O  P R E D U 2 E C E
Ju g o slo v e n sk a  K n lig a , Terazije  2 7 /1 1 , B eo grad.
P R O S V JE T A , 5, T rg  Bratstva  i Je d in stv a , Z a g re b .
P R O S V E T A  P U B L IS H IN G  H O U SE  
Im p ort-Exp ort D iv ision , P. 0 , Box 559 ,
T erazije  16/1, B eo grad.
LATI  N A M E R I C A
A R G E N T IN A : E D IT O R IA L  SU D A M E R IC A N A , S . A.
A lsin a  5 00 , Bu eno s A ires.
B O L IV IA ; L IB R E R IA  S E L E C C IO N E S . C asilla  9 7 2 , La Paz.
LO S  AM IG O S D E L  L IB R O
C alle  Perú e sq . Esp a ñ a . C as illa  4 50 , Coch aham b a.
B R A Z IL :
L IV R A R IA  A G IR
Ru a M exico 9 8 - B, C a ixa  Postal 3 2 9 1 , Rio de Ja n e iro .
L IV R A R IA  F R E IT A S  B A S T O S , S . A.
C a ixa  Postal 8 99 , R io  de Jan e iro .
L IV R A R IA  K O SM O S E D ITO R A
Rua Rosario 135/137, Rio de Janeiro.
C H IL E :
E D IT O R IA L  D EL  P A C IF IC O , A hu m ada 57, Santiago .
L IB R E R IA  IV E N S, C as illa  205 , Sa n tia go .
C O LO M B IA :
L IB R E R IA  A M E R IC A , Calle 51 Núm . 4 9-5 8 . M edellin.
L IB R E R IA  B U C H H O L Z , Av. Jim én e z  de Q u esada 8 -4 0 , Bogotá. 
C O S T A  R IC A : IM P R E N T A  Y L IB R E R IA  T R E JO S  
Apartado  1313, San  Jo sé .
C U 8 A : C U B A R T IM P E X , Apartado  Postal 6 5 4 0 , La H ab an a.
DO M IN ICA N  R E P U B L IC :  L IB R E R IA  D O M IN IC A N A  
M ercedes 4 9 , Santo  D om ingo.
E C U A D O R :
L IB R E R IA  C IE N T IF IC A , C a s illa  3 62 , G u ayaqu il.
L IB R E R IA  U N IV E R S IT A R IA , Calle  G a rd a  M oreno 739 , Quito. 
E L  SA LV A D O R :
L IB R E R IA  C U L T U R A L  S A LV A D O R E Ñ A  
2a . Av. Su r, San  S a lvad o r.
M A N U EL N AV A S V C IA .
la .  A venida S u r  37, San  Sa lvado r.
G U A TEM A LA :
L IB R E R IA  C E R V A N T E S . 5a. Av. 9 39, Zona 1, G uatem ala. 
S O C IE D A D  E C O N O M IC A -F IN A N C IE R A  
6a. Av. 14-33, G u atem ala.
H A IT I:  L IB R A IR IE  “ A LA C A R A V E L L E ’’. Port-au -Prince. 
H O N D U R A S : L IB R E R IA  P A N A M E R IC A N A , Teg u ciga lp a . 
M E X IC O : E D IT O R IA L  H E R M E S , S . A.
Ign acio  M arisca l 4 1, M éxico, D. F.
PA N A M A : JO S E  M E N E N D E Z  
A g e n c ia  In te rn ac ion a l de P u b licacio n e s.
Apartado  2 0 5 2 , Av. 8A  S u r 2 1 -5 8 , P an am á.
P A R A G U A Y:
A G E N C IA  D E L IB R E R IA S  D E S A LV A D O R  N IZ ZA  
Calle  Pte. Franco  No. 39-43, A su n ció n .
P E R U :
L IB R E R IA  IN T E R N A C IO N A L  D E L  P E R U . S . A.
C as illa  1417, Lim a.
L IB R E R IA  S T U O lU M  S. A.
A m argura 9 39 , A partado  2139 , L im a.
U R U G U A Y : L IB R E R IA  R A F A E L  B A R R E T T  
Ram ón  A nador 4 0 3 0 . M ontevideo.
R E P R E S E N T A C IO N  D E E D IT O R IA L E S ,
PR O F, H. D 'E L IA
Plaza  C aga n ch a  1342, 1® piso, Morvtevideo.
V E N E Z U E L A : L IB R E R IA  D EL E S T E
Av. M iranda, No. 52, Edf. G alipán, C a ra c a s .
M I D D L E  E A S T
IR A N ; M EH R  A Y IN  B O O K S H O P  
A bb as Abad A venu e, Isfah an .
IR A Q : M A C K E N Z IE ’S  B O O K S H O P , B a gh d a d .
IS R A E L ;  B L U M S T E IN ’S  B O O K S T O R E S
35 A llenby R d . and 48  N ach lat B en jam in  St., Tel Aviv.
JO R D A N ; JO S E P H  I. B A H O U S  & C O .
D ar-u l-K u lu b , Box 66, Am m an.
LE B A N O N : K H A Y A T ’S  C O L L E G E  BO O K C O O P E R A T IV E  
9 2-9 4 , rue B liss , Beirut.
O R T H  A M E R I C A
C A N A D A :
T H E  Q U E E N ’S  P R I N T E R /L 'IM  PRIM  E U R  D E  LA  R E IN E  
Ottawa, Ontario.
U N IT E D  S T A T E S  O F A M ER IC A :
S A L E S  S E C T IO N , U N IT E D  N A T IO N S , New York.
Puerto R ico:
PAN  A M E R IC A N  B O O K CO ., P. O. B o x '3 5 U ,  San Ju a n  17. 
B O O K S T O R E , U N IV E R S IT Y  OF P U E R T O  R IC O , R(o P ied ra s.
O C E A N I A
A U S T R A L IA :
U. N. A S S O C IA T IO N  OF A U S T R A L IA  '
Me Ewan H o u se. 3 4 3  Little Co llins St., M elbourne C. 1. V ic. 
W EA BO O KRO O M , U n ivers ity , A d e la id e , S .A .
U N IV E R S IT Y  B O O K S H O P , St. Lu cia , B risb an e , Qld.
T H E  E D U C A T IO N A L  AN D  T E C H N IC A L  B O O K A G E N C Y  
P arap  S h o p p in g  C en tre , Darw in, N .T.
C O L L IN S  B O O K  D EP O T  P TY . LT D .
M onash U n ivers ity , W ellington Road, C layto n , ViC- 
C O L L IN S  B O O K D EP O T  P TY . LTD .
3 63  Sw an ston  Street, M elbourne, Vic.
T H E  U N IV E R S IT Y  B O O K S H O P . N ed lan d s, W .A.
U N IV E R S IT Y  BO O KRO O M
U n ivers ity  of M elbourne, P arkville  N .2 , Vic.
U N IV E R S IT Y  C O -O P E R A T IV E  B O O K S H O P  L IM IT ED  
M anning R oad, U n ivers ity  of Syd n ey, N .S.W .
NEW Z E A L A N D :
G O V ER N M EN T P R IN T IN G  O F F IC E
Private Bag, W ellington (and G overnm ent B o o ksh o p s m
A u cklan d , C h ristc h u rch  and D un ed in).
W E S T  I N D I E S
BERMUDA: BERMUDA BOOK STORES
R eid  and B u rn ab y Streets, H am ilton.
B R IT IS H  G U IA N A : B O O K E R S  S T O R E S , LTD .
2 0-2 3  Ch u rch  S treet, Georgetow n.
CU R A fjA O , N .W .I.:
B O E K H A N D E L  S A L A S , P.-O. B ox 4 4 .
JA M A IC A : S A N G S T E R S  B O O K ROOM 
91 Harb ou r Street, K in g sto n .
T R IN ID A D  AND T O B A G O :
C A M P B E L L  B O O K E R  LT D ., Port of S p a in .
164E1)
U nited  Natio'ns p u b licatio n s  m ay be p u rc h a se d  or ord ered  from  b o o kse lle rs  th ro u gh o u t the w orld an d pa id  for in local cu rre n cy . For fu rth er in fo rm atio n  w rite to 
.United N atio n s, S a le s  S e ctio n , New Yo rk, N. Y, 1 0 0 1 7 , or to U nited N a tio n s, S a le s  Se ctio n , P a la is  des N atio n s, G en eva, Sw itze rla n d .
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